Pre‐outcome regret: Widespread and overlooked

Many real‐life decisions (e.g. promises, plans and agreements) involve a time interval between when the decision is made and the main outcome is revealed. Nearly all regret studies focus on anticipated or experienced post‐outcome regret. We argue that regret is also frequently experienced in the pre‐outcome period, and that this ‘pre‐outcome regret’ has other sources than regret experienced after the outcome is known. Regret experienced in the pre‐outcome period has an important function post‐outcome regret (usually) cannot have, namely to motivate the decision maker to reconsider the ongoing decision process and reverse the initial decision. Pre‐outcome regret should for these reasons be distinguished from post‐outcome regret, and studied separately. In two scenario studies, participants were asked to imagine their regret after agreeing to perform an inconvenient task. In both, more regret was reported before than after the event, even when they had imagined a ‘worst case’ outcome. In the third study, participants described a difficult choice from their own life. Again, regret was perceived as higher in the pre‐outcome period than afterwards. In a fourth study, participants reported regret ‘online’ during an economic game (a version of the ultimatum game). They regretted their decisions more before than after they knew the outcome. We conclude that experienced pre‐outcome regret is often stronger than post‐outcome regret, and typically increases during the pre‐outcome period. We suspect that the absence of JDM studies of pre‐outcome regret is a legacy of the dominant gambling metaphor within decision research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

决策理由、行动和后果对决策后悔的影响

探讨决策理由(合理与不合理)、行动(做与不做)和后果(严重与轻微)对决策后悔的影响,以2×2×2被试内设计,设置8个决策情境进行实验。结果:不合理决策的后悔体验比合理决策更高,严重的后果导致的后悔比轻微的后果更高,行动无主效应,但在后果轻微,理由不正当条件下,行动也就是“做”导致更多的后悔情绪。结论:决策理由的合理性与后果的严重性是影响决策后悔的重要因素; 只有理由不正当且后果轻微时,才存在“做效应”。     

Using self-generated validity to promote exercise behaviour

Self-generated validity (SGV) refers to the fact that measurement of cognitions can lead to behaviour change. The present research tested to two predictions in relation to SGV: SGV is stronger when supplementing measures of intentions and other components of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) with measures of anticipated regret; SGV is only stronger when measuring anticipated regret before measuring intentions and other components of the TPB. A total of 576 18-22-year-old students were randomly allocated to complete one of three questionnaires in relation to exercise: (1) TPB questionnaire in relation to exercising in a sports centre (TPB only); (2) TPB questionnaire including anticipated regret questions that appear after intention items and are mixed in with other items (TPB + regret mixed); (3) TPB questionnaire with anticipated regret questions first (TPB + regret first). Past use of the sports centre was also measured by self-report in all conditions. Use of the sports centre 4 and 5 weeks later was measured based on objective records. Hierarchical regression analyses indicated no effect of measuring anticipated regret compared to only measuring TPB variables, but a significant effect of measuring anticipated regret first compared to the other two conditions on sports centre use. This effect persisted after controlling for TPB variables and past behaviour (PB). The effect was moderated by intention strength but not PB. Implications for understanding SGV and behaviour change are discussed.     

失望情绪在不作为惯性产生中的作用

以往不作为惯性领域的研究发现, 当个体没有获得先前更优机会是源于他人或外界等不可控因素时, 个体仍会倾向于继续放弃当前次优机会, 且后悔情绪未能对此进行解释。本研究认为失望情绪适用于解释此种情况下的不作为惯性, 或可成为后悔情绪解释的有效补充。本研究通过两个实验首次探讨了失望情绪在不作为惯性产生中的作用。结果发现, 各自变量对失望情绪（体验失望和预期失望）和作为可能性均具有一致的影响力, 且预期失望在不作为惯性的产生中具有中介作用。本研究表明, 失望情绪可能也是导致不作为惯性的一个重要因素。     

结果的接近性对正性结果评价影响的电生理证据

结果的接近性是指对已发生事件的实际结果与在心理上的理想结果或期待结果之间差距的接近程度。实验采用事件相关电位技术和类老虎机赌博任务探讨了结果的接近性对正性结果评价的影响。(1)行为评定结果表明, 结果的接近性不同水平诱发了不同的情绪体验, “差一点输”的赢钱使被试更多感到庆幸, “最理想”的赢钱使被试感到高兴; 结果的接近性也影响了随后trial的反应时, 与“一般”的赢钱和“最理想”的赢钱相比, “差一点输的”赢钱后的下一个trial中被试的反应时明显变长。(2)脑电结果表明, 结果的接近性不同水平诱发了不同的FRN和P300, 与“一般”的赢钱和“最理想”的赢钱相比, “差一点输”的赢钱诱发了波幅更大的FRN和波幅更大潜伏期更长的P300。这说明结果的接近性明显地影响了正性结果的认知评价加工。     

The inaction effect in the psychology of regret

Previous research showed that decisions to act (i.e., actions) produce more regret than decisions not to act (i.e., inactions). This previous research focused on decisions made in isolation and ignored that decisions are often made in response to earlier outcomes. The authors show in 4 experiments that these prior outcomes may promote action and hence make inaction more abnormal. They manipulated information about a prior outcome. As hypothesized, when prior outcomes were positive or absent, people attributed more regret to action than to inaction. However, as predicted and counter to previous research, following negative prior outcomes, more regret was attributed to inaction, a finding that the authors label the inaction effect. Experiment 4, showing differential effects for regret and disappointment, demonstrates the need for emotion-specific predictions.     

Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind

Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well‐established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants' regret when making reversible decisions and to test the hypothesis that changing one's mind will increase post‐outcome regret. The first two studies employed the Ultimatum game and the Trust game. The third study used a variant of the Monty Hall problem. All games were conducted by individual participants playing interactively against a computer. The outcomes were designed to capture a common characteristic of real‐life decisions: they varied from rather negative to fairly positive, and for every outcome, it was possible to imagine both more and less profitable outcomes. In all experiments, those who changed their minds reported much stronger post‐outcome regret than those who did not change, even if the final outcomes were equally good (Experiments 2 and 3) or better (Experiment 1).This finding was not because of individual differences with respect to gender, tendency to regret, or tendency to maximize. Previous studies have found that those who change from a correct to wrong option regret more than those who select a wrong option directly. This study indicates that this finding is a special case of a more general phenomenon: changing one's mind seems to come with a cost, even when one ends up with favorable outcomes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

做会后悔还是不做会后悔?——自我调节模式对不作为惯性的影响

从消费者的不作为惯性反应差异出发,探讨运动模式和评估模式的消费者在错过第一次合意机会、面对第二次次优机会时购买可能性的差异及原因。通过3个研究发现,相比评估模式的消费者而言,运动模式的消费者具有更高的二次购买可能性。在自我调节模式影响次优购买可能性的过程中,预期后悔起到重要的中介作用。此外,研究还发现,当第二次次优机会中提供了与第一次机会中的产品类似但不同的替代产品时,运动模式和评估模式消费者之间的购买可能性差异消失了。     

The relationship between counterfactual thinking and emotional reactions to event outcomes: Does one account fit all?

By enabling a comparison between what is and what might have been, counterfactual thoughts amplify our emotional responses to bad outcomes. Well-known demonstrations such as the action effect (the tendency to attribute most regret to a character whose actions brought about a bad outcome) and the temporal order effect (the tendency to undo the last in a series of events leading up to a bad outcome) are often explained in this way. An important difference between these effects is that outcomes are due to decisions in the action effect, whereas in the temporal order effect outcomes are achieved by chance. In Experiment 1, we showed that imposing time pressure leads to a significant reduction in the action but not in the temporal order effect. In Experiment 2, we found that asking participants to evaluate the protagonists (“who ought to feel worse?”) led to a significant reduction in the temporal order but not in the action effect. The results suggest that the action and temporal order effects require different explanations and are consistent with other work that suggests that when decisions lead to bad outcomes a comparison of decision quality is an important determinant of the emotional response attributed to the protagonists. The stimulus materials used in our experiments may be downloaded from pbr.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

Regrets in the East and West: Role of intrapersonal versus interpersonal norms

Regrets are stronger following atypical than following normal behaviour. No studies have tested this effect for both intrapersonal normality (consistency within a person) and interpersonal normality (consistency between people) simultaneously. The present research examined whether the impact of violating the two kinds of normality on regret varies across cultures, using a manipulation of mutability crossed with that of norm violation. Among Korean participants (but not Americans) the impacts of mutability on regret were stronger when the intrapersonal rather than the interpersonal norm was violated, which was interpreted in terms of the greater collectivist emphasis in Korea than in the USA.     

Comparisons, mental models, and the action effect in judgments of regret

People tend to attribute more regret to a character who has decided to take action and experienced a negative outcome than to one who has decided not to act and experienced a negative outcome. For some decisions, however, this finding is not observed in a between-participants design and thus appears to rely on comparisons between people's representations of action and their representations of inaction. In this article, we outline a mental models account that explains findings from studies that have used within- and between-participants designs, and we suggest that, for decisions with uncertain counterfactual outcomes, information about the consequences of a decision to act causes people to flesh out their representation of the counterfactual states of affairs for inaction. In three experiments, we confirm our predictions about participants' fleshing out of representations, demonstrating that an action effect occurs only when information about the consequences of action is available to participants as they rate the nonactor and when this information about action is informative with respect to judgments about inaction. It is important to note that the action effect always occurs when the decision scenario specifies certain counterfactual outcomes. These results suggest that people sometimes base their attributions of regret on comparisons among different sets of mental models.     

When Should we Regret?

In this paper, I develop and defend the ‘Justified Decision Perspective’ (JDP) in answer to the question of when we should regret the things we have done. I claim that one should not regret a past decision one has made so long as it was justified in relation to the kind of person one was at the time of acting. On this time-indexing account, judging a decision to be justified – at least for the purposes of assessing one’s regrets – is a matter of identifying the practical reasons that were epistemically available to the agent when she was deliberating about what to do. Accordingly, when responding to her regrets, an agent should not invoke (a) reasons that existed but were epistemically unavailable to her when she was deliberating; or (b) reasons that only came into existence after she acted. The JDP has important implications for prospective regret. In particular, it implies we should worry less about experiencing regret in the future than many of us do. Thus, my overall aim is to show that we often have reason to reject our regrets, which means that regret should play a less prominent and painful role in our lives than it does currently.     

The effects of action,normality, and decision carefulness on anticipated regret: Evidence for a broad mediating role of decision justifiability

Two distinct theoretical views explain the effects of action/inaction and social normality on anticipated regret. Norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) emphasises the role of decision mutability, the ease with which one can imagine having made a different choice. Decision justification theory (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002) highlights the role of decision justifiability, the perception that the choice was made on a defensible basis, supported by convincing arguments or using a thoughtful, comprehensive decision process. The present paper tests several contrasting predictions from the two theoretical approaches in a series of four studies. Study 1 replicated earlier findings showing greater anticipated regret when the chosen option was abnormal than when it was normal, and perceived justifiability mediated the effect. Study 2 showed that anticipated regret was higher for careless than for careful decisions. Study 3 replicated this finding for a sample holding a different social norm towards the focal decision. Finally, Study 4 found that, when decision carefulness, normality and action/inaction were all specified, only the former showed a significant effect on anticipated regret, and the effect was again mediated by perceived justifiability. Decision justification theory thus appears to provide a better account of anticipated regret intensity in this context than does norm theory.     

Human latent inhibition and the density of predictive relationships in the context in which the target stimulus occurs

In two experiments, participants were exposed to a listing of actions performed by a fictitious Mr. X, over three days of his life. For most of his actions an outcome was described, but some were not followed by any outcome. On Day 3, Mr. X performed an action (the target action) that was followed by a novel outcome. For participants in the control condition, the target action that preceded the appearance of this outcome was also novel; for participants in the latent inhibition (LI) condition, Mr. X had performed the target action on repeated occasions during Days 2 and 3, without it producing any outcome. All the participants were tested on their ability to retrieve the action performed by Mr. X prior to the target outcome. In Experiment 1, retrieval of the target action (indicating a less effective target action–outcome association) was poorer in the LI than in the control condition. In Experiment 2, reducing the proportion (the density) of nontarget actions that brought outcomes during initial training was found to reduce the size of the LI effect. These results are predicted by the account of LI put forward previously [Hall, G., & Rodríguez, G. (2010). Associative and nonassociative processes in latent inhibition: An elaboration of the Pearce-Hall model. In R. E. Lubow & I. Weiner (Eds.), Latent inhibition: Data, theories, and applications to schizophrenia (pp. 114–136). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press]. A high density of predictive relationships ensures strong activation of the expectancy that some outcome will occur when the target action is first presented; this facilitates the formation of a target action–no-event association during training in the LI condition, thus enhancing the LI effect.     

Myopic regret avoidance: Feedback avoidance and learning in repeated decision making

Decision makers can become trapped by myopic regret avoidance in which rejecting feedback to avoid short-term outcome regret (regret associated with counterfactual outcome comparisons) leads to reduced learning and greater long-term regret over continuing poor decisions. In a series of laboratory experiments involving repeated choices among uncertain monetary prospects, participants primed with outcome regret tended to decline feedback, learned the task slowly or not at all, and performed poorly. This pattern was reversed when decision makers were primed with self-blame regret (regret over an unjustified decision). Further, in a final experiment in which task learning was unnecessary, feedback was more often rejected in the self-blame regret condition than in the outcome regret condition. We discuss the findings in terms of a distinction between two regret components, one associated with outcome evaluation, the other with the justifiability of the decision process used in making the choice.     

Counterfactually mediated emotions: a developmental study of regret and relief in a probabilistic gambling task

Regret and relief are related to counterfactual thinking and rely on comparison processes between what has been and what might have been. In this article, we study the development of regret and relief from late childhood to adulthood (11.2-20.2 years), and we examine how these two emotions affect individuals' willingness to retrospectively reconsider their choice in a computerized monetary gambling task. We asked participants to choose between two "wheels of fortune" that differed in the amount of gain and loss expected and the probability of winning. We manipulated the outcome of the wheel of fortune that was not selected by participants to induce regret or relief. For each trial, participants rated how they felt about the outcome and their willingness to modify their choice. Participants' ratings suggest that regret and relief are stronger in adults than in children and adolescents. Regret affects participants' willingness to modify their initial choice, but this desire is stronger for adults than for children. In children, the experience of regret seems to be dissociated from the willingness to reconsider a choice. This study provides the first evidence that the ability to experience counterfactually mediated emotions, such as regret and relief, and the ability to take them into consideration continue to develop during late childhood and adolescence.     

Effort Invested in Vain: The Impact of Effort on the Intensity of Disappointment and Regret

Two scenario studies investigated the impact of the investment of instrumental and noninstrumental effort on the intensity of disappointment and regret. The role of effort was investigated in the context of other determinants of disappointment and regret: the desirability of the outcome, its likelihood, and the perceived responsibility for (not) obtaining the outcome. Study 1 shows that after failure, disappointment is more intense after an investment of higher levels of instrumental effort, whereas regret is more intense an investment of less instrumental effort. Study 2 shows that both disappointment and regret are more intense after an investment of higher levels of noninstrumental effort. Further analyses suggest that the effect of instrumental effort on disappointment is due to a direct effect of the investment of effort. The effect of instrumental effort on disappointment was mediated by the perceived likelihood of attaining the outcome and also related to the perceived desirability of the outcome. The impact of instrumental effort on regret was found to be due to a direct effect of the investment of effort, and to the perceived responsibility for not attaining the outcome. The effect of the investment of noninstrumental effort on the intensity of both disappointment and regret was found to be due to a direct effect of effort. Desirability also affected disappointment (with increased desirability leading to higher levels of disappointment), whereas only regret was affected by perceived responsibility. Implications of these findings for the study of disappointment and regret are discussed.     

反事实思维与后悔的关系：调节模式的调节作用

已有研究表明反事实思维越多则后悔越强烈。本研究试图通过两项实验分别探讨特质性、情境性调节模式是否影响反事实思维与后悔之间的关系。结果表明：特质性调节模式及情境性调节模式均对反事实思维与后悔之间的关系具有调节作用,具体来说,针对情境性调节模式而言,运动模式下加法式思维越多则后悔越轻微,评估模式下加法式思维越多则后悔越强烈;针对特质性调节模式而言,运动模式下加法式思维越多则后悔越轻微。