Confusions and Conclusions: A Response to Doane

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate critically the logic and conclusions of Doane's article ( 14 ), and in so doing, to raise serious questions regarding her evaluation of the family interaction literature. In particular, we suggest that Doane's paper is characterized by (a) a confused and inaccurate presentation of previous reviews; (b) a vague and contradictory set of terms around which she attempts to recast previous findings; (c) an arbitrary and unsystematic selection of findings used to support suggestions regarding reliable group differences; (d) uncritical and erroneous interpretations of findings that ostensibly support suggested differences between groups; and (e) a superficial acceptance of recent family interaction data concerned with the relationship between communication deviance/clarity and psychopathology. We hope our detailed critique will stimulate other observers of family interaction research to contribute more accurate and significant perspectives to the field than those presented in Doane's review.     

Truth as a ‘Living Bond’: A Dialectical Response to Recent Rhetorical Theology

Abstract: In recent years, the Radical Orthodoxy movement (especially John Milbank) has developed an influential theological response to the putative nihilism inherent in modern philosophical tendencies to construe the relation between finite and infinite realities as utterly disjunctive and thus incapable of mediation. This response, which generally implies the championing of a ‘participatory’ ontology, has been very hostile to Protestant or ‘dialectical’ theology, whose insistence upon an ‘indirect’ rather than a ‘rhetorical’ form of truth is taken to implicate such theology in the nihilism of a ‘univocal’ ontology. In this article I offer another reading of the dialectical, via Søren Kierkegaard and René Girard, according to which its anti‐objectivism is due not to the inheritance of modern epistemological dilemmas but to a quite biblical existential rigor. I argue, contrary to Milbank, that this rigor is not finally gnostic, but instead that it alone can preserve the form of truth as a living, spiritual form.     

Applying Philosophy: A Response to O'Neill

abstract   I consider the putative originality of applied philosophy and seek to defend a version of it often called 'bottom up'. I review ways in which imagined cases may cause us to reconsider our normative commitments, and endorse a general attentiveness to the matter of how the world is and how it might reasonably be imagined. This is important if practical philosophers want to form the correct normative judgements, to be able to recognize the sui generis character of some moral theorising in particular domains, practically to enact their considered judgments, and properly to acknowledge how the real world, in the form of institutions, practices and a cultural framework, constrains, or facilitates, practical enactment. Throughout I illustrate my abstract claims by reference to the moral judgement and legal regulation of sexual behaviour .     

'Making Exceptions': A Response to Shue

abstract   In what follows I respond to Henry Shue's paper by focusing on three principal themes. The first is the relation of philosophical theory to practice, in which I agree that philosophers have to run the risks attendant upon applying reason to concrete cases. The second is the use of examples in moral philosophy, in particular the example used in the justification of torture as an exception; here I draw distinctions between different types of examples in philosophy and the uses to which they are put. Thirdly, in a brief consideration of our responses to climate change I suggest that, contra Shue, we are not being asked to go beyond a normal requirement so much as to re-establish the boundaries of what counts as normal .     

Licensing Parents: A Response to Critics

The objections of three distinguished critics to my 'Causes and Costs of Crime and a Controversial Cure' (this issue) are welcomed but, in some cases, returned for further consideration.     

Evolution and Providence: A Response to Thomas Tracy

The role of chance in evolutionary process need not negate belief in the purposes of the Creator. The nature of causality is not determined by science alone, for it requires also acts of metaphysical decision. Moreover, science's accounts of physical reality are notably patchy, with relationships between different regimes often ill-understood An honest science cannot exclude the exercise of agency, either human or divine. Evolutionary insight can offer some help with the problems of theodicy.     

Clarifying Cohen: A Response to Jubb and Hall

In this brief essay, we clarify Cohen’s ‘Facts and Principles’ argument, and then argue that the objections posed by two recent critiques of Cohen—Robert Jubb (Res Publica 15:337–353, 2009) and Edward Hall (Res Publica 19:173–181, 2013)—look especially vulnerable to the charge of being self-defeating. It may still be that Cohen’s view concerning facts and principles is false. Our aim here is merely to show that two recent attempts to demonstrate its falsity are unlikely to succeed.     

Anglo-American Postmodernity: A Response to Clayton and Robbins

In Anglo-American Postmodernity I call attention to recent intellectual shifts in epistemology (from foundationalism to holism), philosophy of language (from reference to use), and metaphysics (from reductionism to nonreductionism), and pursue the consequences of these changes for science, theology, and ethics. Wesley Robbins criticizes the book for making overly optimistic claims for the intellectual status of theology; Philip Clayton criticizes it for giving up the quest for general standards of rational progress. Both criticisms miss the mark in not taking on the account of rationality that I have developed from resources in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre.     

Fields and Theology: A Response to Wolfhart Pannenberg

In responding to Pannenberg's paper, "God as Spirit—and Natural Science," Polkinghorne challenges the paper's interpretation of the scientific concept of field. He insists on its physical, material nature, elaborated by quantum theory, and asserts that Pannenberg's concept of field is immaterial or even in some sense "spiritual." Polkinghorne also comments on how a physical theory may give rise to several differing, even contradictory, metaphysical interpretations.     

Referential Intentions: A Response to Buchanan and Peet

Buchanan [2014] argues for a Gricean solution to well-known counterexamples to direct reference theories of content. Peet [2016] develops a way to change the counterexample so that it seems to speak against Buchanan's own proposal. I argue that both theorists fail to notice a significant distinction between the kinds of cases at issue. Those appearing to count against direct reference theory must be described such that speakers have false beliefs about the identity of the object to which they intend to refer, beliefs that appear relevant to the determination of what constitutes communicative success. This suggests, further, that cases of this sort do not provide a basis for robust generalizations about singular reference.