Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of ‘corporality’ and ‘alerting capacity’

How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do not. We are additionally able to explain why different sensory feels differ in the way they do.     

Two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’

The notion of ‘givenness of consciousness’ needs further elucidation. On the one hand, I agree with Lyyra (this volume) that one sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’ is not enough to account for consciousness and self-consciousness. On the other hand, I will argue that Lyyra’s paper is problematic precisely because he fails to consider one basic sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’. Lyyra and I thus agree that there must be (at least) two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’; we disagree, however about which modes of givenness are involved.

‘Now’ and ‘Then’ in Tense Logic

According to Hans Kamp and Frank Vlach, the two-dimensional tense operators “now” and “then” are ineliminable in quantified tense logic. This is often adduced as an argument against tense logic, and in favor of an extensional account that makes use of explicit quantification over times. The aim of this paper is to defend tense logic against this attack. It shows that “now” and “then” are eliminable in quantified tense logic, provided we endow it with enough quantificational structure. The operators might not be redundant in some other systems of tense logic, but this merely indicates a lack of quantificational resources and does not show any deep-seated inability of tense logic to express claims about time. The paper closes with a brief discussion of the modal analogue of this issue, which concerns the role of the actuality operator in quantified modal logic.     

‘Othering’ and ‘selving’ in therapeutic dialogue

In this article we consider therapeutic conversations about suffering and sexual identity through an ethical and practical lens we refer to as ‘othering’ and ‘selving’. The ethical lens is shaped by recent developments in discursive theory and approaches to therapy. Our practical lens draws from research by discourse analysts showing how conversational practices feature in consequential ways in delicate discussions such as those about suffering and sexual identity. After helping readers understand these lenses we then use them in examining actual discussions about identity and suffering. We conclude with some general ideas and reflective questions for therapists wishing to extend these kinds of sensitivities and conversational practices in their work with clients.     

What are the objects of perceptual consciousness?

Four answers to the title question are critically reviewed. (a) The first answer proposes that we perceive our brain events, certain occurrences in our brain that appear to us as parts of the environment. (b) Gestalt psychology distinguishes the phenomenal from the physical and proposes that we always perceive some aspect of our own phenomenal world--which is isomorphic but not identical to certain of our brain events. (c) J. J. Gibson held that our perceptual experiences are registrations of properties of the external environment--which is, therefore, perceived directly (i.e., without experiencing anything else). (d) The fourth answer comprehends perceptual experience to be a qualitative form of noninferential awareness of the apparent properties of specific environmental things. It differs from Gibson's answer in several respects, including the claim that some aspect of the external world appears to us whenever we have perceptual experience.     

Defining ‘Dead’ in Terms of ‘Lives’ and ‘Dies’

What is it for a thing to be dead? Fred Feldman holds, correctly in my view, that a definition of ‘dead’ should leave open both (1) the possibility of things that go directly from being dead to being alive, and (2) the possibility of things that go directly from being alive to being neither alive nor dead, but merely in suspended animation. But if this is right, then surely such a definition should also leave open the possibility of things that go directly from being dead to being neither alive nor dead, but merely in suspended animation. I show that Feldman’s own definition of ‘dead’ (in terms of ‘lives’ and ‘dies’) does not leave this possibility open. I propose a new definition that does.     

‘Necessity’ and ‘provability’ in the later wittgenstein

I present a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy of logic and mathematics. This interpretation, like others, emphasizes Wittgenstein's attempt to reconcile platonistic and constructivistic approaches. But, unlike other interpretations, mine explains that attempt in terms of Wittgenstein's position about the relations between our concepts of necessity and provability. If what I say here is correct, then we can rescue Wittgenstein from the charge of naive relativism. For his relativism extends only to provability, and not to necessity.     

Is predictive processing a theory of perceptual consciousness?

Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offered by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched.     

‘Warm’ and ‘cold’ personality factors in human sexuality

Human sexual responsiveness in the coital relationship has been found to vary between sexual partners. The present study was conducted to determine: (1) the affect of ‘warm’ or ‘cold’ personalities of the sexual partners on foreplay, afterplay, pre- and post-communication, and (2) ‘warmness’ or ‘coldness’ demonstrated in acts of these criteria in the sexual relationship. Significant differences were found in each instance.     

Black-white bias in ‘cultural’ and ‘noncultural’ test items

The original data of McGurk's classic study of black-white differences on cultural and noncultural tests is re-analyzed at the item level to investigate the role of possible item biases that would cause the noncultural items to be relatively more difficult than the cultural items for blacks than for whites. The evidence indicates that McGurk's results cannot be explained in terms of item biases, but appear to be the result of the noncultural items requiring more sheer reasoning ability than the cultural items, which depend more on acquired information.     

Imaginability,morality, and fictional truth: dissolving the puzzle of ‘imaginative resistance’

This paper argues that there is no genuine puzzle of ‘imaginative resistance’. In part 1 of the paper I argue that the imaginability of fictional propositions is relative to a range of different factors including the ‘thickness’ of certain concepts, and certain pre-theoretical and theoretical commitments. I suggest that those holding realist moral commitments may be more susceptible to resistance and inability than those holding non-realist commitments, and that it is such realist commitments that ultimately motivate the problem. However, I argue that the relativity of imaginability is not a particularly puzzling feature of imagination. In part 2, I claim that it is the so-called ‘alethic’ puzzle, concerning fictional truth, which generates a real puzzle about imaginative resistance. However, I argue that the alethic puzzle itself depends on certain realist assumptions about the nature of fictional truth which are implausible and should be rejected in favour of an interpretive view of fictional truth. Once this is done, I contend, it becomes evident that the supposed problem of imaginative resistance as it has hitherto been discussed in the literature is not puzzling at all.

Representing diabetes: ‘Brightside’ and ‘chaos’ in autobiography

This paper examines six autobiographical sources written by people with type 1 diabetes. In seeking to improve the understanding of diabetic lifeworlds; some of the autobiographies present heroic stories of ‘overcoming’ diabetes while others present a more ‘chaotic’ narrative. Regardless of their form, all the autobiographies highlight how the everyday problems and concerns associated with diabetes can be hidden and silenced. Therefore, I ask the question of how to use autobiographies as sources of evidence, being aware of the power constructs that may have directed their form. Despite this question, I argue that autobiographies remain crucial sources for exploring the experience of everyday life and much of the silencing in the texts reflects spatial and emotional challenges faced by the authors. I also consider the limitations of representation in the autobiographies calling for an understanding that the experience of diabetes carries with it feelings, emotions and affects that are non-representable and so never entirely knowable. Thus, this paper builds on recent geographical research on emotion and ‘contested’ illnesses, especially those that are not obviously visible or are easily hidden.     

‘Nature’ and ‘Elementary Nature’ in Phenomenology and Sāṅkhya

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - This is a comparative study. It is in two parts: ‘nature’ and ‘elementary nature’. ‘Nature (of things)’ as...     

Husserl’s hyletic data and phenomenal consciousness

In the Logical Investigations, Ideas I and many other texts, Husserl maintains that perceptual consciousness involves the intentional “animation” or interpretation of sensory data or hyle, e.g., “color-data,” “tone-data,” and algedonic data. These data are not intrinsically representational nor are they normally themselves objects of representation, though we can attend to them in reflection. These data are “immanent” in consciousness; they survive the phenomenological reduction. They partly ground the intuitive or “in-the-flesh” aspect of perception, and they have a determinacy of character that we do not create but can only discover. This determinate, non-representational stratum of perceptual consciousness also serves as a bridge between consciousness and the world beyond it. I articulate and defend this conception of perceptual consciousness. I locate the view in the space of contemporary positions on phenomenal character and argue for its superiority. I close by briefly arguing that the Husserlian account is perfectly compatible with physicalism (this involves disarming the Grain Problem).