Substantiating Byzantium: The role of artifacts in the co‐construction of narratives

Acknowledging the abundance of narrative elements in servicescapes and anchored on the premise that consumption experiences are co‐constructed, this research extends existing servicescapes scholarship by theorizing the role of material objects in the co‐construction of narratives at storyscapes, that is, those servicescapes where narratives are at the center stage of the consumption experience. Using a museum exhibition of Byzantine heritage in Thessaloniki, Greece, the findings provide insight on the way in which consumers engage and “read” material artifacts in narrative co‐construction. The emergent framework theorizes consumer participation as narrative substantiation and sheds light on its four constitutive narrative‐construction processes (completing, relating, recontextualizing, and imagining) and on the ways in which consumers anchor these processes on artifact's materiality (artifactual knowledge, practicalness, intermateriality, and realness). Furthermore, this research offers an alternative approach to the existing language analogy according to which objects have their own voice and rhetoric. I see objects, instead, as contributing an evocative engagement according to which consumers unpack objects not only in their reference to the servicescape narrative but also in reference to their own personal and collective lives. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inferential reasoning by exclusion in pigeons, dogs, and humans

The ability to reason by exclusion (which is defined as the selection of the correct alternative by logically excluding other potential alternatives; Call in Anim Cogn 9:393–403 2006) is well established in humans. Several studies have found it to be present in some nonhuman species as well, whereas it seems to be somewhat limited or even absent in others. As inconsistent methodology might have contributed to the revealed inter-species differences, we examined reasoning by exclusion in pigeons (n = 6), dogs (n = 6), students (n = 6), and children (n = 8) under almost equal experimental conditions. After being trained in a computer-controlled two-choice procedure to discriminate between four positive (S+) and four negative (S−) photographs, the subjects were tested with displays consisting of one S− and one of four novel stimuli (S′). One pigeon, half of the dogs and almost all humans preferred S′ over S−, thereby choosing either by novelty, or by avoiding S− without acquiring any knowledge about S′, or by inferring positive class membership of S′ by excluding S−. To decide among these strategies the subjects that showed a preference for S′ were then tested with displays consisting of one of the S′ and one of four novel stimuli (S′′). Although the pigeon preferentially chose the S′′ and by novelty, dogs and humans maintained their preference for S′, thereby showing evidence of reasoning by exclusion. Taken together, the results of the present study suggest that none of the pigeons, but half of the dogs and almost all humans inferred positive class membership of S′ by logically excluding S−. Electronic supplementary material  The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Strategies in landmark use by children, adults, and marmoset monkeys

Common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus jacchus), human children, and human adults learned to find a goal that was located in the center of a square array of four identical landmarks. The location of the landmark array and corresponding goal varied across trials, so the task could not be solved without using the landmark array. In Experiment 1, a matrix of discrete goal locations was presented and the landmarks surrounded and were adjacent to the correct location during training. After training, an expansion test was given in which the distance between landmarks was increased. Marmosets, children (ages 5–9), and adults all readily learned to use the landmarks to search accurately during training. On the expansion test, adults uniformly searched in the center of the array. Monkeys and children concentrated their searching near the landmarks rather than in the center. The monkeys, but not the children, searched more often on the directionally appropriate side of the landmarks than on other sides of the landmarks. In Experiment 2, children (ages 3–5) were trained with a continuous search space and with the goal farther from the landmarks so that a beaconing strategy rule could not be used. Several of the children failed to acquire the training task. Of those who learned to find the goal, three searched in the middle on expansion tests but most searched nearer to the landmarks. The “middle rule” strategy that is uniformly used by adult humans does not appear to be a preferred strategy for children or non-human primates.     

Suicide by cop in film and society: dangerousness, depression, and justice

Provoking police officers to kill oneself or "suicide by cop" (SBC) has received scholarly as well as public attention. The extent to which film representations of SBC reflect SBC in society in relation to danger, depression, and other features was assessed in this study. Data on cinematic portrayals of SBC are from 16 American films; corresponding data on SBC in the real world are taken from 19 empirical studies. While the demographic features of SBC in the real world are largely reflected in film, major differences exist on motivations and incident characteristics. Motives for cinematic SBC were unlike SBC in society, wherein, respectively, 0% vs. 35% had attempted suicide in the past, 6% vs. 47% were chronically depressed, and 77% vs. 7% had recently killed someone. Cinematic SBC events disproportionately involve murderous, dangerous persons who are not depressed, and their deaths convey a sense of justice. While such media distortions can be profitable and entertain the audience, they also contribute to public misunderstandings of the nature of deviance and hinder the development of effective suicide and violence prevention programs.     

Adaptation, teleology, and selection by consequences

This paper presents and defends the view that reinforcement and natural selection are selection processes, that selection processes are neither mechanistic nor teleological, and that mentalistic and vitalistic processes are teleological but not mechanistic. The differences between these types of processes are described and used in discussing the conceptual and methodological significance of “selection type theories” and B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorist view that “operant behavior is the field of intention, purpose, and expectation. It deals with that field precisely as the theory of evolution has dealt with another kind of purpose” (1986, p. 716). The antimentalism of radical behaviorism emerges as a post-Darwinian extension of Francis Bacon's (and Galileo's) influential view that “[the introduction of final causes] rather corrupts than advances the sciences” (Bacon, 1905, p. 302).