Ultrafast scene detection and recognition with limited visual information

Humans can detect target colour pictures of scenes depicting concepts like picnic or harbour in sequences of six or 12 pictures presented as briefly as 13?ms, even when the target is named after the sequence. Such rapid detection suggests that feedforward processing alone enabled detection without recurrent cortical feedback. There is debate about whether coarse, global, low spatial frequencies (LSFs) provide predictive information to high cortical levels through the rapid magnocellular (M) projection of the visual path, enabling top-down prediction of possible object identities. To test the “Fast M” hypothesis, we compared detection of a named target across five stimulus conditions: unaltered colour, blurred colour, greyscale, thresholded monochrome, and LSF pictures. The pictures were presented for 13–80?ms in six-picture rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) sequences. Blurred, monochrome, and LSF pictures were detected less accurately than normal colour or greyscale pictures. When the target was named before the sequence, all picture types except LSF resulted in above-chance detection at all durations. Crucially, when the name was given only after the sequence, performance dropped and the monochrome and LSF pictures (but not the blurred pictures) were at or near chance. Thus, without advance information, monochrome and LSF pictures were rarely understood. The results offer only limited support for the Fast M hypothesis, suggesting instead that feedforward processing is able to activate conceptual representations without complementary reentrant processing.     

Frank Ebersole on Wittgenstein and Pictures in Philosophy

How do we get into trouble in philosophy, and what do pictures have to do with it? This article addresses Frank Ebersole's thoughts on (Wittgenstein's remarks on) pictures in philosophy. It identifies the puzzlement generated for Ebersole by what Wittgenstein says and also considers some puzzling aspects of Ebersole's own renderings of pictures. It distinguishes between the philosophical picture and the pictorial form in which it may be crystalized and shows how philosophy's reliance on situationally disembedded grammatical stories (pictorial or not) leads us into trouble. Accordingly, responding to such trouble consists not in recovering the picture, in the sense of a single “object” or image we had before our mind's eye, but in—what is better described as Ebersole's strategy of—supplying a grammatical example (pictorial or otherwise) to go with our thinking, an example that makes what we think and say clear to ourselves.     

The role of visual form in lexical access: Evidence from Chinese classifier production

The interface between the conceptual and lexical systems was investigated in a word production setting. We tested the effects of two conceptual dimensions – semantic category and visual shape – on the selection of Chinese nouns and classifiers. Participants named pictures with nouns (“rope”) or classifier–noun phrases (“one-classifier–rope”) in three blocked picture naming experiments. In Experiment 1, we observed larger semantic category interference with phrases than with nouns, suggesting comparable semantic categorical effects on classifier and noun selection. In Experiments 2 and 3, items with similar shapes produced an interference effect when they were named with classifier–noun phrases, but not with bare nouns. This indicates that object shape modulates classifier (but not noun) selection. We conclude that object shape properties can by themselves influence word selection processes just as semantic relationships (captured by semantic category) do. The factors operating during word selection may be more diverse than has been previously thought.     

What is Literature? Revisited: Sartre on the Language of Literature

This article argues that Sartre's distinction in What Is Literature? between prose and poetry should be understood in the light of his earlier distinction in The Imaginary between two kinds of meaning. Sartre argues against the “Cartesian picture” of consciousness in The Imaginary, specifically concerning our experience of images. Not only is a mental image not an “inner object” mediating between consciousness and the world, even a picture drawn on paper should not be understood as an object standing between the viewer and what this picture represents. Our experience, Sartre argues, is that of seeing things in a picture rather than seeing through it, such that the meaning of pictures and images in general is embodied in them and cannot be separated from them. He then goes on to contrast this kind of embodied meaning (which he calls “sense”) with a kind of meaning that can be completely grasped independently of its expression (which he calls “signification”) and identify the two with painting and language respectively. It is for this reason, this article argues, that Sartre later sees poetry as a deviation from language's proper function. This rigid distinction is maintained by Sartre until the end of his career, and the change that some commentators found in him are its outcome rather than a revolt against it. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty has demonstrated more convincingly that sense and signification are both essential aspects of linguistic meaning, and their relation is much more dynamic and complimentary than Sartre would have allowed.     

Social contexts modulate neural responses in the processing of others’ pain: An event-related potential study

Two hypotheses have been proposed regarding the response that is triggered by observing others’ pain: the “empathizing hypothesis” and the “threat value of pain hypothesis.” The former suggests that observing others’ pain triggers an empathic response. The latter suggests that it activates the threat-detection system. In the present study, participants were instructed to observe pictures that showed an anonymous hand or foot in a painful or non-painful situation in a threatening or friendly social context. Event-related potentials were recorded when the participants passively observed these pictures in different contexts. We observed an interaction between context and picture in the early automatic N1 component, in which the painful pictures elicited a larger amplitude than the non-painful pictures only in the threatening context and not in the friendly context. We also observed an interaction between context and picture in the late P3 component, in which the painful pictures elicited a larger amplitude than the non-painful pictures only in the friendly context and not in the threatening context. These results indicate that specific social contexts can modulate the neural responses to observing others’ pain. The “empathic hypothesis” and “threat value of pain hypothesis” are not mutually exclusive and do not contradict each other but rather work in different temporal stages.     

Differential cognitive cues in pictorial depth perception among Ugandan children

Four pictures from Hudson's Depth Perception Test containing size, super-position or overlap, and linear perspective cues were administered to 240 Ugandan primary school children. The key question asked regarding the relationship of elements in each picture varied in terms of “Which (is/looks) (nearer/farther) to (man/you), the elephant or the antelope?”. Results suggested that depth in pictorial material was perceived significantly higher for the question variation “which is/looks farther” rather than “nearer.” In addition, the main effects of “grades” and “man/you” and the “grade x nearer/farther” interaction were statistically significant. Results are discussed in terms of culturally constituted experience and the effects of attentional factors and lexical markings inherent in the relational concepts used in the key question.     

Pictorial encoding effects and memory confusions in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm: Evidence for the activation of spontaneous imagery

The purpose of the experiments reported in this paper was to examine the possible role of spontaneous imagery and list-specific cues on pictorial encoding effects induced by the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task. After viewing pictures and words referring to thematically related materials, by way of a picture/word source-judgement task, participants were asked to remember the way in which these materials were presented. Participants reported “seeing” pictures of items that were presented as words, an effect predicted by the imaginal activation hypothesis in its suggestion that incidental images experienced during encoding will later be mistaken as memories for pictures. Whether participants made the same picture misattributions on related lures (or non-presented related items) depended on the way in which the lures’ respective thematic lists were experienced during encoding (Experiments 1 and 2), pointing to the effects of list-specific cues in picture/word judgements. These findings have intriguing implications for interpretations of picture-encoding effects induced by the DRM task. The findings also speak to the use of DRM false-memory rates when marshalling evidence against the use of imagery in applied settings.     

Propositions,Properties and Relations: Wittgenstein's “Notes on Logic” and the Tractatus

Frege famously argued that truth is not a property or relation. In the “Notes on Logic” Wittgenstein emphasised the bi‐polarity of propositions which he called their sense. He argued that “propositions by virtue of sense cannot have predicates or relations.” This led to his fundamental thought that the logical constants do not represent predicates or relations. The idea, however, has wider ramifications than that. It is not just that propositions cannot have relations to other propositions but also that they cannot have relations to anything at all. The paper explores the consequences of this insight for the way in which we should read the Tractatus. In the “Notes on Logic” the insight led to Wittgenstein's emphasis on “facts” in any attempt to understand the nature of symbolism. This emphasis is continued in the Tractatus. It is central to his view that propositions are facts which picture facts which prevent us from construing such picturing as a relation between what pictures and what is pictured. It illuminates the importance of context principle with regard to the distinction between showing and saying to which Wittgenstein attached so much importance and it underlies the non‐relational view of psychological propositions which he advocates. Finally, if propositions by virtue of sense cannot have predicates or relations the paradox at the end of a work which consist largely of propositions about propositions becomes intelligible.     

Generation of a pictorial code

In Experiments I and II direct measures were obtained of the time required to convert a picture or a sentence to a report of visualization or to a simple drawing, latencies were faster for pictures than for sentences and were affected by the surface form of the sentence. In Experiment Ill, Ss matched pictures or sentences against a test picture under conditions of simultaneous or successive presentation. “Yes” and “No” response times were affected by sentence form under both conditions, although the difference between sentence-picture and picture-picture comparisons was virtually eliminated under the successive condition. In Experiment IV, Ss held a sentence or picture in memory over a 1,500-msec interval at the end of which a test picture or an instruction to draw the design was presented. Construction latencies were shorter in response to pictures than sentences, and there were effects of sentence form on verification time. Some implications of these results are discussed.     

Single-word predictions of upcoming language during comprehension: Evidence from the cumulative semantic interference task

Comprehenders predict upcoming speech and text on the basis of linguistic input. How many predictions do comprehenders make for an upcoming word? If a listener strongly expects to hear the word “sock”, is the word “shirt” partially expected as well, is it actively inhibited, or is it ignored? The present research addressed these questions by measuring the “downstream” effects of prediction on the processing of subsequently presented stimuli using the cumulative semantic interference paradigm. In three experiments, subjects named pictures (sock) that were presented either in isolation or after strongly constraining sentence frames (“After doing his laundry, Mark always seemed to be missing one …”). Naming sock slowed the subsequent naming of the picture shirt – the standard cumulative semantic interference effect. However, although picture naming was much faster after sentence frames, the interference effect was not modulated by the context (bare vs. sentence) in which either picture was presented. According to the only model of cumulative semantic interference that can account for such a pattern of data, this indicates that comprehenders pre-activated and maintained the pre-activation of best sentence completions (sock) but did not maintain the pre-activation of less likely completions (shirt). Thus, comprehenders predicted only the most probable completion for each sentence.     

Defining Elemental Imitation Mechanisms: A Comparison of Cognitive and Motor-Spatial Imitation Learning Across Object- and Computer-Based Tasks

During the first 5 years of life, the versatility, breadth, and fidelity with which children imitate change dramatically. Currently, there is no model to explain what underlies such significant changes. To that end, the present study examined whether task-independent but domain-specific—elemental—imitation mechanism explains performance across imitation tasks or domains. Preschool-age children (n = 156) were tested on 4 imitation tasks, 2 object-based (animal, puzzle box) and 2 computer-based (cognitive, motor-spatial). All tasks involved 3 serial actions. The animal task involved making an animal face, and the puzzle box task involved manipulating a box to retrieve a reward. The cognitive task involved responding to 3 different pictures in a specific picture order, and the motor-spatial task involved responding to 3 identical pictures in a specific spatial order. A principal component analysis including performance on all 4 tasks produced 2 components: “cognitive imitation” (cognitive and animal tasks) and “motor-spatial imitation” (motor-spatial and puzzle box tasks). Regression analyses replicated these results. These findings provide preliminary support for the hypothesis that underlying performance across these different tasks involves multiple—elemental—imitation mechanisms for learning and copying domain-specific information across tasks.     

The specific-word frequency effect in speech production: Evidence from Spanish and French

The role of word frequency in lexical access during the production of homophones remains unresolved. In the current study, we address whether specific-word (the frequency of occurrence of the word “nun”) or homophone frequency (the summed frequency of words with the pronunciation /nΛn/) determines the production latencies of homophones. In Experiments 1a, 2a, and 3a, participants named pictures of high-frequency (e.g., “banco”–a bank: financial institution) and low-frequency (e.g., “banco”–park bench) Spanish (Experiments 1a and 2a) or French (Experiment 3a) homophones and control pictures of nonhomophone words matched in frequency with each of the two uses of the homophones. The naming latencies for low-frequency homophones were longer than those for high-frequency homophones. Furthermore, the naming latencies for homophones were indistinguishable from those for nonhomophone controls matched in specific-word frequency. In Experiments 1b, 2b, and 3b, the participants performed either object decision or picture–word matching tasks with the stimuli used in the corresponding Experiments 1a, 2a, and 3a. There were no reliable differences between high- and low-frequency homophones. The findings support the hypothesis that specific-word and not homophone frequency determines lexical access in speech production.     

Is Colour incompatibility analytic?

It is widely believed that some a priori necessary truths are not analytic in the sense of transformable by substitution of synonyms into logical truths. One much-cited example comes from the supposed incompatibility between colour predicates. The idea is that sentences like “Nothing is both blue all over (or uniformly or at a point) and also red” are not transformable into a logical truth in the same way as “Nothing is both a bachelor and married” because the requisite conceptual link between “bachelor” and “not married” is absent between “blue” and “not red”. This paper examines whether colour exclusion may be more like the bachelor case than it initially appears. It transpires that the most promising line of thought is not, however, as has been argued at length in the literature, that “blue” in some more or less convoluted way manages to mean “not red”. Instead it is suggested that the requisite conceptual link may reside in the oft-ignored qualifications (“all over”, “uniformly”, etc.), without which there is no incompatibility in the first place.     

Name–picture verification as a control measure for object naming: A task analysis and norms for a large set of pictures

The name–picture verification task is widely used in spoken production studies to control for nonlexical differences between picture sets. In this task a word is presented first and followed, after a pause, by a picture. Participants must then make a speeded decision on whether both word and picture refer to the same object. Using regression analyses, we systematically explored the characteristics of this task by assessing the independent contribution of a series of factors that have been found relevant for picture naming in previous studies. We found that, for “match” responses, both visual and conceptual factors played a role, but lexical variables were not significant contributors. No clear pattern emerged from the analysis of “no-match” responses. We interpret these results as validating the use of “match” latencies as control variables in studies or spoken production using picture naming. Norms for match and no-match responses for 396 line drawings taken from Cycowicz, Friedman, Rothstein, and Snodgrass (1997) can be downloaded at: http://language.psy.bris.ac.uk/name-picture_verification.html     

Response to Bordo's “Feminist Skepticism and the ‘Maleness’ of Philosophy”

Bordo argues that the “theoretics of heterogeneity” taken too far prevents us from being able make generalizations or broadly conceptual statements about women. 1 argue that the political efficacy of feminism does not depend on the capacity to speak from the perspective of “women” and that the insistence on the heterogeneity of the category of women does not imply an opposition to abstraction but rather moves abstract thinking in a self-critical and democratizing direction.     

Labeling effects on memory for nonsense pictures

It has been shown that labeling nonsense pictures improves memory for them, but how the label takes effect is uncertain. In this study subjects viewed nonsense pictures with or without labels; in the former case, the labels were either meaningful or nonmeaningful with respect to the pictures. Then the subjects took part in a free recall test, followed by recall in the presence of cues. Only the meaningful labels facilitated free recall of the pictures, but both types of labels facilitated cued recall. The results suggest that a meaningful label affects picture encoding by providing a conceptual interpretation for the picture; a nonmeaningful label, in contrast, appears to provide only an ad hoc associative cue.     

How children view pictures: Children's responses to pictures as things in themselves and as representations of something else

In four experiments we examined under what conditions children around 4 years of age could overcome their normal tendency to treat a picture as transparent and attend to it also as a thing in itself. In Experiment 1, many children chose a picture of food as something “you can really eat” even after having identified it as “just a picture.” In Experiment 2, however, children were able to respond appropriately to implicit requests for a picture as distinct from a real exemplar of the thing represented when the context indicated the correct response. In these tasks, children could succeed by treating picture status simply as an attribute. In Experiments 3 and 4, children were asked to comment on the appearance and reality of pictures, deceptive (trick) objects and real things. Significantly poorer performance on pictures and tricks than on real things suggested that some children have difficulty holding two interpretations of the same input; that is, understanding that a picture has two identities.