Research in education: What influence on policy and practice?

This paper is set in a context where increased emphasis is being placed on the “consumer’s” role in research. It discusses the limitations of “knowledge base” approaches, which aim to deliver the findings of educational research to practitioners and policymakers. The tensions between what these consumers expect of research and what it can, in fact, offer are explored, and the conditions under which effective communication can be established are outlined and exemplified. It is argued, however, that the processes of such communication, if they are to establish the necessary engagement of consumers with researchers, will have to take account of the ways in which consumers are motivated and able to acquire new knowledge. In conclusion, it is argued that if the engagement is unsuccessful and the consumers are unconvinced of the value and validity of research findings for policy and practice, then researchers’ ideas will take a back seat in the debate about what is to count as high-quality work that should be funded. The function of research as the critical extension of knowledge may then be replaced by enquiry that comes up with the results the customer wants. Her current research interests are in the relationships among policy, practice and research, teachers’ thinking, provision for children with special educational needs and gender in education. Her best known recent book, with Donald McIntyre, isMaking Sense of Teaching (Open University Press).     

Where did the cycle begin?: Origins of action planning and their influence on practice

The origins of action planning and action plans are explored and the possible influence of different antecedents on practice is considered. The perceptions of those involved in developing, managing and implementing action planning are discussed. Analysis indicates a lack of clarity concerning the origins of the process and a tendency to view it as a recent 'common-sense' development. As a result, tensions arising from the influence of contrasting models appear to remain unrecognised, and the training needs of helpers, particularly in relation to the acquisition of guidance skills, are underestimated.     

The neglected object: A history of the concept of dreams in Polish psychiatry and psychology in the interwar period, 1918–1939

The development of the concept of dreams in interwar Polish psychiatry and psychology was influenced by Western European concepts as well as by sociocultural factors of the newly independent state. Few Polish psychiatrists addressed the subject of dreams. They were influenced mainly by Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic concept of dreams, but also by Alferd Adler's, Carl Gustav Jung's, and Wilhelm Stekel's ideas. Nevertheless, they approached psychoanalysis critically. The most comprehensive concept of dreams in Polish psychiatry was oneiroanalysis by Tadeusz Bilikiewicz. Oneironalysis was a method of dream analysis based on psychoanalysis but it rejected the psychoanalytic method of free associations and challenged psychoanalytic approaches to the interpretation of dream symbols. Polish psychologists were even less interested in dreams than psychiatrists. Problems with dreams, the most elaborate psychological work by Stefan Szuman consisted of an outline of epistemological problems with general theories of dreams and a harsh critique of psychoanalysis. The neglect of the subject of dreams in Polish psychiatric society can be seen as connected with the social and professional reception of psychoanalysis in Poland. Psychoanalysis was met with opposition from conservative scholars and publicists presenting nationalistic and anti-Semitic attitudes. It was also criticized by the biologically oriented majority of psychiatrists of the Polish Psychiatric Association. In the case of psychology, the most influential Polish psychological school, Lvov-Warsaw School, promoted Brentanian intentionalism, introspection, and psychology of consciousness, therefore, leading to psychologists' reluctance to explore unconscious states like dreams.     

Why should medicine consider a theory of practice? Introduction to the issue

In reference to historical developments, this article introduces the topic of this special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, that is, the relationship(s) between theory and practice. The authors emphasize the need for scientific research in this neglected area for the sake of both clinical practice and medical education.     

Supervision as oversight: A new era in the history of psychoanalytic practice and training?

Taking its cue from Ekstein's analysis of the history of supervision (1960), this article proposes that there is a new historical era emerging in Britain, a phase that could be characterised as the ‘regulatory phase’. It is argued that in the future the clinical supervisor of psychoanalytic work will be positioned as ‘overseer’, with the consequence that what might be overlooked/not seen in the new regulatory climate is the notion of a psychoanalytically informed practice as a practice of the questioning of knowledge and its effects. Further, it considers how the effect of the proposed regulatory framework for psy-practice in the UK elides the current distinction between ‘practitioner/analyst’ and ‘trainee/candidate’. Thus psychoanalytically informed practitioners are re-positioned as candidates for authorisation as state licensed psy-practitioners. A clinical example, based loosely on Freud's account of his analysis of the young female homosexual, draws attention to the specifics and problematics of the competencies for analytic work and its supervision proposed by the Health Professions Council, Skills for Health and research for University College London, which envisages a future role of supervisors as the overseers of standardised interventions.     

Does the eye know calculus? The threshold of representation in classical and connectionist models

The notion of representation lies at the crossroads of questions about the nature of belief and knowledge, meaning, and intentionality. But there is some hope that it might be simpler than all those. If we could understand it clearly, it might then help to explicate those more difficult notions. In this paper, my central aim is to find a principled criterion, along lines that make biological sense, for deciding just when it becomes theoretically plausible to ascribe to some process or state a representational role. I shall be especially concerned with some differences, in this regard, between classical and connectionist models. The relation between ‘standard’ artificial intelligence and connectionism turns out to illustrate a ‘first in, last out’ principle: What we most easily understand (and so can program) is what we have most recently invented; tasks we ourselves perform best, by contrast, are a lot harder to understand. Classical AI has modelled the former; connectionism tries to tackle the latter. I end with some speculations about the possible implications of these considerations for our understanding of understanding.     

How useful is the concept of the ‘harm threshold’ in reproductive ethics and law?

In his book Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit suggests that people are not harmed by being conceived with a disease or disability if they could not have existed without suffering that particular condition. He nevertheless contends that entities can be harmed if the suffering they experience is sufficiently severe. By implication, there is a threshold which divides harmful from non-harmful conceptions. The assumption that such a threshold exists has come to play a part in UK policy making. I argue that Parfit’s distinction between harmful and non-harmful conceptions is untenable. Drawing on Kant’s refutation of the ontological argument for God’s existence, I suggest that the act of creation cannot be identical with the act of harming—nor indeed of benefiting—however great the offspring’s suffering may be. I suggest that Parfit is right that bringing children into existence does not usually harm them, but I argue that this must be applied to all conceptions, since Parfit cannot show how the harm threshold can be operationalised. If we think certain conceptions are unethical or should be illegal, this must be on other grounds than that the child is harmed by them. I show that a Millian approach in this context fails to exemplify the empirical and epistemological advantages which are commonly associated with it, and that harm-based legislation would need to be based on broader harm considerations than those relating to the child who is conceived.     

Simple reaction time and predictive tracking in Parkinson's disease: do they converge on a single, fixed impairment of preparation?

Patients with Parkinson's disease exhibit a number. of abnormalities that seem more marked in circumstances in which stimulus and response are predictable in advance. In this article, we consider the prolonged movement onset latencies exhibited by Parkinsonian subjects in the tracking of predictable targets and in the simple reaction time (RT) task. It has been suggested that the performance impairments on both these tasks stem from a common planning deficit. We argue that the Parkinsonian tendency to refrain from predictive tracking cannot be ascribed to an inability to anticipate due to a planning deficit. The data are better accommodated by our alternative thesis that when Parkinsonians' response initiation lags behind that of normal subjects, this is a result of a strategic adaptation to an impairment of the accuracy of movements guided by an internal representation of the target. Our conclusion, that the primary impairment of predictive tracking is one of inaccurate movement execution rather than delayed response initiation, precludes postulation of the same deficit as a source of the selective prolongation of simple RT sometimes found in Parkinson's disease. Moreover, an analysis of the processing demands of the two tasks shows that the predictability that characterizes each of them is quite different in nature. Hence, the impairments in predictive tracking and simple RT tasks are unlikely to stem from a single mechanism that is defective in Parkinson's disease.     

Does the philosophy of medicine exist? A commentary on Caplan

Caplan has argued that the philosophy of medicine does not exist. Although I will not deny the points he makes, I will argue that the philosophy of medicine has characteristics of a developing field with the potential to meet all of Caplan's criteria. The argument is based on Dewey's established views on logical development for a field of inquiry, as well as pointing out how other criteria Caplan imposes can be fulfilled.The U.S. Government right to retain a non-exclusive, royalty free licence in and to any copyright is acknowledged.     

Incurable suffering from the “hiatus theoreticus”? Some epistemological problems in modern medicine and the clinical relevance of philosophy of medicine

Up to now neither the question, whether all theoretical medical knowledge can at least be described as scientific, nor the one how exactly access to the existing scientific and theoretical medical knowledge during clinical problem-solving is made, has been sufficiently answered. Scientific theories play an important role in controlling clinical practice and improving the quality of clinical care in modern medicine on the one hand, and making it vindicable on the other. Therefore, the vagueness of unexplicit interrelations between medicine's stock of knowledge and medical practice appears as a gap in the theoretical concept of modern medicine which can be described as Hiatus theoreticus in the anatomy of medicine. A central intention of the paper is to analyze the role of philosophy of medicine for the clarification of the theoretical basis of medical practice. Clinical relevance and normativity in the sense of modern theory of science are suggested as criteria to establish a differentiation between philosophy of medicine as a primary medical discipline and the application of general philosophy in medicine.     

Examples,practice problems,or both? Effects on motivation and learning in shorter and longer sequences

Research suggests some sequences of examples and problems (i.e., EE, EP) are more effective (higher test performance) and efficient (attained with equal/less mental effort) than others (PP, sometimes also PE). Recent findings suggest this is due to motivational variables (i.e., self-efficacy), but did not test this during the training phase. Moreover, prior research used only short task sequences. Therefore, we investigated effects on motivational variables, effectiveness, and efficiency in a short (Experiment 1; four learning tasks; n = 157) and longer task sequence (Experiment 2; eight learning tasks; n = 105). With short sequences, all example conditions were more effective, efficient, and motivating than PP. With longer sequences, all example conditions were more motivating and efficient than PP, but only EE was more effective than PP. Moreover, EE was most efficient during training, regardless of sequence length. These results suggest that example study (only) is more effective, efficient, and more motivating than PP.     

Medical semiotics in the 18th century: A theory of practice?

Medical semiotics in the 18th century was more than a premodern form of diagnosis. Its structure allowed for the combination of empirically proven rules of instruction with the theoretical knowledge of the new sciences, employing the relation between the sign and the signified.     

Mirror mirror on the ward: who is the unfairest of them all? Reflections on reflective practice groups in acute psychiatric settings

Consultant psychiatrists in medical psychotherapy, adult psychotherapists, child and adolescent psychotherapists and clinical psychologists increasingly complement their direct therapeutic activity with applications of their psychotherapeutic thinking in acute mental health work through facilitating reflective practice groups for staff working in mental health teams. The authors offer their reflections on facilitating National Health Service reflective practice groups using the metaphor of a mirrored dialogue between patient and professional, and professional and institution as a basis for informing the development of reflective practice for colleagues. Their reflections are based on working on three acute in-patient wards, in a crisis resolution team and in community mental health teams. They describe the practicalities of setting up and facilitating reflective practice groups, and offer insights into some of the issues that arise in reflective practice groups. They conclude that these groups are mutually beneficial in forging links between psychotherapy professionals and professionals working in other disciplines and areas of mental health. Facilitating these groups often requires a challenging adaptation of technique, which will not suit all psychotherapists, as well as a wider understanding of organisational dynamics and the interplay between clinicians and management.