Changes in Negative Reciprocity as a Function of Age

Standard economic models assume people exclusively pursue material self‐interests in social interactions. However, people exhibit social preferences; that is, they base their choices partly on the outcomes others obtained in a social interaction. People care about fairness, and reciprocity affects behavior. This study examines the differences in negative reciprocity (costly punishment for unfair divisions) as a function of age. Sixty‐one kindergarteners (5‐year‐olds), 53 second graders (8‐year‐olds), and 57 sixth graders (12‐year‐olds) played a dictator game or a mini–ultimatum game either with a human proposer or with a random machine that determined the division between the two players. By keeping the divisions between the players constant and varying the source of the unfair proposal, we were able to differentiate between reciprocity‐based and inequality‐aversion preferences. We found that kindergarteners proposed and accepted unfair divisions regardless of the source of the offer, behaving according to the standard economic model. Children in the sixth grade tended to reject unfair offers from a human proposer but accept unfair divisions from a random device, indicating the emergence of negative reciprocity preferences by age eight (and contrary to inequality aversion). Children at this age also tended to give more fair offers in the ultimatum game than in the dictator game, indicating the emergence of strategic thinking. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

议价博弈决策的权利认知效应

在议价博弈中,决策者可能存在因对自己及其他参与者拥有权利的认识程度不同,从而影响其策略选择及决策行为的现象。为验证该“权利认知效应”的存在,用实验法考察了240名不同年龄被试在两种议价博弈任务——最后通牒和纳什议价中的决策表现,结果发现：（1）6到12岁儿童和大学生中均存在权利认知效应;（2）随着年龄增长,受权利认知影响的人数呈现逐渐减少的趋势;（3）在议价博弈中,儿童对分配权的认识程度高于对否决权的认知。     

不同博弈情境下社会排斥对社会决策的影响作用

本研究借助经典的最后通牒博弈范式(UG)和独裁者博弈范式(DG),将回应者/接受者作为研究对象,考察了不同公平条件、平等条件下社会排斥对社会决策的影响作用。实验结果发现:(1)在面对高不公平性的分配方案时,被排斥组比被接纳组更倾向于拒绝接受该分配方案;(2)被排斥组对高不公平性分配方案的满意度要显著低于被接纳组;(3)被排斥组在不平等的博弈(DG)条件下对分配方案的满意度显著低于平等博弈(UG)条件下对分配方案的满意度。本研究结果说明,社会排斥情境下的被试对公平与平等因素更加敏感:在高不公平条件下,被排斥的个体表现出更少的合作互惠行为,甚至不惜放弃自身经济利益,也要惩罚博弈对方的不公平行为;此外,在不平等的博弈条件下,被排斥的个体产生了更多的消极情绪体验。本文的研究结果提高了社会决策研究的生态效度和传统决策模型的预测效度,有利于更加完整透彻地了解社会决策的影响因素。     

Quota vs positional power in four-person apex games

In coalition formation experiments, which coalitions will form and how players in coalitions will allocate their jointly gained rewards are typically predicted as a function of the players' relative power. In this paper, we isolated two logically independent sources of a player's power: the player's contribution to the rewards obtainable by coalitions of which he may be a member (“quota power”), and the number of distinct coalitions which a player may join (“positional power”). The separation of the two types of power is clearly shown in apex games, where a single player (Apex) attempts to lure any of the other players (Base) from the coalition of all Bases. A series of four-person computer-controlled apex and nonapex characteristic function games, varying with respect to the relationship of quota power to positional power, were played by 15 quartets of male players. Quota power was strongly manifested in all outcome measures, while positional power appeared only as a bias toward equal allocations of reward when coalitions among players of equal positional power formed. Neither of two social psychological theories that are applicable, pivotal power and weighted probability theory, predicted coalition frequencies. In a test of five solution concepts, the competitive bargaining set predicted payoff allocations better than either of the two aforementioned theories, the kernel, or an equal-split model.     

亲社会视频游戏中的合作对博弈决策中合作行为的影响

以38名大学生和研究生为被试,采用Chicken Game实验范式测量合作行为,考察了单人和双人合作模式游戏后,性别和游戏习惯对玩家在博弈决策中合作行为的影响。结果表明：（1）双人合作模式游戏可以促进玩家在博弈决策中的合作行为;（2）双人合作模式游戏后,男玩家（相比女玩家）在博弈决策中的合作行为更多;（3）玩游戏的习惯影响博弈决策中的合作行为,相比于经常习惯与现实朋友玩游戏和独自玩游戏的玩家,经常习惯与网友玩游戏的玩家在双人合作模式游戏后的合作行为更多。本研究不仅证实了一般学习模型,也证实了亲社会合作类视频游戏可以有效促进博弈决策中的合作行为。     

人情与公正的抉择:社会距离对第三方干预的影响

第三方干预(third-party intervention)是一种重要的利他行为,它包括惩罚和补偿两种措施。本研究结合情境性问卷与实验法,采用修改后的独裁者博弈范式(Dictator Game,DG),让被试作为第三方对朋友或者陌生人的不公平行为进行干预,考察社会距离对第三方干预的影响。研究发现:(1)对于朋友提出的不公平方案,个体对其的惩罚轻于陌生人,而对第二方(无权者)的补偿没有显著差异。(2)个体对朋友的不公平提议的公平性判断高于陌生人,但提议引发的情绪体验没有显著差异。上述结果表明,社会距离可能通过影响个体对不公平行为的公平感知,进而影响其第三方干预行为。     

The Sticky Anchor Hypothesis: Ego Depletion Increases Susceptibility to Situational Cues

Self‐control depletion has been linked both to increased selfish behavior and increased susceptibility to situational cues. The present research tested two competing hypotheses about the consequence of depletion by measuring how people allocate rewards between themselves and another person. Seven experiments analyzed behavior in standard dictator games and reverse dictator games, settings in which participants could take money from another person. Across all of these experiments, depleted participants made smaller changes to the initial allocation, thereby sticking closer to the default position (anchor) than non‐depleted participants. These findings provide support for a “sticky anchor hypothesis,” which states that the effects of depletion on behavior are influenced by the proximal situational cues rather than by directly stimulating selfishness per se. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

影响博弈结果的方法效应研究

最后通谍博弈和独裁者博弈是实验经济学的经典博弈,也被心理学家用来研究人的公平和利他行为。该研究考查了经济学和心理学通常的报酬支付方式、博弈中待分配的金额是否影响博弈结果,以及两个博弈进行组内实验时是否会产生顺序效应。结果发现支付方式和金额不影响博弈结果,但有顺序效应产生。该研究对国内研究者进一步借用这两个博弈的相关研究打下了一定的方法学基础。     

Lex talionis: Testosterone and the law of retaliation

Research examining both the organizing and activating effects of testosterone in one-shot bargaining contexts has been vexed by inconsistencies. Some research finds that high-testosterone men are more likely to reject unfair offers in an ultimatum game and exogenous administration of testosterone to men leads to less generous offers. In contrast, other research finds that higher prenatal exposure to testosterone predicts more generous dictator game offers and administering testosterone to women leads to more generous ultimatum game offers. The current research seeks to resolve these inconsistencies by examining how the organizing effects of testosterone affect bargaining behavior. Because testosterone is associated with status seeking and concerns with social reputation, we hypothesized that testosterone would predict aggressive bargaining but only after provocation. Two studies found that prenatal testosterone exposure, as measured by 2D:4D ratio, led to aggressive responses for both males and females, but only after they received unfair offers. Furthermore, perceptions of fairness violations moderated but did not mediate the effect of testosterone on retributional responding. These results suggest that the organizing effects of testosterone have consistent effects on bargaining behavior for both males and females but its predictive ability requires some form of provocation to emerge.     

双人合作类电子/传统游戏对幼儿同伴交往与亲社会行为的影响

近期研究表明短时接触双人电子游戏有助于促进幼儿的同伴交往与亲社会行为。本研究进一步考查了5天的双人合作类电子游戏与传统游戏干预对幼儿社会化的影响。结果显示,电子与传统游戏干预均能促进幼儿的同伴交往和亲社会行为,且两者的效果不存在差异;女孩比男孩更喜欢自己的搭档、更乐于与同伴交往和分享,游戏干预效果不存在性别差异。可见双人合作类电子/传统游戏干预对幼儿的同伴交往和亲社会行为发展都较有裨益。     

Associations between empathy and altruistic sharing behavior in Chinese adults

Previous research has shown that affective empathy, rather than cognitive empathy, significantly predicts people’s altruistic sharing behavior in economic games. However, most of these studies were conducted in Western populations. There might be cultural differences in the relations between empathy and altruism due to different levels of empathy between Western and Asian individuals. In this study, we measured different aspects of empathy in Chinese adults as well as their allocation offers in the dictator and ultimatum games. We found that cognitive empathy, but not affective empathy, was a significant predictor of adults’ altruistic sharing behavior in the two economic games. Subjective family income was also revealed to be a significant predictor of individuals’ altruism in the ultimatum game, such that people with lower subjective family income tended to be more generous. Potential implications of our findings are discussed.     

Social value orientations and the strategic use of fairness in ultimatum bargaining

One of the main issues in research on ultimatum bargaining is whether bargainers are motivated by self-interest or by a concern for fairness. It is difficult to distinguish between both motivations, because it may be in the own interest to make fair offers. In the current paper on ultimatum bargaining, it is investigated whether bargainers are truly motivated to be fair, or whether they merely strategically use fairness as a means to increase their own outcomes. The results of two experimental studies indicate that social value orientations play an important role: strategic use of fairness is mainly displayed by proselfs.     

What you don’t know won’t hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games

We used simple economic games to examine pro-social behavior and the lengths that people will take to avoid engaging in it. Over two studies, we found that about one-third of participants were willing to “exit” a $10 dictator game and take $9 instead. The exit option left the receiver nothing, but also ensured that the receiver never knew that a dictator game was to be played. Because most social utility models are defined over monetary outcomes, they cannot explain choosing the ($9, $0) exit outcome over the dominating $10 dictator game, since the game includes outcomes of ($10, $0) and ($9, $1). We also studied exiting using a “private” dictator game. In the private game, the receiver never knew about the game or from where any money was received. Gifts in this game were added innocuously to a payment for a separate task. Almost no dictators exited from the private game, indicating that receivers’ beliefs are the key factor in the decision to exit. When, as in the private game, the receivers’ beliefs and expectations cannot be manipulated by exit, exit is seldom taken. We conclude that giving often reflects a desire not to violate others’ expectations rather than a concern for others’ welfare per se. We discuss the implications of our results for understanding ethical decisions and for testing and modeling social preferences. An adequate specification of social preferences should include “psychological” payoffs that directly incorporate beliefs about actions into the utility function.     

Individual Differences in Good Manners Rather Than Compassion Predict Fair Allocations of Wealth in the Dictator Game

One of the most common tools for studying pro‐sociality is the dictator game, in which allocations to one's partner are often described in terms of altruism. However, the motivations driving these allocations may represent either emotional concern for others (compassion), adherence to social norms regarding fairness (politeness), or both. In this article, we apply personality psychology to the study of behavior in the dictator game, in which we examine the discriminant validity of distinct pro‐social constructs from the Big Five and HEXACO models in relation to allocations of wealth. Across four studies (Study 1: N = 192; Study 2: N = 212; Study 3: N = 304; Study 4: N = 90) utilizing both hypothetical and incentivized designs, we found that the politeness—but not compassion—aspect of Big Five Agreeableness, as well as HEXACO Honesty‐Humility, uniquely predicted dictator allocations within their respective personality models. These findings contribute to a growing literature indicating that the standard dictator game measures “good manners” or adherence to norms concerning fairness, rather than pure emotional concern or compassionate motives, and have important implications for how this paradigm is used and interpreted in psychological research.     

The universal nature of human intelligence: Evidence from games

Mentally retarded individuals have relatively greater difficulty in dealing with strategic games and puzzles than with many other tasks. Consequently, it is of interest to find that strategic games have been played since ancient times, are played throughout the world, and that players who excel are frequently considered wise. Hidden within the more obvious differences between cultures, strategic games are an invariant expression of certain universal intellectual traits.     

Logic Games are Complete for Game Logics

Game logics describe general games through powers of players for forcing outcomes. In particular, they encode an algebra of sequential game operations such as choice, dual and composition. Logic games are special games for specific purposes such as proof or semantical evaluation for first-order or modal languages. We show that the general algebra of game operations coincides with that over just logical evaluation games, whence the latter are quite general after all. The main tool in proving this is a representation of arbitrary games as modal or first-order evaluation games. We probe how far our analysis extends to product operations on games. We also discuss some more general consequences of this new perspective for standard logic.     

Power influences the expression of Honesty-Humility: The power-exploitation affordances hypothesis

Across different experiments we show that individual differences in Honesty-Humility predict exploitation in economic games, and that this relation is moderated by situational power. Power was manipulated by comparing games in which allocators either had absolute power (dictator game), intermediate (delta game), or shared power (ultimatum game) over joint outcomes. We developed the power-exploitation affordances hypothesis that predicts that allocators with lower Honesty-Humility act more exploitative when they have absolute power than when their power is intermediate or shared. Additionally, we also tested these predictions for the actual earnings in these games. The results were generally supportive of our main hypotheses. Our findings contribute to understanding situational and personality effects on how individuals behave in positions of power (e.g., leaders).     

Is behavioral pro-sociality game-specific? Pro-social preference and expectations of pro-sociality

We observed the behaviors of the same people across five games – two prisoner’s dilemma games, a trust game (in which the subject took on the role of both truster and trustee), a dictator game, and a faith game – any pair of which was separated by an interval of several months to reduce potential carry-over effects, and found strong consistency in behaviors among these games. We also found consistency between the expectations of other players’ behaviors and the player’s own behavior across games. We further found that the consistent behavioral pro-sociality observed across different games was related to the general measures of pro-social value orientation and perceiving the game situations. These findings suggest that individual and cultural differences in game behaviors can reflect both the ways in which people perceive game situations and their general social preferences.     

Reciprocal trust mediates deep transfer of learning between games of strategic interaction

We studied transfer of learning across two games of strategic interaction. We found that the interpersonal relation between two players during and across two games influence development of reciprocal trust and transfer of learning from one game to another. We show that two types of similarities between the games affect transfer: (1) deep similarities facilitate transfer of an optimal solution across games; (2) surface similarities can either facilitate or hinder transfer depending on whether they lead players toward an optimal or sub-optimal solution in the target game. Learning an optimal solution in a context of interdependence between players is associated with development of reciprocal trust, which in turn mediates transfer of learning across games. The results can be used to inform the design of training exercises to develop strategic interaction skills.     

短时接触双人电子游戏对幼儿同伴交往与亲社会行为的影响

电子游戏颇受儿童青睐,其用户日趋低龄化,它对幼儿的影响不容小觑。本实验以双人合作/竞技游戏为载体,考查了短时接触电子游戏对60名4~6岁幼儿的同伴交往与亲社会行为的影响,结果发现：1）幼儿与非好友玩伴共同接触双人电子游戏后会变得更喜欢自己的搭档,将其视为新好友并更希望未来与其交往;2）合作比竞技游戏更能促使幼儿喜爱玩伴,竞技游戏的获胜者比失败者更喜欢其搭档;3）年长比年少幼儿更喜欢与同伴交往;4）与其他非好友同伴相比,幼儿更愿意帮助自己的搭档。这表明短时接触内容适宜的双人电子游戏对幼儿的同伴交往和亲社会行为发展较为有益。