After Heidegger: Transubstantiation

Recent debate over transubstantiation (especially Jean‐Luc Marion's defence of it) has concentrated either on transubstantiation as a kind of embarrassment in consequence of modern physics, or on the extent to which it is both a doctrine elaborated in the light of metaphysics and recoverable in consequence of metaphysics having been overcome. In this sense the tension between Aquinas' apparently metaphysical formulation of the doctrine and the less overtly metaphysical formula adopted by the Council of Trent (in its refusal to speak of ‘accidents’) has indicated a way of ‘rescuing’ or ‘recovering’ the doctrine. This article argues that such a recovery is a false trail. Pope Paul VI was right to be wary of relativising the Eucharistic event to the believing community in any doctrine of transignification. Alternatively, attempts like Chauvet's and Macquarrie's to restate Eucharistic event in terms of Heidegger's Geviert presuppose Heidegger has succeeded in destroying the metaphysics of presence, so that they can use the fruits of his researches. What is actually at issue in thinking through transubstantiation is how the doctrine relates to conceptions of the physical: Aristotelian, what comes to be Newtonian, or postmodern conceptions which appear to eschew physics altogether. Heidegger's contribution to the debate would better point to how knowing anything means being included in and (self‐) disclosed by what I know. A re‐investigation of transubstantiation might therefore take into account the extraordinary reappearance of the term ‘transubstantiation’ in current non‐theological investigations of performativity (especially in the work of Judith Butler). Here transubstantiation would include not the maximal meaning of bread and wine as signs constituted in das Geviert, ‘after’ substance has been critiqued, but their minimality, in enacting a change in (our) substance (self‐realising). This would confirm the divinising meaning of the Eucharistic event, which stresses how we are caught up into the divine. Thus, whereas in transignification the Eucharistic event occurs in consequence of the will of the community of believers, in transubstantiation it is the enactment of the community as community that is at issue, an enactment in consequence of no act of will of its own. In terms of the postmodern and non‐theological appropriation of the word transubstantiation, this means that I who participate in the Eucharistic am re‐ordered, or re‐materialised, or ‘trans‐substantiated’ in the Eucharistic event.     

Reading Wittgenstein

Books reviewed in this essay:
Robert Arrington and Hans-Johann Glock (eds), Wittgenstein & Quine
John Koethe, The Continuity of Wittgenstein's Thought
P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy
Hans Sluga and David G. Stern (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein
Marie McGinn, Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations     

On Wittgenstein

Invited contributions were asked for statements of how they came to be acquainted with Wittgenstein's work, the influence it had on their own work, and how they see Wittgenstein in relation to prevalent trends in contemporary philosophy. The weight given to the various elements in the invitation was left to the discretion of the contributors. Contributions have also been included from the Rush Rhees and Peter Winch archives. (Ed.)
Articles by: Stanley Cavell, James Conant, Cora Diamond, İlham Dilman, P.M.S. Hacker, B.F. McGuinness, Anthony Palmer, D.Z. Phillips, Rush Rhees, Joachim Schulte, Eike von Savigny, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Peter Winch     

维特根斯坦和传统

维特根斯坦在奥地利-维也纳传统中长大,并坚定地植根于这一传统之中。任何理解他的人格的尝试都必须设法把他置于这一背景中加以考察。但维特根斯坦作为哲学家的工作,几乎完全是在他并不分享其文化传统、并且对他本人是非常不相宜的环境中完成的。     

Wittgenstein on Description

Philosophical Studies -     

Wittgenstein and criteria

An essay to develop some of Wittgenstein's remarks about the notion of ‘criteria’ and to give the concept clarity even at the expense of some features Wittgenstein claimed for it. This effort was made because of the important role ‘criteria’ plays in Wittgenstein's discussions of feelings and mental states, and it is hoped that a defense of ‘criteria’ will make those discussions more coherent. An attempt is made to relate this notion of ‘criteria’ to the definition and expression of mental states, following some of Wittgenstein's suggestions, and to rebut skepticism about other minds.     

Wittgenstein in China

Although Chinese philosophers were somewhat influenced by Wittgenstein before 1949 – the Tractatus was first translated into Chinese in 1927–28 – they tended to see him either as a disciple of Russell or as a member of the Vienna Circle. However, since 1979 (following 30 years in which they were unable to study such Western philosophers), Chinese scholars have done their utmost to catch up with world standards in Wittgenstein scholarship in three overlapping routes – textual reading, contextual interpretation and philosophical application. As China continues its modernisation, there will likely be more substantive interaction between Wittgenstein's thought and Chinese philosophy and culture.     

维特根斯坦与宗教

维特根斯坦是一个伟大的分析哲学家,但是一生与宗教有非常密切的联系。本文分为两部分。第一部分从维特根斯坦的家庭背景、成长经历、性格特征、所受影响等方面分析了维特根斯坦与宗教(基督教)的联系;第二部分从“关于宗教的本质是否可以言说”、“为什么会有宗教?”“宗教与激情”、“上帝是谁?”“信仰上帝是为了给人生寻找意义”等五个方面分析和评论了维特根斯坦的宗教观点。     

Wittgenstein and logic

In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) presents the concept of order in terms of a notational iteration that is completely logical but not part of logic. Logic for him is not the foundation of mathematical concepts but rather a purely formal way of reflecting the world that at the minimum adds absolutely no content. Order for him is not based on the concepts of logic but is instead revealed through an ideal notational series. He states that logic is “transcendental”. As such it requires an ideal that his philosophical method eventually forces him to reject. I argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is more dialectical than transcendental.