Are go/no-go tasks preferable to two-choice tasks in response time experiments with older adults?

Recent research has shown that, in response time (RT) tasks, the go/no-go response procedure produces faster (and less noisy) RTs and fewer errors than the two-choice response procedure in children, although these differences are substantially smaller in college-aged adults. Here we examined whether the go/no-go procedure can be preferred to the two-choice procedure in RT experiments with older adults (i.e. another population with slower and more error-prone responding than college-aged individuals). To that end, we compared these response procedures in two experiments with older adults (M_age?=?83 years): a visual word recognition task (lexical decision) and a perceptual task (numerosity discrimination). A group of young adults (M_age?=?31 years) served as a control. In the lexical decision experiment, results showed a go/no-go advantage in the mean RTs and in the error rates for words; however, this was not accompanied by less noisy RT data. The magnitude of the word-frequency effect was similar in the two response procedures. The numerosity discrimination experiment did not reveal any clear differences across response procedures, except that the RTs were noisier in the go/no-go procedure. Therefore, we found no compelling reasons why the go/no-go procedure should be preferred over the two-choice procedure in RT experiments with older adults.     

Intelligence analysts’ strategies for solving analytic tasks

Analytic performance may be assessed by the nature of the process applied to intelligence tasks and analysts are expected to use a “critical” or deliberative mindset. However, there is little research on how analysts do their work. We report the findings of a quantitative survey of 113 intelligence analysts who were asked to report how often they would apply strategies involving more or less critical thinking when performing representative tasks along the analytic workflow. Analysts reported using “deliberative” strategies significantly more often than “intuitive” ones when capturing customer requirements, processing data, and communicating conclusions. Years of experience working in the intelligence community, skill level, analytic thinking training, and time spent working collaboratively (opposed to individually) were largely unrelated to reported strategy use. We discuss the implications of these findings for both improving intelligence analysis and developing an evidence-based approach to policy and practice in this domain.     

Is speech alignment to talkers or tasks?

Speech alignment, or the tendency of individuals to subtly imitate each other’s speaking styles, is often assessed by comparing a subject’s baseline and shadowed utterances to a model’s utterances, often through perceptual ratings. These types of comparisons provide information about the occurrence of a change in subject’s speech, but they do not indicate that this change is toward the specific shadowed model. In three experiments, we investigated whether alignment is specific to a shadowed model. Experiment 1 involved the classic baseline-to-shadowed comparison, to confirm that subjects did, in fact, sound more like their model when they shadowed, relative to any preexisting similarities between a subject and a model. Experiment 2 tested whether subjects’ utterances sounded more similar to the model whom they had shadowed or to another, unshadowed model. In Experiment 3, we examined whether subjects’ utterances sounded more similar to the model whom they had shadowed or to another subject who had shadowed a different model. The results of all experiments revealed that subjects sounded more similar to the model whom they had shadowed. This suggests that shadowing-based speech alignment is not just a change, but a change in the direction of the shadowed model, specifically.     

Why does language interfere with vision-based tasks?

Conversation with a remote person can interfere with performing vision-based tasks. Two experiments tested the role of general executive resources and spatial attentional resources in this interference. Both experiments assessed performance in vision-based tasks as participants engaged in a language task involving a virtual remote speaker. In both experiments, the language task interfered with the vision task more when participants were speaking or planning what to say next than when they were listening. In Experiment 1, speaking or planning what to say next were also associated with higher interference from a visual distractor than listening, indicating that preparing to speak and speaking pose higher executive requirements than listening. In both experiments, localizing the voice of the remote speaker to the front of participants slightly reduced interference in comparison to other directions. This suggests that remote conversation requires spatial attention resources for representing the position of the remote person.     

Rules-plus-exception tasks: A problem for exemplar models?

Erickson and Kruschke (2002b) have shown that human subjects generalize category knowledge in a rule-like fashion when exposed to a rule-plus-exception categorization task. This result has remained a challenge to exemplar models of category learning. We show that these models can account for such performance, if they are augmented with exemplar-specific specificity or exemplar-specific attention. This result, however, is only achieved if the choice rule that converts evidence for competing categories into probabilities is sensitive to small differences between evidence values close to 0. Exemplar-specific attention provided the best overall approximation of the data. Exemplar-specific specificity provided a slightly worse approximation, but it predicted better the rule-like generalization pattern observed.     

Extraversion and performance in ‘extra-sensory perception’ tasks

English-language reports on the relationship between extraversion and performance in extra-sensory perception tasks are reviewed. Data reported show that significant confirmations of a positive relationship occur at over six times the chance error rate whilst only one significant reversal of the effect is to be found. It is suggested that this consistency in the experimental reports reflects a real positive relationship between the two variables. Possible mechanisms underlyinf the effect are discussed and suggestions for studying them are made with an emphasis on improvement of methodology.     

Commission errors in delay–execute prospective memory tasks

Individuals frequently retrieve an intention, but the execution of the task needs to be delayed due to ongoing task demands - so-called delay-execute prospective memory (PM) tasks. We investigated commission errors in the delay-execute paradigm. Participants were told that a PM task is finished (PM task has been executed and is now finished for a final phase) or cancelled (PM task has been cancelled immediately after introduction). We observed commission errors and ongoing task performance in the final phase which included several irrelevant PM cues. In two experiments, we observed significantly more commission errors for cancelled compared to the finished intentions. In Experiment 2, commission errors were eliminated if the final phase required divided attention, regardless of PM task status. In addition, we observed significantly more PM cue interference on the ongoing task in the cancelled compared to the finished group, indicating that the PM task was retrieved in the cancelled group but not in the finished group. As retrieval and execution of the PM task were separated by a delay, the results indicate that commission errors are not always the result of a quick, spontaneous retrieval-execution sequence and may also occur when retrieval and execution are temporally separated.     

Who is susceptible in three false memory tasks?

ABSTRACT

Decades of research show that people are susceptible to developing false memories. But if they do so in one task, are they likely to do so in a different one? The answer: “No”. In the current research, a large number of participants took part in three well-established false memory paradigms (a misinformation task, the Deese-Roediger-McDermott [DRM] list learning paradigm, and an imagination inflation exercise) as well as completed several individual difference measures. Results indicate that many correlations between false memory variables in all three inter-paradigm comparisons are null, though some small, positive, significant correlations emerged. Moreover, very few individual difference variables significantly correlated with false memories, and any significant correlations were rather small. It seems likely, therefore, that there is no false memory “trait”. In other words, no one type of person seems especially prone, or especially resilient, to the ubiquity of memory distortion.     

Why do categorization effects occur in comparative judgment tasks?

Three experiments were conducted to understand what eliminates the symbolic distance effect for reaction times (RTs) when subjects learn that items belong to categories. Artificial city locations were judged, and artificial states served as categories. In Experiment 1, whether or not categories were presented and the amount of categorization practice were manipulated. Only those subjects who had practice categorizing cities into states showed a reduced symbolic distance effect for different-state pairs. Analyses of serial position curves indicated that categorization produced faster RTs to different-as compared with their adjacent same-state pairs and it also produced faster RTs for same-state pairs closer to the category border. The border seems to serve as an anchor and facilitates RTs. In Experiments 2a and 2b, distance judgments were made by subjects who either had or had not categorized artificial cities into states. Subjects who learned categories gave larger estimates of distance between cities belonging to different states than to cities belonging to the same state. Categorization seemed to place cities from different states farther apart in psychological space, making their locations more discriminable. This, along with the use of the category border as an anchor, might explain why categorization effects occur in this location judgment task.     

Does the brain consume additional glucose during self-control tasks?

A currently popular model of self-control posits that the exertion of self-control relies on a resource, which is expended by acts of self-control, resulting in less of this resource being available for subsequent acts of self-control. Recently, glucose has been proposed as the resource in question. For this model to be correct, it must be the case that A) performing a self-control task reduces glucose levels relative to a control task and B) performing a self-control task reduces glucose relative to pre-task levels. Evidence from neurophysiology suggests that (A) is unlikely to be true, and the evidence surrounding (B) is mixed, and is unlikely to be true for subjects who have not recently fasted. From the standpoint of evolved function, glucose might better be thought of as an input to decision making systems rather than as a constraint on performance.     

‘Random’ saccadic eye movements during verbal-linguistic and visual-imaginal tasks

Previous research has suggested that questions eliciting visual imagery are associated with lower rates of saccadic eye movements as compared to questions eliciting verbal processes. Two experiments reported here examined the roles of external visual stimulation and speech output in this effect. In both experiments, questions designed to elicit verbal-linguistic or visual-imaginal processing, and which required either syntactically complex or simple responses, were administered while eye movements were recorded by electrooculography. In experiment 1, 42 subjects responded while viewing either the interviewer's face or a gray oval on a video monitor. Imaginal questions elicited a lower rate of eye movements than did verbal questions regardless of the display on the monitor. In experiment 2, 17 subjects responded in conditions of light and darkness. Imaginal questions elicited lower rates of eye movements in both light and dark. Neither cognitive mode nor speech output requirements interacted with stimulus conditions in either experiment. The failure of visual conditions to influence the verbal-imaginal difference in eye movement rate is viewed as inconsistent with a visual interference interpretation of the relationship of eye movements to cognitive activity. Alternate interpretations are discussed.     

Can task modifications influence children's performance on false belief tasks?

Theory of mind (ToM) is commonly measured in young children by the false belief task. Many researchers claim that 3-year-olds' failure on false belief tasks is due to task constraints. Experiment 1 empirically tested the claim made by Wellman, Cross, and Watson (2001 Wellman, H. M., Cross, D. and Watson, J. 2001. Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72: 655–684. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), that even when variables that enhance performance on the false belief task (deception; participation in transformation; salience; and item not real and present) are included in one task, 3-year-olds will still fail to perform above chance level. On the standard task 4-year-olds did perform significantly better than 3-year-olds, although there was no significant difference on the adapted task. Compared to the standard task, 3-year-olds performed better on the adapted task, although this improvement was not significant and performance was still not above chance level. Experiment 2 examined the influence of two additional variables; presence of protagonist at the time when the false belief question is asked, and the order in which test questions are asked (memory preceding false belief or vice versa). Results found no significant effects of either presence of the protagonist or question order on the performance of participants. Results are discussed with reference to reasons behind the failure of some children on false belief tasks.     

Importance effects on performance in event‐based prospective memory tasks

In the present study we manipulated the importance of performing two event‐based prospective memory tasks. In Experiment 1, the event‐based task was assumed to rely on relatively automatic processes, whereas in Experiment 2 the event‐based task was assumed to rely on a more demanding monitoring process. In contrast to the first experiment, the second experiment showed that importance had a positive effect on prospective memory performance. In addition, the occurrence of an importance effect on prospective memory performance seemed to be mainly due to the features of the prospective memory task itself, and not to the characteristics of the ongoing tasks that only influenced the size of the importance effect. The results suggest that importance instructions may improve prospective memory if the prospective task requires the strategic allocation of attentional monitoring resources.     

Does “inhibition of return” occur in discrimination tasks?

When attention is drawn to a location and then withdrawn, responding to a stimulus at that location may be slower than to one at a new location. This “inhibition of return” (IOR) has not been reliably demonstrated in tasks that require discrimination of targets from nontargets. The present experiments replicated IOR in detection and localization tasks only when target/nontarget discrimination was not also required. When discrimination was required, a consistent samelocation advantage occurred for repeated targets. Changed targets may, however, induce a bias toward opposite responses. The results cast doubt on IOR as a general attentional phenomenon.     

What do children with autism attend to during imitation tasks?

Individuals with autism show a complex profile of differences in imitative ability, including a general deficit in precision of imitating another’s actions and special difficulty in imitating nonmeaningful gestures relative to meaningful actions on objects. Given that they also show atypical patterns of visual attention when observing social stimuli, we investigated whether possible differences in visual attention when observing an action to be imitated may contribute to imitative difficulties in autism in both nonmeaningful gestures and meaningful actions on objects. Results indicated that (a) a group of 18 high-functioning 8- to 15-year-olds with autistic disorder, in comparison with a matched group of 13 typically developing children, showed similar patterns of visual attention to the demonstrator’s action but decreased attention to his face when observing a model to be imitated; (b) nonmeaningful gestures and meaningful actions on objects triggered distinct visual attention patterns that did not differ between groups; (c) the autism group demonstrated reduced imitative precision for both types of imitation; and (d) duration of visual attention to the demonstrator’s action was related to imitation precision for nonmeaningful gestures in the autism group.     

Chinese kindergartners’ automatic processing of numerical magnitude in Stroop-like tasks

Using Stroop-like tasks, this study examined whether Chinese kindergartners showed automatic processing of numerical magnitude. A total of 36 children (mean age 5 5 years 10 months) were asked to perform physical size comparison (i.e., “Which of two numbers is bigger in physical size?”) and numerical magnitude tasks (i.e., “Which of two numbers is bigger in numerical magnitude?”) on 216 number pairs. These number pairs varied in levels of congruence between numerical magnitude and physical size (for Stroop effect) and numerical distance (for distance effect). On the basis of analyses of response time and error rates, we found that Chinese kindergartners showed automatic processing of numerical magnitude. These results are significantly different from previous studies’ findings about the onset age (ranging from around the end of first grade to third grade) for automatic processing of numerical magnitude.     

How do young children determine location? Evidence from disorientation tasks

Previous studies show that following disorientation children use the geometry of an enclosed space to locate an object hidden in one of the corners [e.g. (Hermer, L., & Spelke, E. (1996). Modularity and development: A case of spatial reorientation. Cognition, 61, 195-232)]. These studies have used a disorientation procedure that involves rotating the viewer (with eyes closed). Here, we examine 18- to 25-month-olds' spatial coding in two disorientation tasks--involving either viewer or space rotation. Importantly, the rotational movements in both tasks could not be visually tracked. Children were tested in either task (viewer- or space-movement) from either inside or outside a triangular (isosceles) space (with one unique and two equivalent corners). In the viewer-movement task, performance was above chance, regardless of which corner contained the object. In the space-movement task, performance was above chance at only the unique corner. On both tasks, performance was better from inside the space than from outside. The implications for how children determine location are discussed.     

Salience drives non-spatial feature repetition effects in cueing tasks

In an exogenous cueing task repeating a non-spatial feature can benefit performance if the feature is task-relevant to a discrimination response. Previous studies reporting this effect have used complex displays. In the current study, we look at the generalizability of this effect, by extending it to a simple exogenous cueing paradigm in which the cue and target displays each consist of single-object onsets. We also investigate the influence of task-relevant and irrelevant features independently within the same experiment. Consistent with previous studies, we find non-spatial feature repetition benefits in all three experiments. Importantly, and unlike previous studies, we find that the most salient, rather than the task-relevant, feature drives the non-spatial feature repetition benefit. Furthermore, in addition to the previously observed non-spatial feature repetition benefits, we also found a spatially specific feature repetition benefit. We argue that these new findings are consistent with habituation accounts of attentional cueing effects.     

Restrained eating: Mediator of gender differences on cognitive restructuring tasks?

This study examined the hypothesis that gender differences in eating restraint might mediate previously reported gender differences in cognitive restructuring tasks. Thirty female and 30 male college students matched for dietary restraint were administered two tests that had differentiated females from males and obese from normal-weight individuals in previous research: Luchins' water jar problems, and the Embedded Figures Test. On the water jar problems, use of the initial solution when no longer most efficient was greater for restrained eaters than for unrestrained eaters and no gender differences were found, supporting the hypothesis. On the Embedded Figures Test, males performed better than females, with restrained females tending to perform most poorly.Portions of this paper were presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, May 1985.