Beyond “Heartless Conservative” and “Bleeding Heart Liberal” Caricatures: How Religiosity Shapes the Relationship Between Political Orientation and Empathy

Is political orientation associated with self‐reported empathy? Popular caricatures frame political orientation in terms of the “heartless conservative” and the “bleeding heart liberal.” Yet, previous research has produced findings that present mixed evidence to support these caricatures. Using data from the 2004 General Social Survey, analyses show that the caricatures of the caring liberal and the cold‐hearted conservative are supported by results for empathy—in which conservatives have lower levels of empathy than liberals—but this pattern holds only when individuals also have low levels of religiosity. In the context of high religiosity, self‐identified conservatives do not have lower empathy than self‐identified liberals, net of a host of sociodemographic characteristics. Our observations demonstrate that patterns in empathy across political orientation are evident only when levels of different forms of religiosity are considered.     

Does “humanization” of the preborn explain why conservatives (vs. liberals) oppose abortion?

Those on the political right (vs. left) generally oppose abortion, with preborn humanness frequently cited as the reason. We test whether differences in preborn humanness perceptions actually underpin left–right differences in abortion support. We examine two types of right-wing ideology in student and community samples, asking whether perceptions of preborn humanness (a) explain conservative (vs. liberal) opposition to abortion; or (b) exert a greater impact on abortion opposition among conservatives (vs. liberals). Without exception, perceptions of preborn humanness explained very little of right–left differences in abortion support, and the association between preborn humanness perceptions and abortion opposition was no stronger for those on the political right (vs. left). These findings suggest that left–right differences on this critical, election-relevant social attitude are not explained by beliefs about “humanness”, contrary to popular belief.     

Sexualstrafrecht,Sexualmoral, Medienmoral

The law on sexual offences is a crystallization point of legal doctrine and criminal political dispute. It reflects in a special way the tendency and content of a “modernization”, which is characterized by an alienation of collectives and an orientation to a topus of being strictly personal and is defined as quasi-natural. The current hypertrophization of the legal protection of self-determination is closely coupled with the tendency towards socioeconomic dissolution of the western contemporary personhood. This article addresses terminological and systematic associations between “liberal” concepts of governmental restraint and “modern” concepts of a functional security strategy.     

The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives: Personality Profiles,Interaction Styles,and the Things They Leave Behind

Although skeptics continue to doubt that most people are “ideological,” evidence suggests that meaningful left‐right differences do exist and that they may be rooted in basic personality dispositions, that is, relatively stable individual differences in psychological needs, motives, and orientations toward the world. Seventy‐five years of theory and research on personality and political orientation has produced a long list of dispositions, traits, and behaviors. Applying a theory of ideology as motivated social cognition and a “Big Five” framework, we find that two traits, Openness to New Experiences and Conscientiousness, parsimoniously capture many of the ways in which individual differences underlying political orientation have been conceptualized. In three studies we investigate the relationship between personality and political orientation using multiple domains and measurement techniques, including: self‐reported personality assessment; nonverbal behavior in the context of social interaction; and personal possessions and the characteristics of living and working spaces. We obtained consistent and converging evidence that personality differences between liberals and conservatives are robust, replicable, and behaviorally significant, especially with respect to social (vs. economic) dimensions of ideology. In general, liberals are more open‐minded, creative, curious, and novelty seeking, whereas conservatives are more orderly, conventional, and better organized.     

Explicit Sexual Movie Viewing in the United States According to Selected Marriage and Lifestyle,Work and Financial,Religion and Political Factors

The purpose of the current study was to evaluate explicit sexual movie use among men and women in the United States according to relationship, lifestyle, work, financial, religious, and political factors. Analyses involved 11,372 adults who responded to questions about demographics and explicitly sexual movie use in the General Social Survey (GSS) from 2000 to 2014. Viewing of an explicit sexual movie in the previous year was significantly greater in men than women (35 vs. 16%); Blacks than Whites (33 vs. 22%); and never married (41 vs. 18% married, 31% separated, and 24% divorced). It also decreased with older age, higher education, and more children in the household. After model adjustment for these variables, viewing an explicit sexual movie was associated with a number of relationship, lifestyle, financial, religious, political, and other variables. For example, viewing such movies was related to less happiness in marriage, multiple sex partners in past year, less satisfaction with one’s financial situation, no religious preference, and a more liberal political orientation. The effect of some variables on pornography viewing differed between men and women. For example, out of men and women who consider themselves to be “not spiritual”, men were more likely to view pornography than women. Explicit sexual movie viewing is associated with factors from diverse domains, including poorer relationship quality, more liberal sexual views and practices, poorer economic conditions, lower religious orientation or commitment, and more liberal political views.     

Republican Voters Prefer Candidates Who Have Conservative‐Looking Faces: New Evidence From Exit Polls

Research shows people share common political facial stereotypes: They associate faces with political ideologies. Moreover, given that many voters rely on party affiliation, political ideology, and appearances to select political candidates, we might expect that political facial stereotypes would sway voting preferences and, by extension, the share of votes going to each candidate in an election. And yet few studies have examined whether having a stereotypically conservative‐looking (or liberal‐looking) face predicts a candidate's vote shares. Using data from U.S. election exit polls, we show that the Republican voters within each state are more likely to vote for a candidate (even a Democrat) the more that person has a stereotypically Republican‐looking face. By contrast, the voting choices of the Democratic voters within each state are unrelated to political facial stereotypes. Moreover, we show that the relationship between political facial stereotypes and voting does not depend on state‐level ideology: Republican voters in both right‐leaning (“red”) and left‐leaning (“blue”) states are more likely to vote for candidates with conservative‐looking faces. These results have several important practical and theoretical implications concerning the nature and impact of political facial stereotypes, which we discuss.     

Political Conservatism and Left–Right Orientation in 28 Eastern and Western European Countries

The relationship between political conservatism and left–right orientation was examined in 15 Western European and 13 former communist Central and Eastern European countries using the data from European Social Survey Round 3 (N = 46,103) and Round 4 (N = 50,601). Cross‐culturally validated values were used to measure the two potential aspects of conservatism: resistance to change and acceptance of inequality. Both of these aspects were positively related to right‐wing orientation in Western countries. In the former communist countries, the relationships were positive, negative, and nonexistent; they differed between the countries and varied between 2006 and 2008. The results indicate that conservatism can be related to left‐wing or right‐wing orientation depending on the cultural, political, and economic situation of the society in question. The results also show that despite the shared communist past, former communist Central and Eastern Europe is a diverse region that should be treated as such also in research.     

From left to right: Processing acronyms referring to names of political parties activates spatial associations

In line with previous studies, showing that abstract concepts like “power” or “god” implicitly activate spatial associations, in the present study we hypothesized that spatial associations are coactivated during the processing of acronyms referring to names of political parties as well. In four studies, it was found that the reading of these acronyms was accompanied by the implicit activation of spatial left–right associations. That is, participants responded faster to left-wing parties by means of a left-hand button press and vice versa for right-wing parties (Experiments 1 to 3), and participants responded faster when a political acronym was presented at the side of the screen corresponding to the political orientation of the acronym (Experiment 4). Interestingly, a correlation was observed between the effect size for left-wing parties and participants' political preferences, suggesting that the reaction time effects reflect the perceived distance of a party to one's own political orientation. Together these findings indicate that spatial representations activated in response to political acronyms do not simply reflect lexical–semantic associations or spatial metaphors, but representations of parties' political orientation relative to one's own sociopolitical position.     

Authoritarianism without Dominant Ideology: Political Manifestations of Authoritarian Attitudes in Hungary

Since the publication of Adorno, Frenkel‐Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford's (1950 ) classic study, considerable debate has developed concerning the political and ideological correlates of authoritarianism. This paper examines relationships between authoritarianism, on the one hand, and self‐identification with ideological labels, attitudes toward political extremists, and party preferences, on the other hand. The survey data have been collected in Hungary between 1994 and 2002. Findings indicate that it is the center‐right ideology and political orientation that attracts most authoritarians, yet authoritarian extreme‐left also survives. The findings also show that liberal orientation and center‐left identification constitute the political counter‐pole of authoritarianism. Extreme‐right supporters are found to be attracted only to particular aspects of authoritarianism.     

Relationships between core ideological motives,social and economic conservatism,and religiosity: Evidence from a Turkish sample

The “conservatism as motivated social cognition” approach posits two core ideological motives underlying political conservatism across cultures. However, there is a scarcity of tests from non‐Western cultures, and much research has failed to distinguish between social and economic conservatism. Using a relatively large undergraduate sample from a non‐Western, predominantly Muslim country (Turkey), we tested the associations among resistance to change and opposition to equality motives, social and economic conservatism, right‐wing political orientation, and religiosity. In line with the “conservatism as motivated social cognition” account, we found that (a) social conservatism is more strongly related to resistance to change (rather than opposition to equality), (b) economic conservatism is more strongly related to opposition to equality (rather than resistance to change), (c) social conservatism is the strongest predictor of right‐wing political orientation among other conservatism measures, and (d) political orientation and religiosity had divergent effects: While right‐wing political orientation was related to economic conservatism, religiosity was inversely related to the latter, providing support for previous work indicating a resemblance between leftists and Islamists in Turkey. The results generally support the motivated social cognition approach to conservatism while also highlighting the importance of distinguishing between social and economic conservatism.     

Political Ideology Outdoes Personal Experience in Predicting Support for Gender Equality

Indices of gender equality provide an inconsistent picture of current gender inequality in countries with relatively high equality. We examined women's and men's subjectively perceived gender inequality and their support for gender equality in the general population and in politicians, respectively, in three countries with relatively high gender equality: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany (total N = 1,612). In both women's and men's perceptions, women were treated more unequally than men. However, the inequality that women perceived was larger than the inequality men perceived. Additionally, women reported they personally experience less inequality than women as a group (person-group discrepancy). Finally, women's and men's left/liberal (vs. right/conservative) political ideology turned out to be a relatively more powerful predictor of support for gender equality than perceived personal and societal inequality. We discuss reasons for why political ideology emerged as the strongest predictor of equality support and sketch out implications for policy efforts toward promoting gender equality.     

The Liberalization of Young Evangelicals: A Research Note

Media outlets and observers of American religion suggest that young evangelicals are retreating from the ranks of the “Christian right” and are embracing more liberal positions on controversial social issues. We test this hypothesis using the Baylor Religion Survey. We examine two separate measures of evangelical identity as well as a wide variety of political identifications and attitudes. Our study indicates that young evangelicals (1) are significantly more likely than older evangelicals to think that more should be done to protect the environment; (2) hold views similar to older evangelicals regarding abortion, same‐sex marriage, stem cell research, marijuana use, government welfare spending, spending on the nation's health, and the war in Iraq; and (3) remain significantly more conservative than nonevangelicals on these same social issues. We find no strong evidence to support the notion that young evangelicals are retreating from traditional positions or increasingly adopting more liberal positions on hot‐button or controversial social issues.     

Genetic inquiry and ideological thought

It is customary to apply the term “ideology” to political statements and statements about politics believed to be saturated with irrational elements. Since more often than not it is applied to the political science and policies of parties of the extreme, one may suspect that this usage is itself colored by political interests. However, “ideology” can be redefined at the level of a meta‐science that reduces, though it cannot altogether eliminate, the partisan function of language about politics. Ideological thinking can then be shown to involve a logical error that is the counterpart of the genetic fallacy. Surprisingly, in this usage liberal political science, or that with liberal preconceptions, is a more frequent offender against the logic of science than a science of politics with illiberal preconceptions.     

Defending the Faith(s)? Democracy and Hereditary Right in England

The persistence of traditional monarchies in modern societies, which are otherwise characterized by democratic and egalitarian values, remains a paradox in the social sciences. In part this is attributable to the lack of psychological investigation into the relationship between subject and sovereign, and in particular the ways in which the political and social values of the citizenry shape understandings of a hereditary monarch's right to represent a national community. Adopting the qualitative analysis methods of discursive psychology and grounded theory, the current study examines vernacular accounts of nationhood and monarchy in England in both formalized conversational interviews (n = 60) and impromptu street interviews (n = 56). Focusing on accounts of Prince Charles's recent proposal to change the role of the monarch, from “Defender of the (Christian) Faith” to “Defender of Faiths,” those in favor treated it as a positive step towards reflecting a diverse (religious) community, bringing the monarchy into line with current concerns of pluralism and upholding values of personal choice and individual rights. Participants who rejected the proposed change in title construed it as antithetical to these values in terms of reflecting personal stake and interest, an abuse of power, or an imposition on other faiths. In all accounts, the prime concern was in safeguarding the political and social values of the citizenry. In conclusion it is argued that the study of subjects' relationship to the monarch, its function and legitimacy, can provide an opportunity to examine how values can characterize a national community and facilitate national diversity.     

On Nancy Fraser's “Women,Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation”

In “Women, Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation,” Nancy Fraser pursues a “meaning-oriented” inquiry intended to illuminate the gender bias of the American welfare system in order to aid feminists and their allies in the continuing political struggles over the welfare system. For Fraser the fundamental issues are over judgments about what women need—“need interpretation.” I argue that although her analysis of the system is vivid and provocative, it is inadequate as a contribution either to political theory or practical strategy. Fraser substitutes a search for patterns and meanings for careful clarification and defense of political values. She leaves needs without foundation and does not explore the capacities for change in modem liberal states. The meanings she reveals provide us neither with a sound basis for judgments on political values nor with a strategy for improvement.     

Thick or Thin?

If liberal Protestantism begins with suspicion of tradition, is “thick” liberal Protestant theology possible or must liberal Protestant theology always be “thin”? This review essay examines several recent contributions to “thick” theology that make use of, and speak to, social and political engagement. The books under review describe and reflect on the varied forms of Christian political activism and organizing that have emerged in recent years around issues of immigration, fair wages, and global justice. I argue that a distinction between Christian activism and Christian organizing must be made, where the former denotes advocacy on behalf of a community and the latter means standing together with a community, bringing out the capacities of community members, and allowing oneself to be transformed in the process. Further, I reflect on whether liberal Christian theology necessarily results in liberal politics.     

The effects of gender, race, religion, and political orientation on the sex role attitudes of college freshmen.

Freshmen (N = 556) at a large eastern private university were administered a questionnaire during the first week of classes. A social learning perspective was used to examine the effects of gender, race (Asian, black, and white), religion (Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant), and political orientation (liberal and conservative) on four areas of sex role ideology--traditional attitudes toward female sexuality, justification of male dominance, negative attitudes toward homosexuality, and attitudes toward feminism. Although all four independent variables produced a significant effect on at least one measure of sex role ideology, religion and political orientation produced significant differences on all four sex role measures. Liberals as compared to conservatives and Jews as compared to Protestants were less traditional in their attitudes toward female sexuality, less accepting of male dominance and negative attitudes toward homosexuality, and more accepting of feminist attitudes. The results support the view that entering freshmen have established sex role belief systems that tend to be organized around constellations of traditional/conservative versus egalitarian/liberal attitudes.     

The Individualist? The autonomy of reason in Kant’s philosophy and educational views

Immanuel Kant is often viewed by educational theorists as an individualist, who put education on “an individual track,” paving the way for political liberal conceptions of education such as that of John Rawls. One can easily find evidence for such a view, in “Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’,” as well as in his more metaphysical, moral inquiries. However, the place of reason in Kant’s philosophy––what I call the “autonomy of reason”––spells out a negative rather than positive conception of freedom, from which stems a less individualistic or political liberal education than many presume. I cite both well known and lesser known works in the essay to demonstrate that Kant defended universal freedom only as a means towards developing the “autonomy of reason”, and I consider comparatively the education it entails with that spelled out by Rawls, despite the common conflation of the two.     

MODERN LIBERALISM AND PRIDE An Augustinian Perspective

In “Toward an Augustinian Liberalism,” Paul Weithman argues that modern liberal institutions should be concerned with the political vice of pride as a threat to the neutral, legitimate use of public power that liberalism demands. By directing our attention to pride, Weithman attempts to provide an incentive to and foundation for an Augustinian liberalism that can counteract this threat. While Weithman is right to point to the centrality of pride in understanding the modern liberal tradition, an investigation of the early modern reflections on pride in politics reveals a deeper tension between Augustine and modern liberalism than Weithman's analysis acknowledges. This essay discusses this tension by focusing on Hobbes's account of pride and equality in the commonwealth, asking whether Hobbes can be understood as a thinker in the Augustinian political tradition. In order to provide a background on pride as a political vice, this essay contrasts Aristotelian magnanimity with Augustinian humility. Finally, Aquinas's attempt to reintroduce magnanimity into the Augustinian political tradition is considered as a more consistent development of Augustine's thought, thereby revealing more pointedly the tension between Augustine and modern liberalism. By way of conclusion, the possibility of deflating this tension is briefly addressed by considering Jean Bethke Elshtain's discussion of an Augustinian liberalism that does not rely upon a “secular” conception of human nature.     

The Relative Importance of Self-Focused and Society-Focused Values in Explaining Political Attitudes in Europe

Personal values predict political attitudes. Previous research in the United States suggests that so-called “society-focused” personal values such as universalism or conservation do so more than “self-focused” values such as self-direction and power. This study seeks to test the relevance of this distinction in a different context with four political attitudes using the European Social Survey. Three mechanisms are suggested to explain effects of self-focused values on political attitudes. Although society-focused values were generally found to be more important in predicting political attitudes, self-focused values made a significant and often substantial contribution. On average, self-focused values were able to predict around half of the variance in political attitudes that society-focused values were. Power in particular played a role in predicting political attitudes, especially support for economic redistribution. Further analyses support the ideas that (1) even the most self-focused value (i.e., hedonism) can play a relevant role in predicting political attitudes, and (2) self-interest may play a role in explaining the effect of self-focused values on political attitudes. Together, these findings highlight that a priori excluding self-focused values from analyses of political attitudes—as studies have done in the past—may lead to important effects being overlooked.