DESIRES, VALUES, REASONS, AND THE DUALISM OF PRACTICAL REASON

In On What Matters Derek Parfit argues that facts about reasons for action are grounded in facts about values and against the view that they are grounded in facts about the desires that subjects would have after fully informed and rational deliberation. I describe and evaluate Parfit's arguments for this value-based conception of reasons for action and find them wanting. I also assess his response to Sidgwick's suggestion that there is a Dualism of Practical Reason. Parfit seems not to notice that his preferred value-based conception of reasons for action augurs strongly in favour of a view like Sidgwick's. ¹     

REFLECTIONS ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION GOALS IN PSYCHOLOGY ADMISSIONS

Four goals of affirmative action in higher education are described as they relate to psychology admissions. Broadly conceived, these goals are compensating for past injustice, correcting present inequity, promoting intellectual diversity, and enhancing the presence of role models. It is argued that the four goats differ in their underlying assumptions about the purposes of affirmative action and that these differences can result in disparate admission decisions. Data from three experiments on decision making in graduate psychology admissions are presented to illustrate the analysis. In these studies, academic psychologists rated the admissibility of hypothetical graduate student applicants who varied on a number of characteristics (e g., ethnicity, social class, interest in minority research) pertinent to affirmative action. A consistent pattern of ethnic group differences in admissibility ratings was documented, illustrating that compensation for past injustice can be interpreted as a salient affirmative action goal in graduate admissions decisions. Implications of the analysis for clarifying admissions decisions guided by affirmative action goals are discussed.     

MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE UNITY OF THE VIRTUES

The ancient Greeks subscribed to the thesis of the Unity of Virtue, according to which the possession of one virtue is closely related to the possession of all the others. Yet empirical observation seems to contradict this thesis at every turn. What could the Greeks have been thinking of? The paper offers an interpretation and a tentative defence of a qualified version of the thesis. It argues that, as the Greeks recognized, virtue essentially involves knowledge – specifically, evaluative knowledge of what matters. Furthermore, such knowledge is essentially holistic. Perfect and complete possession of one virtue thus requires the knowledge that is needed for the possession of every other virtue. The enterprise of trying to reconcile the normative view embodied in this conception of virtue with empirical observation also serves as a case study for the field of moral psychology in which empirical and normative claims are often deeply and confusingly intertwined. ¹ 1 I owe thanks to audiences at the University of Arkansas, Rice University, the University of Texas, Princeton University, Yale University, Oxford University, the Australian National University, and Monash University, and more particularly to Robert Adams, John Cooper, and Jerome Schneewind for their extremely helpful and illuminating comments on an earlier version of this paper.
     

A LACANIAN LOOK AT ENGLISH ELEGANCE: SOME REFLECTIONS ON IAN MCEWAN'S ENDURING LOVE

This paper makes use of certain thought-provoking ideas from Lacan's seminars in the years between 1959 and 1962 in order to engage with the very subtly conveyed inner drama that subtends the plot of Ian McEwan's novel Enduring Love . Freud, in his 1914 paper 'On narcissism', had referred to theories on the earliest moments of subjectivity as 'nebulous, scarcely imagined concepts'. In 1959 Lacan created a concept that he called the o-object to make incursions into theories on the lasting impact of the anxiety-ridden passage of the small pre-subject into subjective existence. In particular, the seminar on Anxiety (1962-3), for all the convolutions of syntax and sense that render it so difficult to read, opens up reflections on this topic that are not dissimilar to those stimulated by McEwan's accomplished prose. Both Lacan and McEwan explore the problematic dissolution of the everyday distinction between subjectivity and objectivity attendant on the upsurge of anxiety driven by unconscious forces.     

MORAL REFORM,MORAL DISAGREEMENT,AND ABORTION

Abstract: Bernard Gert argues that legitimate moral disagreement calls for tolerance and moral humility; when there is more than one morally acceptable course of action, then intolerance and what Gert calls “moral arrogance” would be objectionable. This article identifies some possible difficulties in distinguishing moral arrogance from moral reform and then examines Gert's treatment of abortion as a contemporary example of moral disagreement that he characterizes as irresolvable.