The Radical Future of Feminist Empiricism

I argue that Nelson's feminist transformation of empiricism provides the basis of a dialogue across three currently competing feminist epistemologies: feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theories, and postmodern feminism, a dialogue that will result in a dissolution of the apparent tensions between these epistemologies and provide an epistemology with the openness and fluidity needed to embrace the concerns of feminists.     

Feminist Philosophy of Disability: A Genealogical Intervention

This article is a feminist intervention into the ways that disability is researched and represented in philosophy at present. Nevertheless, some of the claims that I make over the course of the article are also pertinent to the marginalization in philosophy of other areas of inquiry, including philosophy of race, feminist philosophy more broadly, indigenous philosophies, and LGBTQI philosophy. Although the discipline of philosophy largely continues to operate under the guise of neutrality, rationality, and objectivity, the institutionalized structure of the discipline implicitly and explicitly promotes certain ontologies, epistemologies, and methodologies as bona fide philosophy, while casting the ontologies, epistemologies, and methodologies of marginalized philosophies as mere simulacra of allegedly fundamental ways of knowing and doing philosophy and thus rendering these marginalized philosophies more or less expendable. This article is designed to show that legitimized philosophical discourses are vital mechanisms in the problematization of disability.     

Moving beyond the enduring dominance of positivism in psychological research: Implications for psychology in Australia

Almost since its inception, the dominant narrative of modern psychology has embraced positivism through its insistence that psychological science is objective, generalisable, and value free (or neutral). Consequently, quantitative research and, in particular, experimental designs, are privileged over other forms of enquiry, and other epistemologies, methodologies, and methods remain marginalised within the discipline. We argue that the enduring hegemony of positivism needs to be opposed to enable psychology to genuinely understand the antecedents of, and provide meaningful sustainable solutions for, complex human issues without being constrained by a narrow focus on method. We discuss the ways in which psychology in Australia can move towards embracing a constructionist epistemology that provides the framework for methodological pluralism. We provide a number of suggestions for change across the interrelated areas of accreditation, curriculum, the Australian Psychological Society, and research.     

Preserving integrity against colonization

Genuine reconciliation between first- and third-person methodologies and knowledge requires respect for both phenomenological and scientific epistemologies. Recent pragmatic, theoretical, and verbal attempts at reconciliation by cognitive scientists compromise phenomenological method and knowledge. The basic question is thus: how do we begin reconciling first- and third-person epistemologies? Because life is the unifying concept across phenomenological and cognitive disciplines, a concept consistently if differentially exemplified in and by the phenomenon of movement, conceptual complementarities anchored in the animate properly provide the foundation for reconciliation. Research by people in neuroscience and in dynamic systems theory substantiate this thesis, providing fundamental examples of conceptual complementarity between phenomenology and science.     

Teachers’ epistemological beliefs as an antecedent of autonomy-supportive teaching

A large body of research has been devoted to the outcomes of autonomy-supportive teaching (AST). However, research on its antecedents is scarce. The present study explored teachers’ personal epistemology as a possible predictor of students’ perceptions of AST. We administered surveys to 622 students in 23 seventh- and eighth-grade classrooms regarding the extent to which their teachers tried to take the students’ perspective and to provide rationale—major aspects of autonomy support. At the same time, their teachers’ personal epistemologies were assessed. Hierarchical linear model analysis revealed that students of teachers scored with more objectivist (absolutist) personal epistemologies reported that their teachers were less likely to be autonomy supportive. AST, in turn, predicted students’ optimal internalization of pro-social behavior. Further exploration of a range of teachers’ personal characteristics, then, would appear to be an important and productive approach to understanding the variability of teachers’ engagement in autonomy supportive practices.     

Moral knowledge: some reflections on moral controversies, incompatible moral epistemologies, and the culture wars.

An authentic Christian bioethical account of abortion must take into consideration the conflicting epistemologies that separate Christian moral theology from secular moral philosophy. Moral epistemologies directed to the issue of abortion that fail to appreciate the orientation of morality to God will also fail adequately to appreciate the moral issues at stake. Christian accounts of the bioethics of abortion that reduce moral-theological considerations to moral-philosophical considerations will not only fail to appreciate fully the offense of abortion, but morally mislead. This article locates the bioethics of abortion within the theology of the Church of the first millennium, emphasizing that abortion was prohibited, whether or not one considered the embryo or fetus to be ensouled.     

The epistemological status of a naturalized epistemology

Philosophically inclined psychologists and psychologically inclined philosophers often hold that the substantive discoveries of psychology can provide an empirical foundation for epistemology. In this paper it is argued that the ambition to found epistemology empirically faces certain unnoticed difficulties. Empirical theories concerned with knowledge‐gaining abilities have been historically associated with specific epistemological views such that the epistemology gives preferential support to the substantive theory, while the theory empirically supports the epistemology. Theories attribute to the subject just those epistemic abilities which associated epistemologies attribute to the scientist. The concept of epistemological significance is introduced as the significance a psychological theory can have for modifying the epistemological suppositions with which the theory was originally associated. Substantive psychological theories are strongly constrained by the epistemologies used in their development; the endorsement an epistemology receives from its associated theory should carry no weight. The alliance between psychology and epistemology is not progressive to the development of either field. Alternative sources of progress in epistemology and psychology are suggested.     

Four Varieties of Character‐Based Virtue Epistemology

The terrain of character‐based or “responsibilist” virtue epistemology has evolved dramatically over the last decade — so much so that it is far from clear what, if anything, unifies the various views put forth in this area. In an attempt to bring some clarity to the overall thrust and structure of this movement, I develop a fourfold classification of character‐based virtue epistemologies. I also offer a qualified assessment of each approach, defending a certain account of the probable future of this burgeoning subfield.     

Whose voice counts? Gender,power, and epistemologies in the seminary classroom

This article wrestles with the question “whose voice counts?” as an entrée into a discussion of the challenges students encounter in learning to value different epistemologies and that professors encounter in attempting to teach for inclusion of voices. The essay reflects on an experience teaching a graduate seminar on gender and epistemology in which students encounter challenges reflecting on readings that present theology in the form of personal narratives, rather than in a more abstract or theoretical form. Course content and genres of writing are both gendered and subject to power dynamics associated with the uneven treatment of different types of knowledge. The paper focuses primarily on the lens of gender but notes as well the intersectional nature of gender – and the ways in which the course dynamics are complicated by the race, sexuality, and even the class of the authors, students, and teacher. The paper makes two substantial arguments. First, it names a pedagogical meta‐question at the intersection of gender and pedagogy: Even when women are on the syllabus, how are educators ensuring that the epistemologies at work in their classrooms allow for equal authorial authority in the classroom? Second, the paper challenges educators to make changes in their classrooms to allow students time to engage and employ epistemologies they discuss and to see the importance of these practices for wider systemic change in institutions and society.     

Factors Influencing the Development of Psychology in Sub-Saharan Africa

Psychology is an ethnocentric science, cultivated mainly in the developed world and then exported to sub-Saharan Africa. The major facilitators or deterrents—local, international, and systemic—to its development pertain to the extent to which training, research, and practice are driven by Eurocentric theories, epistemologies, and methods, and how they undermine, ignore, or exclude folk psychology and local issues. Africa has her own frames of reference and social reality; these differ in some remarkable ways from the Euro-American. Efforts to indigenize psychology or to use it to solve the multiple problems Africa faces have merely begun, and need to be hastened. The eco-cultural framework, which compels sensitivity to local cultures and conditions, can promote the process of indigenizing psychology. A few contextualist or Afrocentric studies have yielded evidence pointing to the necessity for the reconsideration of Eurocentric conceptualization.     

Epistemology, family patterns, and psychosomatics: the case of obesity

A family systems model of obesity is developed that attempts to integrate systems epistemology, Minuchin's work on psychosomatic disorders, and a review of the literature on obesity. The model presents obesity as being inextricably embedded in relationship patterns that fundamentally influence its etiology and maintenance. It is argued that the emergent properties of these relationships need to be the focus of analysis, rather than the elementary components residing within the individual, which are emphasized in traditional theories of obesity. The radical shift involved in moving from the traditional mechanistic models to a systems perspective is also discussed because these approaches are based on different epistemologies. The fundamental differences between these epistemologies are important and often underemphasized, which has led to much confusion in past research. Based on the model developed here and supportive data from the obesity literature, the conclusion is reached that obesity research and treatment are likely to be advanced by adopting a systemic approach.     

A Both-And Approach: An Application of Narrative Interventions from a Modern Perspective

A contentious debate between the modern and postmodern epistemologies continue to wage on since the rise of constructivism and social constructionism in the 1990s. This debate has led to both modern and postmodernists falling into an either/or mindset. Others have proposed a solution, the both-and approach, that emphasizes integration of different therapeutic camps. Intentionality is a core component of this approach, as therapists must understand how employed interventions flow from the epistemology and theoretical orientation under which they operate. Another core component of this approach is tailoring the integration to the specific context of the client case. With this understanding and tailoring, therapists can utilize methods across the modern/postmodern divide, as they will coherently flow from their original epistemology and theoretical orientation. Applying methods from both modernism and postmodernism, then, enhances therapists’ therapeutic repertoire, allowing for more opportunities to adapt treatment to each client case. Altogether, the quality of services improve and the amount of clients therapists can help increases as well. This paper will provide an application of the both-and approach to a case study to provide an example of how the said method can be employed in therapy.

     

5-13岁儿童对物种起源认知的发展

本研究采用临床访谈法,采用开放式和封闭式问题情境,测查了5-13岁儿童对物种起源认知的发展。结果显示儿童对物种起源的解释越来越符合科学的解释,这种认知发展过程并不是以一种起源认知替代另一种起源认知的过程,而是多种起源认知以某种方式共存于儿童的认知系统中。本研究结果既显示了儿童对物种起源认知发展的跨文化一致性,也体现了不同文化和宗教环境影响下的差异性。     

Franklin,Holmes, and the Epistemology of Computer Simulation

Allan Franklin has identified a number of strategies that scientists use to build confidence in experimental results. This paper shows that Franklin’s strategies have direct analogues in the context of computer simulation and then suggests that one of his strategies—the so‐called ‘Sherlock Holmes’ strategy—deserves a privileged place within the epistemologies of experiment and simulation. In particular, it is argued that while the successful application of even several of Franklin’s other strategies (or their analogues in simulation) may not be sufficient for justified belief in results, the successful application of a slightly elaborated version of the Sherlock Holmes strategy is sufficient.     

Aristotle's ontogenesis: a theory of individuation which integrates the classical and developmental perspectives

The effects of the classical/developmental split in analytical psychology are described. No underlying issues explaining the nature of the split have been clearly enunciated. The schools can, however, be distinguished by their differing epistemologies. These are the hermeneutic and transcendental branches of phenomenology. The use of these epistemologies leads their proponents to either an immanent or transcendent concept of the divine, respectively. The theoretical break between Freud and Jung can, in part, be attributed to their espousal of determinism and teleology, respectively. This conflict has been continued in analytical psychology with the developmentalists most often advocating determinism, and the classicists usually championing teleology. The dissimilar causal theories lead to different concepts of the nature of individuation. Aristotle's fourfold theory of causality, of which determinism and teleology are two categories, can be seen to be an ontogenic theory rather than a classification of causal influences. Applying his theory to the process of individuation provides an ontogenesis that more accurately describes the process itself, and unifies the developmental and classical theories. Intimations of this formulation in Jung's work are described. More explicit conceptions of this idea in the work of two contemporary analytical psychologists and that of Wilfred Bion are also presented.     

Feminist Radical Empiricism,Values, and Evidence

Feminist epistemologies consider ways in which gender (among other social factors) influences knowledge. In this article, I want to consider a particular kind of feminist empiricism that has been called feminist radical empiricism (where the empiricism, not the feminism, is radical). I am particularly interested in this view's treatment of values as empirical, and consequently up for revision on the basis of empirical evidence. Proponents of this view cite the fact that it allows us to talk about certain things such as racial and gender equality as objective facts: not just whether we have achieved said equality in our society, but whether we are, in fact, all equal. I will raise the concern that the way in which they model the role of values in epistemology may be a problematic idealization of the open‐mindedness of human agents. In some cases, resistance to value‐change cannot be diagnosed as a failure to respond adequately to evidence. If so, the strategy of empirically testing our values that some feminist radical empiricists suggest may not be as useful a tool for social change as they think.     

“Strong objectivity”: A response to the new objectivity question

Where the old “objectivity question” asked, “Objectivity or relativism: which side are you on?”, the new one refuses this choice, seeking instead to bypass widely recognized problems with the conceptual framework that restricts the choices to these two. It asks, “How can the notion of objectivity be updated and made useful for contemporary knowledge-seeking projects?” One response to this question is the “strong objectivity” program that draws on feminist standpoint epistemology to provide a kind of logic of discovery for maximizing our ability to block “might makes right” in the sciences. It does so by delinking the neutrality ideal from standards for maximizing objectivity, since neutrality is now widely recognized as not only not necessary, not only not helpful, but, worst of all, an obstacle to maximizing objectivity when knowledge-distorting interests and values have constituted a research project. Strong objectivity provides a method for correcting this kind of situation. However, standpoint approaches have their own limitations which are quite different from the misreadings of them upon which most critics have tended to focus. Unfortunately, historically limited epistemologies and philosophies of science are all we get to choose from at this moment in history.     

New Philosophies of Science in North America – Twenty Years Later

This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science, studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of science as practice and culture. A unifying theme of the survey is the relation between historical metamethodologists and scientific realists, which dominated philosophical work in the late 1970s. I argue that many of the alternative cognitive naturalisms, social epistemologies, and feminist theories that have been proposed can be understood as analogues to the differences between metamethodological theories of scientific rationality and realist accounts of successful reference to real causal processes. Recent work on experiment, scientific practice, and the culture of science may, however, challenge the underlying conception of the field according to which realism and historical rationalism (or their descendants) are the important alternatives available, and thus may take philosophy of science in new directions. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Pathways of Interdisciplinary Cognition

In this article, I propose that at the juncture of disciplines, the mind is involved in at least 3 cognitive activities: overcoming internal monologism or monodisciplinarity, attaining provisional integration, and questioning the integration as necessarily partial. This claim is supported by interview data I collected primarily from faculty involved in the development and teaching of interdisciplinary courses in programs including the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Bioethics, Swarthmore College's Interpretation Theory, and the NEXA Program at San Francisco State University. I suggest that interdisciplinary thinking is fundamentally similar to dialogical exchanges occurring in language and in collaborative activities in which epistemological positions are bartered. Bakhtin's (1981) theory of dialogic understanding and subsequent linguistic theories of conceptual metaphor and blending serve as a constructive theoretical framework for the understanding of interdisciplinary cognition. Viewing disciplines broadly as languages, epistemologies, and collaborative practices helps uncover some underlying cognitive mechanisms that deserve further investigation.     

Testing the Adult Development Tower of Babel Hypothesis: Homogeneous by Perry Position Collaborative Learning Groups and Graduate Student Satisfaction

The purpose of this quasi-experimental study was to investigate what appears to be a grounding assumption in some adult developmental and educational research: persons of differing epistemologies who are grouped together will understand one another less well than persons who are grouped homogeneously. A robust effect is discussed within the context of adult development theory, research on collaborative learning groups, and Bruffee's social constructionist challenge (K. A. Bruffee, 1993) to Perry and to cognitive development theory. Collateral research questions relating to covariates of developmental position (according to the Perry scheme) are entertained; confirmatory qualitative data are presented.