Race and Nation: How Racial Hierarchy Shapes National Attachments

We contend that the boundaries and nature of national attachments are shaped by the position of one's group within America's racial order, with higher status yielding more racially exclusive forms of identity. We test our claims in the realm of xenophobia. Using an original survey of African Americans (n = 1,000) and Whites (n = 1,000), we assess national pride, nationalism, nativism, and racial identity, plus affect toward various immigrant groups. We establish that national attachments have racially varied meanings, thereby producing sharp differences in each racial group's response to foreigners. Although national pride is unrelated to White antipathy toward outsiders, nationalism and nativism increase White hostility to immigrants—except when they are White. In contrast, national pride diminishes African American hostility to Black and non‐Black immigrants, while nativism is generally unrelated to Black antipathy to outsiders. Finally, while nationalism heightens xenophobia among Blacks, this sentiment envelops all foreigners—including African immigrants. We discuss our results' implications for theories of national attachment in intergroup settings.     

The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (and,More Generally,of Conceptual Analysis)

It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human decision‐making processes—for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will—except in a very trivial and metaphysically uninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questions—namely, the conceptual‐analysis question of what free will is and the question that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility—are also essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human beings.     

Race/Ethnicity and Multicultural Competence Among School Counselors: Multicultural Training,Racial/Ethnic Identity,and Color‐Blind Racial Attitudes

This study tested a model that links race/ethnicity, multicultural training, racial/ethnic identity (REI), color‐blind racial attitudes (CoBRA), and multicultural counseling competence (MCC) among school counselors. The author examined whether multicultural training significantly moderated the association between race/ethnicity and MCC. School counselors’ REI was found to mediate this moderated association. A 3‐way interaction among race/ethnicity, training, and CoBRA revealed that White and racial/ethnic minority school counselors had the lowest MCC scores when they had limited training and higher CoBRA.     

Applicant Race, Job Status, and Racial Attitude as Predictors of Employment Discrimination

It is important to understand why biased employee selection occurs in the workplace. We examined applicant race, job status, and the evaluator's attitudes toward blacks as possible predictors of unfair selection decisions. After completing an attitude toward blacks scale, one hundred and eighty-one people evaluated the qualifications of either a black or white applicant for either a high or low status job. Results showed no differences in the hiring decision. However, evaluators with more negative attitudes toward blacks reported greater confidence in their decision to hire the black applicant than the white applicant for the low status job compared to the confidence of evaluators with more positive attitudes. They also reported greater confidence in their decision to hire the white applicant than the black applicant for the high status job as compared to evaluators with more positive attitudes towards blacks. We observed the opposite results for less biased individuals. Evaluator ratings do not explain these findings. These data suggest that unfair discrimination may operate in subtle ways.     

On Speaking Thus: the Semantics of Indirect Discourse

Indexical predication is possible as well as the more familiar indexical reference. 'My curtains are coloured thus' describes my curtains. The indexical predicate expression it contains ('coloured thus') stands to possible non-indexical replacements ('red') as a referring indexical ('he') does to possible non-indexical replacements ('Tom'), in that it calls upon the context of utterance to fix its semantic contribution to the whole. Indexical predication is the natural resource to call upon in talk about skilful human performances, where we exhibit considerable know-how but little explicit know-that. Speech is among such performances. Both direct and indirect speech reports may be illuminated by seeing them in the light of this thought. A corollary of the approach is that the prospects of providing a formal semantic treatment of indirect speech do not look good.     

On the Conceptual Foundations of Anti-Realism

The central premise of Michael Dummett's global argument for anti-realism is the thesis that a speaker's grasp of the meaning of a declarative, indexical-free sentence must be manifested in her uses of that sentence. This enigmatic thesis has been the subject of a great deal of discussion, and something of a consensus has emerged about its content and justification. The received view is that the manifestation thesis expresses a behaviorist and reductive theory of meaning, essentially in agreement with Quine's view of language, and motivated by worries about the epistemology of communication. In the present paper I begin by arguing that this standard interpretation of the manifestation thesis is neither particularly faithful to Dummett's writings nor philosophically compelling. I then continue by reconstructing, from Dummett's texts, an account of the manifestation thesis, and of its justification, that differ sharply from the received view. On my reading, the thesis is motivated not epistemologically, but conceptually. I argue that connections among our conceptions of meaning, assertion, and justification lead to a conclusion about the metaphysics of meaning: we cannot form a clearly coherent conception of how two speakers can attach different meanings to a sentence without at the same time differing in what they count as justifying assertions made with that sentence. I conclude with some suggestions about how Dummett's argument for global anti-realism should be understood, given my account of the manifestation thesis. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Concepts and Conceptual Analysis

Conceptual analysis is undergoing a revival in philosophy, and much of the credit goes to Frank Jackson. Jackson argues that conceptual analysis is needed as an integral component of so-called serious metaphysics and that it also does explanatory work in accounting for such phenomena as categorization, meaning change, communication, and linguistic understanding. He even goes so far as to argue that opponents of conceptual analysis are implicitly committed to it in practice. We show that he is wrong on all of these points and that his case for conceptual analysis doesn't succeed. At the same time, we argue that the sorts of intuitions that figure in conceptual analysis may still have a significant role to play in philosophy. So naturalists needn't disregard intuitions altogether.     

Operant Variability: A Conceptual Analysis

Some researchers claim that variability is an operant dimension of behavior. The present paper reviews the concept of operant behavior and emphasizes that differentiation is the behavioral process that demonstrates an operant relation. Differentiation is conceived as change in the overlap between two probability distributions: the distribution of reinforcement probability as a function of some response property (S distribution) and the probability distribution of the response property itself (R distribution). This concept implies that the differentiation process can be measured only if S distribution and R distribution are both established on the same response property. To determine whether the differentially reinforced behavioral variability fits the proposed concept of operant behavior, I examine the main procedures (lag n and threshold procedures) and the main dependent variable (U value) employed in the studies of operant variability. Because lag n and threshold procedures establish their S distributions on properties distinct from U value, differentiation cannot be measured over the change in U value. I conclude that studies of operant variability have failed to provide a direct demonstration that variability is an operant dimension of behavior. Hence, studies in which measures of variability provide a basis to measure differentiation can better support the claim that variability is an operant dimension of behavior.