On objectivity

The following definition of objective is proposed: A statement S is objective if and only if in S all parameters that are relevant to its truth value are made explicit. The objectivity of predicates and relations can be defined in a similar manner. This simple conception of objectivity-which could be called explicitness conception of objectivity-can be found in Hermann Weyl and plays a central part in the natural sciences. There are grades of objectivity depending on the quality and the number of parameters our predicates are relativized to A relativistic Ockham principle has to be recognized: Relativization parameters are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The explicitness conception of objectivity is accessible to mathematical specifications, is the core of the idea of invariance, has a lot of philosophical applications and leads to precise notions of subjectivity and a precise formulation of the problem of the limits of objectivity.I am grateful to Andreas Bartels, Ulrich Gähde, Mark Helme, Andreas Kamlah, Andreas Kemmerling, Winfred Klink, Toni Koch, Hilary Putnam and Matthias Varga von Kibéd who have, in one way or another, contributed to the present content and form of this paper.     

On subjectivity and objectivity in psychoanalysis.

Epistemological subjectivism has found its way into psychoanalysis along several theoretical and clinical paths. It has developed out of the clinical interest in transference and countertransference and, in particular, from the broadly generalized definition of countertransference now popular. The clinically necessary attention to analyst-analysand interaction has been turned into interactionism or intersubjectivism and a denial of epistemological subject-object differentiation. These perspectives transform a clinical focus on the here and now of the analytic relation into the determination of the past by the present and a teleological reversal of causality. Once this reversal is made, narrative in the analytic situation becomes the co-creation of the analysand's past by the present analyst-analysand relation. Psychoanalysis, on this view, can at best substitute a coherent, novelistic account for the life history of a person. Some of the problems of subjectivism are examined here with a view to restoring to psychoanalysis the epistemology of science and common sense.     

The other side of false belief: Constructing the objectivity of reality

Young children appear not to grasp the independence between objective reality and subjective beliefs, as evidenced by their errors on false belief tasks. Whereas decades of research have examined children's developing understanding of the subjectivity of beliefs, however, almost no research has examined the other side of the issue: How do humans come to understand the objectivity of reality, and why is this understanding important? To help address this gap, this article proposes an evolutionary-developmental account of how the understanding that reality is objective may have emerged in human thinking. Three key steps are highlighted: (i) phylogenetic foundations in great ape competitive mindreading, (ii) ontogenetic foundations in preverbal infant joint attention, and (iii) key experiences of perspectival conflict in linguistic humans. Functionally, the concept of an objective reality facilitated collaborative reasoning and joint decision-making. To arrive at good joint decisions, individuals needed to recognize that both their own beliefs and others' beliefs could be wrong—with respect to the objective reality.     

The objectivity of color and the color of objectivity

I am grateful to Peter King, David Lewis, George Schumm, Stewart Shapiro, Allan Silverman, William Taschek, Neil Tennant, and Mark Wilson for helpful and stimulating discussions; and especially to Diana Raffman and Michael Watkins for ongoing arguments about the importance of ongoing arguments about the ontology of color.     

The psychoanalytic narrative. On the problem of objectivity

The author seeks to develop a narrative conceptualization of psychoanalytic treatment. Its nucleus is the causal explanation of life history and illness. She criticizes the hermeneutic approach to interpretation that is chiefly concerned with the constitution of life history as meaningful with no consideration given at times to objective truth.     

On objectivity and subjectivity in statistical inference: A response to Mayo

In this paper we respond to the article An Objective Theory of Statistical Testing by D. G. Mayo (1983). We argue that the theory of testing developed by Mayo, NPT*, is neither novel nor objective. We also respond to the claims made by Mayo against Bayesian theory.     

Historical objectivity and value neutrality

To resolve the impasse between skeptic, idealist and positivist as to whether or not historical inquiry can be objective, an affirmative answer is argued by exposing, clarifying and challenging the common presupposition: the thesis of scientific value neutrality. The argument applies a more explicit version of the Braithwaite— Churchman‐Rudner position to history and thus challenges the prevalent claim that history, unlike the law, has but one goal, the establishment of truth about the past. The important yet neglected residual issue concerns what ‘objectivity’ means when inquiry (historical or scientific) is construed as a goal‐directed activity controlled by epistemic and pragmatic utilities.     

Reflective equilibrium and moral objectivity

Ever since the introduction of reflective equilibrium in ethics, it has been argued that reflective equilibrium either leads to moral relativism, or that it turns out to be a form of intuitionism in disguise. Despite these criticisms, reflective equilibrium remains the most dominant method of moral justification in ethics. In this paper, I therefore critically examine the most recent attempts to defend the method of reflective equilibrium against these objections. Defenders of reflective equilibrium typically respond to the objections by saying that either reflective equilibrium can in fact safeguard moral objectivity or alternatively, even if it cannot, that there simply are no reasonable alternatives. In this paper, I take issue with both responses. First, I argue that given the non-foundationalist aspirations of reflective equilibrium, moral objectivity cannot be maintained. Second, I argue that reflective equilibrium is not the only game in town once intuitionism has been discarded. I argue that given their own normative ambitions, combined with their rejection of intuitionism, proponents of reflective equilibrium have reason to take alternative methods of moral justification, and more specifically transcendental arguments, more seriously than they have done so far. I end by sketching the outlines of what this alternative methodology might look like.     

Person perception and scientific objectivity

The perception of other people is shown to require a different set of scientific assumptions than that used in traditional psychology. Mind-body dualism, subject-object dichotomy and traditional notions of scientific causality are shown to be inapplicable to the perception of people, except where people are being seen as objects. The ?predict and control' model of psychology, and the ?medical model' of psychiatry both involve the perception of people as objects. The ?participant observer' model is seen to be the optimal one for the study of human beings.     

“Strong objectivity”: A response to the new objectivity question

Where the old “objectivity question” asked, “Objectivity or relativism: which side are you on?”, the new one refuses this choice, seeking instead to bypass widely recognized problems with the conceptual framework that restricts the choices to these two. It asks, “How can the notion of objectivity be updated and made useful for contemporary knowledge-seeking projects?” One response to this question is the “strong objectivity” program that draws on feminist standpoint epistemology to provide a kind of logic of discovery for maximizing our ability to block “might makes right” in the sciences. It does so by delinking the neutrality ideal from standards for maximizing objectivity, since neutrality is now widely recognized as not only not necessary, not only not helpful, but, worst of all, an obstacle to maximizing objectivity when knowledge-distorting interests and values have constituted a research project. Strong objectivity provides a method for correcting this kind of situation. However, standpoint approaches have their own limitations which are quite different from the misreadings of them upon which most critics have tended to focus. Unfortunately, historically limited epistemologies and philosophies of science are all we get to choose from at this moment in history.