Misconception and miseducation: Presentations of radical behaviorism in psychology textbooks

Behavior analysts have recently expressed concern about what appear to be misrepresentations of behaviorism in psychology textbooks. This paper presents an analysis of currently used textbooks in the areas of introductory, social, cognitive, personality, and developmental psychology that confirms this. Topics on which behavior analysis is most often misrepresented relate to the role of animal learning research, environmentalism, the "empty organism," language, and the overall utility of the approach. Because textbooks are often a major medium of interaction between the public and behaviorism, behavior analysts must work to correct these errors and to prevent possible negative consequences of widespread misunderstanding. Several potential solutions to these problems are presented that take into account current publishing practices and the monetary contingencies which support them.     

Recognition of temporal patterns: from engineering to psychology and back again.

An overview is presented on research conducted in our lab to quantify the underlying principles behind the recognition of temporal patterns. We have been developing a theory based upon pattern matching and time-series analysis, which allows us to model and understand how humans recognize familiar patterns evolving over time and how performance degrades with noise. While our studies are primarily scientific in nature, the work has application beyond the elucidation of psychological and physiological mechanisms. We illustrate an application of these ideas to computer-based human identification through gait analysis. This study also illustrates a novel approach to interdisciplinary research by integrating experimental psychology with that of engineering design.     

The gifts of culture and of eloquence: An open letter to Michael J. Mahoney in reply to his article, "Scientific psychology and radical behaviorism"

In what seems to be a response to a paper by Skinner (1987), Mahoney (1989) provides evidence of unfamiliarity with and intellectual intolerance toward radical behaviorism by presenting a critique of it that includes a variety of improper and counterfactual attributions. For example, he argues that radical behaviorism is Cartesian rather than Baconian when the historical record shows the opposite, that it is fundamentally associationist when in fact it is selectionist, and that its philosophy of science is essentially that of operationalism and logical positivism when instead it moved on to other criteria decades ago. The details of Mahoney's history are sometimes flawed and sometimes unsubstantiated, as when he provides a distorted account of the origins of the Association for Behavior Analysis or when he makes undocumented claims about the banning of books. On examination, many of his arguments are couched in stylistic terms that share their rhetorical features with racial, ethnic, and religious stereotyping.     

An alternative justification for careers education: A radical response to roberts and daws

K. Roberts and Daws have given what are apparently two divergent views of the place and nature of careers education and guidance. This paper seeks to show that while both provide useful comments on a problem area, both seek to discuss this problem from within a normative view of the world. In the case of Roberts this leads to a deterministic acceptance of the status quo, while Daws' view of careers education as a 'catalyst' seems doomed to remain at the level of hope. It is suggested that a more appropriate conceptual framework can be formulated, based on the idea of career choice as the creation of 'nomos', and on a different view of the relationship between individual, society and reality. This finally leads to a discussion of the place of careers education and guidance, and its further development, as an important contribution to radical education and social change.     

Ethics education in science and engineering: The case of animal research

Conclusion The past one hundred fifty years of debate over the use of animals in research and testing has been characterized mainly byad hominem attacks and on uncritical rejection of the other sides’ arguments. In the classroom, it is important to avoid repeating exercises in public relations and to demand sound scholarship. This paper is a modification of material originally included in the handbook which accompanied the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Seminar “Teaching Ethics in Science and Engineering”, 10–11 February 1993.     

Sources of self-esteem: From theory to measurement and back again

According to some conceptions, self-esteem possesses a moral dimension; according to others, it does not. According to some, the realism of the self-evaluation matters; according to others, it does not. For some investigators, narcissism is just high self-esteem; for others, narcissism involves internal conflicts within one's self-evaluation, which is strongly dependent on admiration extracted from other people. The best known procedure for measuring self-esteem has been a 10 question survey introduced by Rosenberg in 1965. Along with other insensitivities and biases, the Rosenberg scale fails to respond to the different high-level values or “sources” that are constitutive of self-esteem for different individuals. A person's self-esteem can be contingent on internal sources (such as independent thinking, productive projects, and moral commitments), or on external sources (such as fame, wealth, physical appearance, or the approval of peers). A study reported here investigated the relationships among global explicit self-esteem (as assessed with the Rosenberg scale), reliance on internal sources of self-esteem (measured with the Self-Esteem Sentence Completion Instrument), reliance on several external sources (via the External Sources of Self-Esteem scale), and narcissistic tendencies (as per the Narcissistic Personality Inventory). The participants were 97 undergraduate college students enrolled in psychology courses. Rosenberg and NPI scores displayed different patterns of correlation with various subscales of the ESOSES, raising the prospect that profiles of various external sources will enable us to differentiate between self-esteem and narcissism. Meanwhile, scores on the SESCI were not significantly related to any other variable, except for a mild negative correlation with the success recognition subscale of the ESOSES—an outcome that raises both theoretical and measurement questions about internal sources. Contrary to frequent assumptions of direct rivalry, reliance on internal sources of self-esteem may be largely independent of reliance on external sources. At the same time, however, more work obviously needs to be done on measuring internal sources of self-esteem, both explicit and implicit.     

Cognitive and Interpersonal Vulnerabilities to Adolescent Depression: Classification of Risk Profiles for a Personalized Prevention Approach

Despite interest in psychosocial vulnerabilities to depression, little is known about reliable and valid individualized risk profiles that can be used to match individuals to evidence-based interventions for depression. This study investigated well-established cognitive and interpersonal vulnerabilities to depression among youth to discern an evidence-based risk classification approach which is being used in a personalized depression prevention randomized clinical trial. Data were drawn from a general community sample of adolescents (N?=?467; ages 10–16, mean 13.14, SD?=?1.62; 57% females) who were followed prospectively for 3 years. Youth completed measures of cognitive (negative cognitive style, dysfunctional attitudes, rumination) and interpersonal (support and conflict with peers and parents, excessive reassurance seeking, social competence, co-rumination) risks to depression, and then were followed longitudinally for onset of depression. Principal axis factor analyses showed that three latent factors--cognitive vulnerability, interpersonal support, and interpersonal conflict--optimally represented the structure of these risk factors. Clinically practical and meaningful cutoffs, based on tertile cut-off scores on cognitive and interpersonal risk measures, were used to categorize youth into relatively balanced high and low cognitive and interpersonal risk groups. These risk classification groups exhibited validity (AUC?>?0.70) by predicting prospective onsets of depressive episodes at 18-months follow-ups. These findings demonstrate a reliable and valid approach to synthesize psychosocial vulnerabilities to depression, specifically cognitive and interpersonal risks. Results are discussed in terms of using these risk classifications profiles to test personalized prevention of depression during adolescence.     

From autonomy to heteronomy (and back): The enaction of social life

The term “social cognition” can be construed in different ways. On the one hand, it can refer to the cognitive faculties involved in social activities, defined simply as situations where two or more individuals interact. On this view, social systems would consist of interactions between autonomous individuals; these interactions form higher-level autonomous domains not reducible to individual actions. A contrasting, alternative view is based on a much stronger theoretical definition of a truly social domain, which is always defined by a set of structural norms; moreover, these social structures are not only a set of constraints, but actually constitute the possibility of enacting worlds that would just not exist without them. This view emphasises the heteronomy of individuals who abide by norms that are impersonal, culturally inherited and to a large extent independent of the individuals. Human beings are socialised through and through; consequently, all human cognition is social cognition. The article argues for this second position. Finally, it appears that fully blown autonomy actually requires heteronomy. It is the acceptance of the constraints of social structures that enables individuals to enter new realms of common meaningfulness. The emergence of social life marks a crucial step in the evolution of cognition; so that at some evolutionary point human cognition cannot but be social cognition.