Confucian Ethics, Public Policy, and the Nurse-Family Partnership

The Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP), a thirty-year program of research in the United States focused on early childhood preventive intervention, offers a powerful example of the kinds of programs and public policies that Confucian understandings of parent?Cchild relationships and moral cultivation might recommend in contemporary societies today. NFP findings, as well as its theoretical foundations, lend empirical support to early Confucian views of the role of parent?Cchild relationships in human moral development, the nature and possibility of moral self-cultivation, and the task of creating and sustaining a good society, which gives philosophers who are interested in ethical claims that reflect and inform actual practice good reasons to take Confucian ethics seriously. Additionally, the evidence provided by the NFP and early Confucian accounts can both be used to promote social change, which highlights how the sciences and the humanities can work together in complementary ways to address societal problems.     

Confucian Moral Realism

In this paper I construct Confucian moral realism as a metaethical theory that is compatible with, or even derivable from, traditional Confucianism. The paper is at once interpretative and constructive. In my analysis, Confucians can establish the realist's claims on moral properties because they embrace the view of a moralistic universe. Moral properties in Confucian ethics not only are presented as objective, naturalistic properties, but also are seen as ‘causally efficacious’. There are several theses commonly endorsed by contemporary moral realists. I will explain how many of the remarks by Confucius, Mencius, in Yijing, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean can be understood as implicit endorsements of these theses. I will also analyze the theses specific to Confucian moral realism. The paper will end with a brief defense of this form of realism.     

Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation in Confucian Role-Based Ethics

How is the Confucian moral agent motivated to do what he or she judges to be right or good? In western philosophy, the answer to a question such as this depends on whether one is an internalist or externalist concerning moral motivation. In this article, I will first interpret Confucian ethics as role-based ethics and then argue that we can attribute to Confucianism a position on moral motivation that is neither internalist nor externalist but somewhere in between. I will then illustrate my claim with my reading of Mencius 6A4, showing that it is superior to readings found in the literature, which typically assume that Mencius is an internalist.     

Philosophy and Public Policy: A Role for Social Moral Epistemology

abstract   Part 1 of this essay argues that one of the most important contributions of philosophers to sound public policy may be to combat the influence of bad Philosophy (which includes, but is not limited to, bad Philosophy produced by accredited academic philosophers). Part 2 argues that the conventional conception of Practical Ethics (CPE) that philosophers bring to issues of public policy is defective because it fails to take seriously the phenomenon of the subversion of morality, the role of false factual beliefs in this subversion, and the vulnerability to the exploitation of our moral powers that our social-epistemic dependency entails. Given the serious risks of the subversion of morality through the propagation of false factual beliefs, CPE's near exclusive emphasis on identifying sound moral principles greatly constrains its potential contribution to the Negative Task of Practical Ethics, the endeavour to reduce the incidence of the most grievously wrong behaviour. Practical ethicists should focus more on the ethics of believing, and develop a more sophisticated conception of the moral and epistemic virtues of individuals and of institutions, one that includes protective meta-virtues, whose function it is to guard us against the more frequent and predictable subversions of morality, including those subversions that are facilitated by the processes of belief-formation that our social institutions and practices foster .     

Adaptationism and Early Confucian Moral Psychology

Ryan Nichols in his recent article ‘A genealogy of early Confucian moral psychology’ argues that the discussion of Confucius and Mencius on moral emotions can be provided an evolutionary analysis. Nichols’ argument is based on the evolutionary value of kin-relations and the origin of emotions toward kin in human society. In this article I argue that Nichols’ argument is flawed because he endorses an adaptationist program of human moral psychology. The adaptationists treat kin-relations and our emotions toward kin as a straightforward result of natural selection and adaptation. They ignore any non-adaptationist interpretation of biological traits. As more and more evolutionary biologists discover that the adaptationist program is too simplistic to understand the diverse evolutionary pathways of living beings, Nichols’ project is not justified due to its reliance on this problematic adaptationist program.     

儒家道德哲学及其审美境界

中国审美文化从本质意义上说是一种与天地亲和的生命文化,儒家传统最基本的特征就是肯定天人之间所具有本体论的一致性,因此儒家不从信仰出发来解释生命的伟大德行,而是从生生不息的生命本身来观照道德的本源。儒家作为生命的实践者,凭借其内在的生命力量,通过澄心静虑、心游目想,通过直观感悟、直觉体悟,以达到人生境界与审美境界的合一。这一过程既是道德主体的一种心理体验,更是道德主体通过一种外在践履工夫的求证。     

The Problem of Confucian Moral Cultivation and Its Solution: Using Ritual Propriety to Support Rule by Law

Thinking about the decline of morality in post-reform China,the author analyzes the development of virtuous governance based on moral education,and concludes that the reason why ancient rulers were so infatuated with it was the inhibitive function of public evaluation on moral transgressions in familiar neighborhoods.However,as China transforms into a dynamic and commercial society,and its people move from familiar neighborhoods to alienated communities in the cities,public evaluation is losing its power over moral transgressors.To prevent the collapse of the moral system,it is necessary to use rule by law to foster people's sense of justice and rule-consciousness-not to simply hope for the appearance of more altruists.This is possible because law is the embodiment of moral principle,and because legal restraints and penalties can be internalized as habits.After a sense of justice and rule-consciousness has been established in people,we can again take up Confucian virtue education to nurture people's sense of shame and dignity,and their humane and righteous mind.However,to stop the current chaos and corruption,it is urgent that we adopt rule by law and supplement it with moral education.     

Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide from Confucian Moral Perspectives

This essay first discusses the three major arguments in favor of euthanasia and physician-assisted-suicide in contemporary Western society, viz., the arguments of mercy, preventing indignity, and individual autonomy. It then articulates both Confucian consonance and dissonance to them. The first two arguments make use of Confucian discussions on suicide whereas the last argument appeals to Confucian social-political thought. It concludes that from the Confucian moral perspectives, none of the three arguments is fully convincing.     

公共道德与私人道德的关系问题

本文试图厘清公共道德与私人道德之间的关系,包括它们的异同、相互之间的可引出性、它们的源头等问题。既从义务论的角度论证公共道德的非个人性,又从公共道德观的发生学的角度论证公共道德的非个人性的相对性。认为公职人员作为伦理主体在面临道德困境时,必须行使其价值判断、道德选择,并对其行为负责。     

儒家伦理的基德和荣格的道德观

作为中国传统文化之主体的儒家伦理,已经确立了中国传统文化的"基德"或"母德",这是在长达2000多年历史发展中形成的,经过先秦时期的百家争鸣,形成了独树一帜的儒家思想,董仲舒提出"抑黜百家、独尊儒术"的建议,确立了儒家在中国社会的统治地位。经过以后历代的兼收并蓄和对立融合,发展成为儒、道、佛融合一体的宋明理学,近代中国社会对儒家思想的批判性发展,促使人们对儒家伦理思想进行时代的反思。荣格的分析心理学思想为东西方道德观的比较提供了一种独特的研究视角。     

儒家和谐伦理体系及其道德哲学意义

儒家在历史上进行的最成功的努力之一,就是建立一个和谐道德哲学体系与和谐伦理精神体系.这个和谐道德哲学体系与和谐伦理精神体系具体表现为四个结构:道德哲学体系、伦理精神体系与家国一体、由家及国的特殊社会结构之间的和谐;以"五伦"为原理的伦理世界的和谐;以"四德"为内核的道德世界的和谐;以"中庸"为境界的伦理世界与道德世界之间的和谐.     

儒家德刑观论析

在道德与法律、德治与刑罚的关系问题上,儒家从其仁爱的思想原则出发,主张为政以德,强调社会管理者自身的道德修养;主张德刑兼治、德主刑辅,重德治、轻刑政;主张宽猛相济,先教后刑;主张富而后教,强调社会道德教化,重视道德对人们行为的规范作用。儒家的德刑观在中国社会长期的历史发展中产生了深远的影响,今天仍然可以为我们的道德建设和法制建设提供许多有益的借鉴和启示。     

儒家道德形而上学问题探究

道德形而上学,主要解释了道德的普遍性与必然性的原理,它是道德哲学的基本问题之一.在儒学的构成中,道德问题是贯穿其整个学说的主线,自然也留下了大量关于道德形而上学的系统论述.经历了先秦时期的萌芽,宋明时期的发展,直至近现代的完善,儒家道德形而上学理论生成了自身独具的结构范式.它通过对非感性世界的追问,为人们的道德生活与意义世界提供了源于生命内在自我领悟的终极关怀.它从根本上决定了儒家道德理想、道德原则、道德评价、道德规范、道德序列以及道德修养的内涵.     

德教概念的儒学意蕴

德教是由上个世纪的中叶,从中国东南沿海传至东南亚,在东南亚华人中广为流传的一种新兴的民间宗教。它已接近成型,有自己的教主、神灵系统、教义、经典;有自己独特的宗教仪式、祈祷方式、通过扶鸾沟通神人;有固定的宗教活动场所、德教会的组织和称之为德生的宗教信徒。应该说现代宗教学所界定宗教的基本要素,德教或多或     

Moral Psychology of Shame in Early Confucian Philosophy

In Western philosophy and psychology, shame is characterized as a self-critical emotion that is often contrasted with the similarly self-critical but morally active emotion of guilt. If shame is negative concern over endangered or threatened self-image (usually in front of others), guilt is autonomous moral awareness of one’s wrongdoings and reparative motivation to correct one’s moral misconduct. Recently, many psychologists have begun to discuss the moral significance of shame in their comparative studies of non-Western cultures. In this new approach, shame is characterized as a positive moral emotion and active motivation for self-reflection and self-cultivation. If shame is a positive and active moral emotion, what is its moral psychological nature? In this paper, I will analyze shame from the perspective of cultural psychology and early Confucian philosophy. Unlike many Western philosophers, Confucius and Mencius discuss shame as a form of moral excellence. In early Confucian texts, shame is not a reactive emotion of an endangered self but a moral disposition that supports a self-critical and self-transformative process of moral development.