You Must Have Thought This Book Was About You1: Reply to Daniel Dennett

Daniel Dennett's review 2 of my book, Human Nature and the Limits of Science, 3 was apparently conceived as part of a multiple review, anticipating an author's response, so I am grateful for the opportunity to satisfy this expectation. Indeed, Dennett uses this excuse to justify devoting his own contribution to responding to those parts of the book directed explicitly at his own work, leaving other imagined reviewers to take care of other issues. Since he has things to say about most of the topics in the book he evidently interpreted this remit widely, in fact taking the book as “presented as an antidote of sorts to [his] own world view” (p. 482). Let me begin, therefore, by reassuring Dennett that, while I certainly had some critical things to say about some of his views, the book most certainly was not intended as an ad hominem attack. The nine pages (out of 187) on which his work is cited fairly accurately reflects the extent to which his views figured in my thinking. Curiously, his ire seems most strongly aroused by my assault on his views on free will in which, apparently, I agree with nearly everything he says and, worse still, fail to cite him at all.     

Reply to Critics

Abstract

Cameron, Eklund, Hofweber, Linnebo, Russell and Sider have written critical essays on my book, The Construction of Logical Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Here I offer some replies.     

Anti-luck epistemology

In this paper, I do three things. First, I offer an overview of an anti-luck epistemology, as set out in my book, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005). Second, I attempt to meet some of the main criticisms that one might level against the key theses that I propose in this work. And finally, third, I sketch some of the ways in which the strategy of anti-luck epistemology can be developed in new directions.     

Kant and the creation of freedom: a response to Terry Godlove

In his review of my book, Terry Godlove raises some robust objections to the exegesis of Kant that I present in my recent book, Kant and the Creation of Freedom: a Theological Problem (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). I respond to these criticisms in this article. Properly to locate Godlove’s exegetical objections, I dedicate the first section to setting out the arc of the argument I trace. I then set out and treat in turn Godlove’s main objections to my exegesis: that it depends upon an interpretation of transcendental idealism which makes the doctrine ‘flatly inconsistent and probably just silly’; that I neglect the most plausible account interpretation of Kant’s various statements about transcendental idealism; and that I ‘pick and choose’ supporting texts too narrowly, leading to an unbalanced presentation, which is too convenient to my thesis. I conclude with some general methodological reflections—stimulated by Godlove, but not aimed at him—about how historical philosophical texts are often treated. I express some anxieties about the principle of charity that underlies much current exegesis, and ‘rational reconstruction’ of historical texts, and I propose a case for what might be called ‘creative decomposition’ (not of the text, but of the self).     

Replies to comments on <Emphasis Type="Italic">Judgment and Agency</Emphasis>

This paper is part of a book symposium on my Judgment and Agency (Oxford University Press, 2015). Here I reply to the comments of three commentators: Jason Baehr, Imogen Dickie, and Hilary Kornblith.     

Replies

In this article, I reply to the preceding articles by Naomi Oreskes, Chrysostomos Mantzavinos, Brad Wray, Sarah Green, Alexander Bird, and Timothy Lyons. These articles contain a number of objections and suggestions concerning systematicity theory, as developed in my book Systematicity: The Nature of Science (Oxford University Press 2013).

     

Problems with paccekabuddhas—decoding early Buddhism

Steven Collins's review (Religion 2:3 (July 1992), pp. 271–8) of my publication Ascetic Figures before and in Early Buddhism: the Emergence of Gautama as the Buddha, Berlin, New York, Mouton de Gruyter 1990) warrants an extended response for a variety of reasons. In a circumstance where a four‐thousand word review has not one positive thing to say about a book, then the principle of natural justice particularly cries out for the author's right of reply. If Collins's review should have the effect of putting off prospective readers of my book then my reply is designed to recuperate their interest. Notwithstanding, it does not take an adept in the art of hermeneutic suspicion to realize the review actually tells us much more about the reviewer than the book. I cannot think that frenzied expressions like ‘academic hooligan’, ‘hearer‐bashing’, ‘fantasy’, ‘biting the hand that feeds you, with a vengeance’ could so easily have poured forth from the pen of normally so gracious a reviewer, had this particular book not hit an emotive nerve—if nothing else!—and sent Collins into an unparalleled fit of moral panic. Indeed, I shall be so bold as to suggest that Collins's reaction to the book has less to do with questions of its scholarly credibility (though his academic posturing would have us believe otherwise): ‘the thesis is presented as historical scholarship, and so it must be judged on academic grounds’ (p. 274) than with Collins's own narrow, pedantic conception, or preconception, of Buddhist Studies. This means my rejoinder to Collins's review inevitably draws me into a discussion of broader methodological questions of general interest to the wider academic community as well as particular issues pertaining to Buddhist scholarship.     

On Political Morality and the Conditions for Warranted Self-Respect

In my recent book Liberalism with Excellence (2017: chapter 7), I have expounded at length a conception of warranted self-respect. That conception, which draws heavily though far from uncritically on the scattered passages about self-respect in the writings of John Rawls, is central to my defense of a variety of liberalism that combines and transfigures certain aspects of Rawlsianism and perfectionism. However, it is also central to the positions taken in some earlier books of mine on capital punishment and torture. (Kramer, The ethics of capital punishment, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011; Torture and moral integrity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) Although my understanding of warranted self-respect was presented far more briefly or obliquely in each of those earlier books than in Liberalism with Excellence, it in fact underlies both my limited defense of the death penalty and my absolutist insistence that the use of interrogational torture is never morally permissible. The present paper will recount the gist of my conception of warranted self-respect and will then explain how that conception figures pivotally in my ruminations on the diverse matters of political morality that have been mentioned here.     

Learning about empathy with unconscious states of mind 1

2008 Ellen Noonan Annual Counselling Lecture, Birkbeck College, University of London

It was a very special privilege to give this lecture in honour of my dear colleague and friend Ellen Noonan. The lecture is based on one of the new chapters of my book about therapy with older people. Ellen was a most helpful mentor to me when I was preparing the first edition of this book and I have dedicated the new edition to her memory. The lecture is essentially about learning to use one's feelings in therapeutic work and to illustrate this theme I shall be drawing on experiences of supervising clinical psychology trainees on placement with me in my NHS work. The theme of this lecture applies as much to counselling as to psychotherapy and I use therapy to refer to counselling and psychotherapy.     

Propositional unity: what’s the problem, who has it and who solves it?

At least since Russell’s influential discussion in The Principles of Mathematics, many philosophers have held there is a problem that they call the problem of the unity of the proposition. In a recent paper, I argued that there is no single problem that alone deserves the epithet the problem of the unity of the proposition. I there distinguished three problems or questions, each of which had some right to be called a problem regarding the unity of the proposition; and I showed how the account of propositions formulated in my book The Nature and Structure of Content [2007 Oxford University Press] solves each of these problems. In the present paper, I take up two of these problems/questions yet again. For I want to consider other accounts of propositions and compare their solutions to these problems, or lack thereof, to mine. I argue that my account provides the best solutions to the unity problems.     

Further thoughts on memory: replies to Schechtman,Adams, and Goldberg

This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press 2010): Marya Schechtman, “Memory and Identity”, Fred Adams, “Husker Du?”, and Sanford Goldberg “The Metasemantics of Memory”.     

Précis of memory: a philosophical study

This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press 2010): Marya Schechtman, “Memory and Identity”, Fred Adams, “Husker Du?”, and Sanford Goldberg “The Metasemantics of Memory”.     

Review of Julie Chajes,Recycled Lives: A History of Reincarnation in Blavatsky’s Theosophy,Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019, xii + 215 p., Hardcover,ISBN 978-0-19-090913-0, £64

Studies in East European Thought - This is a review of Julie Chajes, Recycled Lives: A History of Reincarnation in Blavatsky’s Theosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019. The book,...     

Permissible killing and the irrelevance of being human

This is a review essay of Jeff McMahan's recent book The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (OUP: 2002). In the first part, I lay out the central features of McMahan's account of the wrongness of killing and its implications for when it is permissible to kill. In the second part of the essay, I argue that we ought not to accept McMahan's rejection of species membership as having any bearing on whether it is permissible to kill a particular individual, as there are ways of understanding its relevance that are more plausible than McMahan allows. A review essay of Jeff McMahan. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).     

Replies to Deng,Lee, and Skow

This paper is a contribution to a book symposium on my book Experiencing Time. I reply to comments on the book by Natalja Deng, Geoffrey Lee and Bradford Skow. Although several chapters of the book are discussed, the main focus of my reply is on Chapters 2 and 6. In Chapter 2 I argue that the putative mind-independent passage of time could not be experienced, and from this I develop an argument against the A-theory of time. In Chapter 6 I offer one part of an explanation of why we are disposed to think that time passes, relating to the supposedly ‘dynamic’ quality of experienced change. Deng, Lee, and Skow’s comments help me to clarify several issues, add some new thoughts, and make a new distinction that was needed, and I acknowledge, as I did in the book, that certain arguments in Chapter 6 are not conclusive; but I otherwise concede very little regarding the main claims and arguments defended in the book.     

Reviewing the Past. The Presence of Ruins

In the following text I provide my response to the three reviewers of my book titled “Reviewing the Past. The Presence of Ruins”. First I list a few elements that all the reviewers highlighted. Then, I answer the insightful comments and detailed observations brought forward by them, organised in thematic structures. In this part I start with the three main criteria and the agency of Nature in ruination. Then I investigate the issues regarding the so-called “contemporary ruins”. Ruins’ environmental character, context and sitedness are put into focus in the next section, to finally arrive to the equally inspiring questions of picturesque, sublime and to the issues of representation.

     

THE MODERN INVENTION OF “SCIENCE‐AND‐RELIGION”: WHAT FOLLOWS?

I am grateful to the four reviewers of The Territories of Science and Religion for their careful and insightful readings of the book, and their kind words about it. They all got the central arguments pretty much right, and thus any critical comments are not the result of fundamental misunderstandings. While there are some common themes in the assessments, each reviewer, happily, has offered a distinct perspective on the book. For this reason I will deal with their comments in turn, but with a focus throughout on a generally expressed concern about the broader implications of the book's historical analysis, and what positive or concrete proposals might follow from it.     

Nondoxastic Perceptual Evidence

How does a particular experience evidence a particular perceptual belief for us? As Alvin Plantinga (Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 98) puts it, “[W]hat makes it the case that a particular way of being appeared to—being appeared to greenly, say—is evidence for the proposition that 1 see something green?” Promising, but unsuccessful, answers cite a reliable connection between our having the experience and the belief's being true, our having good reason to believe in such a connection, the proper functioning of our faculties, and objective epistemic norms. A superior view, developed here, is that our experience of being appeared to greenly evidences for us that something is green because we have learned to identify green objects by experiences of that sort. Our learning to do so amounts to our adopting an epistemic norm directing us to form that belief on the basis of that experience.     

Interpretive sensory-access theory and conscious intentions

It is typically assumed that while we know other people's mental states by observing and interpreting their behavior, we know our own mental states by introspection, i.e., without interpreting ourselves. In his latest book, The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge, Peter Carruthers [2011. The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues against this assumption. He holds that findings from across the cognitive sciences strongly suggest that self-knowledge of conscious propositional attitudes such as intentions, judgments, and decisions involves a swift and unconscious process of self-interpretation that utilizes the same sensory channels that we employ when working out other people's mental states. I provide an overview of Carruthers’ book before discussing a pathological case that challenges his account of self-knowledge and mentioning empirical evidence that undermines his use of a particular kind of data in his case against introspection of conscious attitudes.     

Review of B. F. Skinner's The Behavior of Organisms

As I reread my review nearly 50 years later, I think of the circumstances. I had heard a paper by Fred at the Ithaca meeting of the APA in 1932, and recall the praise by Edna Heidbreder, who was sitting next to me, whose remark was that “He has a clean mind.” The year before his book appeared, I had already cited eight of his published papers in a review of the conditioned response in relation to conventional learning experiments that appeared in the Psychological Bulletin (1937, 34, 61–102). It may be because of that the editor sent me Fred's book to review.

When I received the copy of his new book to review, I read it carefully, and soon reported on it orally before Lewis Terman's weekly seminar to get comments and questions before revising my review. I was pleased by Terman's excitement over the originality of Fred's approach.