Reflection and reasoning in moral judgment

While there is much evidence for the influence of automatic emotional responses on moral judgment, the roles of reflection and reasoning remain uncertain. In Experiment 1, we induced subjects to be more reflective by completing the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) prior to responding to moral dilemmas. This manipulation increased utilitarian responding, as individuals who reflected more on the CRT made more utilitarian judgments. A follow-up study suggested that trait reflectiveness is also associated with increased utilitarian judgment. In Experiment 2, subjects considered a scenario involving incest between consenting adult siblings, a scenario known for eliciting emotionally driven condemnation that resists reasoned persuasion. Here, we manipulated two factors related to moral reasoning: argument strength and deliberation time. These factors interacted in a manner consistent with moral reasoning: A strong argument defending the incestuous behavior was more persuasive than a weak argument, but only when increased deliberation time encouraged subjects to reflect.     

Effects of dilemma type,language, and emotion arousal on utilitarian vs deontological choice to moral dilemmas in Chinese–English bilinguals

The present study examines how dilemma type (personal or impersonal moral dilemma), language (native or foreign) and emotion arousal to a dilemma could affect Chinese–English bilinguals' deontological vs utilitarian moral choices regarding 39 moral dilemmas. How emotion arousal plays a mediating role in the effects of dilemma type and language on moral choices is also investigated. As shown in multilevel analyses, participants made fewer utilitarian choices for personal dilemmas than impersonal dilemmas. Although emotion arousal of dilemmas significantly mediated this effect of dilemma type, the indirect effect of dilemma type through arousal on moral choices was inconsistent with the direct effect of dilemma type on moral choices. For the effect of language, participants made more utilitarian choices in the Footbridge (personal) dilemma that was presented in foreign language than in native language. However, this effect was not mediated by arousal, suggesting that it could not be attributed to the emotion‐reducing effect of foreign language. Moreover, there was no language effect on moral choices in analyses that included all 39 dilemmas or only 22 personal dilemmas, indicating the need in future research for further identifying the potential mediators that trigger the foreign language effect on moral choices.     

Expanding the moral circle: Inclusion and exclusion mindsets and the circle of moral regard

The human tendency to draw boundaries is pervasive. The ‘moral circle’ is the boundary drawn around those entities in the world deemed worthy of moral consideration. Three studies demonstrate that the size of the moral circle is influenced by a decision framing effect: the inclusion-exclusion discrepancy. Participants who decided which entities to exclude from the circle (exclusion mindset) generated larger moral circles than those who decided which to include (inclusion mindset). Further, people in an exclusion mindset showed “spill-over” effects into subsequent moral judgments, rating various outgroups as more worthy of moral treatment. The size of the moral circle mediated the effects of mindset on subsequent moral judgment. These studies offer an important first demonstration that decision framing effects have substantial consequences for the moral circle and related moral judgments.     

Gender-related differences in moral judgments

The moral sense is among the most complex aspects of the human mind. Despite substantial evidence confirming gender-related neurobiological and behavioral differences, and psychological research suggesting gender specificities in moral development, whether these differences arise from cultural effects or are innate remains unclear. In this study, we investigated the role of gender, education (general education and health education) and religious belief (Catholic and non-Catholic) on moral choices by testing 50 men and 50 women with a moral judgment task. Whereas we found no differences between the two genders in utilitarian responses to non-moral dilemmas and to impersonal moral dilemmas, men gave significantly more utilitarian answers to personal moral (PM) dilemmas (i.e., those courses of action whose endorsement involves highly emotional decisions). Cultural factors such as education and religion had no effect on performance in the moral judgment task. These findings suggest that the cognitive–emotional processes involved in evaluating PM dilemmas differ in men and in women, possibly reflecting differences in the underlying neural mechanisms. Gender-related determinants of moral behavior may partly explain gender differences in real-life involving power management, economic decision-making, leadership and possibly also aggressive and criminal behaviors.     

Methodological concerns in moral judgement research: Severity of harm shapes moral decisions

Research on moral judgement traditionally deals with scenarios involving trade-offs between saving lives and causing harm or death. In the field of moral psychology and philosophy, these specific scenarios are regularly used jointly, regardless of the severity of harm. We predicted that the confounding between distinct phrasings involving different degrees of harm will have an impact on the frequency of utilitarian judgements regardless of the mere moral value of the action (as usually investigated in the moral judgement field). In line with this prediction, a first experiment showed that utilitarian responses were less frequent for conflicting moral scenarios that involved death, as compared to scenarios that involved non-lethal harm. A second experiment showed that participants' utilitarian responses decreased as the severity of harm increased. Experimental studies on moral reasoning should take greater care to avoid potential confounds associated with this content factor.     

Abstraction increases hypocrisy

Four studies show that an abstract view on moral issues increases moral hypocrisy. In Experiment 1, participants who were directly instructed to take a more abstract view on a moral issue judged the immoral behavior of others more severely than their own immoral behavior, but participants with a concrete view did not. Experiments 2 and 3 induced an abstract view in an indirect manner, by manipulating temporal distance toward the dilemma. In Experiment 4 abstractness was manipulated completely independent from the moral dilemma, by inducing an abstract or a concrete mindset. In all four studies, abstractness consistently increased hypocrisy. The last study also shows that the effect of abstractness on hypocrisy is mediated by the degree of moral flexibility. Together, these studies show that hypocrisy is directly determined by the focus that people have when making a moral judgment.     

Age differences in moral judgment: Older adults are more deontological than younger adults

In 2 studies, an older and a younger age group morally evaluated dilemmas contrasting a deontological judgment (do not harm others) against a utilitarian judgment (do what is best for the majority). Previous research suggests that deontological moral judgments are often underpinned by affective reactions and utilitarian moral judgments by deliberative thinking. Separately, research on the psychology of aging has shown that affect plays a more prominent role in the judgments and decision making of older (vs. younger) adults. Yet age remains a largely overlooked factor in moral judgment research. Here, we therefore investigated whether older adults would make more deontological judgments on the basis of experiencing different affective reactions to moral dilemmas as compared with younger adults. Results from 2 experiments indicated that older adults made significantly more deontological moral judgments. Mediation analyses revealed that the relationship between age and making more deontological moral judgments is partly explained by older adults exhibiting significantly more negative affective reactions and having more morally idealistic beliefs as compared with younger adults.     

产品类型对购物冲量效应的调节作用分析

基于享乐品-实用品有关研究及购物冲量效应, 考察产品类型对购物冲量效应的调节作用及其内在机制。实验一通过现场研究验证购买实用品提高后续购买概率, 购买享乐品降低其概率; 实验二为实验室实验, 再次验证该调节作用, 并验证内在原因：购买享乐品更可能激发内疚感、花钱的痛苦甚至负面自我形象和高层次目标, 导致理由性思维占主导, 前次购买引发的应用思维定式受到削弱。相比于实用品, 购买享乐品引发购物冲量效应的可能性更低。     

Disgust as embodied moral judgment

How, and for whom, does disgust influence moral judgment? In four experiments participants made moral judgments while experiencing extraneous feelings of disgust. Disgust was induced in Experiment 1 by exposure to a bad smell, in Experiment 2 by working in a disgusting room, in Experiment 3 by recalling a physically disgusting experience, and in Experiment 4 through a video induction. In each case, the results showed that disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments relative to controls. Experiment 4 found that disgust had a different effect on moral judgment than did sadness. In addition, Experiments 2-4 showed that the role of disgust in severity of moral judgments depends on participants' sensitivity to their own bodily sensations. Taken together, these data indicate the importance-and specificity-of gut feelings in moral judgments.     

When Intertemporal Rewards Are Hedonic,Larger Units of Wait Time Boost Patience

In intertemporal choices between smaller‐sooner (SS) and larger‐later (LL) rewards, five studies reveal that patience for the LL option is influenced by an interactive effect of the measurement units used to express wait time (large vs. small) and the type of the reward (hedonic vs. utilitarian). Specifically, larger time units boost patience, but more so when rewards are hedonic rather than utilitarian. In line with the numerosity heuristic, the effect of time units on patience is mediated by larger time units shrinking wait time perception. This effect arises because hedonic (vs. utilitarian) rewards promote a reliance on heuristics rather than systematic calculations. Therefore, a more calculative mindset diminishes the effect of units even for hedonic rewards and eliminates the hedonic‐utilitarian asymmetry. These results contribute to research on numerosity, intertemporal choice, and hedonic‐utilitarian differences, and offer a simple tool for practitioners to influence patience.     

Challenges for the sequential two-system model of moral judgement

Considerable evidence supports the sequential two-system (“default interventionist”) model of moral judgement, as proposed by Greene and others. We tested whether judgement speed and/or personal/impersonal moral dilemmas can predict the kind of moral judgements (utilitarian or deontological) subjects make for each dilemma, and whether personal dilemmas create difficulty in moral judgements. Our results showed that neither personal/impersonal conditions nor spontaneous/thoughtful-reflection conditions were reliable predictors of utilitarian or deontological moral judgements. Yet, we found support for an alternative view, in which, when the two types of responses are in conflict; the resolution of this conflict depends on both the subject and the dilemma. While thinking about this conflict, subjects sometimes change their minds in both directions, as suggested by the data from a mouse-tracking task.     

Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment

Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference effect provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, and utilitarian moral judgment more specifically.     

道德判断的外语效应：心理距离的中介与外语熟练度的调节作用

结合建构水平理论,基于多项式加工树构建算法,通过3个实验验证道德外语效应,并尝试探究道德外语效应的可能机制及其边界。实验1的结果表明中文为母语、英文为外语的个体的道德判断受语言的影响。与母语条件相比,外语条件下个体的道义论道德判断更少。实验2的结果进一步表明心理距离可以完全中介语言对道德判断的影响。实验3发现外语熟练度可以调节语言对心理距离的影响。研究结果再次验证了道德外语效应,并表明心理距离的中介作用和外语熟练度的调节作用,拓展了道德外语效应发生机制的可能解释。     

Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making

Three studies test eight hypotheses about (1) how judgment differs between people who ascribe greater vs. less moral relevance to choices, (2) how moral judgment is subject to task constraints that shift evaluative focus (to moral rules vs. to consequences), and (3) how differences in the propensity to rely on intuitive reactions affect judgment. In Study 1, judgments were affected by rated agreement with moral rules proscribing harm, whether the dilemma under consideration made moral rules versus consequences of choice salient, and by thinking styles (intuitive vs. deliberative). In Studies 2 and 3, participants evaluated policy decisions to knowingly do harm to a resource to mitigate greater harm or to merely allow the greater harm to happen. When evaluated in isolation, approval for decisions to harm was affected by endorsement of moral rules and by thinking style. When both choices were evaluated simultaneously, total harm -- but not the do/allow distinction -- influenced rated approval. These studies suggest that moral rules play an important, but context-sensitive role in moral cognition, and offer an account of when emotional reactions to perceived moral violations receive less weight than consideration of costs and benefits in moral judgment and decision making.     

Mortality salience and morality: thinking about death makes people less utilitarian

According to the dual-process model of moral judgment, utilitarian responses to moral conflict draw on limited cognitive resources. Terror Management Theory, in parallel, postulates that mortality salience mobilizes these resources to suppress thoughts of death out of focal attention. Consequently, we predicted that individuals under mortality salience would be less likely to give utilitarian responses to moral conflicts. Two experiments corroborated this hypothesis. Experiment 1 showed that utilitarian responses to non-lethal harm conflicts were less frequent when participants were reminded of their mortality. Experiment 2 showed that the detrimental effect of mortality salience on utilitarian conflict judgments was comparable to that of an extreme concurrent cognitive load. These findings raise the question of whether private judgment and public debate about controversial moral issues might be shaped by mortality salience effects, since these issues (e.g., assisted suicide) often involve matters of life and death.     

Priming virtue: Forgiveness and justice elicit divergent moral judgments among religious individuals

Forgiveness and justice are related virtues but they may exert divergent effects on moral judgments. Participants were primed with either forgiveness or retributive justice and made moral judgments of individuals. Experiment 1 demonstrated that religious participants recalling an experience of forgiveness reported more favorable attitudes toward moral transgressors than did those recalling an experience of retributive justice. Experiment 2 replicated the priming effect on moral judgments using a subtle prime of either forgiveness or justice (word search) and a different dependent measure. Experiment 3 employed a more religiously diverse sample and revealed the moderating role of religious commitment. These results suggest that salience of forgiveness leads to more favorable evaluations of moral transgressors compared to retributive justice for religious individuals.     

Patterns and evolution of moral behaviour: moral dynamics in everyday life

Recent research on moral dynamics (the processes and phenomena – collective or individual – by which moral behaviour and moral attitudes emerge, evolve, spread, erode or disappear) shows that an individual's ethical mind-set (i.e. outcome-based vs. rule-based) moderates the impact of an initial ethical or unethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethically on a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mind-set facilitates Moral Balancing (behaving ethically or unethically decreases the likelihood of engaging in the same type of behaviour again later), whereas a rule-based mind-set facilitates Moral Consistency (engaging in an ethical or unethical behaviour increases the likelihood of engaging in the same type of behaviour later on). The objective was to look at the evolution of moral choice across a series of scenarios, that is, to explore if these moral patterns (Balancing vs. Consistency) are maintained over time. The results of three studies showed that Moral Balancing is not maintained over time. On the other hand, Moral Consistency could be maintained over time, if the mind-set was reinforced before making a new moral judgment (but not otherwise).     

Exposure to moral relativism compromises moral behavior

Across two studies we investigated the relationship between moral relativism versus absolutism and moral behavior. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who read a relativist argument for tolerating female genital mutilation were more likely to cheat to win an incentivized raffle than participants who read an absolutist argument against female genital mutilation, or those in a control condition. In Experiment 2, participants who read a definition of morality phrased in absolutist terms expressed less willingness to engage in petty theft than those who read a definition of morality phrased in relativist terms, or those in a control condition. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that effects were not due to absolutist arguments signaling that fewer behaviors are morally permissible, nor to relativist arguments defending more disagreeable moral positions. Rather, the content of the philosophical positions themselves—the fact that relativism describes morality as subjective and culturally-historically contingent, whereas absolutism describes morality as objective and universal—makes individuals more likely to engage in immoral behaviors when exposed to moral relativism compared to moral absolutism.     

Specificity of meta-emotion effects on moral decision-making

A recently proposed dual process theory of moral decision-making posits that utilitarian reasoning (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) is the result of cognitive control of emotion. This suggests that deficits in emotional awareness will contribute to increased utilitarianism. The present study explored the relative contributions of the different facets of alexithymia and the closely related constructs of emotional intelligence and mood awareness to utilitarian decision making. Participants (N = 86) completed the Toronto Alexithymia Scale, Trait Meta Mood Scale, the Mood Awareness Scale, and a series of high-conflict, personal moral dilemmas validated by Greene et al. (2008). A brief neuropsychological battery was also administered to assess the possible confounds of verbal reasoning and abstract thinking ability. Principal components analysis revealed two latent factors-clarity of emotion and attention to emotion-which cut across all three meta-emotion instruments. Of these, low clarity of emotion-reflecting difficulty in reasoning thoughtfully about one's emotions-predicted utilitarian outcomes and provided unique variance beyond that of verbal and abstract reasoning abilities. Results are discussed in the context of individual differences in emotion regulation.     

权力感对道德困境判断的影响：基于CNI模型的分析

采用道德困境判断的CNI（consequence, norm, inaction）模型,通过两个实验考察权力感对道德困境判断的影响。实验1探讨个人权力感对道德困境判断的影响,结果显示高个人权力感显著增加被试对规则的敏感,促使个体做出道义论的道德判断。实验2考察回忆任务启动的权力感对道德困境判断的影响,发现相对于低权力感启动的被试,高权力感启动的被试在进行判断时更关注行为的结果,对规则更不敏感,这说明启动的权力感促进功利主义的道德判断,抑制道义论的道德判断。结果表明,不同类型的权力感对道德困境判断的影响存在差异。