Need for closure effect on collective action intentions and behavior toward immigrants in Italy: The mediation of binding foundations and political conservatism

Why are people (de)motivated to mobilize in favor of immigrants? Addressing this question, we investigated the role of individuals' epistemic motivation (i.e., need for closure) in influencing the process of becoming motivated to participate in collective action in favor of immigrants in Italy. Specifically, the mediational role of binding moral foundations and political conservatism in explaining the relationship between need for closure and collective action in favor of immigrants was examined in three studies. It was hypothesized that a heightened need for closure would be indirectly and negatively associated with collective action in favor of immigrants, sequentially mediated first through binding moral foundations and then political conservatism. We found support for this prediction when either dispositional measure (Study 1 and Study 2) or an experimental induction (Study 3) of need for closure were used, and when both collective action intentions (Study 1 and Study 3) and behavior (Study 2) were assessed. The results suggest that need for closure constitutes a powerful motivational force that leads individuals to engage in uncertainty‐reducing evaluations and actions. We discuss these results regarding how they are related with previous work and their implications for research and practice.     

The Uncertainty Paradox: Perceived Threat Moderates the Effect of Uncertainty on Political Tolerance

People respond to dissimilar political beliefs in a variety of ways, ranging from openness and acceptance to closed‐mindedness and intolerance. While there is reason to believe that uncertainty may influence political tolerance, the direction of this influence remains unclear. We propose that threat moderates the effect of uncertainty on tolerance; when safe, uncertainty leads to greater tolerance, yet when threatened, uncertainty leads to reduced tolerance. Using independent manipulations of threat and uncertainty, we provide support for this hypothesis. This research demonstrates that, although feelings of threat and uncertainty can be independent, it is also important to understand their interaction.     

Liberalism and Conservatism,for a Change! Rethinking the Association Between Political Orientation and Relation to Societal Change

According to common wisdom, which is supported by extant psychological theorizing, a core feature of political conservatism (vs. liberalism) is the resistance to (vs. acceptance of) societal change. We propose that an empirical examination of the actual difference in political liberals’ and conservatives’ attitudes toward change across different sociopolitical issues may call into question this assumed association between political orientation and relation to change. We examined this proposition in four studies conducted in Germany. In Study 1, we assessed lay people's intuitions about liberals’ and conservatives’ attitudes toward change. Results of this study concur with theoretical assumptions that liberals accept and conservatives resist change. In Study 2a, Study 2b, and Study 3, self‐identified liberals and conservatives were asked whether they would resist or accept change on various sociopolitical issues. Results of these studies suggest that both conservatives and liberals resist and accept societal changes, depending on the extent to which they approve or disapprove of the status quo on a given sociopolitical issue. Overall, our findings provide no evidence for a one‐directional association between political orientation and the tendency to accept or resist change. These findings therefore challenge theoretical and lay assumptions regarding general, context‐independent psychological differences underlying political ideologies.     

Political conservatism as motivated social cognition

Analyzing political conservatism as motivated social cognition integrates theories of personality (authoritarianism, dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity), epistemic and existential needs (for closure, regulatory focus, terror management), and ideological rationalization (social dominance, system justification). A meta-analysis (88 samples, 12 countries, 22,818 cases) confirms that several psychological variables predict political conservatism: death anxiety (weighted mean r = .50); system instability (.47); dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity (.34); openness to experience (-.32); uncertainty tolerance (-.27); needs for order, structure, and closure (.26); integrative complexity (-.20); fear of threat and loss (.18); and self-esteem (-.09). The core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to change and justification of inequality and is motivated by needs that vary situationally and dispositionally to manage uncertainty and threat.     

Relationships between core ideological motives,social and economic conservatism,and religiosity: Evidence from a Turkish sample

The “conservatism as motivated social cognition” approach posits two core ideological motives underlying political conservatism across cultures. However, there is a scarcity of tests from non‐Western cultures, and much research has failed to distinguish between social and economic conservatism. Using a relatively large undergraduate sample from a non‐Western, predominantly Muslim country (Turkey), we tested the associations among resistance to change and opposition to equality motives, social and economic conservatism, right‐wing political orientation, and religiosity. In line with the “conservatism as motivated social cognition” account, we found that (a) social conservatism is more strongly related to resistance to change (rather than opposition to equality), (b) economic conservatism is more strongly related to opposition to equality (rather than resistance to change), (c) social conservatism is the strongest predictor of right‐wing political orientation among other conservatism measures, and (d) political orientation and religiosity had divergent effects: While right‐wing political orientation was related to economic conservatism, religiosity was inversely related to the latter, providing support for previous work indicating a resemblance between leftists and Islamists in Turkey. The results generally support the motivated social cognition approach to conservatism while also highlighting the importance of distinguishing between social and economic conservatism.     

Political Intolerance,Right and Left

Research recently published in Political Psychology suggested that political intolerance is more strongly predicted by political conservatism than liberalism. Our findings challenge that conclusion. Participants provided intolerance judgments of several targets and the political objective of these targets (left‐wing vs. right‐wing) was varied between subjects. Across seven judgments, conservatism predicted intolerance of left‐wing targets, while liberalism predicted intolerance of right‐wing targets. These relationships were fully mediated by perceived threat from targets. Moreover, participants were biased against directly opposing political targets: conservatives were more intolerant of a left‐wing target than the opposing right‐wing target (e.g., pro‐gay vs. anti‐gay rights activists), while liberals were more intolerant of a right‐wing target than the opposing left‐wing target. These findings are discussed within the context of the existing political intolerance and motivated reasoning literatures.     

Need for Cognitive Closure and Conservative Political Beliefs: Differential Mediation by Personal Worldviews

The paper investigates the relationships between motivated social cognition (need for cognitive closure), personal worldviews (traditional, modern, or postmodern), and conservative political beliefs. The relationships were analyzed in a sample of 189 Polish adults. High need for closure was associated with support for both traditional and modern worldviews. Although different in content (i.e., endorsing different values and assumptions about the methods and limits of cognition), the worldviews share similar formal characteristics: Both assume the absolute nature of values and the existence of definite truths. However, acceptance of the traditional worldview was related to political conservatism (i.e., support for nationalist and isolationist opinions and a stronger role for traditional, religious values in public life), whereas acceptance of the modern worldview was associated with a rejection of conservative political beliefs. Moreover, personal worldviews mediated the relationship between need for closure and political beliefs: Support for social conservatism was mediated by acceptance of the traditional worldview, whereas acceptance of the modern worldview predicted rejection of conservative values.     

Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

Individuals are not merely passive vessels of whatever beliefs and opinions they have been exposed to; rather, they are attracted to belief systems that resonate with their own psychological needs and interests, including epistemic, existential, and relational needs to attain certainty, security, and social belongingness. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway ( 2003 ) demonstrated that needs to manage uncertainty and threat were associated with core values of political conservatism, namely respect for tradition and acceptance of inequality. Since 2003 there have been far more studies on the psychology of left‐right ideology than in the preceding half century, and their empirical yield helps to address lingering questions and criticisms. We have identified 181 studies of epistemic motivation (involving 130,000 individual participants) and nearly 100 studies of existential motivation (involving 360,000 participants). These databases, which are much larger and more heterogeneous than those used in previous meta‐analyses, confirm that significant ideological asymmetries exist with respect to dogmatism, cognitive/perceptual rigidity, personal needs for order/structure/closure, integrative complexity, tolerance of ambiguity/uncertainty, need for cognition, cognitive reflection, self‐deception, and subjective perceptions of threat. Exposure to objectively threatening circumstances—such as terrorist attacks, governmental warnings, and shifts in racial demography—contribute to modest “conservative shifts” in public opinion. There are also ideological asymmetries in relational motivation, including the desire to share reality, perceptions of within‐group consensus, collective self‐efficacy, homogeneity of social networks, and the tendency to trust the government more when one's own political party is in power. Although some object to the very notion that there are meaningful psychological differences between leftists and rightists, the identification of “elective affinities” between cognitive‐motivational processes and contents of specific belief systems is essential to the study of political psychology. Political psychologists may contribute to the development of a good society not by downplaying ideological differences or advocating “Swiss‐style neutrality” when it comes to human values, but by investigating such phenomena critically, even—or perhaps especially—when there is pressure in society to view them uncritically.     

On the Grammar of Politics—or Why Conservatives Prefer Nouns

Previous research indicates that political conservatism is associated with epistemic needs for structure and certainty (Jost et al., 2003) and that nouns elicit clearer and more definite perceptions of reality than other parts of speech (Carnaghi et al., 2008). We therefore hypothesized that conservatives would exhibit preferences for nouns (vs. verbs and adjectives), insofar as nouns are better suited to satisfy epistemic needs. In Study 1, we observed that social conservatism was associated with noun preferences in Polish and that personal need for structure accounted for the association between ideology and grammatical preferences. In Study 2, conducted in Arabic, social conservatism was associated with a preference for the use of nominal sentences (composed of nouns only) over verbal sentences (which included verbs and adjectives). In Study 3, we found that more conservative U.S. presidents used greater proportions of nouns in major speeches, and this effect was related to integrative complexity. We discuss the possibility that conservative ideology is linked to grammatical preferences that foster feelings of stability and predictability.     

个体的政治倾向及其变化机制

政治倾向是个体在意识形态上的定位, 可以分为自由主义和保守主义, 政治倾向使个体在认知和行为等方面存在显著差异。虽然个体的政治倾向相对稳定, 但也会受威胁的影响而变化。动机性社会认知理论认为威胁使所有人都变得更加保守, 恐惧管理理论认为威胁使个体更坚信自己原有的文化世界观, 使原有政治倾向更加明显。本文在深入分析讨论的基础上, 指出两种理论分歧的原因在于忽略了外部威胁与内部威胁的不同。内部威胁可加强人们原有的政治倾向, 外部威胁可使人们更趋向保守。未来研究应在内外部威胁影响政治倾向变化的机制、政治倾向的本土化研究以及促进不同政治倾向个体间的和谐关系上做出努力。     

Political Conservatism,Need for Cognitive Closure,and Intergroup Hostility

Two studies examined the interaction of political conservatism and the need for cognitive closure in predicting aggressiveness in intergroup conflict and hostility toward outgroups. In the first study, Polish participants indicated their preference for coercive conflict strategies in the context of a real‐life intergroup conflict. Only among participants who identify themselves as conservative, need for cognitive closure was positively and significantly related to preference for aggressive actions against the outgroup. In the second study, the predicted interaction was investigated in the context of the terrorist threat in Poland. The findings indicated that high in need for closure conservatives showed greater hostility against Arabs and Muslims only when they believed that Poland was under threat of terrorist attacks inspired by Islamist fundamentalism.     

Are needs to manage uncertainty and threat associated with political conservatism or ideological extremity?

Three studies are conducted to assess the uncertainty- threat model of political conservatism, which posits that psychological needs to manage uncertainty and threat are associated with political orientation. Results from structural equation models provide consistent support for the hypothesis that uncertainty avoidance (e.g., need for order, intolerance of ambiguity, and lack of openness to experience) and threat management (e.g., death anxiety, system threat, and perceptions of a dangerous world) each contributes independently to conservatism (vs. liberalism). No support is obtained for alternative models, which predict that uncertainty and threat management are associated with ideological extremism or extreme forms of conservatism only. Study 3 also reveals that resistance to change fully mediates the association between uncertainty avoidance and conservatism, whereas opposition to equality partially mediates the association between threat and conservatism. Implications for understanding the epistemic and existential bases of political orientation are discussed.     

Brexit or Bremain? A person and social analysis of voting decisions in the EU referendum

The period following UK's European Union referendum in 2016 foreshadows significant social and political change in the UK. The current research draws on social psychological theories to empirically examine the drivers of voting decisions during the referendum. We report the results of a prospective study using structural equation modelling with data (N = 244) collected just before, and self‐reported voting behaviour immediately following (N = 197), the European Union referendum. We employ a person and social approach to examine the additive roles of worldview, conservatism, social identity, and intergroup threat as predictors of voting intentions and behaviour. Results showed that person factors (worldview and conservatism) predicted voting intentions through social factors (European identity and realistic threat) and that intentions predicted behaviour. The results highlight the importance of addressing threat‐based intergroup rhetoric and the potential of common in‐group identity to mitigate psychological threat.     

Epistemic motives and cultural conformity: need for closure, culture, and context as determinants of conflict judgments

Three studies support the proposal that need for closure (NFC) involves a desire for consensual validation that leads to cultural conformity. Individual differences in NFC interact with cultural group variables to determine East Asian versus Western differences in conflict style and procedural preferences (Study 1), information gathering in disputes (Study 2), and fairness judgment in reward allocations (Study 3). Results from experimental tests indicate that the relevance of NFC to cultural conformity reflects consensus motives rather than effort minimization (Study 2) or political conservatism (Study 3). Implications for research on conflict resolution and motivated cultural cognition are discussed.     

Self‐Control Success Revealed: Greater Approach Motivation Towards Healthy versus Unhealthy Food

Deviating from existing literature on self‐control failure the current research examines self‐control success and the role of motivation. Functional research suggests people visually perceive objects to be bigger when they are motivated to approach them. Using the size perception task, participants estimated the size of a healthy and an unhealthy food object that were identical in size. In the current research we simulated a reflective state vs. impulsive state using an ego‐depletion manipulation in Study 1 and a cognitive load manipulation in Study 2. Results from both studies revealed that participants in a reflective state (vs. impulsive state) assigned increased size estimations to the healthy food item compared to the unhealthy food item. Current findings demonstrate greater approach motivation towards a ‘virtue’ (i.e., healthy food) as a mechanism that underlies self‐control success, suggesting that successful self‐control involves initiating approach towards a virtue rather than inhibiting a vice. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Threat causes liberals to think like conservatives

In Study 1, politically liberal college students’ in-group favoritism increased after a system-injustice threat, becoming as pronounced as that of conservatives. Studies 2 and 3 conceptually replicated these results with low preference for consistency [Cialdini, R. B., Trost, M. R., & Newsom, J. T. (1995). Preference for consistency: The development of a valid measure and the discovery of surprising behavioral implications. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 318-328.] as a dispositional measure of liberalism. In Study 2, following a mortality salience threat, dispositionally liberal students showed as much conviction in their attitudes toward capital punishment and abortion as dispositional conservatives did. In Study 3, after a mortality salience threat, liberal students became as staunchly unsupportive of homosexuals as conservatives were. The findings that political and dispositional liberals become more politically and psychologically conservative after threats provide convergent experimental support for the [Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129 339-375.] contention that conservatism is a basic form of motivated social cognition.     

The Differential Effects of Right‐Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation on Political Intolerance

Decades of scholarship have identified several determinants of political intolerance, including authoritarianism and normative threat. Previous attempts in the literature to associate other individual difference variables (i.e., social dominance orientation [SDO]) and situational variables (i.e., out‐groups' gains in power and status) have been unsuccessful. Using a dual‐process motivational (DPM) model framework, in Study 1 we found that SDO predicted political intolerance of groups with hierarchy‐attenuating political objectives. This relationship was consistent over and above other well‐known predictors of political intolerance, including right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA). RWA predicted intolerance of groups with both hierarchy‐attenuating and cohesion‐reducing objectives. In Study 2, we manipulated whether an immigrant‐rights group was described as presenting a normative threat or as gaining power and status. Consistent with extant findings, RWA moderated the effect of normative threat on political intolerance. More interestingly, SDO moderated the effect of gains in power and status on political intolerance. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Political ideology as motivated social cognition: Behavioral and neuroscientific evidence

Ideology is a potent motivational force; human beings are capable of committing atrocities (as well as acts of generosity and courage) and sacrificing even their own lives for the sake of abstract belief systems. In this article, we summarize the major tenets of a model of political ideology as motivated social cognition (Jost et al. in Psychol Bull 129:339–375, 2003a, Psychol Bull 129:389–393, 2003b, Person Soc Psychol Bull 33:989–1007, 2007), focusing on epistemic, existential, and relational motives and their implications for left-right (or liberal-conservative) political orientation. We review behavioral evidence indicating that chronically and temporarily activated needs to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity, threat, and disgust are positively associated with conservatism (or negatively associated with liberalism). Studies from neuroscience and genetics suggest that right- (vs. left-) wing orientation is associated with greater neural sensitivity to threat and larger amygdala volume, as well as less sensitivity to response conflict and smaller anterior cingulate volume. These findings and others provide converging evidence for Jost and colleagues’ model of ideology as motivated social cognition and, more broadly, reflect the utility of an integrative political neuroscience approach to understanding the basic cognitive, neural, and motivational processes that give rise to ideological activity.     

Conservatism positively predicted fading affect bias in the 2016 US presidential election at low,but not high,levels of negative affect

Unpleasant affect fades faster than pleasant affect and this Fading Affect Bias (FAB) phenomenon is positively related to healthy outcomes and negatively related to unhealthy outcomes, which makes the FAB a healthy coping process/reaction. Rehearsal seems to be the cognitive mechanism responsible for the FAB. Although the FAB and its relation to healthy outcomes and rehearsal have been examined in many contexts, they have not been evaluated in the realm of politics. Therefore, we evaluated the FAB across event type and we examined the relation of FAB to political leaning (conservatism), unhealthy variables, healthy variables, and rehearsal for the 2016 US Presidential Election. We expected and found that FAB was larger for non‐political events than for election/political events, and conservatism positively predicted FAB. We also expected and found that unhealthy/healthy outcome variables related to FAB in predictable ways. Importantly, we found that negative affect moderated the relation of FAB and conservatism, and rehearsal ratings mediated this 3‐way interaction. The results supported emotion regulation models, such as the mobilization‐minimization hypothesis and self‐enhancement theory.     

Low-effort thought promotes political conservatism

The authors test the hypothesis that low-effort thought promotes political conservatism. In Study 1, alcohol intoxication was measured among bar patrons; as blood alcohol level increased, so did political conservatism (controlling for sex, education, and political identification). In Study 2, participants under cognitive load reported more conservative attitudes than their no-load counterparts. In Study 3, time pressure increased participants' endorsement of conservative terms. In Study 4, participants considering political terms in a cursory manner endorsed conservative terms more than those asked to cogitate; an indicator of effortful thought (recognition memory) partially mediated the relationship between processing effort and conservatism. Together these data suggest that political conservatism may be a process consequence of low-effort thought; when effortful, deliberate thought is disengaged, endorsement of conservative ideology increases.