Is an equal interval scale an equal discriminability scale?

Stevens and Galanter’s (1957) iterative procedure for minimizing bias in category scaling was used for the scaling of loudness of white noise. The spacing obtained deviated systematically from a spacing constructed in accordance with an equal discriminability scale from a previous experiment (Eisler & Montgomery, 1972). For the stimulus spacing yielding a “pure” category scale, a magnitude scale was constructed too. Since the category scale could be predicted accurately by Fechnerian integration of this magnitude scale, it was concluded that the “pure” category scale is a pure discrimination scale. The discrepancy between the equal discriminability scale and the “pure” category scale was interpreted as a bias in the former scale due to greater recognizability of stimuli located at the extremes of the stimulus range.     

What happens between an external stimulus and an overt response?

Peripheral components of feedthrough loops were psychophysiologically measured from the brain, both forelimbs, the tongue and the eyes during simple and choice reaction time tasks using linguistic and non-linguistic stimuli. Closing a microswitch with the little finger was the overt response. Covert electromyographic (EMG) responses were computer identified in the following average temporal order: generally, the earliest covert reactions were in the tongue, brain, eyes, and passive arm-hand region. Next were complex EMG events in the active limb. These covert reactions may function in feedthrough loops to generate and transmit codes during internal information processing. The passive armhand responses occurred significantly earlier than the onset of the covert EMG burst for closing the microswitch; perhaps there is an inhibitory response “commanding” the passive arm not to respond, before the other (active) limb can overtly respond. Mean response patterns to linguistic and non-linguistic stimuli were almost identical. Reaction time to the onset of the EMG burst for switch closing was from 40 to 95 milliseconds earlier than the usual overt reaction time measure (that to switch closing), suggesting that reaction time studies might be improved by using the onset of EMG increase as the more sensitive and precise measure.     

Can an aspect of consciousness be imprinted into an electronic device?

Although quantum mechanics allows consciousness to have some effect on the collapse of wave functions, most conventional scientists expect the effect to be quite small. Their experience with expert systems, computer-aided design, etc., would cause them to deny the possibility that a specific human intention could be imprinted into a simple electronic device via a meditative process and that this device could then influence a target experiment in accordance with the specific intention. Here, via two very different target experiments, that prevailing supposition has been experimentally tested and found to be fallacious! For each target experiment, one starts with two identical physical devices, isolates them from each other and “charges” one with the specific intention for the particular experiment. This charging process involved the services of four highly qualified meditators to imprint the device with the specific intention. The devices were then wrapped in aluminum foil and separately shipped, via Federal Express ∼2,000 miles to a laboratory where the actual target experiments were conducted by others. For the two experiments, the intentions were (1) to decrease (increase) the pH of water by one pH unit and (2) to increase the ATP/ADP ratio in fruit fly larvae so as to significantly decrease their development time. For (1), changes of 0.5 to 1.0 pH units were achieved while, for (2), reductions of ∼15 percent in larval development time for the imprinted vs. unimprinted device were observed (p<0.005). From a theoretical perspective, (1) a thermodynamic basis is provided for the effect of intention on both the electrochemical potential and flux of molecular species, (2) a conceptual model for linking subtle domains with the physical domain devices is given, and (3) a conceptual model is also given of how such devices may broadcast specific prime directive information via intention—augmented electromagnetism which can “tilt” chemical reactions in appropriate ways within the target experiment.     

Can an aspect of consciousness be imprinted into an electronic device?

Although quantum mechanics allows consciousness to have some effect on the collapse of wave functions, most conventional scientists expect the effect to be quite small. Their experience with expert systems, computer-aided design, etc., would cause them to deny the possibility that a specific human intention could be imprinted into a simple electronic device via a meditative process and that this device could then influence a target experiment in accordance with the specific intention. Here, via two very different target experiments, that prevailing supposition has been experimentally tested and found to be fallacious! For each target experiment, one starts with two identical physical devices, isolates them from each other and "charges" one with the specific intention for the particular experiment. This charging process involved the services of four highly qualified meditators to imprint the device with the specific intention. The devices were then wrapped in aluminum foil and separately shipped, via Federal Express approximately 2,000 miles to a laboratory where the actual target experiments were conducted by others. For the two experiments, the intentions were (1) to decrease (increase) the pH of water by one pH unit and (2) to increase the ATP/ADP ratio in fruit fly larvae so as to significantly decrease their development time. For (1), changes of 0.5 to 1.0 pH units were achieved while, for (2), reductions of approximately 15 percent in larval development time for the imprinted vs. unimprinted device were observed (p<0.005). From a theoretical perspective, (1) a thermodynamic basis is provided for the effect of intention on both the electrochemical potential and flux of molecular species, (2) a conceptual model for linking subtle domains with the physical domain devices is given, and (3) a conceptual model is also given of how such devices may broadcast specific prime directive information via intention-augmented electromagnetism which can "tilt" chemical reactions in appropriate ways within the target experiment.     

What is an expert?

Experts play an important role in society, but there has been little investigation about the nature of expertise. I argue that there are two kinds of experts: those whose expertise is a function of what theyknow (epistemic expertise), or what theydo (performative expertise). Epistemic expertise is the capacity to provide strong justifications for a range of propositions in a domain, while performative expertise is the capacity to perform a skill well according to the rules and virtues of a practice. Both epistemic and performative experts may legitimately disagree with one another, and the two senses are conceptually and logically distinct.     

Is guilt an emotion?

Abstract

When unequivocal examples of emotion adjectives occur in the linguistic context of “being” (e.g. being angry) they can be seen to refer to emotions as readily as when they occur in the linguistic context of “feeling” (e.g. feeling angry). This is not true of poor 'or non-examples of emotion words. A psycholinguistic analysis of this phenomenon is proposed, in the light of which it is suggested that words such as “abandoned” and “guilty” do not refer to emotions. The possibility that the word “guilty” has a distinct emotional sense meaning “feeling guilty” is discussed, and the implications of this proposal for theories of emotions are examined. Also discussed are the implications of the inclusion of poor or non-examples of emotions in lists of “basic” emotions. Data are presented indicating that many of the states that emotion theorists have included as emotions, and in some cases as “basic” emotions, are not generally rated as such, and that they fail to exhibit the patterns using the feel-be test that characterise unequivocal examples. It is suggested that a problem in delimiting the domain of theories of emotions may reside in a confusion between emotions on the one hand, and their typical causes and concomitants on the other.     

Is God an Adaptation?

In this critical notice to Robert Wright’s The Evolution of God, we focus on the question of whether Wright’s God is one which can be said to be an adaptation in a well defined sense. Thus we evaluate the likelihood of different models of adaptive evolution of cultural ideas in their different levels of selection. Our result is an emphasis on the plurality of mechanisms that may lead to adaptation. By way of conclusion we assess epistemologically some of Wright’s more controversial claims concerning the directionality of evolution and moral progress.     

Is thinking an action?

I argue that entertaining a proposition is not an action. Such events do not have intentional explanations and cannot be evaluated as rational or not. In these respects they contrast with assertions and compare well with perceptual events. One can control what one thinks by doing something, most familiarly by reciting a sentence. But even then the event of entertaining the proposition is not an action, though it is an event one has caused to happen, much as one might cause oneself to see a book by looking at it. I also discuss how this may support the view that thinking about the world is a source of information about it.     

Is God an Aspect?

Neither logical deduction nor empirical induction is capable of mediating the dispute between religious disciples and non-disciples. The case is particularly acute when it comes to the divine Reality (God). Within Wittgenstein’s theoretical framework, some scholars start from the perspective of language games, contending that this dispute is meaningless and should be abandoned, while others are not satisfied with such a settlement and extend Wittgenstein’s aspect theory to religious issues, arguing that God is an aspect. The extension includes analogous and theoretical extensions. This article will show that even if these two extensions are successful, their interpretations with regard to the disputes between religious disciples and non-disciples are not convincing. Worse still, the extension from aspect theory to religious issues is by no means successful in proving that God is an aspect.     

Was Heidegger an Externalist?

To address the question posed in the title, I focus on Heidegger's conception of linguistic communication developed in the sections on Rede and Gerede of Being and Time. On the basis of a detailed analysis of these sections I argue that Heidegger was a social externalist but semantic internalist. To make this claim, however, I first need to clarify some key points that have led critics to assume Heidegger's commitment to social externalism automatically commits him to semantic externalism regarding concept use. I begin by explaining the independence of those positions, arguing that social externalism answers the question of whose concepts in a linguistic community are properly individuated, whereas semantic externalism makes a claim about what it takes for concepts to be properly individuated. Once these issues are distinguished, it is possible to see that Heidegger's intersubjectivist conception of language commits him to social externalism, while his conception of the ontological difference commits him to semantic internalism.     

What Is an Antique?

Antiques are undoubtedly objects worthy of aesthetic appreciation, but do they have a distinctive aesthetic value in virtue of being antiques? In this article we give an account of what it is to be an antique that gives the thesis that they do have a distinctive aesthetic value a chance of being true and suggests what that distinctive value consists in. After introducing our topic in Section I, in Section II we develop and defend the Adjectival Thesis: the thesis that the concept of being an antique is an adjectival concept. This provides us with the means to formulate our definition, which we do in Section III. In Section IV we further explicate and defend our definition. In Section V we conclude by briefly saying where we think our definition could be improved, by making a few comments about the aesthetics of antiques and by stating an interesting consequence of our definition: that it is not analytic that antiques are old.     

Was Wittgenstein an Anti-Realist?

William Child has said that Wittgenstein is an anti-realist with respect to a person's dreams, recent thoughts that he has consciously entertained and other things. I discuss Wittgenstein's comments about these matters in order to show that they do not commit him to an anti-realist view or a realist view. He wished to discredit the idea that when a person reports his dream or his thoughts, or past intentions, the person is reading off the contents of his mind or memory. Reporting what one dreamt or recently thought is not like reporting what one has just read. The language is different, and the criterion of truth is different.
The anti-realist is able to explain why the reports of thoughts, for instance, are "guaranteed" to be true (PI II, 222) by stipulating that the character and existence of the past thought is constituted by an inclination to assert that one had that past thought so the assertion could not be false. This could not be Wittgenstein's view. What does "guarantee" the truth of such an assertion is the fact that the person himself is the principle authority on what he dreamt, thought, and intended, something which "stands fast" for us.
I next consider Crispin Wright's account of Wittgenstein's ideas about intentions and point out that his assumption that person always makes a judgement as to whether his action conforms to his intention is clearly false. And he is wrong in attributing to Wittgenstein the idea that an intention does not have a determinate content prior to its author's judgement about whether the action conforms to the intention, an idea that is obscure. If this were accurate, it would be a mystery why we do anything, or, at least, why our actions ever conform to our intentions.     

What Is an Affordance?

What should and should not be considered an affordance is still an open issue. At the 2002 North American meeting of the International Society for Ecological Psychology, a symposium was held concerning this topic. The articles in this special issue are expanded versions of the papers presented at that symposium. To set the stage for those discussions, this article presents an analysis of the evolution of J. J. Gibson's thinking on this issue, from some of his earliest writings (i.e., J. J. Gibson & Crooks, 1938) through his most recent writings (i.e., J. J. Gibson, 1979/1986). It is hoped that this forum will stimulate thinking concerning this important ecological concept.     

Does Belief Have an Aim?

The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs `at will. I argue that the truth-aim hypothesis cannot explain any of these facts. In this respect believing differs from guessing since the hypothesis that guessing aims at the truth can explain the three analogous features of guessing. I conclude that, unlike guessing, believing is not purposive in any interesting sense.