Two dissociable aspects of feeling-of-knowing: Knowing that you know and knowing that you do not know

Feeling-of-knowing judgement is traditionally regarded as a unitary cognitive process. However, recent research suggests that knowing that you know (positive feeling-of-knowing) and knowing that you do not know (negative feeling-of-knowing) have different neural substrates (Luo, Niki, Ying, & Luo, 2004 Luo, J., Niki, K., Ying, X. P. and Luo, Y. J. 2004. Knowing that you know and knowing that you don't know: A fMRI study on feeling of knowing (FOK). Acta Psychologica Sinica, 36: 426–443.  [Google Scholar]). In the present study, we used a paradigm adapted from Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) Koriat, A. and Levy-Sadot, R. 2001. The combined contributions of the cue-familiarity and accessibility heuristics to feelings of knowing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27: 34–53. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] to examine whether positive feeling-of-knowing and negative feeling-of-knowing were mediated by distinct cognitive processes. We found that positive and negative feeling-of-knowing were dissociated during immediate feeling-of-knowing judgements (i.e., preliminary feeling-of-knowing) and delayed feeling-of-knowing judgements (i.e., postretrieval feeling-of-knowing). At the judgement intervals, positive feeling-of-knowing was based on partial recovery of the nonrecalled targets, whereas negative feeling-of-knowing was determined by familiarity with the retrieval cues. Our results suggest that feeling-of-knowing is a heterogeneous process.     

Modelling the Direct and Indirect Effects of Positive Emotional and Cognitive Traits and States on Social Judgements

It was hypothesised that positive affective states and situational information-processing demands would differentially influence the favourability of social judgements of a target social group. These hypothesised direct effects on social judgements were subsequently incorporated into a broader statetrait model of the social judgement process, whereby direct and indirect effects of personality and cognitive traits, along with positive affective states and information-processing demands (i.e. cognitive state), were also hypothesised to influence social judgements. Three hundred and eight subjects reported their trait levels of introversion-extraversion and need for cognition, and were subsequently induced into an affective state (content, happy, surprise, or neutral) and a cognitive state (heuristic or substantive information processing). Results indicated that study participants who were manipulated into either a content or a happy affect state made more positive judgements about the target group than study participants who were manipulated into either a surprised or a neutral state. Moreover, when the cognitive demands of the situation were low, a cognitive trait (need for cognition) and the affective state directly influenced the social judgement. H owever, when the cognitive demands of the situation were high, only an indirect effect of affective state through a cognitive state influenced the social judgement. Discussion focused on the components of the state-trait model of the social judgement process as it applies to positive affective states.     

Automatic semantic association between emotional valence and brightness in the right hemisphere

Positive words (e.g., faith) were recognised better when presented in white fonts than in black fonts, whereas the opposite was true for negative words (e.g., enemy). A neural basis for this type of association between emotional valence and brightness was investigated using a visual half-field paradigm. Positive and negative words were presented in black or white fonts and presented to the left visual field–right hemisphere (LVF–RH) or right visual field–left hemisphere (RVF–LH) in a word valence judgement task (i.e., positive vs. negative). A cross-over interaction between emotional valence and brightness was observed; valence judgements were facilitated when a positive word appeared in white and when a negative word appeared in black. This interaction was qualified by a higher-order interaction. The cross-over interaction appeared only for LVF–RH trials, suggesting that the right hemisphere was responsible for the association between emotional valence and brightness.     

Automatic semantic association between emotional valence and brightness in the right hemisphere

Positive words (e.g., faith) were recognised better when presented in white fonts than in black fonts, whereas the opposite was true for negative words (e.g., enemy). A neural basis for this type of association between emotional valence and brightness was investigated using a visual half-field paradigm. Positive and negative words were presented in black or white fonts and presented to the left visual field-right hemisphere (LVF-RH) or right visual field-left hemisphere (RVF-LH) in a word valence judgement task (i.e., positive vs. negative). A cross-over interaction between emotional valence and brightness was observed; valence judgements were facilitated when a positive word appeared in white and when a negative word appeared in black. This interaction was qualified by a higher-order interaction. The cross-over interaction appeared only for LVF-RH trials, suggesting that the right hemisphere was responsible for the association between emotional valence and brightness.     

知道感（FOK）和不知道感（FOnK）的双向实验分离

为了实现FOK（feeling-of-knowing）和FonK（feeling-of-not-knowing）的双向分离,实验一采用高频词或者低频词为线索项目,检验FOK和FOnK的预测准确性。结果发现,在低频线索条件下FOK的预测准确性表现出高于FOnK的预测准确性的趋势,而在高频线索条件下则正好相反,但上述两组差异并未在统计学上达到显著的程度。实验二采用词－非词对和相关词对两种实验条件,在证明相关词对条件可以促进FOK并降低FOnK的同时,观察到词－非词条件可以促进FOnK并降低FOK,从而在较为严格的意义上证明了FOK和FOnK是两个不同的维度的量。上述结果为知道感的“双过程假设”提供了进一步的实验证据     

The influence of decision criteria upon remembering and knowing in recognition memory.

One may recognise an item as 'old' on basis of a recollective experience or by a feeling of familiarity without specific recollection. The former is called a 'remember' judgement; the latter a 'know' judgement. It has been claimed that remember and know responses reflect qualitatively distinct components of recognition memory, and not just derive from gradual differences in perceived trace strength or subjective certainty (i.e. remember judgments include memories of which one is more confident). Nonetheless, the present study examined the possibility that the distinction does relate to decision criteria placed upon a single familiarity axis (see Donaldson, 1996; Hirshman & Master, 1997). To this purpose, two groups of subjects were compared: one, which was instructed to be very conservative in their old-new judgements, while the other group was stimulated to be very lenient instead. Remember hit rates increased with more lenient criteria, whereas know hit rates did not, but false alarm rates did. While remember sensitivity was equal in the two groups, know sensitivity was lower with liberal criteria. Also it correlated with overall response bias. This lends support to the possibility that subjects not only apply an old-new decision criterion, but also set a remember-know criterion, which is affected in a similar way by liberal versus conservative instructions.     

The role of decision processes in remembering and knowing

Participants in recognition memory studies are now often asked to partition recognized items into ones that are accompanied by some recollective experience (those they remember) and ones that are not so accompanied (but which they know were previously encountered). Rather than detecting separate memory systems, such attempts to distinguish between remembering and knowing are better understood as a division of positive recognition responses into those that lie above a second decision criterion (remember) and those that do not (know). As such, the amount of memory associated with knowing is strongly dependent on the placement of the decision criteria. A meta-analysis of published data and a simple experiment tested predictions from the decision process analysis of remember/know responses.     

Sources of information in metamemory: Judgments of learning and feelings of knowing

Metamnemonic judgments probe people’s awareness of their own memory processes. The research reviewed here is an examination of the sources of information that subjects use to make judgments of learning (e.g., paired-associate judgments, ease-of-recognition predictions, free-recall judgments), and feelings of knowing (e.g., speeded strategy decisions, tip-of-the-tongue states, feeling-of-knowing judgments). The general pattern in the data suggests that subjects use different sources of information to form these judgments. Target-based sources appear to be important in judgments made at the time of acquisition, whereas cue-based judgments appear to be important in judgments made at the time of retrieval. In general, these sources of information serve as useful heuristics, and metamnemonic judgments tend to be accurate.     

Accuracy of feeling-of-knowing judgments for predicting perceptual identification and relearning

The feeding of knowing refers to predictions about subsequent memory performance on previously nonrecalled items. The most frequently investigated type of subsequent performance has been recognition. The present research explored predictive accuracy with two new feeling-of-knowing criterion tests (in addition to recognition): relearning and perceptual identification. In two experiments, people attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions such as, "What is the capital of Australia?", then made feeling-of-knowing predictions for all nonrecalled answers, and finally had a criterion test to assess the accuracy of the feeling-of-knowing predictions. Experiment 1 demonstrated that perceptual identification can be employed successfully as a criterion test for the feeling of knowing. This opens a new way for metamemory research via perception. Moreover, the feeling-of-knowing accuracy for predicting perceptual identification was not significantly correlated with the feeling-of-knowing accuracy for predicting recognition, in accord with the idea that these two tests assess memory differently. Experiment 2 demonstrated that relearning performance can also be predicted by feeling-of-knowing judgments. Both experiments showed that there is a positive relationship between the feeling of knowing and the amount of time elapsing before a memory search is terminated during recall. Further analyses showed that this relationship is substantial for nonrecalled items for which the person did not guess an answer (omission errors), but the relationship is null or negative for nonrecalled items that the person guessed incorrectly (commission errors). Several theoretical mechanisms that may underlie the feeling of knowing are proposed.     

Recognition memory and awareness: A high-frequency advantage in the accuracy of knowing

The well-established advantage of low-frequency words over high-frequency words in recognition memory has been found to occur in remembering and not knowing. Two experiments employed remember and know judgements, and divided attention to investigate the possibility of an effect of word frequency on know responses given appropriate study conditions. With undivided attention at study, the usual low-frequency advantage in the accuracy of remember responses, but no effect on know responses, was obtained. Under a demanding divided attention task at encoding, a high-frequency advantage in the accuracy of know responses was obtained. The results are discussed in relation to theories of knowing, particularly those incorporating perceptual and conceptual fluency.     

Recognition memory and awareness: A high-frequency advantage in the accuracy of knowing

The well-established advantage of low-frequency words over high-frequency words in recognition memory has been found to occur in remembering and not knowing. Two experiments employed remember and know judgements, and divided attention to investigate the possibility of an effect of word frequency on know responses given appropriate study conditions. With undivided attention at study, the usual low-frequency advantage in the accuracy of remember responses, but no effect on know responses, was obtained. Under a demanding divided attention task at encoding, a high-frequency advantage in the accuracy of know responses was obtained. The results are discussed in relation to theories of knowing, particularly those incorporating perceptual and conceptual fluency.     

The relation between feelings of knowing and the number of neighboring concepts linked to the test cue

We investigated whether feeling-of-knowing judgments are influenced by the number of different neighboring concepts linked to the test cue in long-term memory as measured using association norms. The purpose was to evaluate contrasting predictions made by the partial-retrieval hypothesis and the competition hypothesis. The partial-retrieval hypothesis assumes the more neighboring concepts activated by the test cue, the higher the feeling of knowing. In contrast, the competition hypothesis assumes that feelings of knowing are sensitive to competition between neighboring concepts, and it predicts that the fewer neighboring concepts activated by the cue, the higher the feeling of knowing. The findings were compatible with the competition hypothesis showing that both feeling-of-knowing and prediction-of-knowing ratings always were higher, the fewer different concepts were linked to the test cue. We obtained an identical pattern of results using different kinds of cues including taxonomic category names, ending sounds, and meaningfully related associates. We consider different ways that these findings could be reconciled with the partial-retrieval hypothesis, and we also discuss implications for other explanations of feeling-of-knowing effects.     

Feeling of knowing for names in response to faces

Participants were asked to recall the names when shown photographs of faces in both a semantic task (Experiment 1) and an episodic task (Experiments 2 and 3). When recall failed, feeling of knowing (FOK) ratings were solicited. In addition, participants reported on the strategies that they used to make their ratings, whether they could recall other pieces of information (the target-accessibility strategy, e.g., Koriat, A. (1993). How do we know that? The accessibility model of the feeling of knowing. Psychological Review, 100, 609–639) or whether the faces simply looked familiar (the cue-familiarity strategy, e.g., Schwartz, B. L., & Metcalfe, J. (1992). Cue familiarity but not target accessibility enhances feeling of knowing ratings. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18, 1074–1083). In all experiments, FOK ratings were fairly accurate in that participants were successful in predicting their performance on a subsequent recognition test. More importantly, participants reported using the cue-familiarity strategy more often, although they gave higher FOK ratings when they reported using the target-accessibility strategy. The FOK ratings that were given using the two strategies were equally accurate.     

Divided attention at retrieval disrupts knowing but not remembering

The view that remember and know responses can be explained within a dual-process framework has recently been questioned (e.g., Gardiner, Konstantinou, Karayianni, & Gregg, 2005). The aims of the present study were to investigate further discrepancies between remember/know (R/K) studies and dual-process models of recognition memory. In two experiments participants were required to make old/new and R/K decisions under full and divided attention conditions. Experiment 1 used a two-step R/K procedure and showed that attention during retrieval reduced overall recognition performance. Experiment 2 used a one-step R/K procedure and showed that dividing attention at retrieval only affected know responses, suggesting that knowing but not remembering relies on controlled retrieval processes. These findings and findings from recent research provide evidence that is inconsistent with the dual-process explanation for R/K research.     

Divided attention at retrieval disrupts knowing but not remembering

The view that remember and know responses can be explained within a dual-process framework has recently been questioned (e.g., Gardiner, Konstantinou, Karayianni, & Gregg, 2005). The aims of the present study were to investigate further discrepancies between remember/know (R/K) studies and dual-process models of recognition memory. In two experiments participants were required to make old/new and R/K decisions under full and divided attention conditions. Experiment 1 used a two-step R/K procedure and showed that attention during retrieval reduced overall recognition performance. Experiment 2 used a one-step R/K procedure and showed that dividing attention at retrieval only affected know responses, suggesting that knowing but not remembering relies on controlled retrieval processes. These findings and findings from recent research provide evidence that is inconsistent with the dual-process explanation for R/K research.     

Expertise in basketball modifies perceptual discrimination abilities,underlying cognitive processes,and visual behaviours

In this paper, the links between cognitive constraints, visual behaviours, and perceptual judgements are examined. Two experiments investigated the perceptual processes employed during same-different judgement tasks. In Experiment 1, experts' eye movements (i.e., number of fixations and fixation duration) were consistent across discrepant source and target conditions where the number of displaced elements was manipulated. In contrast, novices decreased the number of fixations employed as the number of elements displaced increased. The findings are consistent with the view that both experts and novices process information in a manner (relational or attributional) that constrains the type of visual search used (low or high sensitive to attributional change). In Experiment 2, manipulation of target presentation confirmed that recognition was viewpoint dependent for both expert and novice players. The degradation in performance was accompanied by a change in the visual search behaviours employed by experts, which confirmed thr strength of the search–cognition–performance links     

Are you sure you forgot? Feeling of knowing in directed forgetting.

One significant issue in metamemory is how variables increasing memorability affect metamemory. Previous research has produced inconsistent results. The effect of directed forgetting on the magnitude and accuracy of feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments was investigated. Participants were presented with word pairs, some to be remembered and some to be forgotten, and then were asked to recall all target words regardless of initial instructions. For unrecalled items, they were asked to give FOK judgments about performance in a future memory task: a cued stem-completion task (Experiment 1) or a recognition test (Experiment 2). This encoding manipulation increased both the memory performance and the magnitude of FOK judgments. However, no such effect on the accuracy of FOK judgments was observed.     

Curiosity and time: from not knowing to almost knowing

How does it feel to be curious? We reasoned that there are two sides to curiosity: not knowing something (i.e. information-gap) and almost knowing something (i.e. anticipation of resolution). In three experiments, we showed that time affects the relative impact of these two components: When people did not expect to close their information-gap soon (long time-to-resolution) not knowing affected the subjective experience of curiosity more strongly than when they expected to close their information-gap quickly (short time-to-resolution). As such, people experienced less positive affect, more discomfort, and more annoyance with lack of information in a long than a short time-to-resolution situation. Moreover, when time in the long time-to-resolution setting passed, the anticipation of the resolution became stronger, positive affect increased, and discomfort and annoyance with lack of information decreased. Time is thus a key factor in the experience of curiosity.     

Object detection and basic-level categorization: Sometimes you know it is there before you know what it is

A tight temporal coupling between object detection (is an object there?) and object categorization (what kind of object is it?) has recently been reported (Grill-Spector &; Kanwisher, 2005), suggesting that image segmentation into different objects and categorization of those objects at the basic level may be the very same mechanism. In the present work, we decoupled the time course of detection and categorization through two task manipulations. First, inverted objects were categorized significantly less accurately than upright objects across a range of image presentation durations, but no significant effect on object detection was observed. Second, systematically degrading stimuli affected categorization significantly more than object detection. The time course of object detection and object categorization can be selectively manipulated. They are not intrinsically linked. As soon as you know an object is there, you do not necessarily know what it is.     

Orthography, phonology, short-term memory and the effects of concurrent articulation on rhyme and homophony judgements

The role of phonological short-term memory (pSTM) in phonological judgement tasks of print has been widely explored using concurrent articulation (CA). A number of studies have examined the effects of CA on written word/nonword rhyme and homophone judgements but the findings have been mixed and few studies have examined both tasks within subjects. Also important is the influence of orthographic similarity on such tasks (i.e., items that share phonology often strongly overlap on orthography). Although there are reports of orthographic similarity effects (e.g., LOAD-TOAD vs. DIAL-MILE) on rhyme judgements, it is unknown whether (a) similar orthographic effects are present with homophone judgements, (b) the degree to which such orthographic effects interact with CA, and (c) the degree to which such orthographic effects interact with lexical status (words vs. nonwords). The present work re-examines these three issues in a within subject design. CA and orthographic similarity yielded subtle differences across tasks. CA impaired accuracy for both homophone and rhyme judgement, but only slowed RTs on the rhyme judgement task, and then only for words. Orthographic similarity yielded an increase in false positives for similar items and vice versa for dissimilar items, suggesting a general impact of an orthographically based ‘bias’ in choosing similar or dissimilar sounding items. This pattern was amplified under CA but only on the homophone judgement task. These results highlight important interactions between phonological and orthographic representations in phonological judgement tasks, and the findings are considered both with reference to earlier studies and several models of pSTM.