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1.
The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications
of the sort ’some P is/was/will be (a) Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions
on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions,
according to: (a) whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, (b) whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will
be’ are the ‘is’, ‘was’, ‘will be’ of identity or of constitution, and (c) whether ‘Q’ is being used as a subject or predicate
term. We conclude that this latitude is beneficial, as it conforms with linguistic reality (i.e., the multiple uses actually
in place) and also enables one to turn what is ordinarily perceived as a problem for universalist perdurantism viz., a commitment
to all sorts of weird and gerrymandered temporally extended entities, into an advantage, for the richness in questions allows
us to make sense of the many different readings of sentences of the same grammatical form. 相似文献
2.
Sortal predicates have been associated with a counting process, which acts as a criterion of identity for the individuals
they correctly apply to. We discuss in what sense certain types of predicates suggested by quantum physics deserve the title
of ‘sortal’ as well, although they do not characterize either a process of counting or a criterion of identity for the entities
that fall under them. We call such predicates ‘quantum-sortal predicates’ and, instead of a process of counting, to them is
associated a ‘criterion of cardinality’. After their general characterization, it is discussed how these predicates can be
formally described.
To Patrick Suppes on his 80th birthday. 相似文献
3.
Claudia Welz 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(2):267-285
This paper develops the thesis that personal identity is neither to be taken in terms of an unchanging self-sufficient ‘substance’
nor in terms of selfhood ‘without substance,’ i.e. as fluctuating processes of pure relationality and subject-less activity.
Instead, identity is taken as self-transformation that is bound to particular embodied individuals and surpasses them as individuated entities. The paper is structured in three parts. Part I describes the experiential givenness
of conflicts that support our sense of self-transformation. While the first part develops an inter-subjective topography of
emotional movements, the second part pays attention to their temporal dimension. We work with conflicts and get transformed
by them also in the way we remember them. Part II focuses on the process of self-understanding that accompanies conflicts
and their metamorphosis in memory. Part III compares and discusses different models of a ‘relational ontology’ of the person,
which question the idea that we are defined only by how we define ourselves—just as they question the idea that one’s identity
is independent of how one relates to one’s having changed. 相似文献
4.
Elisa Paganini 《Erkenntnis》2011,74(3):351-362
The supporter of vague objects has been long challenged by the following ‘Argument from Identity’: 1) if there are vague objects,
then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3) there are no
vague objects. Some supporters of vague objects have argued that 1) is false. Noonan (Analysis 68: 174–176, 2008) grants that 1) does not hold in general, but claims that ontically indeterminate identity is indeed implied by the assumption
that there are vague objects of a certain special kind (i.e. vague objects*). One can therefore formulate a ‘New Argument
from Identity’: 1′) if there are vague objects*, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically
indeterminate identity; therefore, 3′) there are no vague objects*. Noonan’s strategy is to argue that premiss 1′) is inescapable,
and, as a consequence, that Evans’s alleged defence of 2) is a real challenge for any supporter of vague objects. I object
that a supporter of vague objects who grants the validity of Evans’s argument allegedly in favour of 2) should reject premiss
1′). The threat of the New Argument from Identity is thus avoided. 相似文献
5.
6.
Adam Toon 《Synthese》2010,172(2):301-315
7.
Eric Hiddleston 《Synthese》2011,181(2):209-226
This paper concerns reductionist views about psychology and the special sciences more generally. I identify a metaphysical
assumption in reductionist views which I dub the ‘Micro–Macro Mirroring Thesis’. The Mirroring Thesis says that the relation
between the entities of any legitimate higher-level science and their lower-level realizers is similar to that between the
entities of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. I argue that reductionism implies the Thesis, and that the Thesis is
not a priori. It is more difficult to tell whether the Thesis is true, and I indicate some relevant considerations. 相似文献
8.
In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I
treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the
fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of
this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function
as reasons for action presupposes the possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that
such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’
presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally
flawed.
For their constructive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the
following: Clare Chambers, Roger Crisp, Cécile Fabre, Paul Kelly, David Lloyd-Thomas. Thanks also go to Res Publica’s two anonymous referees. 相似文献
9.
Bryan Pickel 《Philosophical Studies》2010,147(2):193-211
I defend the view that ordinary objects like statues are identical to the pieces of matter from which they are made. I argue
that ordinary speakers assert sentences such as ‘this statue is a molded piece of clay’. This suggests that speakers believe
propositions which entail that ordinary objects such as statues are the pieces matter from which they are made, and therefore
pluralism contradicts ordinary beliefs. The dominant response to this argument purports to find an ambiguity in the word ‘is’,
such that ‘is’ in these sentences means the same as ‘constitutes or is constituted by’. I will use standard tests for ambiguity
to argue that this strategy fails. I then explore and reject other responses to the argument. 相似文献
10.
‘Is’–‘Ought’ Derivations and Ethical Taxonomies 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1
Scott Hill 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):545-566
Hume seems to claim that there does not exist a valid argument that has all non-ethical sentences as premises and an ethical
sentence as its conclusion. Starting with Prior, a number of counterexamples to this claim have been proposed. Unfortunately,
all of these proposals are controversial. Even the most plausible have a premise that seems like it might be an ethical sentence
or a conclusion that seems like it might be non-ethical. Since it is difficult to tell whether any of these counterexamples
are genuine, we need a taxonomy that sorts out ethical sentences from non-ethical ones. We need to know the difference between
an ‘Is’ and an ‘Ought’. In the first part of the paper, I establish the need for a taxonomy. I consider some of the most influential
‘Is’–‘Ought’ derivations. These include proposals by Prior and Searle. I argue that each proposal has a premise whose status
as ethical or non-ethical is difficult to determine. In the second part of the paper, I consider taxonomies proposed by Karmo
and Maitzen. I argue against both taxonomies. I end with the claim that we need a taxonomy of ethical sentences and that none
of the current proposals are adequate.
相似文献
Scott HillEmail: |
11.
Mark Moyer 《Synthese》2006,148(2):401-423
Puzzles about persistence and change through time, i.e., about identity across time, have foundered on confusion about what it is for ‘two things’ to be have ‘the same thing’ at a time. This is most directly seen in the dispute over whether material objects can occupy exactly the same place at the
same time. This paper defends the possibility of such coincidence against several arguments to the contrary. Distinguishing
a temporally relative from an absolute sense of ‘the same’, we see that the intuition, ‘this is only one thing’, and the dictum,
‘two things cannot occupy the same place at the same time’, are individuating things at a time rather than absolutely and are therefore compatible with coincidence. Several other objections philosophers have raised ride
on this same ambiguity. Burke, originating what has become the most popular objection to coincidence, argues that if coincidence
is possible there would be no explanation of how objects that are qualitatively the same at a time could belong to different
sorts. But we can explain an object’s sort by appealing to its properties at other times. Burke’s argument to the contrary
equivocates on different notions of ‘cross-time identity’ and ‘the statue’. From a largely negative series of arguments emerges
a positive picture of what it means to say multiple things coincide and of why an object’s historical properties explain its
sort rather than vice versa – in short, of how coincidence is possible. 相似文献
12.
13.
This paper deals with two issues in the field of reasoning by analogy in the law. The one issue is whether there exists such
a thing as analogous rule application, or whether there is only the ‘normal’ application of a broadened rule. It is argued
that if rules, as the entities made by a legislator, are distinguished from generalised solutions for cases, the idea of analogous
application of rules makes sense. It is also shown how the so-called ‘reason-based model of rule application’, in contrast
to the traditional modus ponens or subsumption model, makes it easy to give a logical account of analogous rule application.
The other issue is how to argue logically about whether two cases are sufficiently similar to adopt the outcome of the one
case for the other case. Section 3 provides a general logical model to establish this. The model is based on the comparison
of the reasons for and against a particular solution in the two cases. 相似文献
14.
15.
Alan Haworth 《Res Publica》2007,13(1):77-100
Philosophers have tended to dismiss John Stuart Mill’s claim that ‘all silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility’.
I argue that Mill’s ‘infallibility claim’ is indeed open to many objections, but that, contrary to the consensus, those objections
fail to defeat the anti-authoritarian thesis which lies at its core. I then argue that Mill’s consequentialist case for the
liberty of thought and discussion is likewise capable of withstanding some familiar objections. My purpose is to suggest that
Mill’s anti-authoritarianism and his faith in thought and discussion, when taken seriously, supply the basis for a ‘public
interest’ account of ‘freedom of expression as the liberty of thought and discussion’ which is faithful to Mill in spirit,
if not to the precise letter. I outline such an account, which – as I say in conclusion – can serve as a valuable safeguard
against ad hoc, reactive legislation, and the demands of a spurious communitarianism. 相似文献
16.
Gert Biesta 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(2):141-153
Much work in the field of education for democratic citizenship is based on the idea that it is possible to know what a good
citizen is, so that the task of citizenship education becomes that of the production of the good citizen. In this paper I
ask whether and to what extent we can and should understand democratic citizenship as a positive identity. I approach this
question by means of an exploration of four dimensions of democratic politics—the political community, the borders of the
political order, the dynamics of democratic processes and practices, and the status of the democratic subject—in order to
explore whether and to what extent the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can and should be understood as a particular order.
For this I engage with ideas from Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Rancière who both have raised fundamental questions about the
extent to which the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can be captured as a particular order. In the paper I introduce the figure
of the ignorant citizen in order to hint at a conception of citizenship that is not based on particular knowledge about what
the good citizen is. I introduce a distinction between a socialisation conception of citizenship education and civic learning
and a subjectification conception of citizenship education and civic learning in order to articulate what the educational
implications of such an ‘anarchic’ understanding of democratic politics are. While the socialisation conception focuses on
the question how ‘newcomers’ can be inserted into an existing political order, the subjectification conception focuses on
the question how democratic subjectivity is engendered through engagement in always undetermined political processes. This
is no longer a process driven by knowledge about what the citizen is or should become but one that depends on a desire for
a particular mode of human togetherness or, in short, a desire for democracy. 相似文献
17.
Steven Gross 《Synthese》2007,156(1):97-117
Michael Tye responds to the problem of higher-order vagueness for his trivalent semantics by maintaining that truth-value
predicates are “vaguely vague”: it’s indeterminate, on his view, whether they have borderline cases and therefore indeterminate
whether every sentence is true, false, or indefinite. Rosanna Keefe objects (1) that Tye’s argument for this claim tacitly
assumes that every sentence is true, false, or indefinite, and (2) that the conclusion is any case not viable. I argue – contra (1) – that Tye’s argument needn’t make that assumption. A version of her objection is in fact better directed against other arguments Tye advances, though Tye can absorb this criticism without abandoning his position’s core. On the other hand, Keefe’s
second objection does hit the mark: embracing ‘vaguely vague’ truth-value predicates undermines Tye’s ability to support validity
claims needed to defend his position. To see this, however, we must develop Keefe’s remarks further than she does. 相似文献
18.
Jonathan Sutton 《Studies in East European Thought》2006,58(2):107-135
This is an examination of two essays on minimal religion by Mikhail Epstein (1982 and 1999), assessing the usefulness of the
term ‘minimal religion’ for the analysis of religion in contemporary Russia.
An adapted version of a paper delivered at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), University of London,
on 8 December, 2003. Note regarding Mikhail Epstein’s use of the words ‘religion’, ‘religiosity’ and ‘spirituality’: Epstein
uses the word ‘religion’ to signify ‘mainstream’, church-based manifestations of religion and also the institutional, hierarchical
structures related to those. Although in English usage the word ‘religiosity’ has negative connotations – signifying either
a superficially felt religious sentiment or a somehow false and insincere expression of religious feeling, intended for outward
show – Epstein appears to use the term entirely neutrally. For him it simply serves as a synonym for the word ‘spirituality’.
In the two essays examined in the present article the word ‘spirituality’ signifies the whole inner spiritual life and aspirations
of the individual and her/his reflection on an ethical way of living, whether the person concerned is a committed, church-going
believer, or someone engaged in a personal spiritual or philosophical quest for meaning, or else someone who has experienced
what Epstein refers to as ‘the wilderness’ of the Soviet years and has learnt of a spiritual dimension to life through that
formative experience. 相似文献
19.
Jeffrey Grupp 《Sophia》2006,45(1):5-23
I discuss the relations between God and spatial entities, such as the universe. An example of a relation between God and a
spatial entity is the relation,causes. Such relations are, in D.M. Armstrong’s words, ‘realm crossing’ relations: relations between or among spatial entities and
entities in the realm of the spatially unlocated. I discuss an apparent problem with such realm crossing relations. If this
problem is serious enough, as I will argue it is, it implies that God cannot be the creator of the universe I also discuss
that if God cannot be the creator of the universe, then God does not exist. 相似文献
20.
Matthew Ratcliffe 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2006,5(1):31-52
This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology, whose ‘core’ involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges out of a context of interaction between them. Self and other form a coupled system rather than two wholly separate entities equipped with an internalised capacity to assign mental states to the other. This applies even in those instances where one might seem to adopt a ‘detached’ perspective towards others. Thus ‘folk psychology’, as commonly construed, is not folk psychology. 相似文献