The effects of statistical training on choice heuristics in choice under uncertainty

Kahneman and Tversky (1984) proposed that decision makers perceive choice uncertainty in two ways: (1) as a distribution of possible outcomes or (2) as a single uncertain outcome. Using statistical training as a factor that influences these perceptions, and thus the type of decision approach individuals use, we found that individuals with different levels of experience displayed differences in the decisions they made and in the choice heuristics used to make those decisions. Statistically naive individuals were more likely to prefer loss-minimizing alternatives, use a more non-compensatory heuristic, and spend more time on loss-related information than their statistically experienced counterparts. When a distributional cue, indicating the distributional nature of choice outcomes, was presented to both experience groups, the naive group was found to use a decision approach similar to the experienced group and to make similar decisions. The results are discussed in terms of the need to include factors that alter individuals' approaches to uncertainty in future behavioral models of uncertain choice.     

Personality and values as predictors of medical specialty choice

Research rarely considers the combined influence of personality traits and values in predicting behavioral outcomes. We aimed to advance a germinal line of inquiry that addresses this gap by separately and simultaneously examining personality traits and physician work values to predict medical specialty choice. First-year medical students (125 women and 119 men) responded to measures of personality and physician work values. After graduation, participants' residency choices were identified. Results indicated that personality traits predict person- or technique-oriented medical specialty choice. Physician work values, whether used alone or in tandem with personality traits, however, did not significantly predict specialty choice. Implications for practice and research are discussed.     

Biases and Heuristics in Decision Making and Their Impact on Autonomy

Cognitive scientists have identified a wide range of biases and heuristics in human decision making over the past few decades. Only recently have bioethicists begun to think seriously about the implications of these findings for topics such as agency, autonomy, and consent. This article aims to provide an overview of biases and heuristics that have been identified and a framework in which to think comprehensively about the impact of them on the exercise of autonomous decision making. I analyze the impact that these biases and heuristics have on the following dimensions of autonomy: understanding, intentionality, absence of alienating or controlling influence, and match between formally autonomous preferences or decisions and actual choices or actions.     

Training fast and frugal heuristics in military decision making

Fast and frugal heuristics have been used to model decision making in applied domains very effectively, suggesting that they could be used to improve applied decision making. We developed a fast and frugal heuristic for infantry decisions using experts from the British Army. This was able to predict around 80% of their decisions using three cues. Next, we examined the benefits of learning to use the fast and frugal heuristic by training junior officers in the British Army to apply the heuristic and assessing their accuracy and mental workload when making decisions. Their performance was compared to a control condition of junior officers who applied standard military decision methods. Participants using the fast and frugal heuristic made decisions as accurately as participants in the control condition, but with reduced mental demand. This demonstrates that fast and frugal heuristics can be learnt and are as effective as analytic decision methods.     

Evaluating a dual‐process model of risk: affect and cognition as determinants of risky choice

In three studies we addressed the impact of perceived risk and negative affect on risky choice. In Study 1, we tested a model that included both perceived risk and negative affect as predictors of risky choice. Study 2 and Study 3 replicated these findings and examined the impact of affective versus cognitive processing modes. In all the three studies, both perceived risk and negative affect were shown to be significant predictors of risky choice. Furthermore, Study 2 and Study 3 showed that an affective processing mode strengthened the relation between negative affect and risky choice and that a cognitive processing mode strengthened the relation between perceived risk and risky choice. Together, these findings show support for the idea of a dual‐process model of risky choice. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Conservatism positively predicted fading affect bias in the 2016 US presidential election at low,but not high,levels of negative affect

Unpleasant affect fades faster than pleasant affect and this Fading Affect Bias (FAB) phenomenon is positively related to healthy outcomes and negatively related to unhealthy outcomes, which makes the FAB a healthy coping process/reaction. Rehearsal seems to be the cognitive mechanism responsible for the FAB. Although the FAB and its relation to healthy outcomes and rehearsal have been examined in many contexts, they have not been evaluated in the realm of politics. Therefore, we evaluated the FAB across event type and we examined the relation of FAB to political leaning (conservatism), unhealthy variables, healthy variables, and rehearsal for the 2016 US Presidential Election. We expected and found that FAB was larger for non‐political events than for election/political events, and conservatism positively predicted FAB. We also expected and found that unhealthy/healthy outcome variables related to FAB in predictable ways. Importantly, we found that negative affect moderated the relation of FAB and conservatism, and rehearsal ratings mediated this 3‐way interaction. The results supported emotion regulation models, such as the mobilization‐minimization hypothesis and self‐enhancement theory.     

Strategy Selection in Risky Choice: The Impact of Numeracy,Affect, and Cross‐Cultural Differences

Real‐world decisions often involve options with outcomes that are uncertain and trigger strong affect (e.g., side effects of a drug). Previous work suggests that when choosing among affect‐rich risky prospects, people are rather insensitive to probability information, potentially compromising decision quality. We modeled the strategies of less and more numerate participants in the United States and in Germany when choosing between affect‐rich prospects and between monetarily equivalent affect‐poor prospects. Using large probabilistic national samples (n = 1047 from the United States and Germany), Study 1 showed that compared with more numerate participants, less numerate participants chose the normatively better option (i.e., the one with the higher expected value) less often, guessed more often, and relied more on a simple risk‐minimizing strategy. U.S. participants—although less numerate—selected the normatively better option more frequently and were more consistent across affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems than the German participants. Using a targeted quota sample (n = 118 from Germany), Study 2 indicated that although both more and less numerate participants paid less attention to probability information in affect‐rich than in affect‐poor problems, the two numeracy groups relied on different outcome‐based heuristics: More numerate participants often followed the minimax heuristic, and less numerate participants the affect heuristic. The observed strategy differences suggest that attempts to improve decision‐making need to take into account individual differences in numeracy as well as cultural‐specific experiences in making trade‐offs. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Numeracy as a Predictor of Adaptive Risky Decision Making

Numeracy or one's ability to appropriately process and use numerical information has been shown to be an important individual difference factor in decision making. The current study utilized a risky decision‐making task (called the “cups task”) in which choices are made to both earn and avoid losing hypothetical money. Critically, this design allowed investigators to examine numeracy‐related differences in adaptive decision‐making as measured by sensitivity to expected value (EV) differences over 54 paired‐choice trials—some in which it was advantageous to take a risk and some in which it was not. Results showed that in an undergraduate sample of 114 individuals, the less numerate took more risks and were less sensitive to varying EV levels than the more numerate, especially when it was disadvantageous to take a risk and when the choice involved a potential loss (rather than a gain). These results are consistent with a dual processing account in which the more numerate are much better than the less numerate at extracting the precise affective “gist” of the numerical information, which is then used to determine the goodness or badness of a particular choice. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decision Pattern Analysis as a General Framework for Studying Individual Differences in Decision Making

This paper investigated decision pattern analysis (DPA) as a general and standard framework for studying individuals' consistent decision making behavior within and between contexts. DPA classifies decisions on the basis of judgement accuracy and the goal orientation of the decided‐upon action. Over repeated decisions, patterns of individuals' decision behavior are described by five variables: competence, optimality, recklessness, hesitancy and decisiveness. A fictitious medical decision making test and three standard cognitive ability tests (extended with confidence ratings and a ‘submit answer for marking’ decision) were used to investigate the psychometric properties of these DPA variables. Internal consistency of the decision patterns ranged from good to excellent. Convergent validity was assessed via cognitive abilities, metacognitive confidence and a control criterion imposed on confidence that determines the decision to be made: the point of sufficient certainty. Personality variables were included to assess discriminant validity. As hypothesised, cognitive abilities showed positive correlations with competence and optimality. High confidence, low points of sufficient certainty and a greater discrepancy between them were associated with higher decisiveness and recklessness, and lower hesitancy. Personality measures showed mixed and generally weak correlations with the DPA variables. These convergent and discriminant results also held after controlling for all variables in regression. The results provide preliminary psychometric support for DPA as a general framework of behavioral decision making. DPA has the potential to be exploited in many contexts for uses that, to date, have been unachievable in a psychometrically valid manner. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Feelings of dread and intertemporal choice

It frequently has been observed that people discount future rewards relative to present rewards. However, the literature on intertemporal choices involving emotional upsets and losses is fraught with inconsistencies, with some studies finding similar discounting of gains and losses, and others reporting that participants elect to undergo negative experiences sooner rather than later. To help resolve these contradictions, time preferences for different types of aversive experiences (social rejection, embarrassment, pain, monetary and property loss) were examined in five studies. Most participants preferred to postpone monetary and property losses, but intertemporal choices for other unpleasant experiences showed highly variable responses, with some participants deferring them as long as possible, and many electing to experience them immediately. Time preferences for these negative experiences were correlated, but were independent of time preference for rewards. It is argued (following Loewenstein, 1987 ) that anticipation of dread plays a key role in many people's choices about timing of aversive experiences. This interpretation was supported by choices about when to learn of a very unpleasant event whose timing was fixed (Study 3), and by a novel preference reversal (Study 4). Study 5 examined how actual and hypothetical experiences of dread unfolded over time; the results were consistent with a dread‐based interpretation of choices in the preceding studies. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Development of Judgment and Decision Making During Childhood and Adolescence

Research on adult judgment and decision making has focused on deviations from normative models, demonstrating biases and reliance on heuristic shortcuts, thus presenting a very different picture than developmental theories that describe a unidirectional progression toward greater logic and efficiency. Recent research related to this apparent contradiction indicates that children develop competencies to reason effectively and make normative decisions, but also develop biased judgment strategies that are used inappropriately in some situations. We suggest potential explanations for the findings, highlighting the need to consider models that incorporate development in both experiential and analytic information processing systems.     

The lure of choice

We report three studies demonstrating the ‘lure of choice’ people prefer options that allow them to take further choices over those that do not, even when the extra choices cannot improve the ultimate outcome. In Studies 1 and 2, participants chose between two options: one solitary item, and a pair of items between which they would then make a further choice. Consistent with the lure of choice, a given item was more likely to be the ultimate choice when it was initially part of a choice pair than when it was offered on its own. We also demonstrate the lure of choice in a four‐door version of the Monty Hall problem, in which participants could either stick with their original choice or switch to one of two unopened doors. Participants were more likely to switch if they could first ‘choose to choose’ between the two unopened doors (without immediately specifying which) than if they had to choose one door straightaway. We conclude by suggesting that the lure of choice is due to a choice heuristic that is very reliable in the natural world, but much less so in a world created by marketers. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Selection of Decision Strategies After Conscious and Unconscious Thought

It is commonly assumed that the use of simple, non‐compensatory strategies is especially pronounced in memory‐based decisions, where information costs are high. At the same time, there is evidence that in memory‐based decisions, a compensatory processing of attributes is facilitated when the processing occurs unconsciously rather than consciously. We applied a strategy classification approach—developed in research on non‐compensatory heuristics—to test two key tenets of unconscious thought theory: the capacity principle and the weighting principle. Participants memorized attribute information about cars and were subsequently either directed to or diverted from thinking consciously about their preferences between the cars (conscious versus unconscious thought). Then, participants indicated in pair‐wise choices which car they would prefer and were classified (based on their choices) as using either one of two compensatory strategies (equal weight or weighted additive) or a non‐compensatory strategy (lexicographic heuristic). In line with the capacity principle, the number of participants best described by a compensatory strategy (the equal‐weight strategy) tended to be higher after unconscious thought than after conscious thought, whereas the number of participants best described by the lexicographic heuristic tended to be lower. Inconsistent with the weighting principle, participants in the unconscious thought condition were better described by the equal‐weight strategy than by the weighted‐additive strategy. In Experiment 2, in which participants were not instructed to form an impression while learning the attribute information, the use of the equal‐weight strategy was not more prevalent after unconscious thought. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“时间贫穷”对跨期决策和前瞻行为的影响及其认知机制

紧张的社会节奏使人们感觉时间正在变少,从而产生时间匮乏的心理感知和思维模式,这一现象概括为"时间贫穷"。"时间贫穷"会对个体认知判断、情绪和行为控制力产生重要影响。通过行为科学和认知神经科学相结合的研究方法,从行为反应-心理机制-神经机制三个层面研究时间贫穷对跨期决策和前瞻行为的影响。研究分为3个部分:(1)时间贫穷对个体认知判断、情绪和行为控制力的影响;(2)时间贫穷对跨期决策的影响;(3)组织中时间贫穷对前瞻行为的影响。通过系列研究,拟解决3个关键问题:(1)时间贫穷如何影响人们的认知判断,导致非理性决策行为?(2)时间贫穷影响认知判断和跨期决策的神经机制究竟是什么?(3)时间贫穷对管理决策带来哪些挑战?对这些问题的深入探讨,不仅对行为决策理论的发展有重要贡献;而且对组织如何进行有效的管理制度设计,避免个体和组织陷入"时间贫穷陷阱",同样有很强的实践意义。     

Attention and attribute overlap in preferential choice

Attributes that are common, or overlapping, across alternatives in two-alternative forced preferential choice tasks are often non-diagnostic. In many settings, attending to and evaluating these attributes does not help the decision maker determine which of the available alternatives is the most desirable. For this reason, many existing behavioural theories propose that decision makers ignore common attributes while deliberating. Across six experiments, we find that decision makers do direct their attention selectively and ignore attributes that are not present in or associated with either of the available alternatives. However, they are as likely to attend to common attributes as they are to attend to attributes that are unique to a single alternative. These results suggest the need for novel theories of attention in preferential choice.     

时间框架对决策的影响

时间是影响决策偏好一致性的重要因素,时间框架与行为决策之间的相互关系是决策科学领域关沣的重要问题.本研究采用实验方法,运用跨时选择研究范式对延迟决策和提前决策进行对比研究.实验结果表明,时间框架对跨时选样产生显著影响;同一时间距离条件下,提前框架下的时间折扣低于延迟框架下的时间折扣,即存在时间维度的框架效应.     

权力对延迟选择的影响

本研究旨在考察权力对延迟选择的影响, 并探讨决策难度在其中的调节作用以及决策过程的中介作用。两个实验均先操纵个体的权力状态, 然后再请被试完成随后的延迟选择任务。结果发现, 决策难度可调节权力对延迟选择的影响, 当决策困难时, 高权力者具有更低的延迟倾向, 当决策容易时, 权力的影响消失。决策过程的加工变异性可中介权力对延迟选择的影响。结果表明, 低权力者比高权力者具有更高的延迟倾向(尤其当决策困难时), 不同权力水平者在决策过程上的差异或可部分解释此种现象。     

The Effect of Decision Strategy on Deciding to Defer Choice

Recent research has examined consumer decision making when the option of not choosing any of the alternatives is also provided. The findings from this research suggest that the decision to defer choice is sensitive to the uncertainty of choosing the most preferred option from the set of alternatives provided. Building on this research, the author tests whether the decision to defer choice is also influenced by task variables that influence decision uncertainty. In the first experiment, this proposition is tested for choice problems in which information on three relatively equally attractive alternatives is presented either sequentially or simultaneously. As predicted, the preference for the defer-choice option was greater when the three alternatives were presented simultaneously. A second study forced subjects into using one of four decision strategies in order to choose between two non-dominated alternatives. The preference for the no-choice option was found to be higher when the rule required explicit attribute tradeoffs and lower when it simplified choice. These results suggest that choice uncertainty is influenced by the decision strategy used to determine the preference among alternatives. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of the results for marketers' communication strategies.