Data-Driven Belief Revision in Children and Adults

The ability to use numerical evidence to revise beliefs about the physical world is an essential component of scientific reasoning that begins to develop in middle childhood. In 2 studies, we explored how data variability and consistency with participants’ initial beliefs about causal factors associated with pendulums affected their ability to revise those beliefs. Children (9–11 years old) and college-aged adults ran experiments in which they generated, recorded, and interpreted data so as to identify factors that might affect the period of a pendulum. In Study 1, several children and most adults used observed evidence to revise their initial understanding, but participants were more likely to change incorrect noncausal beliefs to causal beliefs than the reverse. In Study 2, we oriented participants toward either an “engineering” goal (to get an effect) or a “science” goal (to discover the causal structure of the domain) and presented them with variable data about potentially causal factors. Science goals produced more belief revision than engineering goals. Numerical data, when presented in context, with appropriate structure, can help children and adults reexamine their beliefs and initiate and support the process of conceptual change and robust scientific thinking.     

True or false: do 5-year-olds understand belief?

In 3 studies (N = 188) we tested the hypothesis that children use a perceptual access approach to reason about mental states before they understand beliefs. The perceptual access hypothesis predicts a U-shaped developmental pattern of performance in true belief tasks, in which 3-year-olds who reason about reality should succeed, 4- to 5-year-olds who use perceptual access reasoning should fail, and older children who use belief reasoning should succeed. The results of Study 1 revealed the predicted pattern in 2 different true belief tasks. The results of Study 2 disconfirmed several alternate explanations based on possible pragmatic and inhibitory demands of the true belief tasks. In Study 3, we compared 2 methods of classifying individuals according to which 1 of the 3 reasoning strategies (reality reasoning, perceptual access reasoning, belief reasoning) they used. The 2 methods gave converging results. Both methods indicated that the majority of children used the same approach across tasks and that it was not until after 6 years of age that most children reasoned about beliefs. We conclude that because most prior studies have failed to detect young children's use of perceptual access reasoning, they have overestimated their understanding of false beliefs. We outline several theoretical implications that follow from the perceptual access hypothesis.     

Conceptions of aggression and withdrawal in early childhood

Two studies investigate young children's beliefs about aggression and withdrawal in others with reference to the possibility of stability and change. Study 1 (N=41) provides evidence that preschool children (1) view aggression in more essentialist ways (i.e. they believe it to be more stable and less changeable) than withdrawal and (2) believe that friends hold a greater potential to create change in aggression and withdrawal than do other potential sources of influence, such as parents and teachers. Study 2 (N=25) replicates the findings of Study 1 and also demonstrates that by preschool age, children hold systematic ideas about the effectiveness of strategies that friends can use to change the behaviour of their peers. These ideas include the belief that prosocial strategies, such as showing peers how to make friends, are more effective than requests to stop engaging in undesirable behaviour. Study 2 also demonstrates that preschool‐aged participants engaged in essentialist reasoning to a greater extent than did a comparison group of 20 7–8 year olds. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CHILD-REARING BELIEFS WITHIN DIVERSE SOCIAL STRUCTURES: MOTHERS AND DAY-CARE PROVIDERS IN MEXICO*

The child-rearing beliefs of 32 mothers and 36 day-care providers in Mexico were compared. Day-care providers expected children to master developmental skills at an earlier age than did mothers. Day-care providers more strongly valued the development of independent and cooperative behavior, and placed less importance on obedience. They also reported employing more flexible and nonauthoritarian discipline strategies than did mothers. Mothers and caregivers did not differ in the extent to which they attributed the success of their discipline strategies to their own actions rather than to external factors. Also examined was how mothers' beliefs differed in families characterized by interdependent versus individualistic social structures. In interdependent families, mothers were more likely to believe in later mastery of developmental skills and to make external attributions. These findings suggest that Mexican children experience incongruous social norms as they move between home and day care settings, and that these norms, at least within the home, are associated with the social structural features of the setting.     

The case for motivated reasoning

It is proposed that motivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes--that is, strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. The motivation to be accurate enhances use of those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate, whereas the motivation to arrive at particular conclusions enhances use of those that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion. There is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions. These ideas can account for a wide variety of research concerned with motivated reasoning.     

Using forced choice to test belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

In deductive reasoning, believable conclusions are more likely to be accepted regardless of their validity. Although many theories argue that this belief bias reflects a change in the quality of reasoning, distinguishing qualitative changes from simple response biases can be difficult (Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010). We introduced a novel procedure that controls for response bias. In Experiments 1 and 2, the task required judging which of two simultaneously presented syllogisms was valid. Surprisingly, there was no evidence for belief bias with this forced choice procedure. In Experiment 3, the procedure was modified so that only one set of premises was viewable at a time. An effect of beliefs emerged: unbelievable conclusions were judged more accurately, supporting the claim that beliefs affect the quality of reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated and extended this finding, showing that the effect was mediated by individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. Although the positive findings of Experiments 3–5 are most relevant to the debate about the mechanisms underlying belief bias, the null findings of Experiments 1 and 2 offer insight into how the presentation of an argument influences the manner in which people reason.     

Logic and belief across the lifespan: the rise and fall of belief inhibition during syllogistic reasoning

Popular reasoning theories postulate that the ability to inhibit inappropriate beliefs lies at the heart of the human reasoning engine. Given that people's inhibitory capacities are known to rise and fall across the lifespan, we predicted that people's deductive reasoning performance would show similar curvilinear age trends. A group of children (12‐year‐olds), young adults (20‐year‐olds), and older adults (65+‐year‐olds) were presented with a classic syllogistic reasoning task and a decision‐making questionnaire. Results indicated that on syllogisms where beliefs and logic conflicted, reasoning performance showed the expected curvilinear age trend: Reasoning performance initially increased from childhood to early adulthood but declined again in later life. On syllogisms where beliefs and logic were consistent and sound reasoning did not require belief inhibition, however, age did not affect performance. Furthermore, across the lifespan we observed that the better people were at resisting intuitive temptations in the decision‐making task, the less they were biased by their beliefs on the conflict syllogisms. As with the effect of age, one's ability to override intuitions in the decision‐making task did not mediate reasoning performance on the no‐conflict syllogisms. Results lend credence to the postulated central role of inhibitory processing in those situations where beliefs and logic conflict.     

Beliefs about personality change and continuity

Lay conceptions of personality change and continuity were examined in a sample of 112 undergraduates. Participants rated their personal change over 5 years (past or future), the change they perceived to be normative over 10-year age spans between 15 and 65, their beliefs about whether personality is fixed or malleable (“lay theories”) and their beliefs about the causes of personality change and continuity. Beliefs about normative personality change generally corresponded to research evidence on adult trajectories of the Big Five factors, with some age bias, whereas recalled and anticipated personal change tended to be more positive than these norms. Participants tended to endorse environmental causes more for personality change than for continuity. Lay theories were not consistently associated with these causal beliefs, or with beliefs about personal and normative change.     

Reasoning about other people's beliefs: bilinguals have an advantage

Bilingualism can have widespread cognitive effects. In this article we investigate whether bilingualism might have an effect on adults' abilities to reason about other people's beliefs. In particular, we tested whether bilingual adults might have an advantage over monolingual adults in false-belief reasoning analogous to the advantage that has been observed with bilingual children. Using a traditional false-belief task coupled with an eye-tracking technique, we found that adults in general suffer interference from their own perspective when reasoning about other people's beliefs. However, bilinguals are reliably less susceptible to this egocentric bias than are monolinguals. Moreover, performance on the false-belief task significantly correlated with performance on an executive control task. We argue that bilinguals' early sociolinguistic sensitivity and enhanced executive control may account for their advantage in false-belief reasoning.     

Believability and syllogistic reasoning

In this paper we investigate the locus of believability effects in syllogistic reasoning. We identify three points in the reasoning process at which such effects could occur: the initial interpretation of premises, the examination of alternative representations of them (in all of which any valid conclusion must be true), and the "filtering" of putative conclusions. The effect of beliefs at the first of these loci is well established. In this paper we report three experiments that examine whether beliefs have an effect at the other two loci. In experiments 1 and 2 subjects drew their own conclusions from syllogisms that suggested believable or unbelievable ones. In the third experiment they evaluated conclusions that were presented to them. The data show that beliefs both affect the examination of alternative models and act as a filter on putative conclusions. We conclude by showing how some types of problem and some problem contents make the existence of alternative models more obvious than others.     

Cognitive control in belief‐laden reasoning during conclusion processing: An ERP study

Belief bias is the tendency to accept conclusions that are compatible with existing beliefs more frequently than those that contradict beliefs. It is one of the most replicated behavioral findings in the reasoning literature. Recently, neuroimaging studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event‐related potentials (ERPs) have provided a new perspective and have demonstrated neural correlates of belief bias that have been viewed as supportive of dual‐process theories of belief bias. However, fMRI studies have tended to focus on conclusion processing, while ERPs studies have been concerned with the processing of premises. In the present research, the electrophysiological correlates of cognitive control were studied among 12 subjects using high‐density ERPs. The analysis was focused on the conclusion presentation phase and was limited to normatively sanctioned responses to valid–believable and valid–unbelievable problems. Results showed that when participants gave normatively sanctioned responses to problems where belief and logic conflicted, a more positive ERP deflection was elicited than for normatively sanctioned responses to nonconflict problems. This was observed from ?400 to ?200 ms prior to the correct response being given. The positive component is argued to be analogous to the late positive component (LPC) involved in cognitive control processes. This is consistent with the inhibition of empirically anomalous information when conclusions are unbelievable. These data are important in elucidating the neural correlates of belief bias by providing evidence for electrophysiological correlates of conflict resolution during conclusion processing. Moreover, they are supportive of dual‐process theories of belief bias that propose conflict detection and resolution processes as central to the explanation of belief bias.     

Ideological belief bias with political syllogisms

Abstract

The belief bias in reasoning occurs when individuals are more willing to accept conclusions that are consistent with their beliefs than conclusions that are inconsistent. The present study examined a belief bias in syllogisms containing political content. In two experiments, participants judged whether conclusions were valid, completed political ideology measures, and completed a cognitive reflection test. The conclusions varied in validity and in their political ideology (conservative or liberal). Participants were sensitive to syllogisms’ validity and conservatism. Overall, they showed a liberal bias, accepting more liberal than conservative conclusions. Furthermore, conservative participants accepted more conservative conclusions than liberal conclusions, whereas liberal participants showed the opposite pattern. Cognitive reflection did not magnify this effect as predicted by a motivated system 2 reasoning account of motivated ideological reasoning. These results suggest that people with different ideologies may accept different conclusions from the same evidence.     

Children's differentiation between beliefs about matters of fact and matters of opinion

Two experiments investigated children's implicit and explicit differentiation between beliefs about matters of fact and matters of opinion. In Experiment 1, 8- to 9-year-olds' (n = 88) explicit understanding of the subjectivity of opinions was found to be limited, but their conformity to others' judgments on a matter of opinion was considerably lower than their conformity to others' views regarding an ambiguous fact. In Experiment 2, children aged 6, 8, or 10 years (n = 81) were asked to make judgments either about ambiguous matters of fact or about matters of opinion and then heard an opposing judgment from an expert. All age groups conformed to the opposing judgments on factual matters more than they did to the experts' views on matters of opinion. However, only the oldest children explicitly recognized that opinions are subjective and cannot be "wrong." Implications of these results for models of children's reasoning about epistemic states are discussed.     

The leopard cannot change his spots, or can he? Culture and the development of lay theories of change

Chinese and Canadian children were compared to examine cultural and developmental differences in lay theories of change: implicit beliefs about how the world develops and changes over time. Chinese and Canadian children (ages 7, 9, and 11 years) made predictions about future performance, relationships, happiness, and parental incomes based on a series of scenarios. Overall, the Chinese children predicted greater change than did the Canadian children, indicating that they believed more in change than did the Canadians. Moreover, cultural differences increased significantly with age: In comparison with their Canadian counterparts, Chinese children made no more change predictions at age 7, made slightly more change predictions at age 9, and made significantly more change predictions at age 11. This was true for questions starting with an extremely positive or negative state and those starting with a neutral state. Reasons for cultural and developmental differences were discussed.     

Self-directed activity and cognitive development

Both in constructivist theories of development and in educational applications of such theories, self-directed activity is aleged to play a critical role in the developmental process. The purpose of the present study was to subject this popular assertation to empirical examination. Subjects were fourth- and fifth-graders who showed no formal operational reasoning. Subjects assigned to an experimental condition were matched with yoked-control partners of the same sex and grade. An additional group of subjects was assigned to a simple control condition. Experimental and yoked-control subjects were given opportunities to solve problems requiring formal operational reasoning over a three-month period. The procedure for experimental subjects differed from that for yoked-controls only in that experimental subjects selected the particular information-seeking activities they would engage in. Yoked-control subjects carried out the same activities that had been chosen by their experimental partners. Both groups showed significant progress in the construction of new reasoning strategies, but experimental subjects showed greater progress than yoked-controls. The enhanced progress of the experimental subjects, it is suggested, was due to the increased presence of anticipatory schemes regarding the outcomes of their actions. These anticipatory schemes allowed subjects to better “make use of”, in the cognitive sense—in other words, assimilate into a theoretical framework—the data yielded by the experiments, and thus they gained more from their experience.     

Cognitive style and religiosity: The role of conflict detection

Recent research has indicated a negative relation between the propensity for analytic reasoning and religious beliefs and practices. Here, we propose conflict detection as a mechanism underlying this relation, on the basis of the hypothesis that more-analytic people are less religious, in part, because they are more sensitive to conflicts between immaterial religious beliefs and beliefs about the material world. To examine cognitive conflict sensitivity, we presented problems containing stereotypes that conflicted with base-rate probabilities in a task with no religious content. In three studies, we found evidence that religiosity is negatively related to conflict detection during reasoning. Independent measures of analytic cognitive style also positively predicted conflict detection. The present findings provide evidence for a mechanism potentially contributing to the negative association between analytic thinking and religiosity, and more generally, they illustrate the insights to be gained from integrating individual-difference factors and contextual factors to investigate analytic reasoning.     

Young and older adults' beliefs about effective ways to mitigate age-related memory decline

This study investigated whether young and older adults vary in their beliefs about the impact of various mitigating factors on age-related memory decline. Eighty young (ages 18-23) and 80 older (ages 60-82) participants reported their beliefs about their own memory abilities and the strategies that they use in their everyday lives to attempt to control their memory. Participants also reported their beliefs about memory change with age for hypothetical target individuals who were described as using (or not using) various means to mitigate memory decline. There were no age differences in personal beliefs about control over current or future memory ability. However, the two age groups differed in the types of strategies they used in their everyday life to control their memory. Young adults were more likely to use internal memory strategies, whereas older adults were more likely to focus on cognitive exercise and maintaining physical health as ways to optimize their memory ability. There were no age differences in rated memory change across the life span in hypothetical individuals. Both young and older adults perceived strategies related to improving physical and cognitive health as effective means of mitigating memory loss with age, whereas internal memory strategies were perceived as less effective means for controlling age-related memory decline.     

Beliefs about how to reduce anger.

To learn more about people's beliefs about how to reduce anger, 416 college students were asked what they thought would be the effects of various responses to feeling angry. In general, they thought that behaving aggressively would make them feel worse and that distracting themselves and doing something nice for another would make them feel better. However, males, younger subjects, and those who had behaved more aggressively in the past were more likely to feel that behaving aggressively would elevate their mood. These observations are consistent with theories emphasizing the importance of cognitive variables in the experiences of anger and aggression.     

Does “putting on your thinking cap” reduce myside bias in evaluation of scientific evidence?

Abstract

The desire to maintain current beliefs can lead individuals to evaluate contrary evidence more critically than consistent evidence. We test whether priming individuals’ scientific reasoning skills reduces this often-observed myside bias, when people evaluate scientific evidence about which they have prior positions. We conducted three experiments in which participants read a news-style article about a study that either supported or opposed their attitudes regarding the Affordable Care Act. We manipulated whether participants completed a test posing scientific reasoning problems before or after reading the article and evaluating the evidence that it reported. Consistent with previous research, we found that participants were biased in favor of evidence consistent with their prior attitudes regarding the Affordable Care Act. Priming individuals’ scientific reasoning skills reduced myside bias only when accompanied by direct instructions to apply those skills to the task at hand. We discuss the processes contributing to biased evaluation of scientific evidence.