Kirk on Quine's reasons for indeterminacy of translation

Philosophical Studies -     

Skinner's verbal behavior, Chomsky's review, and mentalism.

Skinner's Verbal Behavior (1957) is a comprehensive treatise that deals with most aspects of verbal behavior. However, its treatment of the learning of grammatical behavior has been challenged repeatedly (e.g., Chomsky, 1959). The present paper will attempt to show that the learning of grammar and syntax can be dealt with adequately within a behavior-analytic framework. There is no need to adopt mentalist (or cognitivist) positions or to add mentalist elements to behaviorist theories.     

Behavior analysis, mentalism, and the path to social justice

Traditional psychology is mentalistic in the sense that it appeals to inner causes in the explanation of behavior. Two examples of mentalism in traditional psychology are (a) dispositional attributions and (b) conventional treatments of intelligence. These examples may be linked to such pernicious social -isms as racism and sexism by noting that some individuals justify engaging in discriminatory conduct toward others by appealing to some deficient inner quality of those being discriminated against. This sort of mentalistic appeal ultimately prevents some members of our society from being integrated into society and from progressing down the path of social justice. Behavior analysis offers a constructional alternative to the mentalistic views of traditional psychology and allows our society as a whole to move down the path.     

Extensionality, underdetermination and indeterminacy

I am grateful to Burton Dreben, Warren Goldfarb, Don Gustafson, Jim Higginbotham, Jerrold Katz, Joe Levine, Ted Morris, Nick Pappas, Hilary Putnam, Georges Rey and Bob Richardson for helpful discussions and comments on the issues discussed in this paper. Also I thank an anonymous reviewer for Erkenntnis for helpful comments.     

Quine's Naturalism and Behaviorisms

This paper investigates the complicated relations between various versions of naturalism, behaviorism, and mentalism within the framework of W. V. O. Quine's thinking. It begins with Roger Gibson's reconstruction of Quine's behaviorisms and argues that it lacks a crucial ontological element and misconstrues the relation between philosophy and science. After getting clear of Quine's naturalism, the paper distinguishes between evidential, methodological, and ontological behaviorisms. The evidential and methodological versions are often conflated, but they need to be clearly distinguished in order to see whether Quine's argument against mentalism is cogent. The paper argues that Quine's naturalism supports only the weakest version of behaviorism, that is, the evidential one, but this version is compatible with mentalistic semantics. Quine's opposition to mentalism is an overreaction against the behaviorist camp. By contrast, Jerry Fodor's objection to José Luis Bermúdez is an overreaction from the opposite direction.     

Quine's Argument from Despair

Quine's argument for a naturalized epistemology is routinely perceived as an argument from despair: traditional epistemology must be abandoned because all attempts to deduce our scientific theories from sense experience have failed. In this paper, I will show that this picture is historically inaccurate and that Quine's argument against first philosophy is considerably stronger and subtler than the standard conception suggests. For Quine, the first philosopher's quest for foundations is inherently incoherent; the very idea of a self-sufficient sense datum language is a mistake, there is no science-independent perspective from which to validate science. I will argue that a great deal of the confusion surrounding Quine's argument is prompted by certain phrases in his seminal ‘Epistemology Naturalized’. Scrutinizing Quine's work both before and after the latter paper provides a better key to understanding his remarkable views about the epistemological relation between theory and evidence.     

Bloor's bluff: Behaviourism and the strong programme

The accumulated case studies in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge have been taken to establish the Strong Programme's thesis that beliefs have social causes in contradistinction to psychological ones. This externalism is essentially a commitment to the stimulus control of behaviour which was the principal tenet of orthodox Skinnerian Behaviorism. Offered as ‘straight forward scientific hypotheses’ these claims of social determination are asserted to be ‘beyond dispute’.

However, the causes of beliefs and especially their contents has also been the subject of intense study in the quite different domain of cognitive science where internal states, images, rules, representations and schemas are postulated as explanatory constructs. Such explanations which postulate mental states are described by Bloor as infected by the ‘disease’ of ‘psychologism’ and Bloor has defined his Strong Programme in terms of its diametrical opposition to mentalistic theories. For example, Bloor has explicitly endorsed the Behaviourist rejection of mental representations such as images. Accordingly, a direct comparison of these radically divergent approaches to a common subject matter is of considerable interest.

The paper attempts to reveal the unnoticed enormity and recidivism of the sociological programme, and how its vulnerability is betrayed in Bloor's response to criticism on central issues.     

Ambiguity,generality, and indeterminacy: Tests and definitions

The problem addressed is that of finding a sound characterization of ambiguity. Two kinds of characterizations are distinguished: tests and definitions. Various definitions of ambiguity are critically examined and contrasted with definitions of generality and indeterminacy, concepts with which ambiguity is sometimes confused. One definition of ambiguity is defended as being more theoretically adequate than others which have been suggested by both philosophers and linguists. It is also shown how this definition of ambiguity obviates a problem thought to be posed by ambiguity for truth theoretical semantics. In addition, the best known test for ambiguity, namely the test by contradiction, is set out, its limitations discussed, and its connection with ambiguity's definition explained. The test is contrasted with a test for vagueness first proposed by Peirce and a test for generality propounded by Margalit.The earliest version of this paper was presented to The Logical Grammar Study Group at The University of Alberta, which included, at that time, Matthew Dryer, Bernard Linsky, Jeff Pelletier, and Len Schubert, Among others. Section 2 of the paper was presented 25 May, 1987 at the annual meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association (Hamilton, Ontario); and Section 1 was presented 22 January, 1900 to the Department of Philosophy at the University of Ottawa. I am grateful to these audiences and others who have provided helpful criticism and comments.     

Quine's Weak and Strong Indispensability Argument

Quine's views on indispensability arguments in mathematics are scrutinised. A weak indispensability argument is distinguished from a strong indispensability thesis. The weak argument is the combination of the criterion of ontological commitment, holism and a mild naturalism. It is used to refute nominalism. Quine's strong indispensability thesis claims that one should consider all and only the mathematical entities that are really indispensable. Quine has little support for this thesis. This is even clearer if one takes into account Maddy's critique of Quine's strong indispensability thesis. Maddy's critique does not refute Quine's weak indispensability argument. We are left with a weak and almost unassailable indispensability argument. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Carnap and translational indeterminacy

InWord and Object W. V. Quine argues that there is no uniquely correct way to assign referents to the terms of a language; any claim about the reference of a term is implicitly relative to a manual of translation. To Rudolf Carnap this must have seemed familiar. BeforeWord and Object was written Carnap had been saying the same thing inMeaning and Necessity: under the assumption of the method of the name-relation, any claim about the reference of a term is implicitly relative to what Carnap calls a conception of the name-relation. Yet Carnap is often taken to be a victim of Quine's relativistic notion of reference. Drawing on Carnap's discussion of the name-relation inMeaning and Necessity, it is argued that Carnap's and Quine's views on reference are not so far apart as is usually perceived.I would like to thank the referees who reviewed this paper for their helpful and insightful comments. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Richard Creath both for his comments on earlier drafts of this paper as well as for conversations (beyond number) on these and many other issues related to the Quine-Carnap debate. Creath's own discussion of this topic entitled Functionalist Theories of Meaning and the Defense of Analyticity, appears in the volumeLanguage, Logic, and the Structure of Scientific Theories: The Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial, edited by W. Salmon and G. Wolters (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, and Konstanz, Germany: University of Konstanz Press, 1994).