Dual processes,evolution and rationality

In three experiments we tested hypotheses derived from the goal specificity literature using a real-world physics task. In the balance-scale paradigm participants predict the state of the apparatus based on a configuration of weights at various distances from the fulcrum. Non-specific goals (NSG) have been shown to encourage hypothesis testing, which facilitates rule discovery, whereas specific goals (SG) do not. We showed that this goal specificity effect depends on task difficulty. The NSG strategy led to rule induction among some participants. Among non-discoverers, SG participants were faster and more accurate on difficult problems than NSG participants. The use of misleading exemplars (scale configurations that obscured the rule governing outcomes) led to fixation on inappropriate hypotheses for NSG but not SG participants. When more diagnostic learning exemplars were used, NSG non-discoverers still performed worse than SG participants on difficult problems. SG participants also outperformed NSG participants on a post-test of difficult problems. These findings qualify the generality of goal specificity effects.     

Goal specificity and learning with a hypermedia program

Problem solving research has found that a nonspecific goal (NSG) leads to better learning than a specific goal (SG). This effect can be understood in terms of dual-space search theories of problem solving. To apply the theory, we studied goal specificity effects with a hypermedia program in which participants had to learn about the outbreak of World War 1, either with the goal to find twenty dates (i.e., SG) or with the goal to explain the reasons for the war (i.e., NSG). As expected, compared to the SG-group, the NSG-group correctly answered more factual questions about the text during the task, spent more time on average per page, and more often looked for extra information. In a final questionnaire with factual and inferential questions, the NSG-group still performed better than the SG-group. The NSG-group may also show better transfer of what they had learnt to a new situation.     

Goal specificity and knowledge acquisition in statistics problem solving: Evidence for attentional focus

Solving training problems with nonspecific goals (NG; i.e., solving for all possible unknown values) often results in better transfer than solving training problems with standard goals (SG; i.e., solving for one particular unknown value). In this study, we evaluated an attentional focus explanation of the goal specificity effect. According to the attentional focus view, solving NG problems causes attention to be directed to local relations among successive problem states, whereas solving SG problems causes attention to be directed to relations between the various problem states and the goal state. Attention to the former is thought to enhance structural knowledge about the problem domain and thus promote transfer. Results supported this view because structurally different transfer problems were solved faster following NG training than following SG training. Moreover, structural knowledge representations revealed more links depicting local relations following NG training and more links to the training goal following SG training. As predicted, these effects were obtained only by domain novices.     

The importance of understanding: Model space moderates goal specificity effects

The three-space theory of problem solving predicts that the quality of a learner's model and the goal specificity of a task interact on knowledge acquisition. In Experiment 1 participants used a computer simulation of a lever system to learn about torques. They either had to test hypotheses (nonspecific goal), or to produce given values for variables (specific goal). In the good- but not in the poor-model condition they saw torque depicted as an area. Results revealed the predicted interaction. A nonspecific goal only resulted in better learning when a good model of torques was provided. In Experiment 2 participants learned to manipulate the inputs of a system to control its outputs. A nonspecific goal to explore the system helped performance when compared to a specific goal to reach certain values when participants were given a good model, but not when given a poor model that suggested the wrong hypothesis space. Our findings support the three-space theory. They emphasize the importance of understanding for problem solving and stress the need to study underlying processes.     

Implicit learning in rule induction and problem solving

Using the Chinese Ring Puzzle (Kotovsky & Simon, ; P. J. Reber & Kotovsky, ), we studied the effect on rule discovery of having to plan actions or not in order to reach a goal state. This was done by asking participants to predict legal moves as in implicit learning tasks (Experiment 1) and by asking participants to make legal moves as in problem-solving tasks (Experiment 2). Our hypothesis was that having a specific goal state to reach has a dual effect on rule discovery. The first effect is positive and related to feedback from moves done in order to attain the goal: generalising the results of action and associating them to the conditions in which they were obtained allows discovery of the rule and learning it. The second effect is negative. In attempting to reach a specific goal, participants first tend to reduce the distance that separates the current state from the goal state (hill climbing) and so neglect the kind of exploration that facilitates rule and procedure discovery because this would seem to be a detour from the goal. Results show that having to plan actions improved performance in implicit learning tasks (Experiment 1), yet it impaired performance in problem-solving tasks (Experiment 2). Although implicit learning and problem solving are based on rule discovery, and entail noticing regularities in the material, in both cases, rule discovery processes appear to be task-dependent.     

Gesturing during mental problem solving reduces eye movements,especially for individuals with lower visual working memory capacity

Non-communicative hand gestures have been found to benefit problem-solving performance. These gestures seem to compensate for limited internal cognitive capacities, such as visual working memory capacity. Yet, it is not clear how gestures might perform this cognitive function. One hypothesis is that gesturing is a means to spatially index mental simulations, thereby reducing the need for visually projecting the mental simulation onto the visual presentation of the task. If that hypothesis is correct, less eye movements should be made when participants gesture during problem solving than when they do not gesture. We therefore used mobile eye tracking to investigate the effect of co-thought gesturing and visual working memory capacity on eye movements during mental solving of the Tower of Hanoi problem. Results revealed that gesturing indeed reduced the number of eye movements (lower saccade counts), especially for participants with a relatively lower visual working memory capacity. Subsequent problem-solving performance was not affected by having (not) gestured during the mental solving phase. The current findings suggest that our understanding of gestures in problem solving could be improved by taking into account eye movements during gesturing.     

Observation can be as effective as action in problem solving

This study discusses findings that replicate and extend the original work of Burns and Vollmeyer (2002) , which showed that performance in problem-solving tasks was more accurate when people were engaged in a non-specific goal than in a specific goal. The main innovation here was to examine the goal specificity effect under both observation-based and conventional action-based learning conditions. The findings show that goal specificity affects the accuracy of problem solving in the same way when the learning stage of the task is observation-based as when it is action-based. In addition, the findings show that, when instructions do not promote goal specificity, observation-based problem solving is as effective as action-based problem solving.     

Enhancing memory and imagination improves problem solving among individuals with depression

Recent work has revealed links between memory, imagination, and problem solving, and suggests that increasing access to detailed memories can lead to improved imagination and problem-solving performance. Depression is often associated with overgeneral memory and imagination, along with problem-solving deficits. In this study, we tested the hypothesis that an interview designed to elicit detailed recollections would enhance imagination and problem solving among both depressed and nondepressed participants. In a within-subjects design, participants completed a control interview or an episodic specificity induction prior to completing memory, imagination, and problem-solving tasks. Results revealed that compared to the control interview, the episodic specificity induction fostered increased detail generation in memory and imagination and more relevant steps on the problem-solving task among depressed and nondepressed participants. This study builds on previous work by demonstrating that a brief interview can enhance problem solving among individuals with depression and supports the notion that episodic memory plays a key role in problem solving. It should be noted, however, that the results of the interview are relatively short-lived.     

The contributions of anchoring and past-test performance to the underconfidence-with-practice effect

In the underconfidence-with-practice effect, people's judgments of learning (JOLs) typically underestimate memory performance across multiple study-test phases. Whereas the past-test hypothesis suggests that this underconfidence stems from participants' reliance on earlier test performance to make subsequent JOLs (despite new learning), the anchoring hypothesis suggests that the underconfidence stems from participants' reliance on a fixed psychological anchor point low on the JOL scale to make their JOLs. To contrast the predictions of these hypotheses, we had college students study, make JOLs, and test over several dozen paired-associate items across two study-test phases. We parametrically manipulated the presence or absence of testing and judging within participants during Phase 1. Contrary to the past-test hypothesis, items tested during Phase 1 demonstrated less underconfidence during Phase 2 than did nontested items. Furthermore, participants did not increase JOLs from Phase 1 to Phase 2 for items that they had not recalled or for items that had not been tested at all, suggesting that the underconfidence stemmed largely from participants' overreliance on a psychological anchor point to make their JOLs. Past test performance, however, seems to be a major cue that participants use to adjust their JOLs away from the anchor, reducing underconfidence. This was most evident when we used a between-participants manipulation (Exp. 2) to cause our participants to anchor their JOLs either high or low on the JOL scale, producing differential underconfidence independent of any adjustment. Taken together, these results support the anchoring hypothesis over the past-test hypothesis for explaining underconfidence with practice.     

The influence of social groups on goal contagion

Goal contagion is the automatic adoption of a goal upon perceiving another’s goal-directed behavior (Aarts, H., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Hassin, R. R. (2004). Goal contagion: Perceiving is for pursuing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(1), 23-37). This paper tests the hypothesis that goal contagion is more likely between people who belong to the same groups. Because past work on goal contagion has required participants to read about the behavior of others, we also test whether goals are caught when one sees rather than reads about another’s motivated behavior. Across three studies, this ecologically valid methodology reliably produced goal contagion, and this effect was more likely to emerge when participants shared a group membership with those they observed. In Study 1, participants were more likely to take on the goal of individuals who belonged to their same university. Study 2 demonstrated that this effect occurred even when participants were not explicitly focused on the group membership of others. A final study verified that our effects were motivational by demonstrating that failing at a goal relevant task increased negative affect, but only for those who viewed the motivated behavior of someone from their own group.     

The Deliberation-Without-Attention Effect: Evidence for an Artifactual Interpretation

ABSTRACT— Proponents of unconscious-thought theory assert that letting the unconscious "mull it over" can enhance decisions. In a series of recent studies, researchers demonstrated that participants whose attention was focused on solving a complex problem (i.e., those using conscious thought) made poorer choices, decisions, and judgments than participants whose attention was distracted from the problem (i.e., those purportedly using unconscious thought). We argue that this finding, rather than establishing the existence of a deliberation-without-attention effect, is explained more compellingly in terms of the well-established distinction between on-line and memory-based judgments. In Experiment 1 , we reversed the recent finding by simply changing participants' on-line processing goal from impression formation to memorization. Experiment 2 provided a replication and further established that some cognitive effort appears necessary to produce both the original pattern of results and its reversal, suggesting that such judgments are ultimately a product of conscious, rather than unconscious, thinking.     

West vs. West like East vs. West? A comparison between Italian and US American context sensitivity and Fear of Isolation

Easterners tend to process information more holistically than Westerners. Kim and Markman (J Exp Soc Psychol 42(3):350–364, 2006) suggest that these differences are rooted in higher chronic levels of Fear of Isolation (FOI) for those cultures that process information more holistically. The goal of this study was to determine if these differences and their suggested cause could be found with two different Western cultures. Testing Italian (IT) and US American (US) adults, we found that IT participants processed information more holistically and had a higher chronic level of FOI than US participants; furthermore, the manipulation of FOI affected context sensitivity more for IT than for US participants. The results demonstrate that IT participants were more similar to previous research with Eastern populations than with Western populations (Kim and Markman in J Exp Soc Psychol 42(3):350–364, 2006) and indicate a within-Western culture difference for reasoning styles and support the hypothesis that this difference is due to different chronic levels of FOI.     

Explicit Learning of a Dynamic System with a Non-salient Pattern

We examine the hypothesis that a specific goal leads to implicit learning, whereas a nonspecific goal leads to explicit learning, even though the pattern to be learnt is non-salient. Subjects learned a dynamic control task (Berry & Broadbent, 1984). One group of subjects had a specific control goal, the second group had a non-specific pattern-search goal, and the third group had both goals. On measures of learning (control performance, prediction, and general questions), the non-specific group learnt explicitly, outperforming the other two groups on all learning measures. The specific group performed next best on control performance and prediction questions but performed very poorly on general questions. The dual-goal group performed poorly on all measures. Non-specific subjects predicted well on both familiar and unfamiliar situations. Specific-goal subjects predicted well on familiar situations, regardless of whether their previous response had been correct or incorrect. Dual-goal subjects predicted well only on familiar correct situations. We conclude that the non-specific group learned through explicit hypothesis testing, the specific group learned through a mixture of explicit problem solving and implicit instance learning, and the dual-goal group learned instances. Results are discussed in terms of dual-space models of problem solving and hypothesis testing and in terms of implicit instance learning. We consider how the choice of learning goal affects the cognitive processes used during learning and suggest that having subjects learn the same information implicitly or explicitly is potentially useful for drawing clearer distinctions between implicit and explicit modes of learning.     

Is problem solving dependent on language?

There has been a long-standing debate in the fields of philosophy and cognitive science surrounding the relationship of language to cognition, but the exact nature of this relationship is still unclear (Sokolov, 1968/1972). In the current study, we explored the role of language in one aspect of cognition, namely problem solving, by administering the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) to stroke patients with varying degrees of language impairment (Experiment 1) and to normal participants under conditions of articulatory suppression (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, there was a significant correlation between performance on the WCST and language measures such as comprehension and naming. Demonstrating the specificity of this result, we also found a significant relationship between language performance and another test of problem solving, the Raven's Colored Progressive Matrices, but no relationship between language and a test of visuospatial functioning. In Experiment 2, normal participants were significantly impaired on the WCST under conditions of articulatory suppression, relative to a baseline condition. Together, these findings suggest that language plays a role in complex problem solving, possibly through covert language processes.     

汉语字谜原型激活中的情绪促进效应

采用先学习原型字谜、接着进行正负情绪诱导、然后再进行靶字谜测验的三阶段实验设计,探讨了不同诱发情绪状态对汉语字谜原型激活的影响。结果发现,在本实验条件下：难度高的靶字谜的测试中没有发现正负诱发情绪状态对汉语字谜原型激活的不同影响;但是,在难度中等的靶字谜的测试中,诱发的正面情绪状态对汉语字谜原型激活有显著促进作用,而诱发的负面情绪状态与控制组相比对汉语字谜原型激活没有显著影响。性别变量在两种实验条件下都没有显著主效应     

Cognitive skills in mathematical problem solving in Grade 3

Background. Research on the relationship between cognitive skills and mathematical problem solving is usually conducted on adults or on participants with acquired deficits associated with brain injury (e.g. Cipolotti, 1995 ; Cohen, Dehaene, & Verstichel, 1994 ; McCloskey, 1992 ). Aims. In these studies we wanted to make a contribution to the field of children's mathematical problem solving. The first aim of this study was to investigate whether mathematical problem solving in children is merely determined by semantic elaboration, as hypothesized in some of the models of adult processing (semantic hypothesis). In addition, we aimed to investigate whether there is a continuum from very good to very poor mathematical problem solving among children with mathematical learning disabilities showing immature cognitive skills (maturational lag hypothesis). Sample. The participants were 376 third graders and 107 second graders. Method. The internal structure of the data was analysed with a principal components analysis. In addition, two MANOVA were conducted to compare children with learning disabilities or problems with age‐matched and performance‐matched subjects. Results. Two components, a semantic and a non‐semantic one, were needed to account for an adequate fit of the dataset. In addition, children with mathematical learning disabilities had less‐developed cognitive skills compared with peers without learning disabilities, but they did not differ from younger children on seven of the nine cognitive skills. Conclusions. This study highlighted that children's mathematical problem solving is not determined by one general component. The picture is more complex, since two mathematics components were found. In addition, although our findings point in the direction of the maturational lag hypothesis it may be important to assess the different cognitive skills and especially assess the number system knowledge, since it seems below average in children with mathematical learning disabilities, compared with the knowledge of younger children with comparable skills in mathematics.     

Knowledge in transition: Adults' developing understanding of a principle of physical causality

What are the conditions that make it likely that cognitive change will occur? We investigate this issue with respect to 25 college students' developing understanding of gear movement (a particular problem in the domain of physical causation). The participants solved problems, then received minimal instruction, and solved additional problems. Significantly, only some of the participants changed their approach to solving the problems after receiving instruction; the remainder of the participants were stable in their understanding and either continued to solve all problems correctly or continued to solve key problems incorrectly. Most analyses focused on the participants who began by solving problems incorrectly. In particular, we attempted to differentiate those participants who exhibited cognitive change from those who did not. To do this, we examined precursors of knowledge change that were motivated by different theoretical positions on mechanisms of cognitive change and development (i.e., consideration of multiple approaches, cognitive conflict, and instruction as an example of a sociocultural process). Results suggest that having multiple approaches available and using instructional information to build on not-well-developed conceptions are likely candidates for understanding knowledge change for adult participants with respect to their developing understanding of physical causality.     

Having the memory of an elephant: long-term retrieval and the use of analogues in problem solving

The authors report 4 experiments exploring long-term analogical transfer from problem solutions in folk tales participants heard during childhood, many years before encountering the target problems. Substantial culture-specific analogical transfer was found when American and Chinese participants' performance was compared on isomorphs of problems solved in European versus Chinese folk tales. There was evidence of transfer even among participants who did not report being reminded of the source tale while solving the target problem. Comparisons of different versions of a target problem indicated that similarity of solution tool affected accessing, mapping, and executing components of problem solving, whereas similarity of goal object had only a moderate effect on accessing. High school students also evidenced greater transfer than did middle school students.     

Escaping mental fixation: Incubation and inhibition in creative problem solving

The inhibition underlying retrieval-induced forgetting has been argued to play a crucial role in the ability to overcome interference in memory and cognition. Supporting this conjecture, recent research has found that participants who exhibit greater levels of retrieval-induced forgetting are better at overcoming fixation on the Remote Associates Test (RAT) than are participants who exhibit reduced levels of retrieval-induced forgetting. If the ability to inhibit inappropriate responses improves the ability to solve fixated RAT problems, then reducing the fixation caused by inappropriate responses should reduce the correlation between retrieval-induced forgetting and problem solving. We tested this hypothesis by inserting an incubation period between two 30-second problem-solving attempts: half of the participants were given an incubation period (distributed condition), half were not (continuous condition). In the continuous condition retrieval-induced forgetting correlated positively with problem-solving performance during both the initial and final 30 seconds of problem solving. In the distributed condition retrieval-induced forgetting only correlated with problem-solving performance during the first 30 seconds of problem solving. This finding suggests that incubation reduces the need for inhibition by reducing the extent to which problem solvers suffer fixation.     

Problem Solvers Adjust Cognitive Offloading Based on Performance Goals

When incorporating the environment into mental processing (cf., cognitive offloading), one creates novel cognitive strategies that have the potential to improve task performance. Improved performance can, for example, mean faster problem solving, more accurate solutions, or even higher grades at university.¹ Although cognitive offloading has frequently been associated with improved performance, it is yet unclear how flexible problem solvers are at matching their offloading habits with their current performance goals (can people improve goal‐related instead of generic performance, e.g., when being in a hurry and aiming for a “quick and dirty” solution?). Here, we asked participants to solve a cognitive task, provided them with different goals—maximizing speed (SPD) or accuracy (ACC), respectively—and measured how frequently (Experiment 1) and how proficiently (Experiment 2) they made use of a novel external resource to support their cognitive processing. Experiment 1 showed that offloading behavior varied with goals: Participants offloaded less in the SPD than in the ACC condition. Experiment 2 showed that this differential offloading behavior was associated with high goal‐related performance: fast answers in the SPD, accurate answers in the ACC condition. Simultaneously, goal‐unrelated performance was sacrificed: inaccurate answers in the SPD, slow answers in the ACC condition. The findings support the notion of humans as canny offloaders who are able to successfully incorporate their environment in pursuit of their current cognitive goals. Future efforts should be focused on the finding's generalizability, for example, to settings without feedback or with high mental workload.