Information learned from generic language becomes central to children’s biological concepts: Evidence from their open-ended explanations

Generic sentences (e.g., “Snakes have holes in their teeth”) convey that a property (e.g., having holes in one’s teeth) is true of a category (e.g., snakes). We test the hypothesis that, in addition to this basic aspect of their meaning, generic sentences also imply that the information they express is more conceptually central than the information conveyed in similar non-generic sentences (e.g., “This snake has holes in his teeth”). To test this hypothesis, we elicited 4- and 5-year-old children’s open-ended explanations for generic and non-generic versions of the same novel properties. Based on arguments in the categorization literature, we assumed that, relative to more peripheral properties, properties that are understood as conceptually central would be explained more often as causes and less often as effects of other features, behaviors, or processes. Two experiments confirmed the prediction that preschool-age children construe novel information learned from generics as more conceptually central than the same information learned from non-generics. Additionally, Experiment 2 suggested that the conceptual status of novel properties learned from generic sentences becomes similar to that of familiar properties that are already at the category core. These findings illustrate the power of generic language to shape children’s concepts.     

概称句推理与排序

概称句推理可分为主要通过演绎方式的和主要通过归纳方式的。对于演绎方式进行的推理又可根据研究关注点的不同分为结论是事实句的推理和结论是概称旬的推理。由于概称句的作用,这三种类型的推理都是非单调推理。通过分别的考察,本文指出,这三种类型的概称句推理要想真正得以刻画,都需要引入前提集的排序的概念。进而,排序将是融合这三种类型推理的纽带。     

This cat has nine lives? Children's memory for genericity in language

Generic noun phrases ("Birds lay eggs") are important for expressing knowledge about abstract kinds. The authors hypothesized that genericity would be part of gist memory, such that young children would appropriately recall whether sentences were presented as generic or specific. In 4 experiments, preschoolers and college students (N = 280) heard a series of sentences in either generic form (e.g., "Bears climb trees") or specific form (e.g., "This bear climbs trees") and were asked to recall the sentences following a 4-min distractor task. Participants in all age groups correctly distinguished between generic and specific noun phrases (NPs) in their recall, even when forgetting the details of the NP form. Memory for predicate content (e.g., "climb trees") was largely unaffected by genericity, although memory for category labels (e.g., "bear") was at times better for those who heard sentences with generic wording. Overall, these results suggest that generic form is maintained in long-term memory even for young children and thus may serve as the foundation for constructing knowledge about kinds.     

Generic statements require little evidence for acceptance but have powerful implications

Generic statements (e.g., "Birds lay eggs") express generalizations about categories. In this paper, we hypothesized that there is a paradoxical asymmetry at the core of generic meaning, such that these sentences have extremely strong implications but require little evidence to be judged true. Four experiments confirmed the hypothesized asymmetry: Participants interpreted novel generics such as "Lorches have purple feathers" as referring to nearly all lorches, but they judged the same novel generics to be true given a wide range of prevalence levels (e.g., even when only 10% or 30% of lorches had purple feathers). A second hypothesis, also confirmed by the results, was that novel generic sentences about dangerous or distinctive properties would be more acceptable than generic sentences that were similar but did not have these connotations. In addition to clarifying important aspects of generics' meaning, these findings are applicable to a range of real-world processes such as stereotyping and political discourse.     

基于同义关联的句子错误记忆：发展性逆转现象及句式效应

以汉语把字句和被字句为材料,采用学习-再认方式,考察基于同义关联的句子错误记忆及其发展性逆转现象和句式效应。实验1结果发现高二和初二校正后的关键诱饵句错误再认率显著高于小学五年级,把字关键诱饵句校正后的错误再认率显著高于被字句,表明基于同义关联的句子错误记忆存在发展性逆转现象和句式效应。实验2结果发现三个年级关键诱饵句与无关句的错误再认率差异均不显著,表明去除同义关联后,句子错误记忆现象被抑制。结果表明,同义关联能诱发句子错误记忆,且句子错误记忆存在发展性逆转现象和句式效应。     

Preschool children's use of cues to generic meaning

Sentences that refer to categories - generic sentences (e.g., "Dogs are friendly") - are frequent in speech addressed to young children and constitute an important means of knowledge transmission. However, detecting generic meaning may be challenging for young children, since it requires attention to a multitude of morphosyntactic, semantic, and pragmatic cues. The first three experiments tested whether 3- and 4-year-olds use (a) the immediate linguistic context, (b) their previous knowledge, and (c) the social context to determine whether an utterance with ambiguous scope (e.g., "They are afraid of mice", spoken while pointing to 2 birds) is generic. Four-year-olds were able to take advantage of all the cues provided, but 3-year-olds were sensitive only to the first two. In Experiment 4, we tested the relative strength of linguistic-context cues and previous-knowledge cues by putting them in conflict; in this task, 4-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, preferred to base their interpretations on the explicit noun phrase cues from the linguistic context. These studies indicate that, from early on, children can use contextual and semantic information to construe sentences as generic, thus taking advantage of the category knowledge conveyed in these sentences.     

Types,Tokens, and Talk about Musical Works

It has recently been suggested that the type/token theorist concerning musical works cannot come up with an adequate semantic theory of those sentences in which we purport to talk about such works. Specifically, it has been claimed that, since types are abstract entities, a type/token theorist can only account for the truth of sentences such as “The 1812 Overture is very loud” and “Bach's Two Part Invention in C has an F‐sharp in its fourth measure” by adopting an untenable semantic claim: namely, that the predicates in such sentences, once applied to musical works, undergo a systematic shift in their meanings. This article is a sustained explanation of why our talk about musical works in fact provides no problem for the type/token theorist. First, we demonstrate that the aforementioned “meaning shift” approach to the sentences’ predicates is well motivated and very credible. Second, we explain how the type/token theorist can adopt the best available version of an alternative, generic quantificational approach to such sentences. Third, we establish that other semantic theories, presented as undermining the type/token theory by giving us a reason for adopting eliminativism about types, are much less theoretically virtuous than the two theories that a type/token theorist can freely adopt.     

Semantic emphasis in causal sentences

A shift in emphasis can change the truth-value of a singular causal sentence. This poses a challenge to the view that singular sentences predicate a relation. I argue that emphasized causal sentences conjoin predication of a causal relation between events with predication of a relation of causal relevance between states of affairs (or perhaps facts). This is superior to the treatments of such sentences offered by Achinstein, Dretske, Kim, Sanford, Bennett, and Levin. My proposal affords clarity regarding logical structure, at least at a certain level of detail. It makes the relation between the content of an emphasized causal sentence and the unemphasized version clear. It answers some questions about the ontological requirements of the truth of emphasized causal sentences, without introducing new entities (as do some other accounts) or unacceptable consequences for identity and individuation of events.     

Relevance differently affects the truth,acceptability, and probability evaluations of “and”, “but”, “therefore”, and “if–then”

In this study, we investigate the influence of reason-relation readings of indicative conditionals and “and”/“but”/“therefore” sentences on various cognitive assessments. According to the Frege–Grice tradition, a dissociation is expected. Specifically, differences in the reason-relation reading of these sentences should affect participants’ evaluations of their acceptability but not of their truth value. In two experiments we tested this assumption by introducing a relevance manipulation into the truth-table task as well as in other tasks assessing the participants’ acceptability and probability evaluations. Across the two experiments, a strong dissociation was found. The reason-relation reading of all four sentences strongly affected their probability and acceptability evaluations, but hardly affected their respective truth evaluations. Implications of this result for recent work on indicative conditionals are discussed.     

Object specificity and personal relevance in long-term visual remembering

The personal relevance of an object is multi-faceted, each facet being capable of contributing to the effects on object memory attributed to personal relevance. An object's status as an individual object (object specificity), rather than just a category of object, is one such facet and its impact on the long-term visual remembering of everyday objects is assessed in two experiments. Images and drawings were produced under generic (e.g., “Please draw a bed”) and personal exemplar (e.g., “Please draw your bed”) instructions, and participants indicated the degree to which the image on which their drawing was based was of a specific object or a generic object. Object specificity induced a sense of time and place for a remembered object, the most recent encounter with the object being most salient. Other aspects of personal relevance collectively facilitated the retrieval of an object's category-irrelevant features (thereby increasing the vividness of the object image), the other objects with which it was seen, and a more general episodic sense of place. Against a broader theoretical perspective, it is proposed that visual episodic memory and visual knowledge are primary sources of information for specific personally relevant objects and generic objects, respectively.     

Laws, Regularities and Exceptions

Sentences of the form ' F s are G s' can express laws of nature, weaker Special Science laws, and also regularities which are not a part of any explicit science. These so-called generic sentences express nomic relationships which may have exceptions. I discuss the kinds of regularities expressed by generic sentences and argue that since they play a similar role in determining our ability to categorise and reason about the world, we should look for a unified treatment of them.     

A Generic Framework for Adaptive Vague Logics

In this paper, we present a generic format for adaptive vague logics. Logics based on this format are able to (1) identify sentences as vague or non-vague in light of a given set of premises, and to (2) dynamically adjust the possible set of inferences in accordance with these identifications, i.e. sentences that are identified as vague allow only for the application of vague inference rules and sentences that are identified as non-vague also allow for the application of some extra set of classical logic rules. The generic format consists of a set of minimal criteria that must be satisfied by the vague logic in casu in order to be usable as a basis for an adaptive vague logic. The criteria focus on the way in which the logic deals with a special ⊡-operator. Depending on the kind of logic for vagueness that is used as a basis for the adaptive vague logic, this operator can be interpreted as completely true, definitely true, clearly true, etc. It is proven that a wide range of famous logics for vagueness satisfies these criteria when extended with a specific ⊡-operator, e.g. fuzzy basic logic and its well known extensions, cf. [7], super- and subvaluationist logics, cf. [6], [9], and clarity logic, cf. [13]. Also a fuzzy logic is presented that can be used for an adaptive vague logic that can deal with higher-order vagueness. To illustrate the theory, some toy-examples of adaptive vague proofs are provided.     

高功能孤独症者非字面语义理解缺陷：隐喻视角的ERP研究

研究采用事件相关电位技术从隐喻语义理解角度考察了高功能孤独症成人非字面语义理解中的行为特点及脑半球参与模式。行为结果显示：高功能孤独症成人对新异隐喻句的反应时最长,两类隐喻句的反应时均长于普通成人,但错误率上两组被试间无差异。脑电结果显示：高功能孤独症组对新异隐喻句的N400波幅最大,未出现半球偏侧化现象,传统隐喻句在左半球的N400波幅大于右半球,两类隐喻句的N400波幅均大于正常被试。结论：高功能孤独症成人具备隐喻理解能力,并对新异隐喻的理解做出更多努力,但右脑功能异常仍旧存在,左右半球在总体功能或神经联通性上仍旧弱于常人。     

Use of nonsexist pronouns as a function of one's feminist orientation

Subjects of both sexes were shown several sentences that contained a blank space where a third-person singular pronoun should be, and were asked to indicate what pronoun they would choose to complete the sentence. Some sentences referred to traditionally masculine positions (e.g., lawyer), some referred to traditionally feminine positions (e.g., secretary), and some referred to positions with generic titles (e.g., spokesman). As hypothesized, subjects with high scores on Spence and Helmreich's (1972) Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS) chose nonsexist pronouns more frequently on all three types of sentences than did subjects with low AWS scores. Less feminist trends in the subjects' pronoun choices are discussed.     

Generic pronouns and sexist language: The oxymoronic character of masculine generics

This experiment investigated the propensity of the generic he to evoke images of males relative to he/she and the plural they. Undergraduates read sentences aloud and verbally described the images that came to mind. The results provide strong support for the hypothesis that the generic he evokes a disproportionate number of male images. Results also suggest that while the plural they functions as a generic pronoun for both males and females, males may comprehend he/she in a manner similar to he. Theoretical implications for a critique of sexist language and prescribing generic pronoun usage are considered.     

The role of pragmatic principles in resolving attachment ambiguities: Evidence from eye movements

In an eyetracking experiment, participants read sentences that contained a prepositional phrase (PP) that could be attached to one of two preceding verbs. To understand the sentence, readers had to select which verb would serve as the host for the PP. In some of the sentences, the critical verbs and the PPs were part of a subordinate clause in which lexical and syntactic factors were expected to matter, but discourse factors favoring attachment of the material to positions where it would be relevant to the main assertion of the sentence were not expected to matter. In other sentences, the critical material was tested in main clause contexts in which the main assertion principle was predicted to apply. Hierarchical linear modeling showed that online attachment preferences were affected by clause type (main vs. subordinate). Specifically, the preference for a local verb over a distant verb was greater when the critical material appeared within a subordinate clause than when it appeared within a main clause. This pattern of results can be explained by the operation of the relativized relevance or main assertion principle, which in our sentences meant that participants favored attachment of the PP to the first verb over the second.     

Closed-class immanence in sentence production

The closed-class hypothesis asserts that function words play a privileged role in syntactic processes. In language production, the claim is that such words are intrinsic to, identified with, or immanent in phrasal skeletons. Two experiments tested this hypothesis with a syntactic priming procedure. In both, subjects tended to produce utterances in the same syntactic forms as priming sentences, with the structures of the self-generated sentences varying as a function of differences in the structures of the primes. Changes in the closed-class elements of the priming sentences had no effect on this tendency over and above the impact of the structural changes. These results suggest that free-standing closed-class morphemes are not inherent components of the structural frames of English sentences.