Is There a Right to Have Rights? The Case of the Right of Asylum

In dialogue with the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt and Seyla Benhabib the author draws on the idea of a right to have rights and raises the question under which political conditions asylum can be a subjective right for political refugees. He argues that mere spontaneous acts of humanitarianism will not suffice to define the institutional commitments of liberal democracies in refugee policy. At the same time, no duty for any particular state to take up refugees can be derived from a right to have rights. The quest for institutional solutions for a timely migration and asylum policy will rather enhance the discourses on the self-understanding of liberal democracies. With a critical eye on German asylum legislation and legal practice, the author contends that it will be a task of any co-ordinated European right of asylum to define political persecution in relation to the first dimension of human rights in order to differentiate the right of asylum from immigration legislation.     

Do Trompe l'oeils Look Right When Viewed from the Wrong Place?

Picture perception and ordinary perception of real objects differ in several respects. Two of their main differences are: (1) Depicted objects are not perceived as present and (2) We cannot perceive significant spatial shifts as we move with respect to them. Some special illusory pictures escape these visual effects obtained in usual picture perception. First, trompe l'oeil paintings violate (1): the depicted object looks, even momentarily, like a present object. Second, anamorphic paintings violate (2): they lead to appreciate spatial shifts resulting from movement. However, anamorphic paintings do not violate (1): they are still perceived as clearly pictorial, that is, nonpresent. What about the relation between trompe l'oeil paintings and (2)? Do trompe l'oeils allow us to perceive spatial shifts? Nobody has ever focused on this aspect of trompe l'oeil perception. I offer the first speculation about this question. I suggest that, if we follow our most recent theories in philosophy and vision science about the mechanisms of picture perception, then, the only plausible answer, in line with phenomenological intuitions, is that, differently from nonillusory, usual picture perception, and similarly to ordinary perception, trompe l'oeil perception does allow us to perceive spatial shifts resulting from movement. I also discuss the philosophical implications of this claim.     

Right or Wrong? The Brain's Fast Response to Morally Objectionable Statements

ABSTRACT— How does the brain respond to statements that clash with a person's value system? We recorded event-related brain potentials while respondents from contrasting political-ethical backgrounds completed an attitude survey on drugs, medical ethics, social conduct, and other issues. Our results show that value-based disagreement is unlocked by language extremely rapidly, within 200 to 250 ms after the first word that indicates a clash with the reader's value system (e.g., "I think euthanasia is an acceptable/unacceptable…"). Furthermore, strong disagreement rapidly influences the ongoing analysis of meaning, which indicates that even very early processes in language comprehension are sensitive to a person's value system. Our results testify to rapid reciprocal links between neural systems for language and for valuation.     

Do a Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong?

A posteriori physicalism is the combination of two appealing views: physicalism (i.e. the view that all facts are either physical or entailed by the physical), and conceptual dualism (i.e. the view that phenomenal truths are not entailed a priori by physical truths). Recently, some philosophers such as Goff (2011), Levine (2007) and Nida‐Rümelin (2007), among others, have suggested that a posteriori physicalism cannot explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties. In this paper, I wish to defend a posteriori physicalism from this new and interesting challenge, by arguing that a posteriori physicalists have the resources to explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal at least something of what it would take for the corresponding phenomenal property to be instantiated.     

Is There a Right to Be Forgiven?

Philosophia - Imagine a case of wrongdoing—not something trivial, but nothing so serious that adequate reparations are impossible. Imagine, further, that the wrongdoer makes those reparations...     

Is there a Moral Right to Vote?

The question raised in this paper is whether legal rights to vote are also moral rights to vote. The challenge to the justification of a moral right to vote is that it is not clear that the vote is instrumental to the preservation of some critical interest of the voter. Because a single vote has ‘no impact’ on electoral outcomes, the right to vote is unlikely to serve the interests of the individual. The account developed in this paper holds that moral voting rights can be justified once we acknowledge that voting by a sub-set of citizens is among the necessary preconditions for democratic institutions making a significant difference to their collective interests. The justification of a moral right to vote does not, then, apply to each individual citizen but only to a sub-set of them. In order to justify inclusive moral voting rights, the further consideration must be added that individuals have critical interests in public recognition of equal status. An inclusive moral right to vote accordingly depends on both collective interest in the outcomes of democratic institutions and on individual interest in equal recognition.     

Do We Have a Theory of Vocational Choice?

A schema for the inductive and deductive functions of theory-building is imposed upon the formulations and research of Roe, the Michigan group, Tiedeman and O'Hara, Super, and Holland, with these results: none of the dominant approaches satisfy the established criteria of theory-building. Many of the efforts suffer from their authors' need to continually relate their data to pre-conceived formulations which do not change with the acquisition of data. For the present, the continuing empirical and longitudinal efforts and the lower-level generalizations that they produce seem to offer the greatest promise for a comprehensive model of vocational development and choice.     

Individualism and Collectivism: What Do They Have to Do With Counseling?

The author defines individualism and collectivism before examining how they are integral parts of the counseling process for clients and counselors. Although individualism has been assumed to be the norm for the counseling culture in the United States, recent work notes the influence of collectivism on professionals and clients in the counseling system. El autor define el individualismo y el colectivismo antes de examinar cómo ellos son partes esenciales del proceso que aconseja para clientes y consejeros. Aunque el individualismo se haya asumido para ser la norma para la cultura que aconseja en los Estados Unidos, el trabajo reciente nota la influencia del colectivismo en profesionales y clientes en el sistema que aconseja.     

What Does Silicon Valley Have to Do with Jerusalem?

Abstract. Adapted from the introductory chapter of Minding God: Theology and the Cognitive Sciences (Peterson 2003), I here lay out a general approach for a dialogue between theology and cognitive science. Key to this task is an understanding of theology as the science or study of meaning and purpose. I give reasons why theology should be thought of in this sense and the potential fruitfulness of this approach.     

Autism—What Does Gender Have to Do With It?

The relationship between gender and autism is an underexplored topic, and one in which the psychoanalytic literature on gender is relevant. The therapist examines her failing to have understood the importance of gender issues for an autistic male child and his family and the ramifications of this oversight to help in the development of “gender creativity” (Ehrensaft, 2016). The gender issues included an initial absence of gender (the meaning of which will be clarified), a subsequently emerging wish to be a girl, and then a powerful, in part reactive wish to be a male. This case highlights the early sensory issues in the development of gender, dyadic work with parents in the treatment sessions, countertransference reactions related to gender, and the relevance of thinking psychoanalytically about neurodevelopmental disorders.     

What Right to Die?

This letter first discusses two meanings of a "right to die." In the popular sense, the term refers to a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. In the strict sense, the term signifies an affirmative right to obtain death--a right to suicide. The letter then explores the legal implications of a suicide right. This right would extend to competent adults, mature minors, and probably also incompetent persons. Counselors would have to inform clients of the suicide option. Intervention to prevent suicide could trigger civil liability. Suicidal intentions would not justify involuntary commitment. Consent would become a defense to homicide.     

Is There a Moral Obligation to Have Children?

ABSTRACT I argue, counter-intuitively, that under certain conditions many people are under some moral requirement to attempt to bring children into being (in order to raise them). There is only rarely a strict obligation to have children, but more moderate, inclining moral considerations in favour of having children, have a place in our moral world. I begin by considering a large number of arguments in favour and against the possibility of an obligation to have children. Then I examine when the weight of one set of arguments is greater. And I conclude by pointing out some general lessons from the discussion.     

Do Expectations Have Time Span?

If it is possible to think that human life is temporal as a whole, and we can make sense of Wittgenstein’s claim that the psychological phenomena called ‘dispositions’ do not have genuine temporal duration on the basis of a distinction between dispositions and other mental processes, we need a compelling account of how time applies to these dispositions. I undertake this here by examining the concept of expectation, a disposition with a clear nexus to time by the temporal point at which the expectation is satisfied. However, it seems that we cannot always identify the beginning of an expectation, and in a few cases, its end. If so, the reduction of expectations to neural events or accompanying feelings which spread over time in the usual way seems a hard enterprise, because these processes, much as other physical processes, have a definite and largely measurable time span. Only at a higher level, that is, as part of human life, expectation can be said to be temporal.     

Do Reentry Women Have Special Needs?

Reentry and nonreentry women were compared on their reasons for being in school, goals associated with education, and campus services used or wanted. Eighty-two California State University, Hayward, undergraduate students volunteered to participate in the questionnaire survey. Reentry women were found to be more self-motivated, with higher educational goals, and higher grade point averages than nonreentry women. Reentry women also made less use of currently available student services. Reasons for this lack of use, and suggestions for future services were explored.     

Do Americans Have a Preference for Rule‐Based Classification?

Six experiments investigated variables predicted to influence subjects’ tendency to classify items by a single property (rule‐based responding) instead of overall similarity, following the paradigm of Norenzayan et al. ( 2002 , Cognitive Science), who found that European Americans tended to give more “logical” rule‐based responses. However, in five experiments with Mechanical Turk subjects and undergraduates at an American university, we found a consistent preference for similarity‐based responding. A sixth experiment with Korean undergraduates revealed an effect of instructions, also reported by Norenzayan et al., in which classification instructions led to majority rule‐based responding but similarity instructions led to overall similarity grouping. Our American subjects showed no such difference and used similarity more overall. We conclude that Americans do not have a preference for rule responding in classification and discuss the differences between tasks that reliably show strong rule or unidimensional preferences (category construction and category learning) in contrast to this classification paradigm.     

Is Democratic Toleration a Rubber Duck?

Democratic politicians face pressures unknown to the prerogative rulers of the early modern period when toleration was first formulated as a political ideal. These pressures are less often expressed as demands by groups or individuals for the permission of practices they dislike than for their restraint or outright prohibition; tolerant dispositions are less politically clamorous. The executive structure of toleration as a virtue, together with the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’, make conflicts over toleration peculiarly intractable. Political conflicts are apt to take the form of mutual allegations ofintolerance; indeed, the problem of ‘tolerating the intolerant’, far from being a marginal case, is central to the theory and practice of toleration. Toleration thus exemplifies a category mistake committed in much contemporary political theory, particularly in its contractualist versions: the threshold of the political lies precisely where rational agreement proves impossible. The main prospects for democratic toleration are thus pre-emptive. The main way in which this can happen is by cultivating executive dispositions: in other words, encouraging people to detach themselves from strong evaluative commitments, so that toleration does not become politically contentious to start with. But this involves losses as well as gains. The gains in civil harmony and peace are obvious. The cost for tolerant political actors is alienation from what they have good reason to value. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.