The Political Relevance of Emotions: “Reassessing” Revisited

Ladd and Lenz (2008 ) question a central claim of affective intelligence theory (AIT), namely that anxiety affects political judgments indirectly by reducing the role of predispositions and increasing the role of contemporary information. They claim that alternative hypotheses, especially the notion that emotions are simply rationalizations of political preferences, better explain the role of emotion in politics. Their ultimate conclusions, however, rest on an overly narrow view of both theory and evidence. Even if one accepts Ladd and Lenz's reanalysis of survey data, there is insufficient evidence to cast aside either AIT or the hypothesis that anxiety affects the mode of political judgment. AIT explains a broad range of political relationships that are unchallenged by the reassessment and which cannot be explained by the offered alternatives. Moreover, numerous experimental studies reject the alternative explanations in favor of an exogenous, often interactive role for anxiety. AIT will surely require amendment, if not abandonment, someday. Competing theories of emotion already exist and, unlike the alternative championed by Ladd and Lenz, these theories too suggest a meaningful role for emotion in political judgment and behavior. For now, given all of the research to date, AIT is a robust competitor, scarcely in need of being “salvaged.” Burgeoning research on the political relevance of emotions will benefit from further debates, replications, and extensions, as long as new claims and evidence are put in proper perspective.     

Does Anxiety Improve Voters' Decision Making?

Affective Intelligence (AI) theory proposes to answer a fundamental question about democracy: how it succeeds even though most citizens pay little attention to politics. AI contends that, when circumstances generate sufficient anxiety, citizens make informed and thoughtful political decisions. In Ladd and Lenz (2008 ), we showed that two simpler depictions of anxiety's role can explain the vote interactions that apparently support AI. Here, we again replicate Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen's (2000 )'s voting model, which they contend supports AI, and again show that it is vulnerable to these alternative explanations, regardless of how candidate choice is measured. We also briefly review the broader literature and discuss Brader's (2005, 2006 ) important experimental results. Although the literature undoubtedly supports other aspects of AI, few studies directly test AI's voting claims, which were the focus of our reassessment. In our view, the only study that does so while ruling out the two alternatives is our analysis of the 1980 ANES Major Panel ( Ladd & Lenz, 2008 ), which finds no support for AI, but ample support for the alternatives. None of the responses to Ladd and Lenz (2008 ) addresses these findings. Overall, evidence that anxiety helps solve the problem of voter competence remains sparse and vulnerable to alternative explanations.     

Mood and Emotions in Small Groups and Work Teams

Affective influences abound in groups. In this article we propose an organizing model for understanding these affective influences and their effects on group life. We begin with individual-level affective characteristics that members bring to their groups: moods, emotions, sentiments, and emotional intelligence. These affective characteristics then combine to form a group's affective composition. We discuss explicit and implicit processes through which this affective combination occurs by examining the research on emotional contagion, entrainment, modeling, and the manipulation of affect. We also explore how elements of the affective context, such as organizationwide emotion norms and the group's particular emotional history, may serve to constrain or amplify group members' emotions. The outcome, group emotion, results from the combination of the group's affective composition and the affective context in which the group is behaving. Last, we focus on the important interaction between nonaffective factors and affective factors in group life and suggest a possible agenda for future research.     

The arousal model of moral condemnation

Previous research regarding the affective correlates of moral judgment has emphasized that this relation is rooted in the natural properties of discrete emotions, suggesting that specific emotions (e.g., disgust) increase moral condemnations for specific categories of moral violation (e.g. purity violations). In three experiments, we find that arousal increases the severity of moral condemnations, while emotion specificity effects remain absent. Results are compatible with constructivist approaches to emotion and the feelings as information account of social judgment.     

Walton's Quasi‐Emotions Do Not Go Away

The debate about how to solve the paradox of fiction has largely been a debate between Kendall Walton and the so‐called thought theorists. In recent years, however, Jenefer Robinson has argued, based on her affective appraisal theory of emotion, for a noncognitivist solution to the paradox as an alternative to the thought theorists’ solution and especially to Walton's controversial solution. In this article, I argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, Robinson's affective appraisal theory is compatible with Walton's solution, at the core of which lies the thesis that there are quasi‐emotions. Moreover, since Robinson's theory is compatible with Walton's solution, I show how it can be used as a model to empirically test whether quasi‐emotions exist.     

Child and family correlates of toddlers' emotional and behavioral responses to a mishap

This study evaluated the unique and joint contributions of internal state language, externalizing behavior, and maternal talk about emotions to the prediction of toddlers' empathy‐related responsiveness. The empathy‐based guilt reactions of 47 toddlers (27 boys) were observed in response to distress that they thought they had caused. In addition, mothers reported on the children's internal state language, externalizing behavior, and empathy‐based guilt. In a separate observation, the mothers discussed emotional expressions with their children, and the functional significance of their emotional discourse was considered. Results revealed that toddlers' internal state language ability was positively related to their attempts to comprehend another's affective state and to maternal reports of children's sympathy reactions. There was also an unexpected inverse relation between externalizing behavior and arousal level. In terms of the parent measures, maternal explanations of emotions were positively related to children's attempts to comprehend another's affective state, whereas mothers' directives for children to label emotions were positively related to children's expressed emotional concern for others. The implications of these findings for understanding empathy and guilt development in young children are discussed. ©2003 Michigan Association for Infant Mental Health.     

Toward an Integrative Perspective on Distinct Positive Emotions for Political Action: Analyzing,Comparing, Evaluating,and Synthesizing Three Theoretical Perspectives

Which emotions explain why people engage in political action (e.g., voting, protesting)? To answer this question, theory and research in psychology and political science predominantly focused on distinct negative emotions such as anger. The current article conceptually explores the motivational potential of distinct positive emotions by developing an integrative perspective that specifies which positive emotions can be differentiated (i.e., their form), which function these emotions have, and which implications these have for explaining political action. To this end, I analyze, compare, evaluate, and synthesize three approaches to positive emotions (affective intelligence theory, appraisal theories of emotion, and broaden-and-build theory). This perspective generates new hypotheses for the field to test, including the role played by distinct positive emotions such as joy, inspiration, interest, hope, and pride in motivating political action. I discuss how this perspective may help restore a balance in research on emotions and political action by focusing on the motivational potential of distinct positive emotions.     

The Emotional Foundation of Political Cognition: The Impact of Extrinsic Anxiety on the Formation of Political Tolerance Judgments

Common sense recognizes emotion's ability to influence judgments. We argue that affective processes, in addition to generating feeling states, also influence how political cognition is manifested. Drawing on the theory of affective intelligence, we examine the role that anxiety plays in how and when people rely on predispositions and when they rely on contemporaneous information in making political tolerance judgments. We report on two experimental studies to test our arguments. In the first study we find that extrinsic anxiety generates a resistance response among subjects who hold a strong predisposition and a receptive response among those who do not. In the second study we present subjects with explicit "frames" exposing them to a pro- or anti-free speech message. We find that extrinsic anxiety enhances responsiveness to frames while an absence of anxiety diminishes the impact of these frames. Taken together these results show that affective processes shape how people make political judgments.     

The Place of Emotion in Stories Told by Children: An Exploratory Study

This study explored the relationship between developmental changes in children's understanding of emotions and their use of affective content (Wilkinson, Barnsley, Hanna, & Swan, 1980) and affective structure (Brewer & Lichtenstein, 1982) in the production of stories. We hypothesized that children with an advanced understanding of emotions would make more use of both affective content and affective structure. This relationship was found only for affective content, which was more advanced in girls than boys. Affective structure did not relate to affective understanding or sex but, rather, to verbal intelligence. The implications of these results for the part played by psychological processes in children's story telling are discussed.     

Disgust,Harm, and Morality in Politics

This study experimentally tests a theoretical framework for moral judgment in politics, which integrates two research traditions, Domain‐Theory and Sentimentalism, to suggest that moral judgment is bidimensional, with one dimension pertaining to harm and the other to moral emotions. Two experiments demonstrate that priming harm associations and the moral emotion of disgust prior to a political issue facilitates moral conviction on the political issue as well as a harsher moral judgment compared to no‐prime and to nonmoral emotional and cognitive negative primes (sadness and damage to objects). In addition, harm cues and disgust, but not sadness or damage, interact with the preexisting attitude toward the political issue in affecting moral conviction.     

Children's understanding of counterfactual emotions: Age differences,individual differences,and the effects of counterfactual‐information salience

The present study investigated developmental trends in the effects of the salience of counterfactual alternatives on judgments of others' counterfactual‐thinking‐based emotions. We also examined possible correlates of individual differences in the understanding of these emotions. Thirty‐four adults and 102 children, 5–8 years of age, were presented scenarios in which characters would be expected to experience regret. In one version of each scenario, the regret‐relevant counterfactual alternative was made more salient than was the case with the other version. Adults consistently judged that a character for whom a counterfactual course of events would have resulted in a better outcome would feel worse than a character for whom an alternative course of events would not have resulted in a more positive outcome. The majority of the children's judgments were not affected by the counterfactual alternatives. However, the judgments of the oldest children (the 8‐year‐olds) were significantly more adult‐like in the high‐salience than in the low‐salience condition. Although the three predictors examined in the present study (verbal ability, working memory capacity, second‐order false belief task performance) together accounted for significant variance in performance on the emotions judgment task, no single predictor alone accounted for significant unique variance in performance. The importance of different social cognitive abilities for understanding people's affective responses is discussed.     

Predicting Political Biases Against the Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party Movements

Accusations of hypocrisy have flown against both supporters and opponents of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) and Tea Party movements. Integrating the ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM), a newly devised model of political judgment, with political tolerance research, we find that how the political activities of OWS and Tea Party demonstrators are described determines whether or not biases against these groups emerge among people low and high in right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA). Specifically, people low in RWA were more biased against the Tea Party than OWS regardless of whether the groups engaged in normatively threatening or reassuring political behavior, whereas people high in RWA were more biased against OWS than the Tea Party when the groups engaged in normatively threatening (and therefore objectionable), but not normatively reassuring (and therefore acceptable) behavior. These findings further support the IOPM's contention that premise objectionableness, not right‐wing orientation, determines biases in political judgment.     

Effects of specific emotions on subjective judgment,driving performance,and perceived workload

The aim of this paper was to explore effects of specific emotions on subjective judgment, driving performance, and perceived workload. The traditional driving behavior research has focused on cognitive aspects such as attention, judgment, and decision making. Psychological findings have indicated that affective states also play a critical role in a user’s rational, functional, and intelligent behaviors. Most applied emotion research has concentrated on simple valence and arousal dimensions. However, recent findings have indicated that different emotions may have different impacts, even though they belong to the same valence or arousal. To identify more specific affective effects, seventy undergraduate participants drove in a vehicle simulator under three different road conditions, with one of the following induced affective states: anger, fear, happiness, or neutral. We measured their subjective judgment of driving confidence, risk perception, and safety level after affect induction; four types of driving errors: Lane Keeping, Traffic Rules, Aggressive Driving, and Collision while driving; and the electronic NASA-TLX after driving. Induced anger clearly showed negative effects on subjective safety level and led to degraded driving performance compared to neutral and fear. Happiness also showed degraded driving performance compared to neutral and fear. Fear did not have any significant effect on subjective judgment, driving performance, or perceived workload. Results suggest that we may need to take emotions and affect into account to construct a naturalistic and generic driving behavior model. To this end, a specific-affect approach is needed, beyond the sheer valence and arousal dimensions. Given that workload results are similar across affective states, examining affective effects may also require a different approach than just the perceived workload framework. The present work is expected to guide emotion detection research and help develop an emotion regulation model and adaptive interfaces for drivers.     

Affective Contagion in Effortful Political Thinking

We offer a theory of motivated political reasoning based on the claim that the feelings aroused in the initial stages of processing sociopolitical information inevitably color all phases of the evaluation process. When a citizen is called on to express a judgment, the considerations that enter into conscious rumination will be biased by the valence of initial affect. This article reports the results of two experiments that test our affective contagion hypothesis—unnoticed affective cues influence the retrieval and construction of conscious considerations in the direction of affective congruence. We then test whether these affectively congruent considerations influence subsequently reported policy evaluations, which we call affective mediation. In short, the considerations that come consciously to mind to inform and to support the attitude construction process are biased systematically by the feelings that are aroused in the earliest stages of processing. This underlying affective bias in processing drives motivated reasoning and rationalization in political thinking.     

Rethinking Affective Experience and Popular Emotion: World War I and the Construction of Group Emotion in International Relations

Research in International Relations (IR) frequently confronts claims about the emotions shared by members of a group. While much attention has been devoted to the potential for affective and emotional experience beyond the individual level, IR scholars have said less about the politics of invoking popular emotion. This article addresses that gap. Specifically, we argue that between individual—and even shared—affective experience on the one hand and group‐based “popular emotion” on the other exists not mechanisms of aggregation but rather processes of framing, projection, and propagation that are deeply political. We distinguish between two tropes that commonly structure references to popular emotion: communal emotion, the idealized attribution of an authentic, unifying emotional response of “the people,” and mass emotion, a volatile and potentially dangerous mob‐like reaction, but one also susceptible to manipulation. Using the outbreak of World War I as a showcase, we demonstrate the political significance of popular emotion, including its enduring relevance for understanding contemporary populism.     

Spendthrifts and Tightwads in Childhood: Feelings about Spending Predict Children's Financial Decision Making

Adults differ in the extent to which they find spending money to be distressing; “tightwads” find spending money painful, and “spendthrifts” do not find spending painful enough. This affective dimension has been reliably measured in adults and predicts a variety of important financial behaviors and outcomes (e.g., saving behavior and credit scores). Although children's financial behavior has also received attention, feelings about spending have not been studied in children, as they have in adults. We measured the spendthrift–tightwad (ST–TW) construct in children for the first time, with a sample of 5‐ to 10‐year‐old children (N = 225). Children across the entire age range were able to reliably report on their affective responses to spending and saving, and children's ST–TW scores were related to parent reports of children's temperament and financial behavior. Further, children's ST–TW scores were predictive of whether they chose to save or spend money in the lab, even after controlling for age and how much they liked the offered items. Our novel findings—that children's feelings about spending and saving can be measured from an early age and relate to their behavior with money—are discussed with regard to theoretical and practical implications. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Traces of the artist: Sensitivity to the role of the artist in children's pictorial reasoning

In three studies we investigated the question of whether children consider the attributes of the artist (sentience, age level, affective style, emotion) when making judgments about the traces (drawings) made by that artist. In Study 1, 2–5‐year‐old children were asked to find pictures drawn by a machine, an adult, an older and a younger child. Results indicated that children younger than 4 years do not consider the artists' attributes when making judgments, but 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds do. Furthermore, whereas the oldest children were adept at both machine‐person (sentience) and person‐person (age) contrasts, 4‐year‐olds succeeded only with person‐person contrasts. In Study 2, videotaped artists displayed differences in degree of agitation (affective style) while drawing, and this attribute was manipulated in the drawing by varying line density, asymmetry, line overlap and line gap, or all four features, across stimuli. Three‐ and five‐year‐old children judged whether a calm or agitated person drew the stimuli. Findings showed that five‐year‐old, but not 3‐year‐old, children easily completed the task. In Study 3, 3‐, 5‐ and 7‐year‐old children judged whether happy or sad artists made paintings of matching emotional tone. Performance on this picture judgment task was contrasted with performance on three theory of mind tasks (false belief, emotion and interpretative). The results indicated that 5‐ and 7‐year‐olds successfully judged the impact of artists' emotions on paintings, but 3‐year‐olds did not. Performance on the picture task was related to that on the false belief task, but not to the emotion or interpretive tasks. Taken together, the results suggest that children's view of visual symbols includes a consideration of the qualities of the artist beginning around 5 years, and there appears to be a common link between judgments of the mind behind the visual symbol in the picture task and judgments of mental state reasoning in the false belief task.     

Confirmatory Search and Asymmetric Dominance

Decision makers use confirmatory search strategies in judgment tasks. As a result of this, their attention towards task‐relevant cues is biased in favor of cues supporting available responses. Changing these responses can alter the cues used in the judgment task and, subsequently, alter beliefs. We use this mechanism to predict and explain the emergence of the asymmetric dominance effect in judgment. In four sets of experiments, we document systematic changes in belief, as dominated options are added to the response set. These effects emerge for a number of naturalistic judgment tasks and are mediated by the increased accessibility of decoy‐supporting cues. Finally, these effects can be eliminated when the decision maker's attention is drawn towards the cues supporting the non‐dominant response. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When Arousal Influences Ad Evaluation and Valence Does Not (and Vice Versa)

This research examines, across 2 studies, the interplay between the valence and arousal components of affective states and the affective tone of a target ad. In the first study, music was used to induce a pleasant or unpleasant mood, while controlling for arousal. Participants were subsequently exposed to an ad that either had a positive‐affective tone or was ambiguous in its affective tone. As predicted, the valence of the affective state colored the evaluation of the ad in a mood‐congruent direction, but this coloring effect occurred only when the ad had an ambiguous‐affective tone. In the second study, the target ad had a clear positive or negative affective tone, and the valence and arousal dimensions of the mood state were manipulated independently. As predicted, the arousal dimension, but not the valence dimension, influenced ad evaluation. Ad evaluations were more polarized in the direction of the ad's affective tone under high arousal than under low arousal. This effect was more pronounced for self‐referent evaluations (e.g., “I like the ad”) than for object‐referent evaluations (e.g., “The ad is good”), favoring an attributional explanation—the excitation transfer hypothesis—over an attention‐narrowing explanation—the dynamic complexity hypothesis. Taken together, the results of the 2 studies stress the important contingency of the affective tone of the ad, when examining the effects of the valence and arousal dimensions of a person's affective state on ad evaluation. The results also provide additional insights into how and when affect serves as information in judgment processes.     

Mapping Contentious Collective Emotions in a Populist Democracy: Duterte's Push for Philippine Federalism

This article analyzes collective emotions toward political change in a populist democracy. Taking the federalization of the Philippines led by President Rodrigo Duterte as an exemplar case, we extend prevailing scholarship which focuses on populist leaders' electoral discourse by examining the affective landscape of the populist public in a postelectoral context. Utilizing a sequential mixed-methods design, we algorithmically classify the stance and sentiment valence of 18,535 Facebook comments about federalism, then we reflexively identify collective emotions based on major discursive storylines across each stance-sentiment intersection. Our integrated analysis reveals collective feelings of (1) hope and euphoria and (2) vindictive contempt among supporters of Duterte's federalism, while detractors of the campaign express (3) derisive amusement and (4) fear and skepticism. Two of these public emotions may be idiosyncratic to Global South populisms: public fear and president-invested salvific hope. We discuss the implications of our findings along themes of emotional polarization in a populist democracy, linking political affect with democratic participation through social media.