Trust as Glue in Nanotechnology Governance Networks

This paper reflects on the change of relations among participants in nanotechnology governance through their participation in governance processes such as stakeholder dialogues. I show that policymaking in practice—that is, the practice of coming and working together in such stakeholder dialogues—has the potential for two-fold performative effects: it can contribute to the development of trust and mutual responsibility on the part of the involved actors, and it may bring about effects on the formation of boundaries of what is sayable and thinkable in nanotechnology governance. Three vignettes about the work of the German NanoKommission indicate the development of new relations of trust, recognition and mutual responsibility among actors. It is concluded that governance in practice can assemble new collectives in which relations of trust are the glue holding the complex structure together. While such a consensus-based progress may be favourable for smooth technology development, it can be considered problematic if evaluated against the ideals of deliberative democracy, which often form the premises on which public engagement is based. Stakeholder forums were set in place with the intention of including various actors, but this is Janus-faced: if a dialogue becomes encapsulated in new governance networks, new exclusions can arise. For example, a policing of which information is released to a wider audience can occur.     

Transformative Choice,Practical Reasons and Trust

Abstract

In this article I reflect on the question of whether we can have reason to make transformative choices. In attempting to answer it, I do three things. First, I bring forward an internalist account of practical reasons which entails the idea that agents should deliberate to the best of their ability. Second, I discuss L.A. Paul’s views on transformative choice, arguing that, although they present a real problem, the problem is not as profound as she believes it is. Third, I argue that, given the situation in which we face transformative choices (a situation of principled uncertainty though not cluelessness), trust is an appropriate response to transformative choices, and that when one’s trust that one’s current desires will be fulfilled in making a transformative choice is reasonable, one has a reason to make it. Thus, trust turns out to be a crucial response to a profound problem each of us will face during our lives.     

Reasonable Trust

Abstract: Establishing trust among individual agents has defined a central issue of practical reasoning since the dawning of liberal individualism. Hobbes was convinced that foolish self‐interest always threatens to defeat uncompelled cooperation when one can gain by abandoning a joint effort. Against this philosophical background, scientific studies of human beings display a surprisingly cooperative species. It would seem to follow that biologically inherited characteristics impair our reason. The response proposed here distinguishes rationality and reasonableness as two forms of good reasoning. One is consistent with the model of strategic rationality, the other with a model of emotional relationship. From the Hobbesian perspective trusting agents are not rational if their makeup discourages advantageous defection even when one knows it will not be detected or punished. The point is indecisive because reasonable trust insulates cooperative action from the factors that have appeared to make it chancy or unstable without some enforcing power. A critical theme is that trust does not simply rest upon a biological disposition to conform to norms. That would explain but not justify aversion to defection. In fact, trust can survive reasoned challenges to norm‐conforming dispositions, displaying the responsible social animal living along with the rational individual.     

Recognition and personhood: A critique of Bernstein's account of the wrongfulness of torture

J. M. Bernstein argues that to capture the depths of the harm of torture, we need to do away with the idea that we possess intrinsic and inviolable worth. If personhood is inviolable, then torture can inflict only apparent harm on our standing as persons. Bernstein claims that torture is a paradigm of moral injury because it causes what he calls “devastation”: The victim experiences an actual degradation of his or her personhood. Bernstein argues that our value is given to us through mutual recognition and hence can be lost. In this paper, I argue that if our human value can be lost, then it first must be built up. If it must be built up, then the question of our status before the building begins must be answered. Bernstein faces a problem of human beings who fall outside relations of mutual recognition and hence are valueless. His best option for answering this problem is to point to the centrality of the body in his account of recognition, but doing so reveals a notion of intrinsic worth implicit in his account. I call for a revision of Bernstein's account that can hold on to devastation without eschewing intrinsic worth.     

The discursive form of human understanding as the source of the transcendental illusion

Kant famously claims that pure reason is subject to a transcendental illusion in which the subjective validity and the regulative use of a principle of reason are conflated with its objective validity and constitutive use. His doctrine of transcendental illusion is puzzling for he insists that this illusion is natural as well as necessary. The two dominant interpretation strategies cannot make sense of this puzzle because they turn out to be either too strong or too weak: they either struggle to account for the legitimate, regulative use of the transcendental principle of reason or fall short of explaining the necessity of the transcendental illusion. In contrast, I shall argue that it is possible to account for the fact that the transcendental illusion is natural and necessary because it has its source in the discursive form of our human understanding, and that this illusion can nevertheless be known to be illusory because our discursive nature can be recognised as a merely particular form of understanding by comparing it with a possible, intuitive form of understanding in an act of critical self-reflection.     

Care Ethics and Obligations to Future Generations

A dominant area of inquiry within intergenerational ethics concerns how goods (and bads) ought to be justly distributed between noncontemporaries. Contractualist theories of justice that have broached these discussions have often centered on the concepts of mutual advantage and (indirect) reciprocal cooperation between rational, self‐interested beings. However, another prominent reason that many in the present feel that they have obligations toward future generations is not due to self‐interested reciprocity, but simply because they care about what happens to them. Care ethics promises to be conceptually well‐suited for articulating this latter reason: given that future generations are in a perpetual condition of dependency on present‐day people's actions, this is precisely the kind of relational structure that care theorists should be interested in morally evaluating. Unfortunately, the care literature has been largely silent on intergenerational ethics. This article aims to advance this literature, offering the blueprints of what a care ethic concerning future generations—a “future care ethic”—should look like. The resultant ethic defends a sufficientarian theory of obligation: people in the present ought to ensure the conditions needed to encourage and sustain a world that enables good caring relations to flourish.     

Mutual Grooming in Human Dyadic Relationships: An Ethological Perspective

Despite its widespread practice among primates writ large, social scientists have given mutual grooming among humans little attention. This research provides an important first step in describing mutual grooming among humans. A scale was developed to measure self-reported giving and receiving of grooming. In Study 1, 184 female and 94 male participants first indicated their closest emotional relationship (for example, romantic partner, best friend, etcetera). They then completed the grooming measure pertaining to that emotionally close target person. Finally, they completed indices of relationship trust, relationship satisfaction, and parental/familial affection. Individuals who focused on their romantic partners (N = 134) reported more mutual grooming than individuals who focused on other types of relationships. Relationship satisfaction, previous experience of familial affection, and trust were positively correlated with mutual grooming for romantically involved individuals. Study 2 (N = 71 heterosexual couples) explored psychological correlates of mutual grooming within romantic dyads. Individuals with more promiscuous attitudes and those who scored high on the anxiety subscale of an adult attachment style measure reported grooming their partners most frequently. Findings were consistent with several proposed functions of grooming: (a) potential parental-investment indicator, (b) developing trust, and (c) courtship/flirtation—all of which play roles in pair-bonding. At first glance, humans may not appear to groom each other with the same fervor as other primates. However, we posit that humans are, in actuality, groomers par excellence.     

Mutual Grooming in Human Dyadic Relationships: An Ethological Perspective

Despite its widespread practice among primates writ large, social scientists have given mutual grooming among humans little attention. This research provides an important first step in describing mutual grooming among humans. A scale was developed to measure self-reported giving and receiving of grooming. In Study 1, 184 female and 94 male participants first indicated their closest emotional relationship (for example, romantic partner, best friend, etcetera). They then completed the grooming measure pertaining to that emotionally close target person. Finally, they completed indices of relationship trust, relationship satisfaction, and parental/familial affection. Individuals who focused on their romantic partners (N = 134) reported more mutual grooming than individuals who focused on other types of relationships. Relationship satisfaction, previous experience of familial affection, and trust were positively correlated with mutual grooming for romantically involved individuals. Study 2 (N = 71 heterosexual couples) explored psychological correlates of mutual grooming within romantic dyads. Individuals with more promiscuous attitudes and those who scored high on the anxiety subscale of an adult attachment style measure reported grooming their partners most frequently. Findings were consistent with several proposed functions of grooming: (a) potential parental-investment indicator, (b) developing trust, and (c) courtship/flirtation—all of which play roles in pair-bonding. At first glance, humans may not appear to groom each other with the same fervor as other primates. However, we posit that humans are, in actuality, groomers par excellence.     

What Is Wrong with Lying?

One thing wrong with lying is that it can be manipulative. Understanding why lying can be a form of manipulation involves understanding how our telling someone something can give them a reason to believe it, and understanding this requires seeing both how our telling things can invite trust and how trust can be a reason to believe someone. This paper aims to outline the mechanism by means of which lies can be manipulative and through doing so identify a unique reason for accepting testimony; a reason based on trusting a speaker's telling.     

Reasons for Actions and Desires

It is an assumption common to many theories of rationality that allpractical reasons are based on a person's given desires. I shall callany approach to practical reasons which accepts this assumption a `Humean approach'.In spite of many criticisms, the Humean approach has numerous followers who take it to be the natural and inevitable view of practical reason. I will develop an argument against the Humean view aimingto explain its appeal, as well as to expose its mistake. I focus on just one argument in favour of the Humean approach, which I believe can be constructed as the background idea of many Humean accounts: the argument from motivation.I first present the argument from motivation and explain why it seems so compelling. However, I then develop an equally compellingobjection to desire-based approaches to reason, showing that they cannot accommodate the justificatory role of reasons. I show that this objection suggests that at least one of the premises of the argument from motivation must be false. And, finally, I argue thatwe should reject the premise that claims that only desires can explain actions. This result is fatal for desire-based views of practical reason. My conclusion is that practical reasons should be based not on desires, but on values.     

The Value of Sacrifices

ABSTRACT

Most authors who discuss the normative impact of sacrifices do so with regards to the impact that a sacrifice can have on the practical reasons of the agent who makes it. A different and underappreciated phenomenon of sacrifices is their other-regarding normative impact: the sacrifice of person A can have an impact on the practical reasons of person B, either by generating practical reasons for B to act in certain ways or by intensifying existing reasons of B for specific courses of action. This paper asks when and why sacrifices have such other-regarding normative impact and argues that sacrifices can have other-regarding normative impact because sacrifices can be intrinsically good. The intrinsic value of sacrifices is explained by the recursive account of value: sacrifices are intrinsically good if and because they are appropriate responses to intrinsic values, and appropriate responses to intrinsic values are themselves intrinsically good. Furthermore, sacrifices are difficult to make, and successful pursuit in difficult activities can also be intrinsically good.     

Puzzles about Trust

This article is an attempt to deepen our understanding of trust. To this end, several elements frequently present in trust‐relationships are first identified, and then three underappreciated puzzles about trust are described. Next, it is argued that certain leading analyses of trust are unsatisfactory, in part, because they are unable to solve these puzzles succesfully. Finally, an alternative way of thinking about trust is proposed. It is agued that this new way of thinking about trust is both independently plausible and better able to solve these puzzles about trust.     

The Epistemology of Testimonal Trust

According to a strong assurance view of testimonial trust, a speaker's assurance that p grounds a reason for the hearer to believe p. While the strong view offers a genuinely inter-personal account of testimony, it faces a problem about bootstrapping: how can trust generate epistemic reasons when trust can obtain between unreliable speakers and hearers? In contrast, a weaker assurance view holds that a speaker's assurance that p grounds a reason for the hearer to believe p only if the speaker is reliable. While the weaker view offers an epistemic account of testimony, it faces a problem about redundancy: how can trust play any epistemic role when the speaker's reliability seems to pre-empt any contribution that trust may make towards such epistemic reason? This paper argues that neither horn of this dilemma is convincing once proponents of assurance views avail themselves of an epistemic distinction between reasons of rationality as a guide to reasonable belief and reasons of justification as a guide to true belief. Whereas testimonial assurance grounds rational reasons, which need not make probable the beliefs they make reasonable, testimonial reliability grounds justificatory reasons, which need not make reasonable the beliefs they make probable.     

Some Behaviorial Science Measurement Concerns and Proposals

Primarily from a measurement standpoint, we question some basic beliefs and procedures characterizing the scientific study of human behavior. The relations between observed and unobserved variables are key to an empirical approach to building explanatory theories and we are especially concerned about how the former are used as proxies for the latter. We believe that behavioral science can profitably reconsider the prevailing version of this arrangement because of its vulnerability to limiting idiosyncratic aspects of observed/unobserved variable relations. We describe a general measurement approach that takes into account idiosyncrasies that should be irrelevant to the measurement process but can intrude and may invalidate it in ways that distort and weaken relations among theoretically important variables. To clarify further our major concerns, we briefly describe one version of the measurement approach that fundamentally supports the individual as the primary unit of analysis orientation that we believe should be preeminent in the scientific study of human behavior.     

Everyday dilemmas: New directions on the judgment and resolution of benevolence–integrity dilemmas

Many everyday dilemmas reflect a conflict between two moral motivations: the desire to adhere to universal principles (integrity) and the desire to improve the welfare of specific individuals in need (benevolence). In this article, we bridge research on moral judgment and trust to introduce a framework that establishes three central distinctions between benevolence and integrity: (1) the degree to which they rely on impartiality, (2) the degree to which they are tied to emotion versus reason, and (3) the degree to which they can be evaluated in isolation. We use this framework to explain existing findings and generate novel predictions about the resolution and judgment of benevolence–integrity dilemmas. Though ethical dilemmas have long been a focus of moral psychology research, recent research has relied on dramatic dilemmas that involve conflicts of utilitarianism and deontology and has failed to represent the ordinary, yet psychologically taxing dilemmas that we frequently face in everyday life. The present article fills this gap, thereby deepening our understanding of moral judgment and decision making and providing practical insights on how decision makers resolve moral conflict.     

When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus

It is often suggested that disagreement among scientific experts is a reason not to trust those experts, even about matters on which they are in agreement. In direct opposition to this view, I argue here that the very fact that there is disagreement among experts on a given issue provides a positive reason for non-experts to trust that the experts really are justified in their attitudes towards consensus theories. I show how this line of thought can be spelled out in three distinct frameworks for non-deductive reasoning: namely, Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Inference to the Best Explanation, and Inferential Robustness Analysis.     

The value of distrust

We assume that a state of distrust is the mental system’s signal that the environment is not normal—things may not be as they appear. Hence, individuals sense they should be on guard. In particular, they are likely to avoid routine strategies, ones proven to be optimal and regularly used in normal environments, because these strategies are easily anticipated by whoever may be seeking to deceive them. Conversely, a state of trust is associated with a feeling of safety. The environment is as it normally is and things really are as they appear to be. Thus, individuals see no reason to refrain from doing what they routinely do. Accordingly, we hypothesize that figuring out a new situation depends on the type of environment and the actor’s state of mind: in normal environments, where routine strategies are optimal, individuals who trust should outperform those who distrust; however, in unusual environments, where non-routine strategies are optimal, individuals who distrust should outperform those who trust. This paper reports three experiments that manipulate distrust via orienting tasks that participants perform prior to attempting to predict a series of events (Experiments 1 and 2) or solve matchstick arithmetic problems (Experiment 3). Performance success depends on discovering and implementing an appropriate rule. We found that, as predicted, the manipulation of distrust sensitized participants to the existence of non-routine contingencies, that is, contingencies that were not expected.     

Rethinking the Priority of Practical Reason in Kant

Throughout the critical period Kant enigmatically insists that reason is a ‘unity’, thereby suggesting that both our theoretical and practical endeavors are grounded in one and the same rational capacity. How Kant's unity thesis ought to be interpreted and whether it can be substantiated remain sources of controversy in the literature. According to the strong reading of this claim, reason is a ‘unity’ because all our reasoning, including our theoretical reasoning, functions practically. Although several prominent commentators endorse this view, it is widely thought to lack exegetical support. This paper seeks to strengthen the case for this reading by showing how theoretical reason's positive function, as Kant presents it in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, may be construed as fundamentally practical. I argue that reason's supreme regulative principle ought to be understood as a categorical practical imperative. This interpretation, I suggest, resolves the apparent inconsistencies that blight Kant's account of the principle in the Appendix, while bringing greater overall coherence to his account of theoretical reason's regulative function.     

(E)-Trust and Its Function: Why We Shouldn't Apply Trust and Trustworthiness to Human–AI Relations

With an increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, theorists have analyzed and argued for the promotion of trust in AI and trustworthy AI. Critics have objected that AI does not have the characteristics to be an appropriate subject for trust. However, this argumentation is open to counterarguments. Firstly, rejecting trust in AI denies the trust attitudes that some people experience. Secondly, we can trust other non-human entities, such as animals and institutions, so why can we not trust AI systems? Finally, human–AI trust is criticized based on a conception of human–human trust, which does not recognize the distinctiveness of the human–AI relationship. This article aims to refute these counterarguments based on the genealogical analyses of ‘trust’ and ‘trustworthiness’ of Karen Jones and Thomas Simpson, who show that trust and trustworthiness help to overcome vulnerabilities. This function of trust gives reason to use human–human trust as a standard. For this function, it is important that trustees are responsive to trust. While animals and institutions could be responsive, narrow AI systems are unable to be responsive to trust. Therefore, we should not apply trust to AI and instead direct our trust to those who can be responsive to and held responsible for our trust.     

创伤外科医患冲突原因分析及换位思考的应用

医患关系是医疗人际关系中的关键。当今医患关系不和谐的现象时有发生,创伤外科领域尤甚,医患双方缺乏相互之间的沟通、交流与理解、信任是导致不和谐的主要因素,当今社会因素和媒体的影响也在一定程度上激化了医患之间的矛盾。如果在矛盾发生时,医患双方能够进行适时的角色互换,诸多医疗纠纷将迎刃而解,医患关系也将更加和谐。