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黄大仙信仰的文化内涵 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
神仙信仰是道教的基本信仰,道教为人们描绘的神仙世界和流传的神仙故事,在中国民间世代相传、家喻户晓。黄大仙是道教史上著名人物,东晋道士,是道教中的得道真人之一,对信仰者的精神文化生活产生了深远的影响。一、黄大仙信仰的历史起源1、黄大仙的民间传说和文字记载历史上,浙 相似文献
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由契丹人建立的辽朝一向以崇佛著称,道教的记载和文化遗迹比较少.许多研究者认为道教对辽朝没有什么影响,学界也多用文献材料或近年出土的墓葬考古资料讨论契丹上层对道教的政策,道教、道士与贵族官僚的关系等.①《辽史》所载"李弘以左道聚众为乱,支解,分示五京"②,曲折地反映出道教在民间的影响.河北省易县龙兴观后殿阶右存有辽道宗寿昌六年(1100)所建香幢,八面刻,正书,③对研究乡村民众的道教信仰显得弥足珍贵,而以往讨论辽代道教,几乎无人注意此条材料. 相似文献
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天保六年,北齐文宣帝高洋颁布《废李老道法诏》,令道士剃发出家为僧。此事虽有佛教徒自神其教的成份,但佛道论争与废除道教一事却非伪造。文宣帝本欲沙汰佛道二教,然最终废除道教者,其原因有三:迷信佛教,缺乏政治家气度;指导思想不清,政教冲突为宗教斗争代替;北齐胡风兴盛,且文宣帝饮酒过度患有精神疾病。文宣帝废除道教后,仍然与道士有交往。及至北齐废帝时期,道教势力再次壮大。藏内文献与《资治通鉴》记载文宣帝禁绝道教的影响,有夸大失实之处。 相似文献
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There is an old but powerful argument for the claim that exhaustive divine foreknowledge is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. A crucial ingredient in this argument is the principle of the “Fixity of the Past” (FP). A seemingly new response to this argument has emerged, the so-called “dependence response,” which involves, among other things, abandoning FP for an alternative principle, the principle of the “Fixity of the Independent” (FI). This paper presents three arguments for the claim that FI ought to be preferred to FP.
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Two types of matching designs, static and dynamic, are differentiated. While all matching designs are logically the same in terms of the probability model which determines chance level of performance, an attempt is made to demonstrate that there is an interaction between the tactics, strategies, and actual knowledge ofS and the type of design used which will, in turn, lead to different results even whenS's knowledge is held constant. It is suggested that analogous situations may exist within the framework of the traditional psychometric model.The work reported in this paper was supported by a National Science Foundation Undergraduate Research Participation Grant (NSF-G15797) to the senior author. The authors are indebted to Joel E. Greene for his advice and criticism. 相似文献
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《Canadian journal of philosophy》2012,42(3):303-321
If practical reasoning deserves its name, its form must be different from that of ordinary (theoretical) reasoning. A few have thought that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, rather than a mental state. I argue here that if the conclusion is an action, then so too is one of the premises. You might reason your way from doing one thing to doing another: from browsing journal abstracts to reading a particular journal article. I motivate this by sympathetically re-examining Hume's claim that a conclusion about what ought to be done follows only from an argument one of whose premises is likewise about what ought to be done. 相似文献
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