How eyewitnesses resist misinformation: Social postwarnings and the monitoring of memory characteristics

Previous findings have been equivocal as to whether the postevent misinformation effect on eyewitness memory is reduced by warnings presented after the misinformation (postwarnings). In the present research, social postwarnings, which characterize the postevent source as a low-credibility individual, diminished the misinformation effect in both cued recall and recognition tests. Discrediting the source as being either untrustworthy or incompetent was effective (Experiment 1). Also, postwarned participants rated reality characteristics of their memories more accurately than did participants receiving no or high-credibility information about the postevent source (Experiment 2). A social postwarning yielded the same results as an explicit source-monitoring appeal and led to longer response times for postevent items, relative to a no-warning condition (Experiments 3 and 4). The findings suggest that the reduced misinformation effect was due to more thorough monitoring of memory characteristics by postwarned participants, rather than to a stricter response criterion or to enhanced event memory.     

Relative - not absolute - judgments of credibility affect susceptibility to misinformation conveyed during discussion

People remember different details about the same events, and when they discuss events they exchange new – and misleading – information. Discussion can change memory, especially when the source of new information is highly credible. But we do not know whether the effects of credibility are based on absolute judgments – judging a source's credibility independently from our own credibility – or relative judgments – judging a source's credibility only in relation to our own credibility. We addressed this question by manipulating subjects' expectations, leading them to believe that they either had the same, higher or lower “visual acuity” than their partner while they watched a movie together. To create ample opportunities for the pairs to mention misleading details to one another, each member unknowingly saw a different version of the movie. The pairs then discussed some of the critical differences, but not others. Later, everyone took an independent recognition test. Subjects' susceptibility to misinformation depended on their own credibility relative to their partner's, supporting the idea that susceptibility to misinformation depends on relative differences in credibility.     

Repetition of previously novel melodies sometimes increases both remember and know responses in recognition memory

Recognition memory for previously novel melodies was tested in three experiments in which subjects usedremember andknow responses to report experiences of recollection, or of familiarity in the absence of recollection, for each melody they recognized. Some of the melodies were taken from Polish folk songs and presented vocally, but without the words. Others were taken from obscure pieces of classical music, presented as single-line melodies. Prior to the test, the melodies were repeated for varying numbers of study trials. Repetition of the Polish melodies increased both remember and know responses, while repetition of classical melodies increased remember but not know responses. When subjects were instructed to report guesses, guess responses were inversely related to remember and know responses and there were more guesses to lures than to targets. These findings establish that remembering and knowing are fully independent functionally and, by the same token, they provide further evidence against the idea that response exclusivity causes increases in remembering to force decreases in knowing. The findings also suggest that simultaneous increases in remembering and knowing occurred because the Polish melodies came from a genre for which the subjects had relatively little previous experience.     

The illusion of knowledge: When more information reduces accuracy and increases confidence

Intuition suggests that having more information can increase prediction accuracy of uncertain outcomes. In four experiments, we show that more knowledge can decrease accuracy and simultaneously increase prediction confidence. Participants were asked to predict basketball games sampled from a National Basketball Association season. All participants were provided with statistics (win record, halftime score), while half were additionally given the team names. Knowledge of names increased the confidence of basketball fans consistent with their belief that this knowledge improved their predictions. Contrary to this belief, it decreased the participants’ accuracy by reducing their reliance on statistical cues. One of the factors contributing to this underweighting of statistical cues was a bias to bet on more familiar teams against the statistical odds. Finally, in a real betting experiment, fans earned less money if they knew the team names while persisting in their belief that this knowledge improved their predictions.     

The effects of the age of eyewitnesses on the accuracy and suggestibility of their testimony

Previous studies have compared the performance of young adult eyewitnesses with that of children or elderly eyewitnesses, but few studies have allowed direct comparison of the performance of all three age groups. The accuracy and suggestibility of accounts of a video recording of a kidnapping were investigated using an experimental eyewitness paradigm. Subjects were drawn from three age groups: children (aged 7–9 years); young adults (aged 16–18 years) and elderly subjects (aged 60–85 years). Subjects' accuracy in answering non-misleading questions and their susceptibility to misleading information was measured. Both the elderly and child subjects gave fewer correct answers and more incorrect answers to non-misleading questions than did young adults. The elderly subjects gave fewer correct responses but also fewer incorrect responses to non-misleading questions than did child subjects. Children were more suggestible than either elderly or young adults. No significant difference was found in the suggestibility of elderly and young adults. Contrary to the trace strength hypothesis no relationship was found between accuracy of recall and suggestibility. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Paradoxical effects of testing: retrieval enhances both accurate recall and suggestibility in eyewitnesses

Although retrieval practice typically enhances memory retention, it can also impair subsequent eyewitness memory accuracy (Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich, 2009). Specifically, participants who had taken an initial test about a witnessed event were more likely than nontested participants to recall subsequently encountered misinformation—an effect we called retrieval-enhanced suggestibility (RES). Here, we sought to test the generality of RES and to further elucidate its underlying mechanisms. To that end, we tested a dual mechanism account, which suggests that RES occurs because initial testing (a) enhances learning of the later misinformation by reducing proactive interference and (b) causes the reactivated memory trace to be more susceptible to later interference (i.e., a reconsolidation account). Three major findings emerged. First, RES was found after a 1-week delay, where a robust testing benefit occurred for event details that were not contradicted by later misinformation. Second, blockage of reconsolidation was unnecessary for RES to occur. Third, initial testing enhanced learning of the misinformation even when proactive interference played a minimal role.     

The detrimental effects of power on confidence, advice taking, and accuracy

Incorporating input from others can enhance decision quality, yet often people do not effectively utilize advice. We propose that greater power increases the propensity to discount advice, and that a key mechanism explaining this effect is elevated confidence in one’s judgment. We investigate the relationships across four studies: a field survey where working professionals rated their own power and confidence and were rated by coworkers on their level of advice taking; an advice taking task where power and confidence were self-reported; and two advice taking experiments where power was manipulated. Results consistently showed a negative relationship between power and advice taking, and evidence of mediation through confidence. The fourth study also revealed that higher power participants were less accurate in their final judgments. Power can thus exacerbate the tendency for people to overweight their own initial judgment, such that the most powerful decision makers can also be the least accurate.     

Processes leading to confidence and accuracy in sentence recognition: a metamemory approach

We propose that memory confidence is based on the processes and products of the just-completed memory task, along with the participants' metamemory beliefs about the relation of these processes and products to memory accuracy. We tested this metamemory approach to confidence by having participants carry out a simple recognition memory task with deceptive and nondeceptive items. The deceptive items were sentences that contained a possible synonym substitution, thus allowing errors based on gist memory. For nondeceptive items, high confidence was associated with high accuracy. For deceptive items the relationship reversed; high confidence was associated with low accuracy. A memory process questionnaire was developed that provided more differentiated phenomenal reports than the traditional know/remember distinction. For nondeceptive items, metamemory beliefs tended to be valid indicators of accuracy, but for deceptive items involving unconscious reconstructive memory processes, they tended to be invalid indicators of memory accuracy. The overall results lend strong support for our metamemory approach to memory confidence.     

The role of individual differences in the accuracy of confidence judgments

Generally, self-assessment of accuracy in the cognitive domain produces overconfidence, whereas self-assessment of visual perceptual judgments results in underconfidence. Despite contrary empirical evidence, in models attempting to explain those phenomena, individual differences have often been disregarded. The authors report on 2 studies in which that shortcoming was addressed. In Experiment 1, participants (N= 520) completed a large number of cognitive-ability tests. Results indicated that individual differences provide a meaningful source of overconfidence and that a metacognitive trait might mediate that effect. In further analysis, there was only a relatively small correlation between test accuracy and confidence bias. In Experiment 2 (N = 107 participants), both perceptual and cognitive ability tests were included, along with measures of personality. Results again indicated the presence of a confidence factor that transcended the nature of the testing vehicle. Furthermore, a small relationship was found between that factor and some self-reported personality measures. Thus, personality traits and cognitive ability appeared to play only a small role in determining the accuracy of self-assessment. Collectively, the present results suggest that there are multiple causes of miscalibration, which current models of over- and underconfidence fail to encompass.     

Effects of alternating set for speed or accuracy on response time,accuracy and confidence in a unidimensional discrimination task

Three approaches to a theoretical analysis of confidence judgments are considered: one linking confidence to the number of sensory observations, one based on a distinction between ‘state’ and ‘process’ factors, and a ‘balance of evidence’ hypothesis developed from an accumulator model of discrimination. An experiment is described in which observers were asked to decide which of two parallel lines was the longer, and to rate their confidence in each judgment. Each observer's set for speed or accuracy was manipulated over successive blocks of trials, and effects on response time, accuracy, and confidence were examined. Under an accuracy set, observers produced a higher percentage of correct responses, had longer response times, and made more confident judgments than under a set for speed. Within both speed and accuracy blocks, however, confidence ratings were inversely related to response time. The data on response accuracy, time, and confidence indicate certain deficiencies in either of the first two approaches, but were well accounted for by the third.     

"With a little help from my friends...": the role of co-witness relationship in susceptibility to misinformation

Inaccuracies in eyewitness accounts can occur when witnesses are exposed to post-event misinformation via discussion with a co-witness. The current study examined the role of co-witness relationship by comparing the memory performance of pairs of romantic couples, friends and previously unacquainted strangers with that of individuals. Ninety-six participants viewed an event and then discussed the witnessed event with a stranger, a romantic partner or a friend. One member of each pair saw a theft take place during the witnessed event. Individual group participants did not discuss the witnessed event with anyone. Results indicate that all co-witness dyads produced less accurate recall accounts than participants who did not interact with another witness. However, witnesses who were previously acquainted with their co-witness (either in a friendship or romantic relationship) were significantly more likely to report information obtained from their co-witness that they had not seen themselves. Prior acquaintance also led to an increased number of incorrect attributions of both guilt and innocence.     

The effects of confederate influence and confidence on the accuracy of crime judgements

Building on recent work which has investigated social influences on memory and remembering, the present experiment examined the effects of social pressure and confederate confidence on the accuracy and confidence of eyewitnesses. Sixty undergraduate participants watched a video of a staged mugging and then answered questions about the video out loud in the presence of either one or three confederates who had also watched the film with them. Unbeknownst to the participant, the confederate(s) always gave incorrect responses to four out of the eight questions. Participants and confederates were also asked to give confidence scores out loud for each of their answers. Again, unbeknownst to the participant, the confederate(s) always expressed either high or low confidence scores for the incorrect information, depending on condition. Participants gave fewer correct answers, and were less confident, in the presence of three, as opposed to one, confederates. Participants were also more confident, yet no more accurate, when the confederate(s) gave high, as opposed to low, confidence scores. Thus the presumed independence of evidence given by multiple witnesses cannot be safely assumed.     

Repetition effects in associative false recognition: Theme-based criterion shifts are the exception, not the rule

Previous reports have demonstrated that false memory for the critical items of associative lists decreases when lists are studied multiple times (Benjamin, 2001). In three experiments, we explored two hypotheses that might account for false memory reductions with repetition. Under an identification hypothesis, repetition decreases false memory because participants realise that critical items are absent from the list at encoding and thus reject them at test. Under a criterion shift hypothesis, repetition decreases false memory because it increases the discriminability of studied words from lures, causing participants to set a higher response criterion for positive recognition responses. Results uniquely supported the criterion shift hypothesis. Furthermore, results showed that participants only changed their criterion on separate recognition tests, not on an item-by-item basis within a single recognition test. The failure to establish separate criteria within a test increased false memory for repeated lists.     

Effects of pattern, spatial frequency, number, and rate of stimulus presentation on the accuracy of detection.

Brief trains of pulsed stimuli were used to assess whether magnocellular or parvocellular visual pathways could be differentiated perceptually. Trains of either one to four sine-wave, square-wave, or checkerboard gratings were presented at three temporal and two spatial frequencies to six observers. The task of the observer was to report the perceived number of stimuli (gratings) in a train. The difference between actual number and perceived number of gratings was recorded as an error score. It was found that neither the pattern nor the spatial frequency of the gratings significantly affected perceptual accuracy. On the other hand, the number of gratings in a train and the interstimulus interval between gratings produced significant differences. Perceptual accuracy was greater when lower numbers of gratings in a train were presented with longer interstimulus intervals. The observers typically reported fewer stimuli than were presented. The source of the discrepancy is discussed in terms of a light adaptive process initiated in the retina.     

Analytic Positions,Repetition, and the Organization of Emotional Memory

Analytic positions are defined as viewing perspectives. Therefore, an analytic position determines one's field of observation. Two families of affect theories in psychoanalysis are then identified: the Darwinean and the Aristotelian. Affect has been addressed as either an energic like charge along a gradient or a form of communication. Each swims into focus when viewed with respect to the position of the observer as either inside the clinical interaction or outside the transference. How each is observed then determines different implications for interpretation, transference, reconstruction, and defense analysis. How the mind itself is modeled in theory is seen to follow from how observers position themselves. Choosing an observational field cannot be avoided. How an analyst in a clinically meaningful way might think about such disparate fields is taken up.     

Decisions,actions, and the appropriateness of confidence in knowledge

This research examines the appropriateness of confidence (i.e., subjective probability judgments) in knowledge associated with decisions and actions of social importance. One hundred and thirty seven participants completed a 50 item questionnaire assessing their knowledge of the two leading candidates in the 1988 presidential election in the U.S.A. Ninety one of the respondents completed the questionnaire one week prior to the election, whereas the other 46 completed the questionnaire on election day shortly after voting. After each item in the questionnaire, all respondents indicated whether or not the item content represented a reason why they voted (or intended to vote) for or against the candidate to whom the item referred. Within-person results indicated that, in comparison to items that were not cited as reasons for voting intentions or voting behavior, items endorsed as reasons were characterized by better accuracy and resolution, but worse overconfidence. Between groups, decision makers were significantly more accurate and better calibrated than those who had not made a decision between the candidates. Implications of inappropriate confidence on decision making effectiveness are discussed.     

Pythagoreanism, meaning and the appeal to number

The threat of Pythagoreanism hovers over the appeal to quantification, despite Yanchar's and Westerman's calls for a liberal, interpretive view of numbers. I discuss their articles by agreeing that the distinction between qualitative and quantitative methods is of limited utility, by noting various versions of interpretation in their articles, and by pressing the need to address questions of measurement. Without a coherent measurement strategy, the use of numbers remains at best ambiguous and at worst arbitrary. Although disagreeing with a number of issues in their respective positions, I welcome this opportunity to consider the broader question of measurement and its place in psychology.     

直视不可能性：克尔凯郭尔、德里达以及宗教的再现

克尔凯郭尔在假名作品《恐惧与战栗》当中描述过“信仰”的“双重运动”,《再现》当中描述过对“再现”的“超越”,它们与德里达所说的“对于不可能的事情的经验”之间有着惊人的对应。因此在主线上,德里达提出的对于不可能的事情的激情与上述两部假名作品当中所提出的“宗教”范畴彼此呼应。一种“不可能性的公理”构成了德里达所说的“没有宗教的宗教”,而不是简单的宗教;构成了某种“宗教的再现”。于是,德里达和克尔凯郭尔的假名作者们拉近了宗教和解构之间的距离。     

Hypercorrection of high confidence errors: Prior testing both enhances delayed performance and blocks the return of the errors

How people correct their mistakes and sustain those corrections over time is a problem of central interest to education. It might be thought that the erroneous beliefs that people hold with high confidence would be especially difficult to correct. Interestingly, people correct these high confidence errors more easily than low confidence errors, a phenomenon known as the ‘hypercorrection effect’. Unfortunately, though, with a delay in testing there is a tendency for some of these high confidence errors to reemerge – a finding with serious consequences for education. This study investigated the effect of intervening a test immediately after corrective feedback on preventing the return of the errors. It also investigated processing differences between prevention-focused and promotion-focused people. The most educationally important new finding was that testing immediately after corrective feedback not only greatly enhanced memory for the correct answers but also blocked the return of the errors.