The Worldview of Memory Lane

This article is a response to Jacob Belzen’s Towards Cultural Psychology of Religion, Principles, Approaches and Applications (New York: Springer, 2010) from a cross-cultural pastoral perspective and identifies seven issues where the book and cross-cultural pastoral thinking impact each other: definition, research methodology, object of research, flexibility of research, the relationship between cultural and cross-cultural psychology, culture, and private religious experience. Below I will view Belzen’s book through the prism of my primary concerns as a Dutch academic trained in cross-cultural pastoral care and counseling who pastors in a diverse and fluid cultural context.     

Defending conversation and responsibility: reply to Dana Nelkin and Holly Smith

In this paper, I defend the central arguments of my book Conversation and Responsibility in response to two critics, Dana Nelkin and Holly Smith.     

In defence of a faith-like model of love: a reply to John Lippitt’s “Kierkegaard and the problem of special relationships: Ferreira,Krishek, and the ‘God filter”’

In his major work on love, Works of Love, Kierkegaard clearly and robustly affirms the moral superiority of neighbourly love, and approves preferential love on one condition: that it serve as an instance of neighbourly love. But can an essentially preferential love be an instance of the essentially non-preferential neighbourly love? John Lippitt seems to think it can. In his paper “Kierkegaard and the problem of special relationships: Ferreira, Krishek, and the ‘God filter”’ he defends Kierkegaard’s position in Works of Love against my criticism (as presented in my book Kierkegaard on Faith and Love); specifically, against my claim that in using Kierkegaard’s view of neighbourly love as a framework for understanding preferential love, one fails to account for the latter’s distinctive character. Lippitt claims that I misinterpret Kierkegaard’s position and, using what he calls ‘the God filter’, he attempts to show how adhering to Kierkegaard’s view of neighbourly love allows one to sustain the distinctiveness (and value) of preferential love. In what follows I will defend my interpretation of Kierkegaard’s position and explain why I take the view he presents in Works of Love to be problematic. Furthermore, in my aforementioned book I offer a Kierkegaardian model of love that does precisely what Lippitt seeks his ‘God filter’ model to do: namely, preserve the distinctiveness of preferential love while allowing its possible coexistence with neighbourly love. Thus, against the background of Lippitt’s criticism I will demonstrate this model again, in hope of clarifying the advantages this view offers.     

Imagining Hope: William F. Lynch’s Psychology of Hope

This article is a follow-up to my recent article on Erving Goffman’s Asylums (1961), an analysis of the mental hospital environment. I focus here on William F. Lynch’s book Images of Hope (1965) which was written when Lynch was a scholar in residence at St. Elizabeths Hospital in Washington, D.C. in 1962. I take particular note of the fact that Lynch perceived the book to be a venture into the psychology of hope, and that he based this psychology on the complementary relationship of hope and imagination. I also consider the relationship that he draws between hope and help; the dynamic of hope and hopelessness; the roles of wishing and waiting in the development of a mature sense of hope; and the imagination as an instrument of coping. I conclude that among the selves that comprise our composite Self, the hopeful self is essential to life itself.     

Tyrannized Souls: Plato's Depiction of the ‘Tyrannical Man’

In book 9 of Plato's Republic, Socrates describes the nature and origins of the ‘tyrannical man’, whose soul is said to be ‘like’ a tyrannical city. In this paper, I examine the nature of the ‘government’ that exists within the tyrannical man's soul. I begin by demonstrating the inadequacy of three potentially attractive views sometimes found in the literature on Plato: the view that the tyrannical man's soul is ruled by his ‘lawless’ unnecessary appetites, the view that it is ruled by sexual desire, and the view that it is ruled by a lust for power. I then present my own account. On the view I defend, the tyrannical man's soul is to be understood as ruled by a single, persistent, powerful desire for bodily pleasure: as much as he can get, and however he can get it. Finally, I show how understanding the tyrannical man's soul in the way I recommend helps resolve some commonly expressed concerns about this part of the Republic. I suggest, on this basis, that Plato's procedure in constructing his catalogue of corrupt cities and souls in Republic 8 and 9 was more carefully thought out and systematic than has sometimes been supposed.     

The way of life of Mr. Nowhere: examining Harding’s “Objectivity and Diversity”

In the following critique of Sandra Harding’s 2015 book Objectivity and Diversity I will raise three sets of interrelated issues. One: that Harding’s arguments for re-conceptualizing the term ‘objectivity’ may not be persuasive to those who continue to cling to the ‘view from nowhere’ understanding of the term. Two: that because of this entrenchment of the view from nowhere, Harding’s rhetorical strategy of referring to traditional knowledge as ‘science’ may result in further marginalization of already marginalized groups. And Three: that not all cases of multiple and conflicted selves are necessarily cases of increased access to knowledge and increased empowerment. Thus, while I am deeply sympathetic to the arguments being made in Harding’s book, I think this new scientific self that Harding proposes at the end of her book needs to be developed and clarified further.     

Rethinking Reconstructionist Confucianism’s Rethinking

In this review of Fan Ruiping’s book, I am concerned first of all about how representative his account of Confucianism/Ruism is in relationship to the multiform traditions associated with that teaching through more than two thousand years of its existence. Fan emphasizes pre-imperial forms of Confucian traditions, but neglects many alternatives from later sources. Secondly, his account of “familism” lends itself to questions related to the problem of revenge that is associated with traditional Confucianism. This raises further ethical doubts about the effectiveness of his reconstructed Confucianism within contemporary Chinese society. Finally, his “familism” appears to focus on extended family structures, but whether this is suitable and relevant for the structures of modern family transformations in mainland China is questioned.     

The Problem of Unconceived Objections

In this paper, I argue that, just as the problem of unconceived alternatives provides a basis for a New Induction on the History of Science to the effect that a realist view of science is unwarranted, the problem of unconceived objections provides a basis for a New Induction on the History of Philosophy to the effect that a realist view of philosophy is unwarranted. I raise this problem not only for skepticism’s sake but also for the sake of making a point about philosophical argumentation, namely, that anticipating objections to one’s claim is not the same as supporting one’s claim. In other words, defending p from objections does not amount to support or evidence for p. This, in turn, presents dialectical and pragma-dialectical approaches to argumentation with the following question: does proper argumentation require that arguers anticipate and respond to unconceived objections?     

Desiring (With) Bion: An Experience in Reading

This article considers my experience of reading Wilfred R. Bion’s book Learning from experience (1962) and how transference operates in and around his work. I argue that Bion’s work cannot simply be read but must be felt. I highlight the importance of Learning from experience for psychoanalytic practitioners becoming more self-reflexive about our theoretical and clinical practices, but also to bring attention to the process through which many of us come to Bion’s insights “first hand” if you like, which is through his writings, in our position as readers.     

Response to Abrusán,Shaw, and Elbourne

In my book Category Mistakes (OUP 2013), I discuss a range of potential accounts of category mistakes and defend a pragmatic, presuppositional account of the phenomenon. Three commentators discuss the book: Márta Abrusán focuses on a comparison between my book and Asher’s Lexical Meaning in Context, suggesting that Asher’s theory has the advantage of accounting not only for category mistakes, but also for additional phenomena such as so-called ‘coertion’ and ‘co-predication’. I argue that Asher’s account of all three phenomena is deficient, and, moreover, that it is far from clear that the latter two phenomena are related to that of category mistakes. James Shaw challenges two of my arguments against the MBT view. I respond to these challenges. Paul Elbourne provides a novel argument in support of my account of category mistakes, involving multi-sentence discourses and ERP experiments. I show that it is not entirely straightforward for my account to explain this data, but that his argument does ultimately provide support for my view.     

Animal groups and social ontology: an argument from the phenomenology of behavior

Through a critical engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the concepts of nature, life, and behavior, and with contemporary accounts of animal groups, this article argues that animal groups exhibit sociality and that sociality is a fundamental ontological condition. I situate my account in relation to the superorganism and selfish individual accounts of animal groups in recent biology and zoology. I argue that both accounts are inadequate. I propose an alternative account of animal groups and animal sociality through a Merleau-Pontian inspired definition of behavior. I criticize Merleau-Ponty’s individualistic prejudice, but show that his philosophy contains the resources necessary to overcome this bias. I define behavior as a holistic, ongoing, meaningful and Umwelt-oriented intrinsically configured expression of living forms of existence. By looking at cases of animal groups drawn from contemporary studies in zoology and behavioral ecology, I show that animal groups, in the fact that they behave, manifest themselves to be a fundamental form of existence, namely, the social form of existence.     

Characteristics of Confucian Rituals (Li)—A Critique of Fan Ruiping’s Interpretation

In this paper I argue that Fan Ruiping’s explication of the Confucian notion of li 禮 (ritual propriety) is problematic in several ways. First, his division of human activities into “social” and “natural” is less than illuminating, as human “natural” activities (such as hunting) are already inescapably social. Second, I question the appropriateness for him to characterize li in terms of “closed activities,” as some rituals are evidently open-ended. Third, he seems to have overemphasized the constitutive function of li and understated its regulative function. Fourth, contrary to Fan’s claim, Confucian li accomplishes “external goals” in human life as well as “internal goals.” Finally, Fan’s requirement for being a Confucian with respect to the observance of li is unrealistically high and makes it difficult for people to qualify as Confucian.     

The Attractiveness of Panentheism—a Reply to Benedikt Paul Göcke

In his recent article in Sophia, Benedikt Paul Göcke concluded that ‘as long as we do not have a sound argument entailing the necessity of the world, panentheism is not an attractive alternative to classical theism’ (Benedikt Paul Göcke, ‘Panentheism and Classical Theism’, Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 75). As the article progresses, Göcke clarifies his view of what panentheism is, essentially identical to Göcke’s view of classical theism in every way, except in the world’s modal relation to God. This concept is vastly different to many of the panentheistic notions that are more commonly held. While it is not initially made transparent—especially with the label Göcke chooses to use—it becomes increasingly clear that Göcke critiques a God concept of his own making. More common variations of panentheism are contrasted with Göcke’s version, in order to provide a broader and more accurate view of the ancient concept, and to demonstrate that Göcke’s view of panentheism is idiosyncratic. It is finally explained that even if Göcke’s view of panentheism were definitive, he has not successfully argued for the relative unattractiveness of the concept, relative to his view of classical theism.     

The Environmental Ethics of Fan Ruiping’s Revisionist Confucianism

Fan Ruiping is engaged in a wide-ranging project to reconstruct Confucianism for the contemporary period. It includes his sustained attack on John Rawls’ theory of distributive justice, various Chinese policies and practices on the delivery of health and elder care, and global business ethics. This paper describes his revised Confucian understanding of environmental morality under the metaphor of nature as garden and man as gardener. I argue the current state of this effort is in need of a more robust appropriation of Chinese sources and a greater attention to comparative analogues using the garden metaphor. I conclude with some suggestions that might advance this specific aspect of his project.     

Husserl’s Conception of Experiential Justification: What It Is and Why It Matters

The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is an interpretative one as I wish to provide a detailed account of Husserl’s conception of experiential justification. Here Ideas I and Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge: Lectures 1906/07 will be my main resources. My second aim is to demonstrate the currency and relevance of Husserl’s conception. This means two things: Firstly, I will show that in current debates in analytic epistemology there is a movement sharing with Husserl the basic idea that certain experiences gain their justificatory force simply from their distinctive phenomenal character. Secondly, I shall reveal the benefits of Husserl’s specific version of this view. Thus, one of my aims is to show that debates in current analytic epistemology could profit from adopting certain Husserlian elements. More precisely, I will defend Husserl’s claim that perceptual experiences are justifiers due to their self-giving phenomenal character as opposed to the currently popular view that it is the phenomenology of pushiness that makes them justifiers. To put it differently, what matters is what is originally given within experience and not how you feel about what is given.     

Hegel,the Trinity,and the ‘I’

The main goal of this paper is to argue the relevance of Hegel’s notion of the Trinity with respect to two aspects of Hegel’s idealism: the overcoming of subjectivism and his conception of the ‘I’. I contend that these two aspects are interconnected and that the Trinity is important to Hegel’s strategy for addressing these questions. I first address the problem of subjectivism by considering Hegel’s thought against the background of modern philosophy. I argue that the recognitive structure of Hegel’s idealism led him to give the Trinity a decisive role in his philosophical account. Next, I discuss the Trinity by analysing the three divine persons. This analysis paves the way for the conclusion, where I argue that the Trinity represents a model for re-thinking the ‘I’ in a way that overcomes a ‘naïve realist’ and a ‘subjective’ account of the self. I suggest that Hegel’s absolute idealism can be conceived as an approach to the ‘I’ that considers the role of acts of mutual recognition for the genesis of self-conscious thought, and that the Trinity is the Darstellung of the relational and recognitive structure of the ‘I’.     

Heidegger,Hermeneutics and History: Undermining Jeff Malpas’s Philosophy of Place

Most works about the philosophy of Martin Heidegger either disregard Heidegger’s attachment to National Socialism or assume the ‘minimalist’ view that his attachment was a brief political aberration of no consequence for his philosophy. This paper contends that the minimalist view is not only factually wrong but also that its assumption promotes methodological errors and poor philosophy. To assess this contention we examine two important texts from one of the more fertile fields in current philosophy: Jeff Malpas’s Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World (2006) and Heidegger and the Thinking of Place (2012). Malpas claims that Heidegger’s rejection of National Socialism spurred, or was concomitant with, new directions in his philosophy. These claims are wrong. The paper concludes that any work about Heidegger’s philosophy must first acknowledge and understand his enduring attachment to National Socialism.     

Remembering entails knowing

In his recent book, Bernecker (Memory, 2010) has attacked the following prominent view: (RK) S remembers that p only if S knows that p. An attack on RK is also an attack on Timothy Williamson’s view that knowledge is the most general factive stative attitude. In this paper, I defend RK against Bernecker’s attacks and also advance new arguments in favor of it. In Sect. 2, I provide some background on memory. In Sect 3, I respond to Bernecker’s attacks on RK and develop a new argument for RK. In Sects. 4 and 5, I develop two more new arguments for RK.     

Principles,Virtues, or Detachment? Some Appreciative Reflections on Karen Stohr’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">On Manners</Emphasis>

Karen Stohr’s book On Manners argues persuasively that rules of etiquette, though conventional, play an essential moral role, because they “serve as vehicles through which we express important moral values like respect and consideration for the needs, ideas, and opinions of others” (Stohr 2012: 3–4). Stohr frequently invokes Kantian concepts and principles in order to make her point. In Part 2 of this essay, I shall argue that the significance of etiquette is better understood using a virtue ethics framework, like that of Confucianism, rather than the language of Kantianism. Within the Chinese tradition, Daoists have frequently been critics of Confucian ritualism. Consequently, in Part 3, I shall consider some possible Daoist critiques of Stohr’s work.     

Comments on Jonathan Lear’s<Emphasis Type="Italic"> Radical Hope</Emphasis> (Harvard: 2006)

Cultural devastation, and the proper response to it, is the central concern of Radical Hope. I address an uncertainty in Lear’s book, reflected in a wavering over the difference between a culture’s way of life becoming impossible and its way of life becoming unintelligible. At his best, Lear asks the radical ontological question: when the cultural collapse is such that the old way of life has become not only impossible but retroactively unimaginable,––when nothing one can do (or did) makes sense anymore,––how can one go on? In raising this question, Lear’s book is a remarkable breakthrough; it comes close to raising the crucial ontological question of how to deal with the total collapse of a culture, and it may well become a classic by starting a conversation on the question: How should we live when our own culture is in the process of actually collapsing?

Lear suggests that

[w]hat would be required … would be a new Crow poet: one who could take up the Crow past and—rather than use it for nostalgia or ersatz mimesis—project it into vibrant new ways for the Crow to live and to be. (p. 51)

Later Heidegger had a similar suggestion for us and I try to spell it out briefly.