The counselor as psychoecologist

Counselors may be in need of a new model of practice. Current approaches based on the intrapersonal models of psychotherapy are not congruent with institutional realities. More important, they assume, often falsely, a “disturbed” person who must be adjusted to a “normal” environment. This article suggests that emotional disturbance be viewed as an ecological phenomenon that exists in the transactions among people. The task of the counselor is to alter disturbed transactions in ways that promote individual competence. The implications for practice of viewing the counselor as a psychoecologist are discussed and illustrated through a case study.     

The Metabolic Core of Environmental Education

I consider the case of the “simplest” living beings—bacteria—and examine how their embodied activity constitutes an organism/environment interaction, out of which emerges the possibility of learning from an environment. I suggest that this mutual co-emergence of organism and environment implies a panbiotic educational interaction that is at once the condition for, and achievement of, all living beings. Learning and being learned from are entangled in varied ways throughout the biosphere. Education is not an exclusively human project, it is part of the ancient evolutionary process of elaborating and diversifying the relational possibilities inherent in metabolism that has brought forth our diverse and flourishing world. Abstracted from context, “education” appears as a set of ways in which humans actively engage and take responsibility for the learning outcomes of relationships with each other. Insofar as we consider this distinction absolute rather than a performed construct to be assessed by its consequences, we blind ourselves to the educative dimension of other species as well as our many miseducative engagements with them. If learning processes are inherent and constitutive of ecological communities, education theorists should devote their pedagogical sensitivities and insights to the crucial challenge of developing educative sustainable human–nature relations.     

INTEGRAL GEOGRAPHY: SPACE,PLACE, AND PERSPECTIVE

Considering the role of space and place in Integral Ecology is presented as the concept of Integral Geography. First, an ecological AQAL model is proposed to situate the diverse scientific disciplines used in geography, giving equal consideration for their respective contributions in knowledge and understanding of the world. Second, a model for incorporating perspectives provided in the arts and humanities is proposed in situating scientific understanding in relation to aesthetic and cultural aspects of “being and becoming.” Third, a Geographical Information System (GIS) based map model illustrates how biophysical and social realities can be viewed and analyzed from a geographical perspective as “Integral places.”     

Studying radical organizational innovation through grounded theory

The main aim of this article is to study the social processes occurring during the implementation of radical organizational innovation. Our aim is to understand the nature of the development of radical innovation by identifying the social processes, that are taking place. The perspective for the analysis stems from “grounded theory” as a generative and inductive analytical strategy (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). An in-depth case study was thoroughly analysed. A total of 14 indepth interviews were conducted with key informants selected according to “theoretical sampling” criteria. The systematic use of the “constant comparative method” allowed us to differentiate grounded theories leading to a “conceptual saturation” of the categories generated from the empirical data. Results show the emergence of two basic processes, “learning” and “adaptation”, during the development of radical innovation. A “grounded” theory concerning the development of radical innovation is proposed, emphasizing the organization's selfregulating capacity for learning and adapting. Our results describe innovation as an adaptable response that causes disorder in terms of “a creative tension in the system”. Finally, the methodological implications of grounded theory are discussed with regard to the study of radical innovation. The requisites and limitations observed in using grounded theory are outlined.     

The conceptual structure of sex role stereotypes in college students

This study investigated sex stereotypes as natural language categories. Ten years ago, sex stereotypes were found to have a core-peripheral structure similar to that of the nonevaluative categories studies by Rosch (1973). Changes and stability in these conceptions were studied by having 56 female and 56 male undergraduate students rate 217 adjectives on Likert scales according to how well each adjective represented their own view of typical Men or Women. Mean ratings were analyzed to reveal a structure of core, peripheral, and nonmembers for Men and for Women. As was the case ten years ago, core traits reflected dimensions of “niceness-nurturance” for Women and “potency-strength” for Men. Female students also viewed Women as “competent,” while male students also viewed Women as “socially effective.” Adjectives that constituted the core for one category were generally placed in the periphery for the other category. As compared to ten years ago, the peripheries of the categories were expanded and showed a greater degree of overlap. College students' conceptions of Men and Women are best characterized as overlapping rather than as bipolar opposites. The formation of sex stereotype categories was discussed in terms of cognitive and social learning processes.     

Lutheran conceptions of human dignity in a global context: A conversation with Indian Dalits and European/Americans

This paper explores Lutheran conceptions of human dignity expressed by European/Americans (Oswald Bayer and John Witte, Jr.) and Dalits (Raj Bharath Patta and Surekha Nelavala). The former emphasize the human coram Deo, the lost dignity of the individual sinner, and the imputed dignity of the justified. The latter attend especially to humans coram hominibus, the dignity of the “sinned upon” in Indian society, and the full inclusion of Dalits. While neither view replaces the other, I argue that European/Americans must become more responsive to differentiated social realities in which persons are “sinful” and “sinned upon” in unequal ways.     

Sex stereotypes and implicit personality theory: Toward a cognitive—Social psychological conceptualization

Progress in understanding sex stereotypes has been impeded by the failure of researchers to address two critical conceptual questions: What is a sex stereotype? How do sex stereotypes function in social cognition and behavior? As a step toward answering the first question, the meaning of the term “sex stereotype” was considered. On the basis of points of agreement among extant conceptual definitions of the construct “stereotype” (in both the female-male and ethnic relations literatures), a generic definition of “sex stereotypes” is proposed: the structured sets of beliefs about the personal attributes of women and of men. In order to relate sex stereotypes more closely to research and theory on “normal” psychological processes, this basic definition is recast in terms of the person perception construct, “implicit personality theory”: the structured sets of inferential relations that link personal attributes to the social categories female and male. Two studies are presented to illustrate the utility of this translation. The remainder of the article addresses the second question. Here we offer preliminary ideas regarding a more general cognitive—social psychological framework for the study of sex stereotypes. Stereotype and stereotyping are distinguished, and each is discussed in light of relevant research in cognitive and social psychology.     

Primate Culture and Social Learning

The human primate is a deeply cultural species, our cognition being shaped by culture, and cultural transmission amounting to an “epidemic of mental representations” (Sperber, 1996). The architecture of this aspect of human cognition has been shaped by our evolutionary past in ways that we can now begin to discern through comparative studies of other primates. Processes of social learning (learning from others) are important for cognitive science to understand because they are cognitively complex and take many interrelated forms; they shape traditions, cultures and nonsocial aspects of cognition; and in turn they may be shaped by their cultural context. The study of primate social learning and culture has in recent years enjoyed a renaissance, providing a wealth of new findings, key aspects of which are reviewed. The focus is on cognitive issues, including learning about the consequences, sequential structure and hierarchical organization of actions; relating stored knowledge to the assimilation of new social knowledge; feedback guiding the construction of imitations; conceptual grasp of imitation; and the reciprocal relationship between social learning and culture.     

Child As Metaphor: Colonialism,Psy-Governance,and Epistemicide

This paper mobilizes transdisciplinary inquiry to explore and deconstruct the often-used comparison of racialized/colonized people, intellectually disabled people and mad people as being like children. To be childlike is a metaphor that is used to denigrate, to classify as irrational and incompetent, to dismiss as not being knowledge holders, to justify governance and action on others’ behalf, to deem as being animistic, as undeveloped, underdeveloped or wrongly developed, and, hence, to subjugate. We explore the political work done by the metaphorical appeal to childhood, and particularly the centrality of the metaphor of childhood to legitimizing colonialism and white supremacy. The article attends to the ways in which this metaphor contributes to the shaping of the material and discursive realities of racialized and colonized others, as well as those who have been psychiatrized and deemed “intellectually disabled”. Further, we explore specific metaphors of child-colony, and child-mad-“crip”. We then detail the developmental logic underlying the historical and continued use of the metaphorics of childhood, and explore how this makes possible an infantilization of colonized peoples and the global South more widely. The material and discursive impact of this metaphor on children’s lives, and particularly children who are racialized, colonized, and/or deemed mad or “crip”, is then considered. We argue that complex adult-child relations, sane-mad relations and Western-majority world relations within global psychiatry, are situated firmly within pejorative notions of what it means to be childlike, and reproduce multi-systemic forms of oppression that, ostensibly in their “best interests”, govern children and all those deemed childlike.     

Empathy as dialectic imagination

Abstract

The importance of relationship processes for humanistic and psychodynamic therapists makes empathy a critical concept in psychotherapy. Experimental work suggests that learning occurs only when the subject is actively and cooperatively engaged in the learning process. Similarly, psychotherapy is only effective when the client is willingly active in the therapeutic process. A crucial aspect of the therapist's activity is empathic imagination, defined here as the use of “dialectic” thinking capacities‐the recognition of conceptual alternatives in a given situation. These processes are at the heart of a humanistic view of agency. The therapist's use of this capacity allows imaginative projection into aspects of the client's experience, helping the client to feel understood in the relationship and emboldened to consider new possibilities in life.     

Normative Social Role Concepts in Early Childhood

The current studies (N = 255, children ages 4–5 and adults) explore patterns of age‐related continuity and change in conceptual representations of social role categories (e.g., “scientist”). In Study 1, young children's judgments of category membership were shaped by both category labels and category‐normative traits, and the two were dissociable, indicating that even young children's conceptual representations for some social categories have a “dual character.” In Study 2, when labels and traits were contrasted, adults and children based their category‐based induction decisions on category‐normative traits rather than labels. Study 3 confirmed that children reason based on category‐normative traits because they view them as an obligatory part of category membership. In contrast, adults in this study viewed the category‐normative traits as informative on their own (not only as a cue to obligations). Implications for continuity and change in representations of social role categories will be discussed.     

The effect of children's spontaneous cognitive sets on discrimination learning

Two experiments investigated the role of children's spontaneous cognitive “sets” in pictorial discrimination learning. Lists were constructed to highlight either perceptual or conceptual similarities among the stimuli. In each experiment age by treatment interactions revealed that in comparison to the behavior of older children (sixth graders), that of younger children (kindergartners) is governed more by the perceptible than by the conceptual attributes of stimuli—data in complete accord with Bruner's view of cognitive development.     

The Social Constitution of Perceiver-Environment Reciprocity

Although animal—environment reciprocity is central to ecological psychology, one facet of this viewpoint remains underappreciated: organisms alter environments so as to better function in them. In many species this activity of “niche construction” includes coordinated actions by individuals jointly working toward common ends. Mounting paleontological and archeological evidence indicates that human evolution should be viewed in the light of such social considerations. The environment of our immediate human ancestors was marked by, among other things, group settlements, manufactured stone tools, and extensive migration. An emerging species such as ours, whose distinctive psychological qualities offered a selective advantage relative to these conditions, would flourish particularly if it could preserve the gains of prior generations even as its members continued to transform econiche features in functionally significant ways. This evolutionary perspective, with its due recognition of sociocultural processes, highlights 3 factors of importance for ecological psychology: (1) the history of person-environment reciprocity results in human environments whose natural and sociocultural factors are inextricably intertwined. (2) developing individuals enter human environments not as solitary explorers but through the guidance of more experienced persons with the result that much development takes shape through social mediation; and (3) a distinguishing and ubiquitous feature of human environments that is a product of collective human actions is places. Nearly all human activity, including most psychological research, occurs in places, and owing to their psychological significance, it would seem impossible to disentangle psychological and social processes. These 3 factors illuminate that a fully-realized ecological psychology will be one that includes recognition of the constitutive role played by social processes.     

Dignity in Three Acts

The author develops three distinct senses of “dignity” that materialize in Drozek’s paper. Dignity as intrinsic worth invites the question of whether the implicit notion of dignity in contemporary psychoanalysis is best viewed as Kantian and, if so, how we are to accommodate the rationalism that inheres in it. Dignity as a state of mind leads the author to sketch the view that dignity is imperiled by absence (of vitality, of realness), contrasting it with Drozek’s emphasis on badness. Dignity as a relational provision summons inquiry into the distinction between “valuing” and “recognizing” in the encounter between subjectivities. Recognition, it is suggested, not only begets love, but also serves as the most compelling analytic instantiation of the Kantian Formula for Humanity—to treat the other as an end. By spelling out these interrelated significations, we not only discern our debts to the concept of dignity but also reveal potential psychoanalytic contributions to the broader conversation about dignity’s essence.     

Walking in Beauty: An American Indian Perspective on Social Justice

The purpose of this article is to introduce “walking in beauty,” an American Indian spiritual perspective related to social justice that emphasizes beauty, harmony, connectedness/unity of experience, and imagination. Walking in beauty includes 3 processes: embodiment, creativity, and appreciation of the sublime. Recommendations are offered for counselors to walk in beauty with their clients. This way of being is viewed as a path to social justice.     

相似性判断和差异性判断的不对称性及其机制探索

本文阐述了相似性判断和差异性判断不对称性的相关研究。首先介绍了不对称性的发展及理论解释。其次,根据事件相关电位的研究结果,阐述了图-词信息的双编码模型对相似性判断的影响。接着分析和介绍了相似性判断的双编码过程及其时间进程。最后,作者提出有待深入研究的几个问题：（1）差异性策略在分类和推理中的应用;（2）相似性双编码过程的实证研究及其应用;（3）从发展认知神经科学的角度探讨不对称的认知神经机制。     

Meaning and the mediation of emotional experience: Placing mediational meaning at the center of psychological processes

This paper outlines a framework to understand and further study how meaning mediates psychological processes. Central to this paper is the concept of mediational meaning: a representation of “me in the world,” socially distributed as a cultural artifact, that “encodes” emotion and motivates social activity. It is suggested that the emotional encoding of mediational meaning can be understood through the study of its structure, which is conceptualized on two levels: a conceptual level, called the “view,” and a narrative level, called the “narrative structure.” This paper proposes an operationalization of both structural levels and hypothesizes specific relationships between certain structural aspects of mediational meaning and certain dimensions of emotional experience: valence, action readiness, and some aspects of the quale.     

Who Ministers to Whom: Matthew 25:31–46 and Prison Ministry

This essay sees Matthew 25:31–46 as Jesus’ offer of both gift and challenge: disciples will simultaneously minister to and be ministered to by Jesus in jail and prison. Following a consideration of two different dominant ways of interpreting the passage in the literature—what are sometimes called the missionary and the social justice interpretations—and Luther's reading of the passage as falling under the Fifth Commandment, the essay invites the reader to engage the transformative consequences of  “seeing” Jesus imprisoned in the U.S. criminal “justice” system.     

Social Construction and Achieving Reference1

One influential view is that at least some putatively natural human kinds are actually social constructions, understood as some real kind of thing that is produced or sustained by our social and conceptual practices. Category constructionists share two commitments: they hold that human category terms like “race” (and racial terms) and “sex” (and sexual terms) and “homosexuality” and “perversion” actually refer to constructed categories, and they hold that these categories are widely but mistakenly taken to be natural kinds. But it is far from clear that these two commitments are consistent. The sort of mismatch between belief and underlying nature constructionists’ suppose is often taken to indicate a failure of reference. Reliance on a causal‐historical account of reference allows the preservation of reference, but unfortunately, constructionists' appropriation of causal historical accounts of reference is beset by difficulties that do not attend natural kind theorists’ appeals to such accounts. Here, I set out these difficulties, but argue that they can be answered, allowing terms for apparently natural human kinds refer to some sort of social construction about which there is massive error.     

On the need for real dialogue: What's wrong with monological contractualism?

According to T.M. Scanlon, the core idea of contractualism consists in the claim that what we are morally required to do is conceptually grounded in the value of living in “relations of mutual recognition” with others. Specifically, Scanlon's contractualist idea of “living in relations of mutual recognition with others” requires that one act only in ways that cannot be reasonably rejected by all of those affected, according to the results of a hypothetical reflection conducted within one's own mind. I claim, however, that Scanlon is mistaken to rely on a single individual's hypothetical reflection (monological reflection) to determine what no one affected could reasonably reject. Instead, following Jürgen Habermas, I claim that we must engage in actual dialogue with all who stand to be affected, in order to live in relations of mutual recognition with others.