Liberal Naturalism: The Curious Case of Hegel

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to defend the claim that the absolute idealism of Hegel is a liberal naturalist position against Sebastian Gardner’s claim that it is not genuinely naturalistic, and also to defend the position of ‘liberal naturalism’ from Ram Neta’s charge that there is no logical space for it to occupy. By ‘liberal naturalism’, I mean a doctrine which is a non-reductive form of philosophical naturalism. Like Fred Beiser, I take the thesis of liberal naturalism to find support in the idealism of Hegel. I begin by first explaining what philosophical naturalism amounts to. I then move on to show, using Finn Spicer’s and Alison Stone’s understandings of philosophical naturalism, how there is a stronger form of philosophical naturalism but also how there is a weaker form as well. Having established the distinction between stronger and weaker variants of philosophical naturalism, I discuss Sebastian Gardner’s recent objections to treating absolute idealism as a genuinely naturalist position. I argue that Gardner is incorrect to claim that absolute idealism is not a genuinely naturalist position on both historical and interpretive grounds, where to do so I bring in features of Hegel’s idealism to show that Hegel was committed to liberal naturalism. In the next section of the paper, I address Ram Neta’s charge that there is no logical space for liberal naturalism. To counter this claim, I offer an Hegelian diagnosis of Neta’s charge and argue that Neta’s concern about the possibility of liberal naturalism is illegitimately motivated.     

Solger and Hegel: Negation and Privation

Abstract

This paper has two related goals. Firstly, after briefly clarifying the theoretical core of Solger’s thought, it will analyse his metaphysics from Hegel’s point of view, emphasizing that sacrifice is, for Solger, the fundamental structure of the relationship between the finite and the Infinite. Secondly, it will investigate the main reasons behind Hegel’s criticism of Solger, showing that they have different conceptions of privation and negation and concluding that Solger and Hegel have different aims. Hegel’s aim consists in recomposing the unity of finite and infinite, whereas Solger’s thought is structured on the rupture between these two.     

Naturalising deconstruction

Most contemporary readings of Derrida’s work situate it within a transcendental tradition of philosophical enquiry explicitly critical of naturalistic accounts of knowledge and mind. I argue that Derrida provides the naturalist with some of the philosophical resources needed to rebut transcendental critiques of naturalism, in particular the phenomenological critiques which derive from Husserl’s philosophy. I do this by showing: a) that Derrida’s account of temporality as differance undermines phenomenological accounts of the meaning of naturalistic theories and assumptions; and b) that it is itself both usable and interpretable within the naturalistic framework of current cognitive science.     

The Art of Nature: Hegel and the Critique of Judgment

This essay examines the reasons for Hegel's frequently professed claim that Kant's Critique of Judgment simultaneously reveals the internal limits of critical philosophy and opens the door to his own system of speculative idealism. It evaluates Hegel's contention that the conceptions of aesthetic experience, organic purposiveness, and the intuitive intellect developed in the third Critique together conspire to undermine the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the theories of nature and freedom advanced in the first and second Critiques . Finally it explains how Hegel understands his logic and real philosophy as a realist and quasi-naturalistic alternative to Kant's subjective idealism, one that purports to generate a system of categories adequate not only to dead matter but also to organic life and free self-conscious spirit.     

Gestures of work: Levinas and Hegel

What is Levinas's relation to Hegel, the thinker who seems to summarize everything which Levinas's philosophy opposes, yet with whom Levinas never enters a sustained philosophical engagement? An answer can be found through an analysis of the concept of work, understood both as activity of labor and product thereof. The concept of work reveals that, despite the apparent (but superficial) sense of opposition, Levinas's philosophy works in a deliberately noncommittal, or, to use a Levinasian expression, ``dis-interested'' mode with respect to Hegel. Such mode of disinterstedness expresses an ethical gesture of joyful hospitality that neither confirms nor refutes the German philosopher but rather opens him up to an eschatological dimension.     

黑格尔的“第三条道路”——《法哲学原理》的合理性与现实性

黑格尔的《法哲学原理》在他整个体系中占据着特别重要的地位,然而自问世以来就不断引发争议和骂名。实际上,黑格尔在政治上既反对复辟派,也反对激进派,他对当时具有进步性质的普鲁士改革抱有希望,这种居间的政治姿态归根结蒂出自哲学家探求真理的理论动机。他从意志自由出发,力图以自由秩序取代自然秩序,从而突破了自然法传统,把社会-国家理论奠定在全新的基础之上。这个内容丰富的"法哲学"揭示出现代人类生活的真实状态与辩证结构,并通过将古代的整体原则与启蒙主义的个体性精神统一起来,力图寻找一条合理性与现实性在其中达成"和解"的"第三条道路",黑格尔也因此被视为"第一位意识到现代性问题的哲学家"。     

The family myth: its deconstruction and replacement with a balanced humanized narrative

Abstract :  According to Carl Jung the mythopoeic activities of the collective unconscious contribute to the trajectory of personal individuation ( Segal 1998 ). The 'family myth' represents an imaginal narrative that emphasizes the importance of the family's founders, its collective values, and its position with respect to 'outsiders'. Sigmund Freud identified the importance of the Oedipal myth as the basis of nuclear family dynamics ( Rudnytsky 1992 ); however, the 'myth of the family' represents in reality a 'family of myths', each emphasizing different elements of potential interpersonal dynamics. But whereas some myths foster the child's optimal separation from parental influence and promote the process of individuation, others tend to hinder development.
One potentially deleterious form of the family myth tends to serve the narcissistic wishes of parents in their bid to maintain influence over the child by fostering the archetypal features of their role. The children who are the targets of the myth are thwarted in their psychological development by virtue of the fact that they are denied the opportunity to humanize their archetypal projections onto their parent(s). The result is a persistence of childlike attitude with respect to people and situations that they encounter outside the nuclear family. The persistent constellation of the child archetype is evidenced by features of the puer aeternus, with deficits in the ability to work, form stable adult relationships, and create a separate nuclear family. The significance of this type of family myth in the inappropriate preservation of puerile attitudes is examined and the desire of the offending parent(s) to promote their own immortality is explored. The contribution of the myth to the transference and transference resistance is explicated and suggestions are offered with respect to how to approach this critical issue in analysis.