The benefits of collective responsibility: How ingroup reputation concern motivates prosociality in intergroup contexts

Collective responsibility processes have been investigated from the perspectives of the outgroup (e.g., collective blame) and the ingroup (e.g., collective guilt). This article extends theory and research on collective responsibility with a third perspective, namely that of the individual actor whose behavior triggers the attribution of collective blame. Four experiments (n = 78, 118, 208 and 77, respectively) tested the hypotheses that collective responsibility processes influence the individual actors' appraisals, emotions and behavior. The possibility of collective blame for their individual action prompted more prosocial behavior among participants (Experiment 1). Participants also experienced more ingroup reputation concern and in turn more negative emotions (Experiment 2–4) for a past wrongdoing if it could reflect negatively on the ingroup in the eyes of outgroups. The increased negative emotions then motivated participants to improve the ingroup's image (Experiment 4). The effects were moderated by perceived ingroup entitativity, in that activating collective blame increased ingroup reputation concern and negative emotions only for ingroups perceived as highly entitative (Experiment 3).     

Does group identification facilitate or prevent collective guilt about past misdeeds? Resolving the paradox

The influence of group identification on collective guilt and attitudes towards reparation was examined in the context of the Belgian colonization of Congo. People should experience collective emotions to the extent that being a member of the relevant group is part of their self-concept. Yet, the acknowledgement of ingroup responsibility for past misdeeds is particularly threatening for high identifiers and may lead to defensive reactions aimed at avoiding guilt. We therefore predicted, and found, a curvilinear effect of identification on collective guilt. Attitudes towards reparation of past wrongdoings were also assessed and yielded a linear trend: identification predicted less favourable attitudes towards reparation but this effect was marginally stronger as identification increased.     

Ingroup ambivalence and experienced affect: the moderating role of social identification

No previous work in the field of group‐related attitudes and emotions has investigated the possible affective consequences of ingroup ambivalence—that is, the consequences of having attitudes towards an ingroup that are simultaneously both positive and negative. The current study was designed to explore this issue. Ambivalent attitudes have been argued to be more psychologically salient to the individual than univalent ones. A linear increase in participants' experienced affect was therefore predicted as a function of their ambivalence toward the ingroup. However, consistent with the predictions of social identity theory, previous findings have shown that higher ingroup identifiers are more likely to be involved with the ingroup than lower identifiers. Accordingly, we predicted and found effects of ingroup ambivalence on affect for high but not low ingroup identifiers. Combining the findings of two distinct literatures, the initial evidence provided by this study exploratively traces the sources of the affective processes that are set in motion by the evaluation of one's own group in an intergroup context. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Forgive them for I have sinned: The relationship between guilt and forgiveness of others' transgressions

We propose that guilt leads to forgiveness of others' transgressions. In Study 1, people prone to experience guilt (but not shame) were also prone to forgive others for past misdeeds. In Study 2, we manipulated harm‐ and inequity‐based guilt; both increased forgiveness of others' transgressions. Further, the effect of guilt on forgiveness was mediated by identification with the transgressor. In Study 3, we replicated the guilt–forgiveness relationship and examined three other plausible mediators: capability for similar wrongdoing, empathic understanding, and general identification; only identification with the transgressor satisfied the criteria for mediation. In Study 4, we induced guilt by asking participants to harm a friend or stranger. Guilt induced by harming a friend led to greater forgiveness of third‐party transgressors, and again, identification with the transgressor mediated the effect. We discuss the implications of these results for understanding how the prosocial effects of guilt extend beyond the boundaries of a single interpersonal relationship.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

Group motives in threatening contexts: When a loyalty conflict paradoxically reduces the influence of an anti‐discrimination ingroup norm

The influence of pro‐ versus anti‐discrimination ingroup norms on Swiss nationals' attitudes towards foreigners was investigated as a function of national identification and perceived material ingroup threat. As predicted, results revealed a significant interaction between identification and threat: High identifiers showed a more negative attitude than low identifiers mainly when perceived threat was high. In other words, high identifiers conformed to the pro‐discrimination norm, but showed a counter‐conformity effect for the anti‐discrimination norm. Additional results revealed that high identifiers actually disagreed with the anti‐discrimination norm when perceived threat was high, but that they were more attached to the ingroup. These findings suggest that when the ingroup norm is not an appropriate response to an ingroup threat (i.e. anti‐discrimination norm), high identifiers find themselves in a loyalty conflict: they are unable to simultaneously conform to the group norm and protect the group. This conflict was resolved through a compensatory mechanism: High identifiers distanced themselves from the ingroup norm in order to protect the group (i.e. by increasing negative attitudes towards foreigners) but reinforced other ingroup ties (i.e. by increasing attachment to the ingroup values). Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings

Can it ever be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted badly? Some say no, citing supposed features of guilt feelings as such. If one understands group action according to my plural subject account of groups, however, one can argue for the appropriateness of feeling guilt just because one's group has acted badly - a feeling that often occurs. In so arguing I sketch the plural subject account of groups, group intentions and group actions: for a group to intend (in the relevant sense) is for its members to be jointly committed to intend that such-and-such as a body. Individual group members need not be directly involved in the formation of the intention in order to participate in such a joint commitment. The core concept of joint commitment is in an important way holistic, not being reducible to a set of personal commitments over which each party holds sway. Parties to a group intention so understood can reasonably see the resulting action as "ours" as opposed to "theirs" and thus appropriately respond to the action's badness with a feeling of guilt, even when they themselves are morally innocent in the matter. I label the feeling in question a feeling of "membership guilt." A number of standard philosophical claims about the nature of guilt feelings are thrown into question by my argument.     

Group Distinctiveness,Political Identification,and the Third-Person Effect: Perceptions of a Political Campaign in the 2004 Greek National Election

The present study examined the effects of political identification and group distinctiveness on perceptions of media influence during an election campaign. Participants estimated the effect of political communication on self and on voters of two large, nondistinctive political parties and two small, distinctive political parties. Nondistinctive party members showed an ingroup bias (i.e., greater perceived media influence on the outgroup) irrespective of strength of identification compared to the nondistinctive outgroups, whereas they did not show any bias (high identifiers) or even reverse bias (low identifiers) toward the distinctive outgroups. Distinctive party members showed an ingroup bias (irrespective of strength of identification) against the nondistinctive outgroups and an ingroup bias (high identifiers) or no bias (low identifiers) toward the distinctive outgroups. Ingroup assimilation (i.e., lack of difference in perceived influence between self and ingroup) was evident for distinctive party members, but not for nondistinctive party members. Results highlight the importance of group distinctiveness and identification in third-person perceptions.     

Ingroup identification moderates stereotype change in reaction to ingroup deviance

An experiment (N = 98) investigated the moderating effect of ingroup identification on reactions to deviant ingroup members. We measured psychology students' level of identification with the group ‘psychologists’ and presented them with information about either a normative or deviant psychologist. Participants completed an ingroup stereotype measure either before or after reading about and evaluating the target psychologist. High identifiers expressed a more positive stereotype of the ingroup after, compared to before, reading about a deviant ingroup member. High identifiers also expressed a more positive stereotype of the ingroup after reading about a deviant than after reading about a normative ingroup member. By contrast, low identifiers' stereotype judgements were relatively unaffected by the target information. The target evaluation ratings indicate that high identifiers were more positive than low identifiers towards the normative ingroup member, but were more negative than low identifiers towards the deviant. The results point to the greater motivational demands on high identifiers to maintain a positive image of the group. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When majority members exclude ethnic minorities: The impact of shame on the desire to object to immoral acts

In recent years, ethnic minorities have experienced an increase in acts of exclusion. In two studies, we demonstrated how ingroup members' felt shame about such immoral behavior explained their desire to pro‐socially object to this immorality by distancing from the perpetrating ingroup and by wanting to support the affected minorities. We showed how the desire to pro‐socially object varies as a function of national identification. As expected, nationally attached identifiers' felt shame for the immoral behavior was linked with greater willingness to pro‐socially object to it. The opposite pattern was found for nationally glorifying identifiers. In the second study, we found that anger directed at the ingroup partially explained the relationship between group‐based shame and the pro‐social desire to object. The results contribute to the literature on shame and pro‐social motivations by showing that distancing from the perpetrating ingroup can be considered as a pro‐social strategy rather than a defensive one.     

Remembering historical victimization: collective guilt for current ingroup transgressions

The authors examined the consequences of remembering historical victimization for emotional reactions to a current adversary. In Experiment 1, Jewish Canadians who were reminded of the Holocaust accepted less collective guilt for their group's harmful actions toward the Palestinians than those not reminded of their ingroup's past victimization. The extent to which the conflict was perceived to be due to Palestinian terrorism mediated this effect. Experiment 2 illustrated that reminding Jewish people, but not non-Jewish people, of the Holocaust decreased collective guilt for current harm doing compared with when the reminder concerned genocide committed against another group (i.e., Cambodians). In Experiments 3 and 4, Americans experienced less collective guilt for their group's harm doing in Iraq following reminders of either the attacks on September 11th, 2001 or the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor compared with a historical victimization reminder that was irrelevant to the ingroup. The authors discuss why remembering the ingroup's past affects responses to outgroups in the present.     

Group‐Based Shame and Guilt: Emerging Directions in Research

Research on the role of emotion in social identity, group processes, and intergroup conflict is burgeoning. This paper examines recent research on group‐based shame and guilt and describes important themes in this research. Guilt and shame are distinguished by different appraisals and motivations in intergroup contexts. Group‐based shame is associated with threats to group‐image and motivations to protect and repair that image. In contrast, group‐based guilt is associated with efforts to repair and apologize for ingroup wrongdoing. Current research is expanding in several important directions. First, the scope of emotions is expanding beyond that of shame and guilt to consider the roles of emotions such as ingroup‐directed anger in situations that may also provoke group‐based shame and guilt. Second, people’s motivations to avoid feeling group‐based shame and guilt are becoming better understood, particularly in relation to different aspects of social identification. Finally, we argue that dynamic processes in emotion expression and experience, particularly due to the relation between perpetrator and victim groups, are an important future direction in research on group‐based shame and guilt.     

Keeping it in‐house: how audience affects responses to group criticism

It is often assumed that group‐directed criticism is best kept ‘in‐house’, but the effects of audience on responses to criticism have not been directly examined. Consistent with predictions, ingroup members who criticized the group to an outgroup audience were seen to be making a less appropriate choice of audience (Experiments 2 and 3), aroused more negative feelings (Experiment 1), were downgraded more strongly on personality traits (Experiment 2), and were seen to be doing more damage to the group (Experiment 2) than were ingroup members who kept their criticisms in‐house. Experiment 3 showed that, whereas moderate identifiers agreed with the comments less and showed weaker friendly intentions toward the critic when an outgroup audience as compared to an ingroup audience was chosen, high identifiers agreed with the criticisms just as strongly—and showed more friendly intentions toward the critic—when they were made to an outgroup as compared to an ingroup audience. Results are discussed in light of the broader literature on identity threat. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Righteous or self‐righteous anger? Justice sensitivity moderates defensive outrage at a third‐party harm‐doer

While bystanders' outrage over moral transgressions may represent a genuine desire to restore justice, such expressions can also be self‐serving—alleviating guilt and bolstering one's moral status. Four studies examined whether individual differences in observer justice sensitivity (JS_O) moderate the degree to which outrage at third‐party harm‐doing reflects concerns about one's own moral identity rather than justice per se. Among participants low (vs. high) in JS_O, feelings of guilt predicted greater outrage and desire to punish a corporation's sweatshop labor practices (Studies 1 & 2). Furthermore, affirming one's personal moral identity reduced outrage and support for punishing a corporate harm‐doer among those low, but not high in JS_O (Studies 3 & 4). Similar moderation was absent for other forms of justice sensitivity and just world beliefs. Effects were not explained by negative affect, empathy, personal harm, or political orientation. Results suggest that JS_O uniquely differentiates defensive and justice‐driven moral outrage (150/150).     

Friend or foe? Ingroup identification moderates reactions to outgroup members' allocation behavior

In the present article we build on previous work suggesting that people react more strongly to the favorability of outgroup authority allocations than ingroup authority allocations. Based on theorizing and research on intergroup perception and self‐categorization, we refine this argument by suggesting that responses to outgroup authorities depend on people's level of ingroup identification. We present data from an experiment showing that the favorability of treatment by an outgroup member primarily influences decision acceptance among high (vs. low) ingroup identifiers. In line with theory and research based on the relational model of authority, findings of the present study also suggest that ingroup identification has a reversed effect on acceptance of an ingroup authority's decisions. Specifically, the favorability of treatment by an ingroup member primarily influences decision acceptance among low (vs. high) ingroup identifiers. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

群体内疚:界定、心理机制、行动倾向及干预策略

当个体认为内群体为外群体受到的不道德伤害负有责任时会体验到群体内疚。该情绪常见的触发情境包括过往历史的伤害事件、当下的群际冲突、不公正的社会关系及未来的伤害事件。群体认同、内群体责任和不当性评估是影响群体内疚产生的三大心理机制。群体内疚会导致施害群体对受害群体表现出积极行动,如友善态度,冲突和解、群体补偿及群际支持。通过群体肯定、自我肯定、促进共同认同、强调内群体责任及展现已有补偿行为等干预策略可以引发施害群体的群体内疚。未来的研究应澄清群体内疚的成因机制,进一步探索群体内疚与补偿行为间的作用关系。     

Self‐Harm Focus Leads to Greater Collective Guilt: The Case of the U.S.‐Iraq Conflict

Collective guilt from harm one's group has caused an out‐group is often undermined because people minimize or legitimize the harm done (i.e., they generate exonerating cognitions). When a group action has harmed both the in‐group and an out‐group, focusing people on “self‐harm”—ways in which the in‐group has harmed itself—may elicit more collective guilt because self‐harm is less likely to be exonerated. In Study 1, American participants who focused on how the invasion of Iraq had harmed the United States expressed greater collective guilt over harm inflicted on the people of Iraq than those who focused on Iraqi suffering. Study 2 showed that this effect is due to reductions in exonerating cognitions among people focused on self‐harm. We consider the implications of these findings for intergroup reconciliation, particularly in situations where two groups have been involved in open conflict.     

Moral foundations tell us why guilt induces unfair allocation in multi‐party interactions

Previous studies have demonstrated that a sense of guilt promotes and maintains social fairness in two‐party interactions (Psychological Bulletin, 115, 1994 and 243). However, the situation is much more complex in three‐party or multi‐party interactions. De Hooge et al. (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 2011 and 462) found that guilt could not only induce pro‐social behaviour towards the victim, but also have a disadvantageous impact on a third party. In the present study, we attempt to explain how guilt promotes unfair allocations from a moral foundations perspective. We conducted two experiments using a ‘three‐party dictator game’ paradigm. Firstly, it was repeatedly verified that guilt could induce unfair allocations in three‐party interactions. Secondly, five moral foundations (harm, fairness, ingroup, hierarchy and purity) were measured. Then the moderating and main effects of these five indices on how guilt affects the fair allocation of resources were explored using regression analysis. The results show that competition between harm and fairness in individual traits can explain the disadvantageous effect of guilt on fair allocations: the fairness foundation promoted equality in allocation, while the harm foundation promoted victim compensation.     

Group identification and historical memory

Differences in ingroup identification can influence the accessibility of historical memories. In Study 1, the authors examined individual differences in identity; in Study 2 they experimentally manipulated identity. In Study 1, high identifiers recalled fewer incidents of ingroup violence and hatred than did low identifiers. High and low identifiers did not differ in their recall of ingroup suffering. In Study 2, participants in the high-identity condition recalled fewer incidents of violence and hatred by members of their group than did those in the low-identity condition but a similar number of good deeds. Control participants recalled more positive than negative group actions; this bias was exaggerated in the high-identity condition and eliminated in the low-identity condition. The authors interpret the results as indicating the effects of social identity on individual-level memory processes, especially schema-consistent recall. They evaluate other explanations of the bias, including collective censorship of negative histories.     

One day we might be no more: Collective angst and protective action from potential distinctiveness loss

Potential loss of group distinctiveness can represent a threat to the existence of a group. Across three studies (Ns = 42, 60, 94), a mediated‐moderation model was tested in which the interactive effects of group identification and potential ingroup distinctiveness loss predicts the desire to engage in ingroup protective action to the extent that collective angst (i.e., concern for the ingroup's future vitality) is aroused. It was hypothesized that the threat of potential distinctiveness loss would result in collective angst and subsequent support for protective action among high, but not necessarily low, identified group members. Results provided support for this model within the context of French Canadian distinctiveness from English Canada (Experiment 1, where the outcome measure was the desire for a sovereign Quebec) and Canadian distinctiveness from the United States (Experiments 2 and 3, where the outcome was support for action to protect Canadian sovereignty and rejection of a North American Union respectively). When and why collective angst facilitates ingroup protective action is discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.