Investigating the role of E-contact and self-disclosure on improving Turkish-Kurdish interethnic relations

While recent research has started to pay more attention to the role of contact strategies on promoting intergroup harmony between Turkish and Kurdish communities, the effectiveness of a novel form of indirect contact strategy, E-contact—where participants engage in a cooperative and structured online interaction with an individual from the outgroup—has not yet been tested. Across two studies (N_{Study 1} = 110, N_{Study 2} = 176), we investigated the effects of E-contact among Turks on promoting positive attitudes and behavioral tendencies toward Kurds, testing outgroup trust and intergroup anxiety as mediators and incorporating a distinction between lower and higher self-disclosure conditions. As expected, E-contact led to more positive outgroup attitudes, as well as greater approach tendencies and decreased avoidance tendencies through increased outgroup trust (Studies 1 and 2) and reduced intergroup anxiety (Study 2). Study 2 also found that E-contact produced lower perceived interethnic conflict through increased outgroup trust. While both lower and higher personal disclosure conditions provided similar effects in the two studies, E-contact with heightened self-disclosure was especially effective at promoting more positive outgroup attitudes and reducing avoidance tendencies. Findings highlight potential benefits of using E-contact as a prejudice-reduction strategy in conflict settings.     

Why do U.S. conservatives take fewer COVID-19 precautions? The role of worry,perceived risk,and governmental trust

Research suggests a U.S. political ideology gap for taking COVID-19 precautions, but we do not know the role of cognitive risk (assessed here as perceived risk) and affective risk (assessed here as worry) in explaining why conservative Americans participated in fewer recommended precautions (e.g., mask wearing) and whether governmental trust attenuates the effect. We predicted that conservatives (compared with liberals) would take fewer precautions because they thought they were less at risk and were less worried about COVID-19, but that this would be more pronounced for those with low governmental trust. In this study, U.S. adults (representative sample: N = 738; M_age = 46.8; 52% women; 78% white) who had not had COVID-19 took two online surveys 2 weeks apart during the first wave of the pandemic (April 2020). Participants reported ideology, perceived risk of getting or dying of COVID-19, worry about COVID-19, and trust in the CDC and state officials at baseline. At follow-up, participants reported on COVID-19 precautions: (1) prevention behavior participation (e.g., mask wearing) and (2) behavioral willingness for future behaviors (e.g., vaccination). Results showed that, politically conservative Americans took fewer precautions due to lower worry (but unexpectedly not due to lower perceived risk). As predicted, when trust was high, the ideology gap was muted for predicting precautions as well as for predicting perceived risk and worry. In sum, conservatives worried less about COVID-19 which predicted fewer precautions, but trust in governmental institutions reduced this ideological gap. Improving governmental trust could be one fruitful path to increasing COVID-19 precautions.     

Political distrust,perceived threat,and intentions to engage in normative and violent collective action: A mixed-methods study

In three studies, we examined the role of distrust and perceived threat in intentions to engage in normative and violent non-normative collective action. A field-based qualitative study of 35 pro-democracy protestors during the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-Extradition protests revealed that perceived threat to Hong Kong values alongside distrust of political institutions spurred collective action engagement and support for defensive violent collection action. In Study 2, a questionnaire (N = 639) testing pro-democracy action intentions demonstrated direct paths on both normative and violent collective action intentions from distrust and threat. In Study 3 (N = 133), experimental trust and threat manipulations demonstrated a significant association between distrust and threat on violent collective action intentions and acceptance, and a significant interaction on acceptance of violent collective action. Our results reveal the importance of distrust and threat in attitudinal support for, and engagement in, collective action and their role in transitioning from non-violent to violent collective action.     

How Social-Class Background Influences Perceptions of Political Leaders

In this research, we contribute to a nascent literature examining how cues to social class can guide voters' political judgments. Drawing upon and merging a voting-cues framework with the stereotype-content model, we test predictions that, relative to those from high-class backgrounds, candidates from lower- and working-class backgrounds will be perceived to be more ideologically liberal, warmer, and will be evaluated more positively. We test these predictions across four experimental studies (N_Study1 = 200; N_Study2 = 537; N_Study3 = 352; N_Study4 = 654) employing a candidate-evaluation paradigm; participants were presented with basic candidate background information, including cues to candidate class and other demographics, and were asked to read an excerpt from a speech before providing their judgments. Findings reveal that candidates from lower- and working-class backgrounds were perceived to be more liberal and warmer than those from high-class backgrounds. Additionally, we found that lower-class candidates were generally evaluated more positively than high-class candidates, and we found some evidence for evaluations across class to be moderated by participants' political ideology. These effects generally held across candidate gender and race. This work has important theoretical and practical implications offering insight into the social-class gap between the electorate and the largely elite elected policymakers.     

The associations of cultural worldviews,political orientation,and trust with COVID-19 risk beliefs in the U.S.

Given that risk beliefs predict engagement in behaviors to prevent disease, it is important to understand the factors associated with risk beliefs. In the present paper, we conducted path analyses to investigate the associations of belief systems (political orientation and cultural worldviews of individualism and hierarchy) with COVID-19 risk beliefs (i.e., perceived likelihood, perceived severity, and worry about disease; Studies 1 and 2), and the indirect effect through trust in information sources in these relationships (Study 1). Two online panels of U.S. adults were surveyed at three timepoints during the COVID-19 pandemic (Study 1: baseline n = 1,667, 1-year follow-up n = 551; Study 2: n = 404). Results of path analyses indicated that, across studies and timepoints, when controlling for political orientation, trust, and demographic factors, greater individualism had consistent significant direct effects on lower perceived severity and worry about COVID-19, whereas greater hierarchy had consistent significant direct effects on lower perceived severity. However, after accounting for cultural worldviews of individualism and hierarchy (and trust and demographic factors), none of the associations among political orientation and any of the three COVID-19 risk beliefs were significant. The test of indirect effects indicated that individualism and hierarchy were indirectly associated with lower perceived severity of and worry about COVID-19 through less trust. The findings suggest that cultural worldviews of individualism and hierarchy play a role in shaping people's risk beliefs.     

Trust and Involvement as Higher-Order Factors of General Attitudes Towards Politics. Testing a Structural Model Across 26 Democracies

Interindividual differences in how people think and feel about politics have been investigated for decades. However, the great number of attitudinal concepts that has been developed to describe these differences is likely to distract from their conceptual overlap and dimensional structure. In addition, not much is known about the cross-cultural invariance of their interrelation. We propose that attitudes towards politics can be structured by two broad higher-order factors, a factor of general political involvement and a factor of general political trust. In two studies (N₁ = 767; N₂ = 29,018), including representative samples from 26 democracies, we first conduct several confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) to show that the higher-order model is a well-fitting and parsimonious alternative to a baseline model without higher-order factors in most samples. Second, we present evidence from multigroup CFA that the overall patterns of factor loadings are the same across all 26 countries. We interpret this structural equivalence across different democracies as support for the assumption that general political involvement and general political trust reflect basic orientations towards politics that are based on (1) demands of democratic political systems and (2) universal principles in human trait structure.     

Who do we trust? Differences in types of trust and beliefs in conspiracy theories between vaccinated and unvaccinated Europeans across 17 European countries

A plethora of research has highlighted that trust in science, political trust, and conspiracy theories are all important contributors to vaccine uptake behavior. In the current investigation, relying on data from 17 countries (N = 30,096) from the European Social Survey we examined how those who received (and wanted to receive the COVID-19 vaccine) compared to those who did not differ in their trust in: science, politicians and political parties, international organizations and towards people in general. We also examined whether they differed in how much they believed in conspiracy theories. Those who received (or wanted to receive) the COVID vaccine scored significantly higher in all forms of trust, and lower in conspiracy theory beliefs. A logistic regression suggested that trust in science, politicians, international organizations, as well as belief in conspiracy theories were significant predictors, even after accounting for key demographic characteristics.     

Solidarity across group lines: Secondary transfer effect of intergroup contact,perceived moral distance,and collective action

We tested, in three studies, whether the generalization of contact effects from primary to secondary outgroups—the secondary transfer effect (STE)—occurs for collective action. The results supported a serial mediation model: contact with immigrants by advantaged group members (Italians: Study 1, N = 146, 121 females, M_age = 28.31 years; Study 3, N = 406, 239 females, M_age = 36.35; British people, Study 2, N = 160, 113 females, M_age = 32.31) was associated with lower perceived moral distance toward primary outgroups, which in turn was associated with more positive attitudes and greater collective action intentions toward primary outgroups, and lower perceived moral distance toward secondary outgroups. Lower perceived moral distance toward secondary outgroups and stronger collective action intentions toward the primary outgroup were associated with higher collective action intentions toward secondary outgroups (results were inconsistent for attitudes). We discuss the findings with a focus on how a consideration of perceived moral distance extends current theorizing, and the relevance of generalized prejudice for the STE.     

Does System Justification Promote Establishment Voting? Mainstream Politics in France,Germany, and the United Kingdom

Throughout Europe and North America, mainstream political parties have ceded electoral support to antiestablishment parties from the far left and far right. We investigate the hypothesis that individual differences in system justification—the psychological tendency to defend and justify the overarching social system—would be negatively associated with antiestablishment voting, even among citizens who would otherwise be inclined to support radicalism. In three large, nationally representative surveys conducted in France (N = 14,432), Germany (N = 1,168), and the United Kingdom (N = 2,337), we observed that system justification was positively associated with voting for establishment parties and negatively associated with antiestablishment voting. System justification was associated with reduced support for antiestablishment parties on the right and left—even among respondents who were high on ethnic intolerance, opposition to the European Union, economic distress, and support for income redistribution. Thus, all other things being equal, system-justification tendencies reinforce political moderation, establishment voting, and therefore social stability.     

Distancing or drawing together: Sexism and organisational tolerance of sexism impact women's social relationships at work

This article examines the role of organisational climate in women's social responses to sexism at work. We argue that after experiences of sexism, women “draw together” with other women when they perceive that the organisational climate is intolerant of sexism. We assess the role of organisational climate at three levels: peer-, manager-, and policy-level. We conducted a correlational study (N_study1 = 405) and two experimental studies (N_study2 = 377, N_study3 = 391), in which we examined women's experiences of sexism at work (measured in Study 1; manipulated in Studies 2 and 3). We also measured perceived tolerance of sexism at the peer-, manager- and policy-level in all studies. The main DVs were women's workplace friendships with other women in Studies 1 and 2, and closeness to female co-workers in Study 3. Results showed that perceived tolerance of sexism from peers was especially important in shaping women's social relationships following experiences of sexism; tolerance from managers or at the policy level had less consistent effects. Specifically, experiences with sexism were positively associated with female participants' reported friendship (Studies 1 and 2) and closeness (Study 3) with their female colleagues, but only when peers were perceived not to tolerate sexism. When peers were perceived to tolerate sexism, female participants did not respond to sexism by drawing together.     

Beyond ‘Liberals’ and ‘Conservatives’: Complexity in Ideology,Moral Intuitions,and Worldview Among Swedish Voters

This research investigated the congruence between the ideologies of political parties and the ideological preferences (N = 1515), moral intuitions (N = 1048), and political values and worldviews (N = 1345) of diverse samples of Swedish adults who voted or intended to vote for the parties. Logistic regression analyses yielded support for a series of hypotheses about variations in ideology beyond the left–right division. With respect to social ideology, resistance to change and binding moral intuitions predicted stronger preference for a social democratic (vs. progressive) party on the left and weaker preference for a social liberal (vs. social conservative or liberal-conservative) party on the right. With respect to political values and broader worldviews, normativism and low acceptance of immigrants predicted the strongest preference for a nationalist party, while environmentalism predicted the strongest preference for a green party. The effects were generally strong and robust when we controlled for left–right self-placements, economic ideology, and demographic characteristics. These results show that personality variation in the ideological domain is not reducible to the simplistic contrast between ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’, which ignores differences between progressive and non-progressive leftists, economic and green progressives, social liberal and conservative rightists, and nationalist and non-nationalist conservatives.     

Compliance in crisis: Concern,trust and distrustful complacency in the COVID-19 pandemic

Two studies tested a distrustful complacency hypothesis, according to which either concern or political trust would be enough to sustain law-abiding attitudes and compliance with health-protective policies during the COVID-19 pandemic; but the absence of both concern and trust would result in markedly lower support and compliance. Study 1 supported this hypothesis with NatCen nationally representative sample of Great Britain (N = 2413; weighted regression analyses), focussing on law-abiding attitudes. Study 2 (preregistered) replicated these findings with a representative sample (N = 1523) investigating support for COVID-19 policies and compliant behaviour. Participants who were less concerned about the consequences of the pandemic (for themselves and for others) and simultaneously less trustful of the government expressed weaker law-abiding attitudes and reported less compliance with COVID-19 restrictions. These findings have implications for policy and public health strategies in time of crisis.     

Justice for the People? How Justice Sensitivity Can Foster and Impair Support for Populist Radical-Right Parties and Politicians in the United States and in Germany

Many people argue that support for populist radical-right political agents is motivated by people feeling “left behind” in globalized Western democracies. Empirical research supports this notion by showing that people who feel personally or collectively deprived are more likely to hold populist beliefs and anti-immigration attitudes. Our aim was to further investigate the psychological link between individuals' justice concerns and their preferences for populist radical-right political agents. We focused on stable individual differences in self-oriented and other-oriented justice concerns and argue that these should have opposing correlations with preferences for populist radical-right parties. We tested our hypotheses in two national samples, one from the United States (N = 1500) and one from Germany (N = 848). Sensitivity to injustice towards oneself enhanced the likelihood of preferring Trump (United States) and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) (Germany) via increased anti-immigration attitudes and increased populist attitudes. Sensitivity to injustice towards others reduced the likelihood of preferring Trump and AfD via decreased anti-immigration attitudes. We discuss our findings in regard to how stable individual differences in the evaluation of fairness can motivate intra- and interpersonal political conflicts in modern w estern societies and how politics and mass media can fuel these conflicts.     

Change in school ethnic diversity and intergroup relations: The transition from segregated elementary to mixed secondary school for majority and minority students

This research examined the impact of a change in school diversity on school children's intergroup relations. A longitudinal survey tracked 551 White British and Asian British students (M_age = 11.32) transitioning from elementary (time 1) to secondary (time 2) school in an ethnically segregated town in the United Kingdom. We estimated a multivariate, multilevel model. A cross-sectional comparison of segregated schools and a mixed elementary school at time 1 revealed that both Asian and White British in the mixed school reported more positive intergroup relations. A longitudinal analysis found that the transition from segregated elementary to mixed secondary schools was associated with Asian British developing more positive intergroup relations. White British reported overall less positive intergroup relations, although only trust decreased; evidence from other measures remains inconclusive. The findings are important for understanding early stages of diversity exposure, and the impact of changing diversity levels on majority and minority groups.     

Perceptions of inferred parental ability through sexually dimorphic facial features

In addition to providing robust cues diagnostic of prospective mates' heritable fitness, various physical features could be similarly utilized in inferring individuals' parental abilities. This study sought to explore how variations in sexually dimorphic facial features inform perceptions of social targets as motivated to provide parental care. American undergraduates (N = 244) viewed a series of 12 total male and female faces manipulated at varying degrees of sex-typicality (i.e., masculinized versus feminized versus unaltered controls) on a within-subjects basis, and rated the perceived motivation of each target to nurture and protect a child using items derived from the Parental Care and Tenderness Scale. Female targets were perceived as more motivated by parental care than male targets, F(1, 240) = 14.86, p < .001, η_p² = 0.058, whereas male targets were perceived as specifically motivated to protect offspring, F(1, 240) = 177.32, p < .001, η_p² = 0.425. Feminized targets were additionally perceived as more motivated by nurturance, though such inferences were apparent for both male and female targets, F(1, 240) = 7.36, p < .001, η_p² = 0.058. Findings represent an understanding of perceivers use of functional heuristics of sexual dimorphism in identifying optimal parents.     

With a little help from our friends: The impact of cross-group friendship on acculturation preferences

Despite extensive research on intergroup contact and acculturation, our understanding of how contact affects receiving society members’ preferences for acculturation orientation of immigrants over time is still relatively rudimentary. This longitudinal study examined how perceived group similarity and outgroup trust mediate the effects of cross-group friendship on acculturation preferences (culture maintenance and culture adoption) of the receiving society. It was predicted that cross-group friendship would affect acculturation preferences over time, and that these relationships would be partly mediated by outgroup trust and perceived group similarity. A three-wave full longitudinal sample (N = 467 Chilean school students) was analyzed using structural equation modeling. Results confirmed that cross-group friendship longitudinally predicted majority members’ support for the adoption of Chilean culture (via perceived group similarity) and Peruvian culture maintenance (via outgroup trust). Conceptual and practical implications are discussed.     

Culturally intelligent supervisors: Inclusion,intercultural cooperation,and psychological safety

By integrating the cultural intelligence (CQ) and diversity/inclusion literature, we attempt to make a dual contribution to the literature by understanding how subordinates' perceptions of their supervisors' CQ may enhance their intercultural cooperation via their individual psychological climate for inclusion. We further examine the role of minority members' psychological safety as a result of perceived supervisor CQ and psychological climate for inclusion. To explore these processes, we conducted three studies. Based on social processing and social learning theories, we empirically tested the relationship between perceived supervisor CQ and subordinates' intercultural cooperation and initially determined the role of one of the three dimensions of psychological climate for inclusion (i.e. integration of differences) (Study 1: two-waves; N = 316). To address the data limitation and to expand the framework (i.e. adding in the other dimensions of psychological climate), we conducted Study 2 (two-waves; N = 173). We further extended the framework to include psychological safety and obtained two-waves of data from ethnic minority members in Study 3 (N = 155). Our results supported our predictions offering novel insights into why CQ matters for supervisors of culturally diverse work units and clarify the various mechanisms on how supervisors' CQ influences intercultural cooperation in those units.     

Exploring everyday experiences of cultural diversity: The construction,validation, and application of the normative multiculturalism scale

The 3-factor structure of the Normative Multiculturalism Scale (NMS)—Contact with Diversity (CD), Multicultural Ideology (MI), and Multicultural Policies and Practices (MPP)—was tested and confirmed with community samples from New Zealand (N = 381) and the United States (N = 311). Correlations with criterion measures (e.g., perceived minority disadvantage and attitudes to diversity) supported the criterion validity of the subscales. NMS factors were then examined as predictors of social connectedness in a British community sample (N = 347). Hierarchical multiple regression revealed that MI predicted general trust, and MI and MPP predicted national attachment. While MPP was associated with greater perceived threat, this relationship was dampened by the joint influences of MI and CD. The research presents a novel perspective on multiculturalism by adopting a normative approach and examining the main and interaction effects of contact with diversity, multicultural ideology, and multicultural policies on interpersonal and intergroup outcomes.     

Income inequality and interpersonal trust in China

Two studies investigated the cross‐temporal and cross‐sectional associations between income inequality and interpersonal trust in China. In Study 1, a cross‐temporal meta‐analysis involving 141 studies (N = 64,853) found that Chinese college students’ scores on the Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter, 1967) decreased 0.54 SD from 1998 to 2016, and that the decline in interpersonal trust across birth cohorts was explained by earlier income inequality index in China. In Study 2, a cross‐regional analysis showed that Chinese citizens in provinces with more income inequality (vs. less inequality) perceived the local government to be less trustworthy and, in turn, reported lower levels of interpersonal trust. These findings contribute to the understanding of the rising income inequality as an explanation for the waning interpersonal trust in China, and point to a crucial channel connecting income inequality with interpersonal trust.     

The association between in-class cultural diversity with empathy and bullying in adolescence: A multilevel mediation analysis

Little is known about the associations between cultural class composition, teacher support for diversity (TSD), cognitive and affective empathy, and bullying and victimisation. Research shows that empathy is negatively associated with bullying and victimisation; and support for diversity and classroom cultural diversity are positively linked to social skills. The present study examines whether cultural diversity and perceived TSD are protective factors against bullying and victimisation, either directly or mediated by empathy. Participants were 897 students from Grades 7 to 10 (M_age = 13.45, SD_age = 1.07, 51.3% girls, 46.7% boys) in 36 classes. Multilevel mediation analyses were conducted. Age and gender were controlled for. More perceived TSD and affective empathy were associated with less bullying. Moreover, the effect of perceived TSD on bullying was partly indirect through affective empathy. Victimisation was not predicted by the study variables. The class level showed no effects. Bullying and victimisation are complex phenomena, which seem to be linked more to individual than to class characteristics. The result that higher perceived TSD was linked to empathy and bullying provides a promising starting point for measures of competence enhancement and bullying prevention.