分析性与信念之谜

不同类型的语句在产生信念之谜的可能性上存在差异,这可以支持分析语句或分析命题存在这一论点。为达到这个理论目的所采用的论证策略是这样的:第一步,根据所定义的主观翻译原则与客观翻译原则,考虑各种不同的实义词,从日常对象到人工物语词,到像单身汉这样的语词,含有所有这些语词的语句都有产生信念之谜的可能性。然后,考虑按通常的标准被认为是综合的或分析的语句,发现仅仅从分析语句还不能构造克里普克的信念之谜。第二步,论证在分析与综合区分不存在与不同语句产生信念之谜之可能性上的本质差异不存在之间有一种类似蕴涵的关系。因为已经证明分析语句与综合语句在产生信念之谜的可能性上有实质差异,故可以推出分析性的存在性。     

幼儿对误信念与元表征受干扰的真信念的理解

采用阶段性错误信念任务和阶段性元表征干扰任务对101名3-5岁幼儿误信念和真实信念的理解能力及其关系进行研究,结果发现:(1)幼儿完成两种任务经历了相似的发展趋势,但后者比前者简单；(2)幼儿完成前者的心理过程很可能卷入了其完成后者的心理过程,结果符合但不完全支持表达论；(3)幼儿完成后者可能只需抑制干扰信息表达已有元表征,而完成前者则需要在形成元表征的同时抑制干扰因素,而这两种心理过程的结合可能需要更为复杂的心理过程参与.     

3～5岁幼儿错误信念理解能力的发展趋势

基于以往支持心理理论执行功能表达论的研究结果,对标准错误信念任务修正后采用阶段性错误信念任务,运用实验法对101名3~5岁儿童进行研究。结果发现:(1)新任务保留了标准错误信念任务的优势,能勾勒出幼儿错误信念理解能力的发展趋势;(2)3~5岁儿童表现出不同层次和水平的错误信念理解能力;(3)具体分析儿童错误信念的理解能力发展的心理模式,发现每一年龄组具有的错误信念理解能力,都是其更高水平能力发展的基础,支持表达论。     

信念如山

人生离不开信念，坚定的信念让人产生十足的动力。信念隐藏在我们体内，产生于心中，只要善于应用，它就是一股取之不尽的力量源泉。当然，信念需要行动来贯彻，源泉也需要开发。如果怀抱着一生的信念，却守株待兔，那只是空想主义者。在现实生活中，我们所有的行动都是符合某个信念框架的，     

外表真实区别、表征变化和错误信念的任务分析

自20世纪80年代以来,“心理理论”已成为发展心理学的研究热点和最活跃、最多产的领域。为了分析和比较“心理理论”的实验任务,该研究以济南市3所幼儿园中的233名3—6岁儿童为有效被试。进行了“意外转移。和“欺骗外表”两种心理理论实验任务。得出如下主要结论：(1)意外转移任务中内隐错误信念显著难于标准错误信念,易化错误信念与标准错误信念的难度不存在显著差异。(2)欺骗外表任务中外表真实区别难度显著低于表征变化和错误信念。(3)意外转移任务的错误信念显著难于欺骗外表任务的错误信念。     

聋童与正常儿童对多种信念的认知

选取了122名3～12岁聋童,并分别用65名3～5岁的正常儿童作对照,开展了2个实验系列,探讨了儿童的正确信念、一级错误信念及二级错误信念认知的发展特点.结果如下: (1)聋童及正常儿童信念认知的发展过程中,无论是关于正确信念,还是关于一级错误信念,都是先发展自我信念认知,再发展他人信念认知;(2)关于正确信念、一级错误信念和二级错误信念认知的发展,聋童都比正常儿童滞后,但两者的发展趋势一致; (3)手语聋童在信念认知上略好于口语聋童; (4)父母为聋人或父母会手语的聋童,以及兄弟姐妹会手语的聋童,其信念认知水平要比其他聋童好.     

组合原则的哲学论争

有关组合原则的很多话题在哲学、语言学、心理学和神经科学等领域中都有争议。组合原则因其简单性,在接纳该原则的系统中,发挥着核心作用。鉴于思考问题的角度不同,组合原则的地位和应用范围也不同。本文关注组合原则在哲学领域中引起的论争,试图理清学界对整体主义和组合原则关系的不同看法,总结二者的不相容情形,并在那些接纳组合原则的系统中对这一概念作进一步的澄清。     

大学生公正世界信念与学业倦怠的关系：应对方式与无聊倾向的链式中介作用

为探讨大学生公正世界信念与学业倦怠的关系,以及应对方式和无聊倾向在其中的中介作用,采用公正世界信念问卷、大学生无聊倾向性问卷、简易应对方式量表和大学生学习倦怠量表对955名大学生进行调查。结果显示：(1)以积极应对与无聊倾向为中介变量,公正世界信念不能直接显著预测学业倦怠,无聊倾向在其中起完全中介作用;以消极应对与无聊倾向为中介变量,公正世界信念能负向显著预测学业倦怠,消极应对与无聊倾向在其中起部分中介作用;(2)积极/消极应对-无聊倾向的链式中介作用在公正世界信念与学业倦怠的关系中均成立,且达到显著性水平。本研究结果有助于理解公正世界信念对学业倦怠的作用机制,并为大学生学业倦怠的缓解提供建议。     

大学生控制信念及其与人际信任的关系

以290名大学生为被试,采用量表法考察其控制信念和人际信任的特点及两变量之间的关系。结果表明,（1）被试的认知控制信念得分最高,情感控制最低,直接控制和间接控制信念得分居中;且控制信念得分存在显著性别和生源地差异,女生的认知控制和情感控制得分都高于男生,农村生源学生的间接控制信念得分显著低于城市生源学生;（2）被试人际信任得分较低,且不存在性别和生源地差异;（3）控制信念与人际信任的关系因被试性别和生源地的不同而有差异,对于女生和农村生源大学生来说,直接控制、认知控制信念得分越高,人际信任得分也越高;而对     

欲望和信念的适应性方向

欲望和信念的适应性方向的理论源于休谟对心灵状态的基础性划分,是当代哲学关于实践理性讨论的重要支柱之一。对两种适应性方向之差别的说明,可以分为描述性解释和规范性解释。本文试图表明,规范性解释必然是诉诸问题的,描述性解释虽然有可能成功,但现有的主流理论都隐含地使用了一种诉诸态度的错误方式。在戴维森的认知主义方案的基础上,通过改造维勒曼的双层模型,我们可以为描述性解释开拓一个新的出路。     

The Compositionality Papers

Book Information The Compositionality Papers. The Compositionality Papers Jerry A. Fodor and Ernest Lepore, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, viii + 212, US$65.00 (cloth), US$19.95 (paper) By Jerry A. Fodor. and Ernest Lepore. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. viii + 212. US$65.00 (cloth:), US$19.95 (paper:),     

组合原则

组合原则是逻辑语义学的基本原则,表现为函项的思想和句法与语义的对应。就构造逻辑系统而言,组合原则是一种方法论。作为延伸到自然语言形式语义学的产物,组合原则起到一种核心灵魂的作用。组合原则在理论层面和应用领域皆获得一些有价值的结果。自然语言违反组合原则的实例主要表现为歧义现象、语用因素和句法与语义不对应的情况,这正是调整组合原则的适用条件从而促进形式语义学发展的契机。     

The Principle of Semantic Compositionality

The Principle of Semantic Compositionality (sometimes called Frege's Principle) is the principle that the meaning of a (syntactically complex) whole is a function only of the meanings of its (syntactic) parts together with the manner in which these parts were combined. This principle has been extremely influential throughout the history of formal semantics; it has had a tremendous impact upon modern linguistics ever since Montague Grammars became known; and it has more recently shown up as a guiding principle for a certain direction in cognitive science.Despite the fact that The Principle is vague or underspecified at a number of points — such as what meaning is, what counts as a part, what counts as a syntactic complex, what counts as combination — this has not stopped some people from viewing The Principle as obviously true, true almost by definition. And it has not stopped other people from viewing The Principle as false, almost pernicious in its effect. And some of these latter theorists think that it is an empirically false principle while others think of it as a methodologically wrong-headed way to proceed.In fact, there are approximately 318 arguments against The Principle which can be found in the literature, whereas there are only three (or maybe four) arguments proposed in favor of The Principle. This paper will adjudicate among these arguments. And at the end it will suggest some other way to look at what proponents of compositionality really want.     

The Myth of Reverse Compositionality

In the context of debates about what form a theory of meaning should take, it is sometimes claimed that one cannot understand an intersective modifier-head construction (e.g., ‘pet fish’) without understanding its lexical parts. Neo-Russellians like Fodor and Lepore contend that non-denotationalist theories of meaning, such as prototype theory and theory theory, cannot explain why this is so, because they cannot provide for the ‘reverse compositional’ character of meaning. I argue that reverse compositionality is a red herring in these debates. I begin by setting out some positive arguments for reverse compositionality and showing that they fail. Then I show that the principle of reverse compositionality has two big strikes against it. First, it is incompatible with all theories of meaning on the market, including the denotationalism favored by neo-Russellians. Second, it explains nothing that is not already explained by its venerable predecessor, the principle of (forward) compositionality.     

Compositionality and the Manifestation Challenge

I address the question whether Dummetts manifestation challenge to semantic realism can be disarmed by reflection on the compositionality of meaning. Building on work of Dummett and Wright, I develop in §§12 what I argue to be the most formidable version of the manifestation challenge. Along the way I review attempts by previous authors to deploy considerations about compositionality in realisms favour, and argue that they are unsuccessful. The formulation of the challenge I develop renders explicit something which I argue to be implicit in Dummetts and Wrights presentations: that the challenge depends on a contention about the constitution of speakers states of declarative sentence understanding: i.e., that many such states incorporate abilities to recognize whether the associated sentences truth conditions are satisfied. In §3 I argue that reflection on the compositionality of meaning reveals, first, that this contention must be rejected by the realist, and second, that it is unmotivated. This result does not settle the debate over the manifestation challenge, but it implies that the onus of argument does not currently rest with the realist.     

Communication and Strong Compositionality

Ordinary semantic compositionality (meaning of whole determined from meanings of parts plus composition) can serve to explain how a hearer manages to assign an appropriate meaning to a new sentence. But it does not serve to explain how the speaker manages to find an appropriate sentence for expressing a new thought. For this we would need a principle of inverse compositionality, by which the expression of a complex content is determined by the expressions of it parts and the mode of composition. But this presupposes that contents have constituent structure, and this cannot be taken for granted. However, it can be proved that if a certain principle of substitutivity is valid for a particular language, then the meanings expressed by its sentences can justifiably be treated as structured. In its simplest form, this principle says that if in a complex expression a constituent is replaced by another constituent with a different meaning, the new complexhas a meaning different from the original. This principle is again inversely related to the normal compositional principle of substitutivity. The combination of ordinary and inverse compositionality is here called strong compositionality. The proof is carried out in the algebraic framework developed by Wilfrid Hodges and Dag Westerståhl.     

Compositionality and sandbag semantics

It is a common view that radical contextualism about linguistic meaning is incompatible with a compositional explanation of linguistic comprehension. Recently, some philosophers of language have proposed theories of ‘pragmatic’ compositionality challenging this assumption. This paper takes a close look at a prominent proposal of this kind due to François Recanati. The objective is to give a plausible formulation of the view. The major results are threefold. First, a basic distinction that contextualists make between mandatory and optional pragmatic processes needs to be revised. Second, the pragmatic theory can with stand a Davidsonian objection only by rejecting the importance of a distinction between primitive and non-primitive semantic items. Thirdly, however, the theory is now open to a worry about how it should be understood: either the theory consists in a very broad functionalist generalization about communication, which makes it explanatorily inert, or it boils down to a highly particularist view about linguistic meaning. Finally, I argue that Recanati’s notion of ‘occasion meaning’ is problematic and suggest replacing it with the notion of speaker meaning, which is explanatorily more basic.     

Modal Fictionalism and Compositionality

Modal fictionalists propose to defuse the unwanted ontological commitments of modal realism by treating modal realism as a fictional story, and modal assertions as assertions, prefixed by a fictionalist operator, that something is true in that story. However, consideration of conditionals with modal antecedents raises the problem ofembedding, which shows that the simple prefixing strategy cannotsucceed. A compositional version of the fictionalist strategy isdeveloped and critiqued, and some general semantic morals aredrawn from the failures of both strategies.     

The Cogito and the Metaphysics of Mind

Descartes used the cogito to make two points the epistemological point that introspection affords us absolute certainty of our existence, and the metaphysical point that subjects are thinking things logically distinct from bodies. Most philosophers accept Descartes’s epistemological claim but reject his metaphysical claim. I argue that we cannot do this if the cogito works, then subjects are non-physical. Although I refrain from endorsing an argument for dualism based on this conditional, I discuss how such an argument would differ from the conceivability arguments pursued by Descartes in the Sixth Meditation and by contemporary philosophers. Unlike those arguments, this argument would not be refuted by the discovery of a posteriori identities between physical and phenomenological properties. In other words, it is possible to argue for substance dualism even if phenomenal properties are physical properties.