Sense Generation: A “Quasi-Classical” Approach to Concepts and Concept Combination

This article presents a detailed formal approach to concepts and concept combination. Sense generation is a competence-level theory that attempts to respect constraints from the various cognitive sciences, and postulates “quasi-classical” conceptual structures where attributes receive only one value (but are defeasible and so do not represent necessary and sufficient conditions on category membership) and where classification is binary (but explicitly context-sensitive). It is also argued that any general theory of concepts must account for “privative” combinations (e.g., stone lion, fake gun, apparent friend) as extreme test-cases of representational and classificatory flexibility. The approach presented therefore provides a treatment of these combinations. The approach differentiates between the “lexical concept” (the stable information represented in a mental lexicon) which acts as a base from which the various “senses” (flexible contents associated with words and phrases in context, and used in classification) are “generated.” Generation allows nonmonotonicity, so that in different circumstances, different attributes may be defeated or modified. Classification is treated as relative to the perspective adopted, so that a classification acceptable from one perspective may be unacceptable from another, without contradiction. The result is a view that assumes bottom-up priority in concept combination, where the range of senses generated by bottom-up rules of combination is tempered by pragmatic-communicative constraints on classification. An account of the representational and classification behavior of privative combinations is outlined, and the article concludes with a discussion of some of the implications of the approach.     

Violence as a social fact

This paper describes a class of social acts called “violent acts” and distinguishes them from damaging acts. The former are successfully performed if they are apprehended by the victim, while the latter, being not social, are successful only as long as the intended damage is realized. It is argued that violent acts, if successful, generate a social relation which include the aggressor, the victim and, if the concomitant damaging act is satisfied, the damage itself.     

Carson Strong's “positive killing and the irreversibly unconscious patient”: A commentary

There is general agreement that death of the entire brain results in death of the person, and that such a condition can exist in a body which is still technically “alive.”1,2 Dr. Strong additionally contends that in cases of irreversible coma, since cognitive abilities characteristic of the person are no longer manifest and cannot be expected to reappear, such an individual no longer has the “right to life” and somatic death can be initiated by “positive killing.” This, the author claims, can be considered a logical and morally acceptable extension of the conceptual framework now in force for dealing with cases of isolated brain death.     

Varieties of Objectivity: Reply to De Mesel

In a previous paper, I argued that the later Wittgenstein did not endorse a realist account of ethics, where a realist account is understood to involve a claim to truth as well as objectivity. In this paper, I respond to a number of critical questions that Benjamin De Mesel raises about that interpretation. I agree with him that just as there are uses for expressions such as “truth”, “fact” and “reality” in ethics, there are uses for expressions such as “objectivity” that do not involve a deeper realist commitment. But I uphold and reinforce my claim that objectivity in ethics as the realist conceives it is ruled out by Wittgenstein, who describes the correspondence between ethical expressions and reality in an entirely different way.     

On Some Counter-Examples to the Guise of the Good-Thesis: Intelligibility without Desirability

This paper argues that there are cases, which various guise of the good-theses concerning desires, intentions and actions would not allow. In these cases the agent acts for considerations that the agent does not regard as good reasons. The considerations render the actions intelligible but not desirable (where desirability and intelligibility can be objective or subjective). These cases are atypical, but nonetheless show that those guise of the good-theses which do not allow them, should be revised. In typical cases the intelligibility of desires, intentions and actions co-varies with their desirability: there are both unintelligible cases without suitable desirability characteristics and cases where desirability characteristics make the desire, intention and action intelligible. The claim here is that there are further more atypical and puzzling, but equally possible cases, where intelligibility and desirability come apart. The paper first introduces the Guise of the Good - debates about desires, intentions, and actions, and suggests distinguishing the category of “acting for a reason” from “acting for a consideration not taken to be a reason”. It then argues that while desirability entails intelligibility, and lack of intelligibility entails lack of desirability, these two cases leave conceptual room for a third category, which is that of intelligibility without desirability. This is so, whether we examine objective or subjective intelligibility and desirability. The claim is meant to apply mutatis mutandis to characteristics of desires, intentions and actions. The paper then provides possible cases of intelligibility without desirability, and defends the view against some objections.     

THE TAKEN-FOR-GRANTED

This essay constitutes a theoretical account of how speakers interpret that which is taken for granted in messages. It is argued that the term “taken for granted” (TFG) is useful in reconsidering research concerning enthymemes, argument theory, indirect speech acts, conversational maxims, pragmatic implication, and a number of other areas. When combined with materials from the symbolic interactionist literature on alignment, the TFG concept provides a framework for a model of how speakers interpret unspoken portions of utterances.     

The subject of “We intend”

This paper examines and compares the ways in which intentions of the singular kind (“I intend”) and the plural kind (“we intend”) are subjective. Are intentions of the plural kind ours in the same way intentions of the singular kind are mine? Starting with the singular case, it is argued that “I intend” is subjective in virtue of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is special in that it is self-identifying, self-validating, self-committing, and self-authorizing. Moving to the plural form, it is argued that in spite of apparent differences, attitudes of the form “we intend” are subjective in the same way. The self-knowledge at work here is plural rather than singular. This supports a plural subject account of collective intentionality. It is argued that the worries sometimes raised in the literature against the metaphysical “spookiness” of plural subjects are due to a fundamental misconception of the way in which attitudes of either kind –singular and plural – are subjective.     

From volitional action to automatized homicide: changing levels of self and consciousness during partial limbic seizures

Refined definitions are proposed for subtle, transient changes primarily of the “sense of self,” as expressed in observable action behavior due to neuro-pathological disturbances, especially during partial seizures' interfering with volition. Two such subtypes are exemplified by temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE), typically with clouding of consciousness (with amnesia for the acts), and by the proposed “Limbic Psychotic Trigger Reaction” (LPTR). During LPTR, consciousness is preserved to the extent that such seizure-stricken patients remember their acts, which are associated with a fleeting de novo psychosis and autonomic arousal. The acts are nonvolitional, unplanned, nonintended, motiveless, purposeless, and out-of-character, ranging from socially bizarrely inappropriate behavior to homicide. Basic “paleo” levels of the sense of self and of consciousness are preserved: Such patients “know” the nature, i.e., the kind of action, while they transiently lose their previously characteristic ability to fully appreciate the “quality” of their acts, their consequences, and implications.     

Comparison between two opposite homicidal syndromes (Syndrome e vs. limbic psychotic trigger reaction)

Two syndromes with opposite kinds of homicidal acts also implicate opposite activation of frontal lobe and limbic systems. I. Fried's “Syndrome E” refers to planned, ideologically-motivated mass murders, committed in groups and accompanied by “elation.” Implicated are heightened functioning of certain frontal lobe regions with certain reduced limbic involvement . In contrast, A. A. Pontius' “Limbic Psychotic Trigger Reaction” delineates unplanned, motiveless homicidal acts (so far 17 cases) committed by a single loner with flat affect, implicating a partial limbic seizure hyperactivation with fleeting psychosis and brief secondary dysfunctioning of certain frontal regions.     

Are thought experiments “disturbing”? The case of armchair physics

Philosophical Studies - Proponents of the “negative program” in experimental philosophy have argued that judgements in philosophical cases, also known as case judgements, are unreliable...     

Suicide in the Subway: Psychodynamic Aspects*

ABSTRACT: Fifty-one cases of suicide attempts in the subway have been investigated to examine the question of whether the method used has psychodynamic significance or is merely adventitious. We found that no single characteristic distinguished subway suicide from all other suicide modalities, although as a group the subway cases had a higher proportion of psychotic and previously suicidal patients than other series quoted in the literature. However, there were important differences between subway suicide cases seeking a “traumatic” death (jumping in front of a train; lying across the track awaiting destruction) and those seeking a “nontraumatic” death (electrocution on the live “third rail”). The traumatic group had histories of exposure to violence, other traumatic suicide attempts, hostile or destructive delusions, and many “destroy” words on psychological test protocols. The smaller nontraumatic group had no such history of exposure to violence; their previous suicide attempts were nontraumatic; delusions, when present, were not menacing; and the psychological tests showed more “escape” words than “destroy” words.     

Interpreting Political Apologies: The Neglected Role of Performance

In recent years, state leaders have increasingly apologized for historical wrongdoing. This article argues that there are scant conceptual tools available in current apology theory to capture the meanings of such political apologies. Salient theories treat apologies predominantly as “speech acts,” and this perspective produces frameworks of analysis that are preoccupied with linguistic features (e.g., the phrasing of the utterance of the apologizer). This article points to the limitations of this approach by arguing that dramaturgical aspects of performance are equally important. Political apologies are frequently offered during public ceremonies. Reactions in their aftermath indicate that the setup of those ceremonies matter to the victims, who, as primary addressees, assign meanings to the act. Current apology theory, however, gives little consideration to this observation. “What is said” matters most; “where and how it is said” is being neglected. The article concludes with a proposal for future research, which includes the reimagining of political apology as “performance” –a concept that gives credence to both formal speech and dramaturgy.     

Constructive criticism: An evaluation of Buller and Hardcastle's genetic and neuroscientific arguments against Evolutionary Psychology

David Buller and Valerie Hardcastle have argued that various discoveries about the genetics and nature of brain development show that most “central” psychological mechanisms cannot be adaptations because the nature of the contribution from the environment on which they are based shows they are not heritable. Some philosophers and scientists have argued that a strong role for the environment is compatible with high heritability as long as the environment is highly stable down lineages. In this paper I support this view by arguing that the discoveries Buller and Hardcastle refer to either do not show as strong a role for the environment as they suggest, or these discoveries show that the brain's developmental process depends in many cases on input from the environment that is highly stable across generations.     

An Inference-Based Approach to Treating Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders

This article outlines the conceptual and empirical basis for an inference-based approach (IBA) to treating obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). The IBA considers that in most cases the obsessional process begins with an initial doubt (e.g., “Maybe my hands are not clean”; “Perhaps the door was not locked”; “There's a chance I made an error”; “I could have harmed someone”) and that this doubt is a product of invalid reasoning. The IBA focus on initial doubt adds an extra upstream dimension to the current cognitive behavior therapy (CBT), which targets downstream appraisals, following on from the initial intrusion. Hence the aim of inference-based therapy (IBT) is to modify the reasoning narrative producing the doubt, and to return the person to the world of commonsense perception. IBT complements existing CBT and a case study illustrates the application of the IBT protocol. The IBA may be particularly useful in cases where belief in the initial probability of an obsessional doubt is strongly held and/or where consequences or appraisals following the doubt are absent or minimally associated with distress.     

Understanding the “cognitive revolution” in psychology

In this paper it is argued that the “cognitive revolution” in psychology is not best represented either as a Kuhnian “paradigm shift,” or as a movement from an instrumentalist to a realist conception of psychological theory, or as a continuous evolution out of more “liberalized” forms of behaviorism, or as a return to the form of “structuralist” psychology practiced by Wundt and Titchener. It is suggested that the move from behaviorism to cognitivism is best represented in terms of the replacement of (operationally defined) “intervening variables” by genuine “hypothetical constructs” possessing cognitive “surplus meaning,” and that the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s continued a cognitive tradition that can be traced back to the 1920s. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

The Elusive Notion of “Argument Quality”

We all seem to have a sense of what good and bad arguments are, and there is a long history—focusing on fallacies—of trying to provide objective standards that would allow a clear separation of good and bad arguments. This contribution discusses the limits of attempts to determine the quality of arguments. It begins with defining bad arguments as those that deviate from an established standard of good arguments. Since there are different conceptualizations of “argument”—as controversy, as debate, and as justification—and since arguments in each of these senses can be used for different purposes, a first problem is that we would need a large variety of standards for “good” arguments. After this, the contribution focuses in particular on proposals made in the literature on how to assess the quality of arguments in the sense of justification. It distinguishes three problems of assessment: How to determine (1) whether reasons are acceptable, (2) whether reasons are sufficient to justify the conclusion, and (3) how to identify arguments in real-world speech acts and texts? It is argued that limitations of argument assessment result from unavoidable relativism: The assessment of many—if not most—arguments depends on the epistemic situation of the evaluator.     

Why Do We Still Call Them “Paradoxes”

The fact that therapists label some events “paradoxical” may suggest that our current beliefs or theories are limited in their ability to adequately account for those phenomena. It is argued that our underlying belief in objectivity surrounds therapeutic “paradoxes” with a persistently paradoxical aura, and leads to confusion in our understanding of a variety of phenomena. Maturana's ideas regarding structure determinism, instructive interaction, and phenomenal domains are used to suggest an answer to these difficulties. It is claimed that the problematic status of many theoretical concepts (for example, communication, information, resistance, homeostasis, and pathology) is revealing of something quite important — that the experiential validity of instructive interaction repeatedly leads us into implicitly or explicitly employing instructive interaction in a domain where it can never be valid: the domain of theory and explanation.     

Comparing objects in memory: Evidence suggesting an internal psychophysics

In this experiment, Ss were visually presented with the names of two animals and were required to throw a switch under the name of the larger animal. Although error rates were relatively low (4.5%), reaction time (RT) was largely an inverse linear function of the logarithm of the estimated difference in animal size. Since RT is similarly related to size differences when Ss make direct perceptual comparisons (e.g., of lengths of line),.it was argued that Ss compare animal names by making an “internal psychophysical judgment.” A more general model was then proposed for answering, from memory, questions of the form, “Which is /X/, /A/ or [B/?” where /X/ is any comparative adjective and /A/and /B/ are any concrete nouns.