No anticipation–no action: the role of anticipation in action and perception

This paper reviews psychophysical evidence for the existence and the nature of two types of anticipation in goal-oriented action. The first one relates to attained changes of the perceptual world, thus to action goals. These anticipations determine appropriate motor output. We argue that goal codes do not only serve as a reference unit, against which currently produced behavioral effects are compared. Rather voluntary actions appear to be planned literally in terms of intended behavioral effects. The second type of anticipation relates to the environmental conditions that have to be met to bring an intended effect into being. These anticipations serve to trigger selected actions, when appropriate execution conditions are encountered. Altogether, the behavioral evidence portrays a remarkable automaticity of goal-oriented action. Once a goal exists (wherever it might come from), corresponding efferent output is generated and executed under appropriate conditions.     

What limits tool use in nonhuman primates? Insights from tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) aligning three-dimensional objects to a surface

Perceptuomotor functions that support using hand tools can be examined in other manipulation tasks, such as alignment of objects to surfaces. We examined tufted capuchin monkeys’ and chimpanzees’ performance at aligning objects to surfaces while managing one or two spatial relations to do so. We presented six subjects of each species with a single stick to place into a groove, two sticks of equal length to place into two grooves, or two sticks joined as a T to place into a T-shaped groove. Tufted capuchins and chimpanzees performed equivalently on these tasks, aligning the straight stick to within 22.5° of parallel to the groove in approximately half of their attempts to place it, and taking more attempts to place the T stick than two straight sticks. The findings provide strong evidence that tufted capuchins and chimpanzees do not reliably align even one prominent axial feature of an object to a surface, and that managing two concurrent allocentric spatial relations in an alignment problem is significantly more challenging to them than managing two sequential relations. In contrast, humans from 2 years of age display very different perceptuomotor abilities in a similar task: they align sticks to a groove reliably on each attempt, and they readily manage two allocentric spatial relations concurrently. Limitations in aligning objects and in managing two or more relations at a time significantly constrain how nonhuman primates can use hand tools.     

Visuospatial cueing by self-caused features: Orienting of attention and action–outcome associative learning

The effect of a salient visual feature in orienting spatial attention was examined as a function of the learned association between the visual feature and the observer’s action. During an initial acquisition phase, participants learned that two keypress actions consistently produced red and green visual cues. Next, in a test phase, participants’ actions continued to result in singletons, but their color could be either congruent or incongruent with the learned action–color associations. Furthermore, the color singletons now functioned as valid or invalid spatial cues in a visual search, in which participants looked for a tilted line (“/” or “\”) among distractors (“X”s). The results showed that an action-congruent color was more effective as a valid cue in the search task (increased benefit), but less effective as an invalid cue (reduced cost). We discuss our findings in terms of both an inhibition account and a preactivation account of action-driven sensory bias, and argue in favor of the preactivation account.     

On the timescale of stimulus-based action–effect learning

When performing an action, people pick up associations between their actions and the resulting consequences of that action, a phenomenon that has been termed response (R)–effect (E) learning. In the present study, we investigated incidental R–E learning in a forced-choice—that is, a stimulus (S)-based—acquisition mode. Specifically, the study examined at which timescale R–E learning evolves—that is, how many encounters are actually needed to form stable R–E associations. The learning of R–E associations was assessed in a subsequent test phase via effect-based response priming. Experiment 1 tested 4 different numbers of S–R–E repetitions for a 2–2–2 S–R–E mapping. Experiment 2 disentangled the contributions of S–E and R–E associations to the facilitating impact of effect-based response priming by means of a 4–2–4 S–R–E mapping. Experiment 3 investigated whether R–E associations can be picked up even when a given E cannot be unequivocally predicted based on the antecedent S in case of inconsistent S–R–E couplings. Together, the results of the present study clearly show that R–E learning occurs in a stimulus-based action mode and that it evolves very rapidly after only 12 S–R–E repetitions. Moreover, the present findings suggest that at least in this initial phase of learning, complete S–R–E consistency seems to be relevant for R–E learning.     

Stimulus–classification and stimulus–action associations: Effects of repetition learning and durability

It has been shown that acquired stimulus–response bindings result from at least two types of associations from the stimulus to the task (stimulus–task or stimulus–classification; S–C) and from the stimulus to the motor response (stimulus–response or stimulus–action; S–A). These types of associations have been shown to independently affect behaviour. This finding suggests that they are processed in different pathways or different parts of a pathway at the neural level. Here we test a hypothesis that such associations may be differentially affected by repetition learning and that such effects may be detected by measuring their durability against overwriting. We show that both S–C and S–A associations are in fact strengthened when learning is boosted by increasing repetitions of the primes. However, the results further suggest that associations between stimuli and actions have less durable effects on behaviour and that the durability of S–C and S–A associations is independent of repetition learning. This is an important finding for the understanding of the underlying mechanisms of associative learning and particularly raises the question of which processes may affect flexibility of learning.     

What is the role of the cerebellum in motor learning and cognition?

The exact role of the cerebellum in motor learning and cognition is controversial. Nonetheless, recent ideas and facts have prompted an attempt at building and testing a more unified and coherent conceptualization. This article will suggest that the cerebellum might indeed participate in both motor control and cognition, and in motor adaptation, motor learning, and procedural learning. The proposed process would entail stimulus-response linkage through trial and error learning, and would consist of groupings of single-response elements-motor and cognitive-into large combinations. After practice, the occurrence of a sensory or experiential `context' would automatically trigger the combined response. The parallel fiber is the proposed agent of stimulus-response linkage and of combining the response elements. The attempt here is to focus on the role of the parallel fiber as a possible combiner of downstream motor and cognitive elements.     

Predicting parental sunscreen use: Disentangling the role of action planning in the intention–behavior relationship

Structural equation modeling was used to examine antecedents of parental sunscreen use (N = 436) in a longitudinal design. The influence of a volitional planning cognition was assessed in several path models, investigating potential mediation and moderation of the intention–behavior relationship. Premotivational and motivational variables accounted for 55.1% of the variance in intention to use sunscreen. Intention emerged as the most powerful predictor of behavior, followed by action planning and self-efficacy expectations, together explaining 35.4% of parental sunscreen use after five months. Strong support was found for both mediating and moderating influences of action planning on the intention–behavior relationship. Action planning also partially mediated the impact of self-efficacy on behavior. The results support theoretical considerations to add postintentional cognitions to current health behavior models. Although action planning is an important component in the transition from intention to behavior, the impact of intention and of other premotivational and motivational variables should not be overlooked when developing health educational interventions.     

About the role of bottom-up and top-down processes on perception–action interaction in sensorimotor transformations

Theories of common-coding propose that feature codes of perceived and to-be-produced events are likely to interact with each other when they overlap. We investigated the impact of bottom-up and top-down processes on cross talk in a motor replication task. Participants moved a pen on a covered digitizer tablet while a gain varied the relation between hand and cursor amplitude. Then, participants replicated the hand amplitude (intra-modal) or the cursor amplitude (intermodal) without visual feedback. We replicated that, when the not-to-be-replicated amplitude was longer (shorter) than the to-be-replicated amplitude, replications significantly overshot (undershot) (= after-effects). Importantly, after-effects were remarkably smaller in the experimental groups which wore gloves (thin and thick rubber) or goggles (clear and tinted lenses) than in a control group. Our results provide evidence that top-down attention modulated perception–action interaction.     

Global/local processing of hierarchical visual stimuli in a conflict–choice task by capuchin monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Sapajus</Emphasis> spp.)

In the last two decades, comparative research has addressed the issue of how the global and local levels of structure of visual stimuli are processed by different species, using Navon-type hierarchical figures, i.e. smaller local elements that form larger global configurations. Determining whether or not the variety of procedures adopted to test different species with hierarchical figures are equivalent is of crucial importance to ensure comparability of results. Among non-human species, global/local processing has been extensively studied in tufted capuchin monkeys using matching-to-sample tasks with hierarchical patterns. Local dominance has emerged consistently in these New World primates. In the present study, we assessed capuchins’ processing of hierarchical stimuli with a method frequently adopted in studies of global/local processing in non-primate species: the conflict–choice task. Different from the matching-to-sample procedure, this task involved processing local and global information retained in long-term memory. Capuchins were trained to discriminate between consistent hierarchical stimuli (similar global and local shape) and then tested with inconsistent hierarchical stimuli (different global and local shapes). We found that capuchins preferred the hierarchical stimuli featuring the correct local elements rather than those with the correct global configuration. This finding confirms that capuchins’ local dominance, typically observed using matching-to-sample procedures, is also expressed as a local preference in the conflict–choice task. Our study adds to the growing body of comparative studies on visual grouping functions by demonstrating that the methods most frequently used in the literature on global/local processing produce analogous results irrespective of extent of the involvement of memory processes.     

Movements or targets: What makes an action in action–effect learning?

According to ideomotor theory, actions become linked to the sensory feedback they contingently produce, so that anticipating the feedback automatically evokes the action it typically results from. Numerous recent studies have provided evidence in favour of such action–effect learning but left an important issue unresolved. It remains unspecified to what extent action–effect learning is based on associating effect-representations to representations of the performed movements or to representations of the targets at which the behaviour aimed at. Two experiments were designed to clarify this issue. In an acquisition phase, participants learned the contingency between key presses and effect tones. In a following test phase, key–effect and movement–effect relations were orthogonally assessed by changing the hand–key mapping for one half of the participants. Experiment 1 showed precedence for target–effect over movement–effect learning in a forced-choice RT task. In Experiment 2, target–effect learning was also shown to influence the outcome of response selection in a free-choice task. Altogether, the data indicate that both movement–effect and target–effect associations contribute to the formation of action–effect linkages—provided that movements and targets are likewise contingently related to the effects.     

How sequence learning creates explicit knowledge: the role of response–stimulus interval

Destrebecqz and Cleeremans (Psychon bull rev 8:343-350, 2001; Attention and implicit learning. John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam, pp 181-213, 2003) reported that increasing the response-stimulus interval (RSI) during incidental sequence learning improved participants' ability to discriminate old and new sequences in a recognition test. However, the original experimental design confounded RSI effects during training and test. I therefore repeated the experiment with an improved design in which RSI was varied systematically during the training phase and the recognition task. Participants learned a sequence of response locations either incidentally or intentionally. As a result, sequence recognition was not affected by the RSI manipulations in the group of incidental learners. With intentional learning instructions, recognition was unaffected by training RSI, but a long RSI in the test phase improved recognition performance over a short RSI. Response latencies while executing the test sequences indicated no effect of training RSI on sequence learning. However, sequence knowledge was expressed more readily when the RSI in the test phase matched the RSI in the training phase.     

How monkeys see the eyes: cotton-top tamarins’ reaction to changes in visual attention and action

Among social species, the capacity to detect where another individual is looking is adaptive because gaze direction often predicts what an individual is attending to, and thus what its future actions are likely to be. We used an expectancy violation procedure to determine whether cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus oedipus) use the direction of another individual’s gaze to predict future actions. Subjects were familiarized with a sequence in which a human actor turned her attention toward one of two objects sitting on a table and then reached for that object. Following familiarization, subjects saw two test events. In one test event, the actor gazed at the new object and then reached for that object. From a human perspective, this event is considered consistent with the causal relationship between visual attention and subsequent action, that is, grabbing the object attended to. In the second test event, the actor gazed at the old object, but reached for the new object. This event is considered a violation of expectation. When the actor oriented with both her head-and-eyes, subjects looked significantly longer at the second test event in which the actor reached for the object to which she had not previously oriented. However, there was no difference in looking time between test events when the actor used only her eyes to orient. These findings suggest that tamarins are able to use some combination of head orientation and gaze direction, but not gaze direction alone, to predict the actions of a human agent. Received: 17 February 1999 / Accepted after revision: 9 May 1999     

Nonverbal working memory of humans and monkeys: Rehearsal in the sketchpad?

Investigations of working memory tend to focus on the retention of verbal information. The present experiments were designed to characterize the active maintenance rehearsal process used in the retention of visuospatial information. Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta;N=6) were tested as well as humans (totalN=90) because these nonhuman primates have excellent visual working memory but, unlike humans, cannot verbally recode the stimuli to employ verbal rehearsal mechanisms. A series of experiments was conducted using a distractor-task paradigm, a directed forgetting procedure, and a dual-task paradigm. No evidence was found for an active maintenance process for either species. Rather, it appears that information is maintained in the visuospatial sketchpad without active rehearsal.     

Does own experience affect perception of others’ actions in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)?

Anticipating another’s actions is an important ability in social animals. Recent research suggests that in human adults and infants one’s own action experience facilitates understanding and anticipation of others’ actions. We investigated the link between first-person experience and perception of another’s action in adult tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella spp., formerly Cebus apella spp.). In Experiment 1, the monkeys observed a familiar human (actor) trying to open a container using either a familiar or an unfamiliar action. They looked for longer when the actor tried to open the container using a familiar action. In Experiment 2, the actor performed two novel actions on a new container. The monkeys looked equally at the two actions. In Experiment 3, the monkeys were trained to open the container using one of the novel actions in Experiment 2. After training, we repeated the same procedure as in Experiment 2. The monkeys looked for longer when the actor manipulated the container using the action they had practiced than when she used the unfamiliar action. These results show that knowledge derived from one’s own experience impacts perception of another’s action in these New World monkeys.     

Reciprocity of trust in the supervisor–subordinate relationship: The mediating role of autonomy and the sense of power

This article develops and tests a model of reciprocal trust between supervisor and subordinate. Drawing from literature on trust and control and on the approach/inhibition theory of power, the authors present a model in which supervisor trust is suggested to enhance subordinate reciprocal trust through increased work-related autonomy and a heightened sense of power. The mediator analysis using the two-level full structural model confirmed that the relationship between supervisor trust and subordinate trust was partially mediated by the suggested chain of variables. The article responds to a call for empirical studies on reciprocal trust and offers a complementary mechanism for trust building beside characteristics and relationship-based approaches.     

Hindsight bias and outcome bias in judging directors’ liability and the role of free will beliefs

Following a corporate disaster such as bankruptcy, people in general and damaged parties, in particular, want to know what happened and whether the company's directors are to blame. The accurate assessment of directors’ liability can be jeopardized by having to judge in hindsight with full knowledge of the adverse outcome. The present study investigates whether professional legal investigators such as judges and lawyers are affected by hindsight bias and outcome bias when evaluating directors’ conduct in a bankruptcy case. Additionally, to advance our understanding of the mechanisms underlying these biases, we also examine whether free will beliefs can predict susceptibility to hindsight bias and outcome bias in this context. In two studies (total N = 1,729), we demonstrate that legal professionals tend to judge a director's actions more negatively and perceive bankruptcy as more foreseeable in hindsight than in foresight and that these effects are significantly stronger for those who endorse the notion that humans have free will. This contribution is particularly timely considering the many companies that are currently going bankrupt or are facing bankruptcy amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.     

Compress global,dilate local: Intentional binding in action–outcome alternations

Intentional binding refers to subjective temporal attraction between an action and its outcome. However, the nature of intentional binding in multiple actions remains unclear. We examined intentional binding in alternated action–outcome dyads. Participants actively or passively pressed a key, followed by a tone, and they again pressed the key; resulting in four keypress–tone dyads in a trial. Participants reproduced the duration of alternated keypress–tone dyads or the temporal interval between a dyad embedded in the alternations. The reproduced duration was shorter in the active than in the passive condition, suggesting the intentional binding in action–outcome alternations. In contrast, the reproduced interval between a dyad was longer in the active condition and did not correlate with the reproduced duration. These results suggest that subjective time during actions relies not only on an internal clock but also on postdictive biases that are switched based on what we recall.     

The role of learning in risk-avoidance strategies during spider–ant interactions

Cognitive abilities used by arthropods, particularly predators, when interacting in a natural context have been poorly studied. Two neotropical sympatric predators, the golden silk spider Nephila clavipes and the ectatommine ant Ectatomma tuberculatum, were observed in field conditions where their interactions occurred regularly due to the exploitation of the same patches of vegetation. Repeated presentations of E. tuberculatum workers ensnared in their web triggered a progressive decrease in the capture response of N. clavipes. All the spiders that stopped trying to catch the ant on the second and/or third trial were individuals that had been bitten during a previous trial. Behavioural tests in natural field conditions showed that after a single confrontation with ant biting, spiders were able to discriminate this kind of prey more quickly from a defenceless prey (fruit flies) and to selectively and completely suppress their catching response. This one-trial aversive learning was still effective after 24 h. Likewise, E. tuberculatum workers entangled once on a N. clavipes web and having succeeded in escaping, learned to escape more quickly, breaking through the web by preferentially cutting spiral threads (sticky traps) rather than radial threads (stronger structural unsticky components) or pursuing the cutting of radials but doing it more quickly. Both strategies, based on a one-trial learning capability, obviously minimize the number of physical encounters between the two powerful opponents and may enhance their fitness by diminishing the risk of potential injuries resulting from predatory interactions.     

Redundant food searches by capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella): a failure of metacognition?

This study investigated capuchin monkeys' understanding of their own visual search behavior as a means to gather information. Five monkeys were presented with three tubes that could be visually searched to determine the location of a bait. The bait's visibility was experimentally manipulated, and the monkeys' spontaneous visual searches before tube selection were analyzed. In Experiment 1, three monkeys selected the baited tube significantly above chance; however, the monkeys also searched transparent tubes. In Experiment 2, a bent tube in which food was never visible was introduced. When the bent tube was baited, the monkeys failed to deduce the bait location and responded randomly. They also continued to look into the bent tube despite not gaining any pertinent information from it. The capuchin monkeys' behavior contrasts with the efficient employment of visual search behavior reported in humans, apes and macaques. This difference is consistent with species-related variations in metacognitive abilities, although other explanations are also possible.