Individual differences in the acceptance of stereotyping

Previous research has documented individual differences in a range of constructs relating to social stereotyping, prejudice, and intergroup attitudes. However, research has not sought specifically to measure a general acceptance of social stereotyping. In the present research, we explored attitudinal, cognitive, emotional, and personality correlates of a person’s self-reported willingness to rely on stereotypical information when interacting with people of different social and cultural groups. In six studies (N = 1080) we found that more acceptance of stereotyping was associated with more explicit and implicit stereotyping of particular groups, less liberal gender-role values, more authoritarian attitudes, preference for hierarchies, higher social dominance orientation, less universal outlook, less complexity in describing others’ emotions, less utilization of emotional information, and more utilization of social categories (gender and race) when rating the similarity of faces, less agreeable and more agentic personality, and more rigid and simplistic cognitive style (all independent of one’s gender). Female and African-American participants were less accepting of stereotyping than male and Caucasian participants. The general tendency to accept stereotyping in daily life is a measurable individual difference that may prove useful in social-personality research.     

Sex differences in children's discrepant perceptions of peer acceptance

Sex differences in children's play patterns during middle childhood are thought to promote greater awareness of social acceptance among girls compared with boys. The present study posited that girls are more discerning of peer acceptance than are boys; however, these sex differences were predicted to vary depending on how discrepant perceptions were assessed (i.e., inaccuracy versus bias). Additional differences were expected if children perceived acceptance by same- versus opposite-sex peers. Participants were 912 third through fifth graders (420 girls and 492 boys). Consistent with predictions, boys were more inaccurate than girls, but only for perceived acceptance by same-sex peers. As expected, girls were more negatively biased than boys, but only for perceived acceptance by opposite-sex peers. Results did not support the hypothesis that boys have more positively biased perceptions of peer acceptance than girls. Overall, these findings raise important issues regarding the evaluation of children's discrepant self-perceptions of peer acceptance.     

Gender and racial differences in the acceptance of rape myths within a college population

Four hundred forty nine students completed a questionnaire that sought to measure degree of acceptance/rejection of nine statements that reflected prejudical, stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, or rapists. These statements, termed rape myths, are seen as reflecting and perpetuating sexual and racial stereotypes as well as serving to demean the victim and hinder the functioning of the criminal justice system. The data indicate that at least a substantial minority of respondents do accept rape myths as valid. Further analysis revealed significant differences by racial and sexual groupings. Results were interpreted through use of the concept of defensive attribution.     

Perceived proposer personality characteristics and gender differences in acceptance of casual sex offers

In a highly influential paper, Clark and Hatfield (1989) demonstrated that, whereas men were quite likely to accept a casual sexual offer from a confederate research assistant, women never did so. The current research provides a more in-depth explanation of gender differences in acceptance of casual sex offers via 4 (quasi-) experiments. First, using a person-perception paradigm, I assessed people's impressions of women and men who proposed a casual sexual encounter in the same manner that confederates in Clark and Hatfield did. Women and men agreed that female proposers were more intelligent, successful, and sexually skilled than men who made the same proposals. Second, I demonstrated that the large gender differences from the original Clark and Hatfield study could be eliminated by asking participants to imagine proposals from (attractive and unattractive) famous individuals, friends, and same-gender individuals. Next, I assessed factors associated with likelihood of agreeing to the casual sex proposal. The extent to which women and men believed that the proposer would be sexually skilled predicted how likely they would be to engage in casual sex with this individual. Finally, I examined these factors in the context of actual encounters from the participants' previous experiences, and the results were replicated in this context. Overall findings suggest that the large gender differences Clark and Hatfield observed in acceptance of the casual sex offer may have more to do with perceived personality characteristics of the female versus male proposers than with gender differences among Clark and Hatfield's participants and that sexual pleasure figures largely in women's and men's decision making about casual sex.     

Habitual acceptance of misinformation: Examination of individual differences and source attributions

This study identifies individuals who are habitually susceptible to accepting postevent misinformation across testing on three separate events. The results indicate that those individuals identified as habitually susceptible exhibited higher dissociation scores and less of an association between memory accuracy and confidence than did the individuals identified as nonhabitually susceptible. When they were asked to identify the source of the remembered information, similar patterns of source attributions were found for all individuals when they were responding correctly and incorrectly to nonmisinformation and when they were correctly rejecting items of misinformation. Importantly, from a source-monitoring perspective, individuals identified as habitually susceptible demonstrated a different pattern of source attributions than did those classified as nonhabitually susceptible when they were accepting misinformation. Habitually susceptible individuals were as likely to attribute the source of their memory incorrectly to something seen in the experienced event as to attribute it correctly to something read after the fact.     

Age differences in personality traits across cultures: self‐report and observer perspectives

Using self‐report measures, longitudinal studies in the US and cross‐sectional studies from many cultures suggest that the broad factors of Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Openness to Experience decline from adolescence to adulthood, whereas Agreeableness and Conscientiousness increase. Data are inconsistent on the rate of change during adulthood, and on the generalizability of self‐report findings to informant ratings. We analysed cross‐sectional data from self‐reports and informant ratings on the Revised NEO Personality Inventory in Czech (N = 705) and Russian (N = 800) samples. Some curvilinear effects were found, chiefly in the Czech sample; informant data generally replicated self‐reports, although the effects were weaker. Although many of the details are not yet clear, there appear to be pan‐cultural trends in personality development that are consistent with the hypothesis of intrinsic maturation. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Return of the Candy Witch: Individual differences in acceptance and stability of belief in a novel fantastical being

Recent research indicates that preschoolers make sophisticated choices in accepting testimony as a source of knowledge. Nonetheless, many children accept fantastical beings as real based on misleading testimony. The present study probes factors associated with belief in a novel fantastical figure, the Candy Witch, that 3‐ to 7‐year‐olds heard about at school. Short‐term belief was predicted by an interaction of age, existing beliefs in fantastical figures, and whether the child was ‘visited’ by the Candy Witch. Stability of belief was assessed over the course of 3 weeks and again 1‐year later. First year results revealed three patterns of belief: stable belief, wavering belief and stable non‐belief. First year belief status was not related to age, but older children from the stable belief group were more likely than younger children to disbelieve 1‐year later. The discussion presents a new proposal for the trajectory from belief to disbelief and an updated perspective on the role of individual differences in belief.     

Processing deceptive information in sports: Individual differences for responding to head fakes depends on the attentional capability of the observer

In team sports, players sometimes try to deceive their opponents by providing misleading information in order to gain a temporal advantage. Head-fakes are often applied when a player gazes in one direction, while passing/shooting the ball in another direction. The opponent is challenged to focus attention on the relevant information (i.e., pass direction), while ignoring the conflicting information (i.e., gaze direction). The present study aimed to identify the link between attentional capabilities and the effectiveness of head fakes. Twenty-seven novices performed in a basketball-specific head-fake task and in the attention-window task. A correlation between performances in both tasks revealed that participants with higher attentional capabilities were better able to focus their attention on the relevant feature (pass direction), when judging basketball situations, than participants with lower attentional capabilities. The results emphasize the relevance of high attentional capabilities in team sports and indicate that focusing one’s attention to the pass direction poses a possibility of reducing the effects of head fakes.     

Why group apologies succeed and fail: intergroup forgiveness and the role of primary and secondary emotions

It is widely assumed that official apologies for historical transgressions can lay the groundwork for intergroup forgiveness, but evidence for a causal relationship between intergroup apologies and forgiveness is limited. Drawing on the infrahumanization literature, we argue that a possible reason for the muted effectiveness of apologies is that people diminish the extent to which they see outgroup members as able to experience complex, uniquely human emotions (e.g., remorse). In Study 1, Canadians forgave Afghanis for a friendly-fire incident to the extent that they perceived Afghanis as capable of experiencing uniquely human emotions (i.e., secondary emotions such as anguish) but not nonuniquely human emotions (i.e., primary emotions such as fear). Intergroup forgiveness was reduced when transgressor groups expressed secondary emotions rather than primary emotions in their apology (Studies 2a and 2b), an effect that was mediated by trust in the genuineness of the apology (Study 2b). Indeed, an apology expressing secondary emotions aroused no more forgiveness than a no-apology control (Study 3) and less forgiveness than an apology with no emotion (Study 4). Consistent with an infrahumanization perspective, effects of primary versus secondary emotional expression did not emerge when the apology was offered for an ingroup transgression (Study 3) or when an outgroup apology was delivered through an ingroup proxy (Study 4). Also consistent with predictions, these effects were demonstrated only by those who tended to deny uniquely human qualities to the outgroup (Study 5). Implications for intergroup apologies and movement toward reconciliation are discussed.     

Children's reasoning about the self‐presentational consequences of apologies and excuses following rule violations

The accounts given by those who have violated a rule are likely to have important self‐presentational consequences, potentially reducing the negative impact of the breach on social evaluations of transgressors. However, little is known about young children's self‐presentational reasoning about such accounts. In the present study, a sample of 120 4‐ to 9‐year‐olds responded to rule violation stories where the transgressor uses either an apology, an excuse, or no account. Results showed that whereas children rated both account types similarly in terms of their impact on punishment consequences, even the youngest saw apologies as leading to significantly more positive social evaluation than excuses. Correspondingly, children were more likely to identify prosocial motives for apologies than for excuses, and more likely to identify self‐protective motives for excuses than for apologies. Explicit references to self‐presentational motives when explaining the accounts increased significantly with age, and were more likely following social‐conventional rather than moral rule violations.     

Slope estimation and viewing distance of the observer

The overestimation of geographical slant is one of the most sizable visual illusions. However, in some cases estimates of close-by slopes within the range of the observer’s personal space have been found to be rather accurate. We propose that the seemingly diverse findings can be reconciled when taking the viewing distance of the observer into account. The latter involves the distance of the observer from the slope (personal space, action space, and vista space) and also the eye-point relative to the slope. We separated these factors and compared outdoor judgments to those collected with a three-dimensional (3D) model of natural terrain, which was within arm’s reach of the observer. Slope was overestimated in the outdoors at viewing distances between 2 m and 138 m. The 3D model reproduced the errors in monocular viewing; however, performance was accurate with stereoscopic viewing. We conclude that accurate slant perception breaks down as soon as the situation exits personal space, be it physically or be it by closing one eye.