Digitally manipulating memory: Effects of doctored videos and imagination in distorting beliefs and memories

In prior research on false autobiographical beliefs and memories, subjects have been asked to imagine fictional events and have been exposed to false evidence that indicates that the fictional events occurred. But what are the relative contributions of imagination and false evidence toward false belief and memory construction? In the present study, subjects observed and copied various simple actions; then they viewed doctored videos that suggested that they had performed extra actions and they imagined performing some of those and some other actions. Subjects returned 2 weeks later for a memory test. False evidence or imagination alone was often sufficient to cause belief and memory distortions; in combination, they appeared to have additive or even superadditive effects. The results bear on the mechanisms underlying false beliefs and memories, and we propose legal and clinical applications of these findings.     

The role of self-aspects in emotions elicited by threats to physical health

In two studies, we examined the relationship between self-aspects and socially engaging and socially disengaging emotions elicited by imagined and real physical health problems. In Study 1, participants imagined themselves experiencing a health problem described in a hypothetical scenario and rated the extent to which they would experience a list of emotions. The experience of socially engaging emotions such as shame and embarrassment was predicted by the endorsement of collective self. In Study 2, participants recalled a past health problem and emotions they experienced during its course. Again, collective self predicted the extent to which people mentioned socially engaging emotions in their free recall of emotions. Independent self was not related to the imagined experience of socially disengaging emotions in Study 1 or the recollection of such emotions in Study 2.     

IMAGINATIVE CONTAGION

Abstract: The aim of this article is to expand the diet of examples considered in philosophical discussions of imagination and pretense, and to offer some preliminary observations about what we might learn about the nature of imagination as a result. The article presents a number of cases involving imaginative contagion: cases where merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect only perceiving or believing that P to have. Examples are offered that involve visual imagery, motor imagery, fictional emotions, and social priming. It is suggested that imaginative contagion is a more prevalent phenomenon than has typically been recognized.     

The paradox(es) of pitying and fearing fictions

The acknowledged paradox in our emotional response to fictional characters and events is that the very beliefs required by a cognitive account of the emotions are excluded by knowledge that the context is fictional. Various proposed solutions have failed to reconcile cognitivism with respect to the emotions with the facts of that response. Those offered include denying cognitivism by excluding the belief on the emotions, denying genuine emotional response in these contexts, or advocating either fictional realism or irrationalism in such response. By specifically examining pity and fear this paper tries to reconcile genuine emotional response to fictional characters and events with a unified cognitive account of the emotions by arguing that instead of excluding belief the existential condition on the beliefs in an emotion can be lifted by the invitation to imagine. At the same time it shows that the richness of that response need not be denied and throws some light on further related paradoxes (for instance by indicating why not all emotions are rationally possible in fictive contexts and that although we can pity fictions we cannot rationally fear them). Then by explaining why, unlike in ordinary contexts we do not act on our emotions in fictive ones, it differentiates the reasons for passivity in fictional and in historical circumstances.     

The Effects of Imagined Versus Actual Contact With a Person With a Diagnosis of Schizophrenia

Intergroup contact has been demonstrated to reduce prejudice toward out-groups under the right conditions; however, real contact experiences are often difficult to arrange. Imagined contact may be an alternative. The current study randomly assigned participants to imagine or to have real contact with a person with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Results demonstrated that both imagined and real contact had positive effects on attitudes toward people with schizophrenia, as compared to the effects of imagined and real interactions with an age-matched control person. We discuss the strengths and limitations of imagined contact interventions with an eye toward future research.     

Unwilling,but not unaffected—Imagined contact effects for authoritarians and social dominators

According to a dual process model perspective, intergroup contact should be particularly effective for people high in right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA), but not for those high in social dominance orientation (SDO), because of different underlying motivational goals. In the present studies, we tested the hypothesis that imagined contact, that is, the mental representation of a positive intergroup encounter, improves intergroup relations for high RWAs. In two experimental studies, we showed that high RWAs, compared with low RWAs, show less negative emotions toward Turks (Study 1; N = 120) and more willingness to engage in future contact with Romani people (Study 2; N = 85) after imagined contact. As expected, people high in SDO did not benefit from imagined contact. Instead, people low in SDO showed less negative emotions after imagined contact in Study 1, but this effect was not replicated in the second study. Theoretical implications and the role of imagined contact as a possible intervention for highly biased individuals will be discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotions are real

It is obvious that emotions are real, but the question is what kind of "real" are they? In this article, I outline a theoretical approach where emotions are a part of social reality. I propose that physical changes (in the face, voice, and body, or neural circuits for behavioral adaptations like freezing, fleeing, or fighting) transform into an emotion when those changes take on psychological functions that they cannot perform by their physical nature alone. This requires socially shared conceptual knowledge that perceivers use to create meaning from these physical changes (as well as the circuitry that supports this meaning making). My claim is that emotions are, at the same time, socially constructed and biologically evident. Only when we understand all the elements that construct emotional episodes, in social, psychological, and biological terms, will we understand the nature of emotion.     

Eluding Wilson’s “Elusive Narrators”

George Wilson has defended the thesis that even impersonal third-person fictional narratives should be taken to contain fictional narrations and have fictional narrators. This, he argues, is necessary if we are to explain how readers can take themselves, in their imaginative engagement with fictions, to have knowledge of the things they are imagining. I argue that there is at least one class of impersonal third-person fictional narratives—thought experiments—to which Wilson’s model fails to apply, and that this reveals more general problems with his argument. I further argue that there is no good reason to think that Wilson’s account applies more restrictedly to those impersonal third-person fictional narratives that feature in standard works of literary fiction.     

Do we weep for Cordelia?

Abstract

Much of the contemporary debate concerning the nature and role of fictive emotions has argued that we do feel garden-variety emotions for fictional characters; the puzzle has been to account for this, given our knowledge of their fictional status. In this paper I argue that many of the emotional responses we have towards fictional characters are nothing like the emotions we feel in ordinary life. The implications for our engagement with literary fictions are subsequently examined.     

Suicidal–Homicidal Ideation in Mass Killers and Transcendence

This article examines the role that suicidal–homicidal ideation plays in influencing mass killers and draws on the author’s concept of transcendent fantasy theory. Although numerous researchers touch on the fact that 50% of mass killers commit suicide, few have traced and compared the suicidal person’s fantasy process with that of the suicidal–homicidal killer’s fantasy process. Suicidal individuals tend to be intropunitive. They internalize the blame for real or imagined failures, and they seek to escape from such failures, or to inflict punishment on him- or herself for the same reasons. Mass killers externalize the blame for their real or imagined losses. Due to their mordant bitterness toward self and others, these suicidal–homicidal individuals often fantasize not only about escaping, but transcending their feelings of inadequacy, self-doubt, and worthlessness by having society see them as powerful, clever, and superior for pulling off a massacre and making (in their view) oppressive people pay.     

Narrative and Character Formation

I defend the claim that fictional narratives provide cognitive benefits to readers in virtue of helping them to understand character. Fictions allow readers to rehearse the skill of selecting and organizing into narratives those episodes of a life that reflect traits or values. Two further benefits follow: first, fictional narratives provide character models that we can apply to real‐life individuals (including ourselves), and second, fictional narratives help readers to reflect on the value priorities that constitute character. I defend the plausibility of these cognitive benefits against certain worries raised by Gregory Currie and Peter Goldie.     

The emotions least relevant to politics? Queering autonomous activism

Studies of emotion and activism have often attempted to uncover ‘the emotions most relevant to politics’ (Goodwin et al., 2001). This suggests that only certain feelings are productive for activism, while other emotions have less relevance for activist theory and practice. In this paper I ask if the notion of politically ‘relevant’ emotions helps perpetuate a distinction between what is considered political and what is not. This paper builds upon a case study in which I interviewed self-identified queer-activists about their experiences of autonomous activism. These interviews reveal how the everyday emotions surrounding the ‘personal’ politics of sexuality/intimacy are often seen as either less important, a distraction from, or entirely irrelevant to ‘real’ political issues. Ultimately, I want to challenge attempts to neatly separate our intimate lives from the public sphere of activism. I argue that it can never just be a matter of politics and emotion, but also the politics of emotion (Ahmed, 2004). Therefore we should not just assume that emotions matter for resistance - without first realizing the importance of resisting these hierarchies of emotion.     

Emotivational psychology: How distinct emotions facilitate fundamental motives

Fundamental motivational systems and distinct emotions have both been suggested to be critically involved in the orchestration of adaptive responses to recurrent challenges in humans' evolutionary history. Research on motivation has, however, proceeded largely independently from research on emotions. Here, we contend that distinct emotions are what motivate behavior, and that these emotions may have evolved in tandem with fundamental motivational systems because they play a critical role in the functioning of those systems. Specifically, once a threat or opportunity has been identified, a distinct emotion is elicited, automatically galvanizing and guiding physiological, cognitive, and behavioral responses toward an adaptive outcome; this entire process occurs via a motivational system. We map six characteristic distinct emotions to six fundamental motivational systems and review evidence supporting each hypothesized link. In doing so, we propose a novel framework for understanding human motivation and the corresponding emergence of distinct emotions.     

Standing in the Last Ditch: On the Communicative Intentions of Fiction Makers

Some of us have suggested that what fiction makers do is offer us things to imagine, that this is what is distinctive of fiction and what distinguishes it from narrative‐based but assertive activities such as journalism or history. Some of us hold, further, that it is the maker's intention which confers fictional status. Many, I think, feel the intuitive appeal of this idea at the same time as they sense looming problems for any proposal about fiction's nature based straightforwardly on the identification of fiction with the to‐be‐imagined. I formulate a very weak version of the proposal which is not vulnerable to some objections recently presented. My formulation is in terms of supervenience. But while this version is weak, it is also quite precise, and its precision brings into view certain other problems which have not so far been attended to. To the extent that these problems are serious, the prospects for an intentional theory of fiction look, I am sorry to say, poor; the version susceptible to the objections is weak, and anything weaker still but not so susceptible could hardly be thought of as a theory of fiction, though it might supplement such a theory.     

Increasing outgroup trust,reducing infrahumanization,and enhancing future contact intentions via imagined intergroup contact

The present study was designed to test whether imagined intergroup contact (Crisp & Turner, 2009) affects attributions of human emotions to outgroup members and positive behavioral intentions toward the outgroup via increased outgroup trust. Italian fourth-graders took part in a three-week intervention, where they were asked to imagine meeting an unknown immigrant child in various social settings. One week after the last session, they were administered the dependent measures. Results revealed an indirect effect of imagined contact on both behavioral intentions and attributions of uniquely human emotions to outgroup members via outgroup trust. The theoretical and practical implications are discussed, and an integration of the imagined contact and infrahumanization literature is suggested.     

How to Do Things with Emotional Expressions: The Theory of Affective Pragmatics

It is widely accepted that emotional expressions can be rich communicative devices. We can learn much from the tears of a grieving friend, the smiles of an affable stranger, or the slamming of a door by a disgruntled lover. So far, a systematic analysis of what can be communicated by emotional expressions of different kinds and of exactly how such communication takes place has been missing. The aim of this article is to introduce a new framework for the study of emotional expressions that I call the theory of affective pragmatics (TAP). As linguistic pragmatics focuses on what utterances mean in a context, affective pragmatics focuses on what emotional expressions mean in a context. TAP develops and connects two principal insights. The first is the insight that emotional expressions do much more than simply expressing emotions. As proponents of the Behavioral Ecology View of facial movements have long emphasized, bodily displays are sophisticated social tools that can communicate the signaler's intentions and requests. Proponents of the Basic Emotion View of emotional expressions have acknowledged this fact, but they have failed to emphasize its importance, in part because they have been in the grip of a mistaken theory of emotional expressions as involuntary readouts of emotions. The second insight that TAP aims to articulate and apply to emotional expressions is that it is possible to engage in analogs of speech acts without using language at all. I argue that there are important and so far largely unexplored similarities between what we can “do” with words and what we can “do” with emotional expressions. In particular, the core tenet of TAP is that emotional expressions are a means not only of expressing what's inside but also of directing other people's behavior, of representing what the world is like and of committing to future courses of action. Because these are some of the main things we can do with language, the take home message of my analysis is that, from a communicative point of view, much of what we can do with language we can also do with non-verbal emotional expressions. I conclude by exploring some reasons why, despite the analogies I have highlighted, emotional expressions are much less powerful communicative tools than speech acts.     

The Cognitive Role of Fictionality

The question of the cognitive role of fictionality is this: what is the correct cognitive attitude to take to p, when it is fictional that p? We began by considering one answer to this question, implicit in the work of Kendall Walton, that the correct response to a fictional proposition is to imagine that proposition. However, this approach is silent in cases of fictional incompleteness, where neither p nor its negation are fictional. We argue that that Waltonians should embrace a pluralistic account of the cognitive role of fictional incompleteness: in some cases of fictional incompleteness, we are permitted to resolve the incompleteness during our engagement with the target fiction, and in other cases, we are obliged not to resolve the incompleteness. But though pluralism is accommodated by Walton’s wider account of fictionality, it puts tension on his motivating idea that fictionality stands to the imagination as truth stands to belief. And so we develop a rival conception of the cognitive role of fictionality that is built around a different analogy: on this evidentialist approach, (known) fictionality stands to the imagination as evidence stands to credence.     

Space for emotion in the spaces of activism

This paper explores the role of emotions in activism. Although, increasingly, researchers have examined what emotions inspire or deter different forms of political and social movement activism, this paper takes a new direction by considering what spaces, practices and emotional stances are necessary to sustain individual and collective resistance in the long-term. We argue that we need to sustain activism through emotional reflexivity, building sustaining spaces to create space for emotion in activism. Using empirical examples from different forms of autonomous (anti-capitalist) activism in Britain, the role and importance of emotions to the sustainability of activism is explored. In particular, we consider the role of different spaces in sustaining activists through the cycles of protest, what spaces of activism can be opened up by a closer attention to emotions, and how the spaces in which protest and other activist practices take place shape the emotional and affective engagements of participants. As autonomous forms of activism attempt to prefiguratively enact new post-capitalist social relations in the here and now, we suggest there is still some way to go in changing affective relationships within many of these groups.     

Escaping affect: how motivated emotion regulation creates insensitivity to mass suffering

As the number of people in need of help increases, the degree of compassion people feel for them ironically tends to decrease. This phenomenon is termed the collapse of compassion. Some researchers have suggested that this effect happens because emotions are not triggered by aggregates. We provide evidence for an alternative account. People expect the needs of large groups to be potentially overwhelming, and, as a result, they engage in emotion regulation to prevent themselves from experiencing overwhelming levels of emotion. Because groups are more likely than individuals to elicit emotion regulation, people feel less for groups than for individuals. In Experiment 1, participants displayed the collapse of compassion only when they expected to be asked to donate money to the victims. This suggests that the effect is motivated by self-interest. Experiment 2 showed that the collapse of compassion emerged only for people who were skilled at emotion regulation. In Experiment 3, we manipulated emotion regulation. Participants who were told to down-regulate their emotions showed the collapse of compassion, but participants who were told to experience their emotions did not. We examined the time course of these effects using a dynamic rating to measure affective responses in real time. The time course data suggested that participants regulate emotion toward groups proactively, by preventing themselves from ever experiencing as much emotion toward groups as toward individuals. These findings provide initial evidence that motivated emotion regulation drives insensitivity to mass suffering.