Why can't we tickle ourselves?

When we tickle ourselves something prevents the sensation being as strong as when someone else does it. It is suggested that the "something" may be: (i) the predictability of the stimulus; (ii) the presence of feedback from the movement of the arm doing the tickling; (iii) the presence of a corollary discharge from the voluntary movement of the tickling arm; (iv) the absence of a social/sexual context. To study these, Ss rated perceived "tickle-strength" in situations where they were tickled: (a) with their eyes closed; (b) with their eyes open; (c) with their own arm doing the tickling, but being moved by someone else; (d) by themselves. One group of Ss was divided into same sex and different sex subject-experimenter pairs. The results showed significant effects of predictability and sensorimotor feedback.     

Can we imagine how objects look from other viewpoints?

Many psychologists who study cognition believe that perception achieves object-centered representations that make it possible to extract representations of how the object would appear from differing viewpoints. Others believe we can achieve representations of how an object would appear by a process of visualization or mental rotation. We report experiments in which the subject tries to imagine how three-dimensional novel wire objects would appear from positions other than the one they are in. Subjects are unable to perform this task unless they make use of strategies that circumvent the process of visualization. It is suggested that the linear increase in time required to succeed in mental rotation tasks as a function of the angular discrepancy between the figures compared is the result of increasing difficulty rather than of the time required for rotation.     

Can substantive theorizing really save us from ourselves? A skeptical commentary on Wicker's proposal

This commentary concurs in Wicker's call for more attention to substantive theorizing, but attempts to place that strategic approach within a broader conceptual and methodological context. It presents a perspective that is somewhat more skeptical than Wicker's as to the ultimate potential of research in our field. Specifically, the commentary discusses five themes that Wicker raises in support of the importance and potential value of substantive theorizing, looking at the dark side of each of them as well as at the potential gains. The commentary thus tries to give an appropriate balance of attention to both the limitations and the advantages of substantive theorizing.     

Are we more consistent when talking about ourselves than when behaving? Consistency differences through a questionnaire and an objective task

The present paper aimed to examine questionnaire response patterns and objective task-based test behavioral patterns in order to analyze the differences people show in consistency. It is hypothesized that people tend to be more consistent when talking about themselves (when describing themselves through verbal statements) that when they solve a task (when behaving). Consistency is computed using the pi* statistic (Hernandez, Rubio, Revuelta, & Santacreu, 2006). According to this procedure, consistency is defined as the value and the dimensionality of the latent trait of an individual (theta) remaining invariant through out the test of. Participants who are consistent must show a constant theta and follow a given response pattern during the entire course of the test. A sample of 3,972 participants was used. Results reveal that 68% of participants showed a consistent response pattern when completing the questionnaire. When tackling the task-based test, the percentage was 66%. 45% of individuals showed a consistent pattern in both tests. Implications for personality and individual differences assessment are discussed.     

Can brain stimulation improve semantic joke comprehension?

ABSTRACT

Semantic humour involves a deviation from lexico-semantic rules that introduces ambiguity into interpretation of a situation. The left Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG) has been implicated in humour processing (e.g. semantic puns, ambiguity resolution). The present study aimed to examine whether transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) over the left IFG would enhance semantic ambiguity resolution. In two sessions, fifteen participants aged 20–35 years received either offline anodal tDCS or sham stimulation for 20?min, after which they read semantically ambiguous humorous sentences, literal (non-ambiguous) sentences, and meaningless sentences, and then performed a semantic judgment task relating to each sentence’s final word. Results showed that ambiguity resolution requires longer processing than literality. However, left IFG stimulation was ineffective in increasing ambiguity resolution. Researchers should target different brain areas in both hemispheres to further explore humour comprehension.     

Can we perceive mental states?

Synthese - In this paper, I defend Non-Inferentialism about mental states, the view that we can perceive some mental states in a direct, non-inferential way. First, I discuss how the question of...     

Can we define mental disorder by using the criterion of mental dysfunction?

The concept of mental disorder is often defined by reference to the notion of mental dysfunction, which is in line with how the concept of disease in somatic medicine is often defined. However, the notions of mental function and dysfunction seem to suffer from some problems that do not affect models of physiological function. Functions in general have a teleological structure; they are effects of traits that are supposed to have a particular purpose, such that, for example, the heart serves the goal of pumping blood. But can we single out mental functions in the same way? Can we identify mental functions scientifically, for instance, by applying evolutionary theory? Or are models of mental functions necessarily value-laden? I want to identify several philosophical problems regarding the notion of mental function and dysfunction and point out some possible solutions. As long as these questions remain unanswered, definitions of mental disorder that rest upon the concept of mental dysfunction will lack a secure foundation.     

Can the memory enhancement of the survival judgment task be explained by the elaboration hypothesis?: Evidence from a memory load paradigm1

Many reports have described a survival judgment task that requires participants to judge words according to their relevance to a survival situation, eliciting better recall than that obtained in other judgment tasks (e.g., semantic or self‐judgment tasks). Two explanatory hypotheses (the adaptive hypothesis and the elaboration hypothesis) have been proposed. Here we used the memory load paradigm to investigate whether the adaptive hypothesis or the combination hypothesis can better account for the memory enhancement of the survival judgment task. We used a survival judgment task and an autobiographical recall task with the condition of no memory load or memory load. The 48 participants performed four encoding conditions (memory load—survival, no memory load—survival, memory load—autobiographical, and no memory load—autobiographical). The results showed that memory enhancement of the survival judgment task occurred only in the no memory load condition, but not in the memory load condition. Our results support the elaboration hypothesis. We also discuss the validity of the elaboration hypothesis and future directions to be pursued in this research field.     

Creativity from Constraints: What can we learn from Motherwell? from Modrian? from Klee?

This article presents a problem‐solving model of variability and creativity built on the classic Reitman and Simon analyses of musical composition and architectural design. The model focuses on paired constraints: one precluding (or limiting search among) reliable, existing solutions, the other promoting (or directing search to) novel, often opposite, ones. The primary constraint pair precludes an existing goal criterion and promotes a novel one. Other constraints — source (elements for recombination), task (how materials are used) and subject (motif, theme) — are then strategically selected to realize the goal. A brief discussion of Abstract Expressionism introduces the model, which is then applied to the painting careers of Piet Modrian and Paul Klee.     

Can subjects maintain a constant criterion in a memory task?

In two recognition memory experiments, subjects rated how certain they were that a given test item had been shown previously. Subjects either received standard instructions about their rating criteria or were explicitly instructed to maintain criteria defined in the manner of Healy and Jones (1973) or along the lines of signal detection theory. When a priori probability varied, subjects in all instruction groups held constant the criteria defined by signal detection theory at the expense of shifting the criteria proposed by Healy and Jones. The results were taken as evidence for the psychological validity of recognition memory analyses based on signal detection theory.     

Can we modify maladaptive attributions for fatigue?

Research has shown that those with insomnia focus primarily on their sleep as a cause of daytime fatigue rather than the multitude of other possible causes of fatigue. This can create sleep-related anxiety and further perpetuate the sleep disturbance. In order to lessen the increased focus on sleep, the present study investigated whether people could learn to consider other attributions for fatigue via an information-based manipulation. Undergraduate students (N = 88) were randomized to two information groups: They either received information about common factors that could explain daytime fatigue (the fatigue information condition) or received generic sleep-related information (the control condition). Each group was tested pre- and post-intervention. Fatigue information participants were significantly more likely to consider non-sleep-related attributions for fatigue at post-intervention, relative to control participants. These results demonstrate that attributions for fatigue may be amenable to change via an information-based intervention; thus, this research explores a preliminary step toward investigating refinements to insomnia treatments.     

Can time-based decay explain temporal distinctiveness effects in task switching?

In task switching, extending the response–cue interval (RCI) reduces the switch cost—the detriment to performance when switching compared to repeating tasks. This reduction has been used as evidence for the existence of task-set decay processes. Recently, this has been challenged by the observation of sequential dependencies on the RCI effect: switch cost is only reduced at longer RCIs when the previous trial had a short RCI. This trial-wise variation of RCI is thought to affect the temporal distinctiveness (TD) of a previous task's episodic trace, affecting the probability of its automatic retrieval on the current trial; importantly, TD is thought to be independent of the current trial's RCI. The present study highlights a dependency between the current RCI and TD, and demonstrates that a decay model can reproduce some patterns of data attributed to TD. Further, the decay account makes a strong prediction when TD is held constant: repetition response times should slow as the RCI increases, and switch response times should be facilitated. This prediction was tested via re-analysis of extant data and three experiments. The re-analysis provided some evidence for the decay account, but Experiments 1 and 2 report slowing for task repetition and switch trials, which cannot be explained by a task-set decay process. Experiment 3, which utilized tasks requiring perceptual judgements, showed small evidence for decay. We conclude that the data are largely consistent with the TD account and that the evidence for decay of higher-level task-sets is not convincing.     

Kvashchev's experiment: Can we boost intelligence?

In an effort to improve performance of high school students on intelligence tests, a large-scale study involving 296 students was carried out. Members of the experimental group (N = 149) were given exercises in creative problem solving 3 to 4 times a week over a period of 3 years and performance was assessed on four occasions—at the beginning of the experiment, at the end of it, and twice during the fourth year of High School. The test battery contained 28 measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence. The results indicate that it is possible to achieve small improvement in performance and that this improvement remains 1 year after the end of training. The improvement is more pronounced with measures of fluid intelligence than with measures of crystallized intelligence.     

Can task modifications influence children's performance on false belief tasks?

Theory of mind (ToM) is commonly measured in young children by the false belief task. Many researchers claim that 3-year-olds' failure on false belief tasks is due to task constraints. Experiment 1 empirically tested the claim made by Wellman, Cross, and Watson (2001 Wellman, H. M., Cross, D. and Watson, J. 2001. Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72: 655–684. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), that even when variables that enhance performance on the false belief task (deception; participation in transformation; salience; and item not real and present) are included in one task, 3-year-olds will still fail to perform above chance level. On the standard task 4-year-olds did perform significantly better than 3-year-olds, although there was no significant difference on the adapted task. Compared to the standard task, 3-year-olds performed better on the adapted task, although this improvement was not significant and performance was still not above chance level. Experiment 2 examined the influence of two additional variables; presence of protagonist at the time when the false belief question is asked, and the order in which test questions are asked (memory preceding false belief or vice versa). Results found no significant effects of either presence of the protagonist or question order on the performance of participants. Results are discussed with reference to reasons behind the failure of some children on false belief tasks.