Divided stimulus control: Which key did you peck,or what color was it?

Responding on concurrent schedules produced a conditional discrimination (Phases 1 and 2), asking either which peck produced the event, or which color the keys were when the event was produced. In Phases 3 and 4, reinforcer delivery or a delay in blackout was interpolated between responding and the conditional discrimination. In Phase 1, location versus color discrimination accuracy was controlled by the relative reinforcer frequency for correct responses to these questions (divided stimulus control). In Phases 2 to 4, relative reinforcer frequency for correct responses to these questions was .5, and the relative frequency with which concurrent‐schedule responses produced the questions was varied. This variation had no clear effect on the accuracy of reporting Location or Color. These results are consistent with the model of divided control suggested by Davison and Elliffe (2010). Arranging a 3‐s reinforcer between responding and choice decreased both color and location accuracy, but a 3‐s delay only decreased location accuracy. Thus, in concurrent‐schedule performance, both ambient stimuli prior to a reinforcer and the location of the just‐reinforced response are available as discriminative stimuli following the reinforcer. Control of postreinforcer responding is divided between these according to their association with the relative frequency of subsequent reinforcers.     

The folk strike back; or,why you didn’t do it intentionally,though it was bad and you knew it

Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain.

Tell me, what did you see? The stimulus on computers

Most psychology experiments start with a stimulus, and, for an increasing number of studies, the stimulus is presented on a computer monitor. Usually, that monitor is a CRT, although other technologies are becoming available. The monitor is a sampling device; the sampling occurs in four dimensions: spatial, temporal, luminance, and chromatic. This paper reviews some of the important issues in each of these sampling dimensions and gives some recommendations for how to use the monitor effectively to present the stimulus. In general, the position is taken that to understand what the stimulus actually is requires a clear specification of the physical properties of the stimulus, since the actual experience of the stimulus is determined both by the physical variables and by the psychophysical variables of how the stimulus is handled by our sensory systems.     

Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do

While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that’s notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridge-principles will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won’t lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay.     

People's hypercorrection of high-confidence errors: did they know it all along?

This study investigated the "knew it all along" explanation of the hypercorrection effect. The hypercorrection effect refers to the finding that when people are given corrective feedback, errors that are committed with high confidence are easier to correct than low-confidence errors. Experiment 1 showed that people were more likely to claim that they knew it all along when they were given the answers to high-confidence errors as compared with low-confidence errors. Experiments 2 and 3 investigated whether people really did know the correct answers before being told or whether the claim in Experiment 1 was mere hindsight bias. Experiment 2 showed that (a) participants were more likely to choose the correct answer in a 2nd guess multiple-choice test when they had expressed an error with high rather than low confidence and (b) that they were more likely to generate the correct answers to high-confidence as compared with low-confidence errors after being told they were wrong and to try again. Experiment 3 showed that (c) people were more likely to produce the correct answer when given a 2-letter cue to high- rather than low-confidence errors and that (d) when feedback was scaffolded by presenting the target letters 1 by 1, people needed fewer such letter prompts to reach the correct answers when they had committed high- rather than low-confidence errors. These results converge on the conclusion that when people said that they knew it all along, they were right. This knowledge, no doubt, contributes to why they are able to correct those high-confidence errors so easily.     

Remembering a nuclear accident in Japan: did it trigger flashbulb memories?

Flashbulb memories are vivid memories of the details surrounding the discovery of an emotional event. We investigated whether the nuclear accident that occurred in Japan in 1999 produced flashbulb memories among people who lived near the accident site. A questionnaire was distributed twice (approximately 3 weeks after the accident and 1 year later) to (1) the residents of the communities surrounding the accident site, (2) the students at a university near the accident site, and (3) the students at two universities far away from the accident site. Flashbulb memory holders were defined as those individuals who showed consistent memories between test and retest. The results indicated that only a small percentage of participants formed flashbulb memories. Further, no age-related decline was found. Flashbulb memories were distinguished by perfect or near perfect scores on four attributes: source, place, activity, and people. The results also indicated that the ratings on emotional reactions, personal consequentiality, and surprise did not differentiate between the flashbulb and non-flashbulb memory holders. In contrast, the flashbulb memory holders reported rehearsing more than the non-flashbulb memory holders. These results supported the notion that flashbulb memories are formed through rehearsal rather than at encoding. However, it is also possible that rehearsal was a result of the flashbulb memory.     

Where did you park your car? Analysis of a naturalistic long-term recency effect

Abstract

Three experiments studied the long-term retention of parking locations. In Experiment 1, members of the Applied Psychology Unit (MU) attempted to recall where they had parked during the morning and afternoon of each of the previous 12 working days. A marked recency effect was observed. In Experiment 2, members of the APU Subject Panel were invited for a single test session, and asked where they had parked after a delay of 2 hours, 1 week or 1 month. Recall was excellent and did not differ as a function of delay, allowing a simple trace decay interpretation to be ruled out. A third experiment invited subjects to attend on two occasions separated by a 2-week interval. The subjects were then required to recall their parking locations some 4 weeks after either their first visit or their second visit. Performance in both groups was inferior to that observed in Experiment 2, and declined over time. A temporal discrimination model, based on laboratory studies of both long-term and short-term recency in free recall, offers a plausible explanation of our results.     

Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem

Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem.” However, a satisfying version of illusionism has to explain not only why the illusion of consciousness arises, but also why it arises with its particular strength: Notably, why we are so deeply reluctant to recognize the illusory nature of consciousness. Explaining our strong intuitive resistance to illusionism means solving what I call the “illusion meta-problem,” which I think is a part of the illusion problem. In this paper, I argue that current versions of illusionism are unable to solve the illusion meta-problem. I focus on two of the most promising recent illusionist theories of consciousness, and I show why they fail to explain the peculiar reluctance we encounter whenever we try to accept that consciousness is an illusion.     

It’s not what you said,it’s how you said it: An analysis of therapist vocal features during psychotherapy

Psychotherapy is a conversation, whereby, at its foundation, many interventions are derived from the therapist talking. Research suggests that the voice can convey a variety of emotional and social information, and individuals may change their voice based on the context and content of the conversation (e.g. talking to a baby or delivering difficult news to patients with cancer). As such, therapists may adjust aspects of their voice throughout a therapy session depending on if they are beginning a therapy session and checking in with a client, conducting more therapeutic ‘work’ or ending the session. In this study, we modelled three vocal features—pitch, energy and rate—with linear and quadratic multilevel models to understand how therapists’ vocal features change throughout a therapy session. We hypothesised that all three vocal features would be best fit with a quadratic function—starting high and more congruent with a conversational voice, decreasing during the middle portions of therapy where more therapeutic interventions were being administered, and increasing again at the end of the session. Results indicated a quadratic model for all three vocal features was superior in fitting the data, as compared to a linear model, suggesting that therapists begin and end therapy using a different style of voice than in the middle of a session.     

Why did you choose that person over me? Ingroup rejection and attributions to discrimination

The present research examined the attributions that people make when an individual rejects a member of his or her own group in favor of a member of an outgroup (i.e., ingroup rejection). Study 1 showed that Latinos rejected by an ingroup member (perpetrator) made more attributions to discrimination than Whites under similar circumstances. Study 2 showed that Latinos made more attributions to discrimination for ingroup rejection when the perpetrator was Latino as compared to when the perpetrator was White, whereas Whites' attributions to discrimination were relatively low regardless of perpetrator's ethnicity. Study 3 showed that priming loyalty norms increased attributions to discrimination among Latinos in response to ingroup rejection, but not in response to outgroup rejection. This research brings a new perspective to discrimination research by focusing on intragroup rejection and nonprototypical cases of discrimination.     

What did you say? Self‐regulatory depletion impairs interpretation of vocal cues

Evidence indicates that people are motivated to interpret environmental cues to belongingness, but doing so can be challenging. Prior evidence shows that the self's regulatory resources are consumed when interpreting complex facial displays; with this study, we examined how the depletion of such resources may impact the ability to interpret vocal tones. Results showed that depletion decreased accuracy in identifying complex (vs. simple) vocal cues, which extends prior work and offers a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between self‐regulatory resources and the ability to effectively interpret one's social environment.     

How many voices did you hear? Natural variability disrupts identity perception from unfamiliar voices

Our voices sound different depending on the context (laughing vs. talking to a child vs. giving a speech), making within‐person variability an inherent feature of human voices. When perceiving speaker identities, listeners therefore need to not only ‘tell people apart’ (perceiving exemplars from two different speakers as separate identities) but also ‘tell people together’ (perceiving different exemplars from the same speaker as a single identity). In the current study, we investigated how such natural within‐person variability affects voice identity perception. Using voices from a popular TV show, listeners, who were either familiar or unfamiliar with this show, sorted naturally varying voice clips from two speakers into clusters to represent perceived identities. Across three independent participant samples, unfamiliar listeners perceived more identities than familiar listeners and frequently mistook exemplars from the same speaker to be different identities. These findings point towards a selective failure in ‘telling people together’. Our study highlights within‐person variability as a key feature of voices that has striking effects on (unfamiliar) voice identity perception. Our findings not only open up a new line of enquiry in the field of voice perception but also call for a re‐evaluation of theoretical models to account for natural variability during identity perception.     

Why did he do it? attribution of obedience and the phenomenon of dispositional bias

Two studies are reported which demonstrate the influence of perceptual or ‘perspective’ variables in mediating attribution processes. In both studies subjects first observed a re-enactment of Milgram's (1963) experiment of obedience in which a ‘teacher’ obeys an experimenter's request to deliver dangerously high levels of shock. They were then asked to make judgements concerning the magnitude of situational forces acting upon the teacher and also to make inferences about his personality dispositions. Study I showed that passage of time can lead observers to assume more situational control when they were required to think and write about the witnessed re-enactment of the Milgram situation compared with observers who had no time to contemplate or who were prevented from doing so. Study II did not support the notion that focus of attribution is a simple function of what one pays attention to, or a function of the differing perspectives which actors and observers employ. Both of these results seriously challenge Jones and Nisbett's (1972) contention that the differences in attribution tendencies between actors and observers arise from the difference in perspective, Moreover, considerable evidence suggests that changes in situational and dispositional attributions may not follow a simple ‘zero-sum’ model, and that subjects seem to be unwilling to treat the two sources of control as if they were inversely correlated.     

Do I belong?: it depends on when you ask

A feeling of belonging to an academic context is a critical determinant of academic achievement and persistence, particularly for students of color. Despite the fact that students of color are generally more susceptible to fluctuations in belonging uncertainty than White students, survey design can unintentionally mask this reality. We investigated whether context effects undermine the accurate assessment of belonging uncertainty in junior high and high school students (Study 1) and college students (Study 2). Considering one's ethnic identification (Study 1) and personal experiences with discrimination (Study 2) threatens sense of belonging in students of color, but not White students. Researchers should consider question order within surveys so as not to artificially mask belonging uncertainty in students of color.     

It’s not what you do,it’s why you do it: Motives for disclosure and concealment decisions among employees with depression

This multi-method study examined disclosure decisions made by employees with depression as well as their motives for those decisions. In Study 1, we conducted in-depth interviews with employees who had been diagnosed with depression to better understand why they chose to disclose or conceal their depression at work. Based on the results of the interviews, both approach and avoid motives for disclosure and concealment emerged in the analysis. Further, these motives were influenced by multiple organizational factors including social support, stigma, and diversity climate. In Study 2, we developed and validated a scale to measure approach and avoid motives for disclosure and concealement. In Study 3, we tested approach and avoid motives as mediators of the relationships between organizational factors and employee outcomes (i.e., engagement and presenteeism). We tested our model among 223 working adults with depression. Our results provided support for the hypothesized relationships among those who disclosed but not those who concealed, suggesting that when employees disclosed for approach reasons they were more likely to be engaged, and when they disclosed for avoid reasons they were more likely to engage in presenteeism. These findings provide both theoretical and practical contributions to the study of concealable identity management and to employees with mental illness.     

That’s the man who did it,or was it a woman? Actor similarity and binding errors in event memory

Mistakes in eyewitness identification frequently occur when incorrect associations are made between a familiar person and the actions of another person. The present research demonstrates that actors do not need to be similar in appearance for such conjunction errors to occur. The actors can, in fact, be very different in appearance, even of different sexes. Participants attempted to remember a series of brief everyday events, each involving an actor performing an action. Increases in actor similarity led to increases in conjunction errors in which participants incorrectly associated a familiar actor with a familiar action that was actually performed by someone else, but conjunction errors frequently occurred even when the familiar actor was of a different sex than the original actor, arguing against the hypothesis that these conjunction errors are due solely to mistaken identity.     

Are eyes special? It depends on how you look at it

Recent behavioral data have shown that central nonpredictive gaze direction triggers reflexive shifts of attention toward the gazed-at location (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998). Friesen and Kingstone suggested that this reflexive orienting effect is unique to biologically relevant stimuli. Three experiments were conducted to test this proposal by comparing the attentional orienting produced by nonpredictive gaze cues (biologically relevant) with the attentional orienting produced by nonpredictive arrow cues (biologically irrelevant). Both types of cues produced reflexive orienting in adults (Experiment 1) and preschoolers (Experiment 2), suggesting that gaze cues are not special. However, Experiment 3 showed that nonpredictive arrows produced reflexive orienting in both hemispheres of a split-brain patient. This contrasts with Kingstone, Friesen, and Gazzaniga's (2000) finding that nonpredictive gaze cues produce reflexive orienting only in the face-processing hemisphere of split-brain patients. Therefore, although nonpredictive eyes and arrows may produce similar behavioral effects, they are not subserved by the same brain systems. Together, these data provide important insight into the nature of the representations of directional stimuli involved in reflexive attentional orienting.