Where does attention go when you blink?

Many studies have shown that covert visual attention precedes saccadic eye movements to locations in space. The present research investigated whether the allocation of attention is similarly affected by eye blinks. Subjects completed a partial-report task under blink and no-blink conditions. Experiment 1 showed that blinking facilitated report of the bottom row of the stimulus array: Accuracy for the bottom row increased and mislocation errors decreased under blink, as compared with no-blink, conditions, indicating that blinking influenced the allocation of visual attention. Experiment 2 showed that this was true even when subjects were biased to attend elsewhere. These results indicate that attention moves downward before a blink in an involuntary fashion. The eyes also move downward during blinks, so attention may precede blink-induced eye movements just as it precedes saccades and other types of eye movements.     

Why does a red snake in the grass capture your attention?

It has been suggested that affective stimuli automatically capture attention; this preferential processing is thought to be related to the evolutionary significance of affective stimuli. However, recent evidence suggests that perceptual salience alone might explain why some affective stimuli are more likely to influence attentional processes in certain contexts. In this study, we manipulated affective and perceptual salience to better understand how affective information is processed and how it impacts attentional processes in different contexts. We used stimuli that are both affectively and perceptually salient, while varying the task requirement to encourage the processing of perceptually salient (Experiment 1) or affectively salient (Experiment 2) information. This design made it possible to observe independent and interdependent relationships between perceptual and affective salience. The results showed that when the task encouraged the processing of perceptually salient information, affective salience did not influence task performance. In contrast, when the task encouraged the processing of affectively salient information, affectively salient information impaired task performance. The findings suggest that the affective nature of the stimuli does not always influence attentional processes.     

Talking heads or talking eyes? Effects of head orientation and sudden onset gaze cues on attention capture

The direction of gaze towards or away from an observer has immediate effects on attentional processing in the observer. Previous research indicates that faces with direct gaze are processed more efficiently than faces with averted gaze. We recently reported additional processing advantages for faces that suddenly adopt direct gaze (abruptly shift from averted to direct gaze) relative to static direct gaze (always in direct gaze), sudden averted gaze (abruptly shift from direct to averted gaze), and static averted gaze (always in averted gaze). Because changes in gaze orientation in previous study co-occurred with changes in head orientation, it was not clear if the effect is contingent on face or eye processing, or whether it requires both the eyes and the face to provide consistent information. The present study delineates the impact of head orientation, sudden onset motion cues, and gaze cues. Participants completed a target-detection task in which head position remained in a static averted or direct orientation while sudden onset motion and eye gaze cues were manipulated within each trial. The results indicate a sudden direct gaze advantage that resulted from the additive role of motion and gaze cues. Interestingly, the orientation of the face towards or away from the observer did not influence the sudden direct gaze effect, suggesting that eye gaze cues, not face orientation cues, are critical for the sudden direct gaze effect.     

On the generality of the displaywide contingent orienting hypothesis: Can a visual onset capture attention without top-down control settings for displaywide onset?

The contingent orienting hypothesis (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992) states that attentional capture is contingent on top-down control settings induced by task demands. Past studies supporting this hypothesis have identified three kinds of top-down control settings: for target-specific features, for the strategy to search for a singleton, and for visual features in the target display as a whole. Previously, we have found stimulus-driven capture by onset that was not contingent on the first two kinds of settings (Yeh & Liao, 2008). The current study aims to test the third kind: the displaywide contingent orienting hypothesis (Gibson & Kelsey, 1998). Specifically, we ask whether an onset stimulus can still capture attention in the spatial cueing paradigm when attentional control settings for the displaywide onset of the target are excluded by making all letters in the target display emerge from placeholders. Results show that a preceding uninformative onset cue still captured attention to its location in a stimulus-driven fashion, whereas a color cue captured attention only when it was contingent on the setting for displaywide color. These results raise doubts as to the generality of the displaywide contingent orienting hypothesis and help delineate the boundary conditions on this hypothesis.     

Are spatial selection and identity extraction separable when attention is controlled endogenously?

Visual search for a target involves two processes: spatial selection and identity extraction. Ghorashi, Enns, and Di Lollo (2008) found these processes to be independent and surmised that they were carried out along distinct visual pathways: dorsal and ventral, respectively. The two experiments that are described in the present article evaluated this hypothesis. Attentional-blink methodology was combined with voluntary spatial cuing in a visual search task: Intertarget lag was used to manipulate identity extraction; predictive cues were used to signal target locations. Central digit cues in Experiment 1 required participants to identify digits before voluntarily directing attention to a corresponding location, whereas flashed dots in Experiment 2 (indicating an opposite location) required attentional redeployment without prior cue identification. Consistent with the dual-pathway hypothesis, cuing was impaired only when the first target and the number cue competed for ventral-pathway mechanisms. Collectively, the results support the dual-pathway account of the separability of spatial selection and identity extraction.     

To reverse or not to reverse: when is an ambiguous figure not ambiguous?

The role of bottom-up processes in our perception of reversible figures was examined. In Experiment 1 the overlapping squares figure and nonsense reversible figures were used. The effects of adapting subjects for differing durations to an unambiguous version of the figure before presentation of the traditional reversible figure were determined under conditions of varying precision of fixation. In Experiment 2 the research was expanded to other examples of reversible figures. In both experiments, results with two dependent measures (the subject's first percept and the number of reversals reported) were generally consistent with the interpretation of bottom-up processes underlying the adaptation effects. However, the crucial role of stimulus and procedural variables and the differential sensitivity of the two dependent measures was demonstrated.     

Does attention follow the motion in the “shooting line” illusion?

When a line is presented in the vicinity of a recent luminance change (peripheral cue), it is perceived to be drawn over time away from its “cued” end even though the line is actually presented all at once. This study was designed to determine whether attention, exogenously attracted to the cue, would come under the exogenous control of this illusory motion and follow the drawing motion from the cued end to its terminus. Each trial began with the display of four small squares at the corners of an imaginary square centered about fixation. On the critical trials, one of the four squares brightened briefly, after which a horizontal line was presented joining either the two upper or the two lower squares. Shortly thereafter, the distribution of attention was determined by asking the observer to indicate the nature of a change that was equally likely to occur to one of the squares. Responses to targets presented at a noncued location that was at the end of an illusorily drawn line were as fast as those to targets at the cued location and were much faster than those to targets at the remaining noncued locations. This pattern was not shown when the line preceded the cue, strongly suggesting that attention follows the motion in this illusion.     

Involuntary capture of visual-spatial attention occurs for intersections,both real and “imagined”

In three spatial precuing experiments, we demonstrate attentional capture by an intersection that occurs (1) between two lines that are not part of an enclosed object, and (2) between a line in the cuing array that is not physically present during target search and the invisible circumference of a perceptual circle formed by the elements in the target array. This capture effect conceptually replicates Cole, Gellatly, and Blurton’s (2001)corner enhancement effect, in which responses are faster for targets presented near an object’s corners rather than along its straight edges. However, it extends that effect by showing that it occurs even when the intersection is not part of an enclosed object and is not physically present during target search. More important, our capture effect occurred even though the target’s position was not designated by a perceptually distinctive feature and was not predicted by the intersection’s position. Thus, it seems that a line intersection—whether it be real or imaginary—automatically captures visual—spatial attention, contrary to Folk, Remington, and Johnston’s (1992) and Gibson and Kelsey’s (1998) views that such an involuntary capture of spatial attention is contingent on attentional control settings.     

“Extinction” of the McCollough effect does not transfer interocularly

A McCollough effect was induced in subjects by having them view typical adapting stimuli binocularly for 5 min. In the control condition, the strength of the McCollough effect was measured 20 min after the end of the adaptation. The strength was measured during monocular and binocular viewing of a test pattern via a color cancellation technique. Monocular strengths for the two eyes of a given subject were equal to each other and slightly weaker than the binocular strength. In the test condition, 15 min of the 20 min between adaptation and testing were spent monocularly viewing black and white gratings of the same orientation and spatial frequency as the adapting gratings. The strength of the effect as measured ipsilaterally was markedly decreased from that in the control condition. The strength of the effect as measured with the contralateral eye showed only a small decrease from that of the control condition. This finding is relevant to various models of the McCollough effect and related color aftereffects, especially those that posit a “learning” type of mechanism between achromatic spatial channels (which exhibit clear interocular transfer of various achromatic effects) and monocular color channels.     

Object features, object locations, and object files: which does selective attention activate and when?

The representation within which attention operates was investigated in 3 experiments. The task was similar to that of R. Egly, J. Driver, and R. D. Rafal (1994). Participants had to detect the presence of a target at 1 of 4 ends of 2 shapes, differing in color and form. A precue appeared at 1 of the 4 possible corners. The 2 shapes occupied either the same or different locations in the cuing and target displays. The results showed that the cued object location was attended whether or not space was task relevant, whereas the cued object features (color and form) were attended only when these were task relevant. Moreover, when object file continuity was maintained through continuous movement, attention was found to follow the cued object file as it moved while also accruing to the cued location.     

Tactile “capture” of audition

Previous research has demonstrated that the localization of auditory or tactile stimuli can be biased by the simultaneous presentation of a visual stimulus from a different spatial position. We investigated whether auditory localization judgments could also be affected by the presentation of spatially displaced tactile stimuli, using a procedure designed to reveal perceptual interactions across modalities. Participants made left—right discrimination responses regarding the perceived location of sounds, which were presented either in isolation or together with tactile stimulation to the fingertips. The results demonstrate that the apparent location of a sound can be biased toward tactile stimulation when it is synchronous, but not when it is asynchronous, with the auditory event. Directing attention to the tactile modality did not increase the bias of sound localization toward synchronous tactile stimulation. These results provide the first demonstration of the tactilecapture of audition.     

The incremental validity of the MMPI-2: when does therapist access not enhance treatment outcome?

The present study examined whether therapist access to the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2) predicted favorable treatment outcome, above and beyond other assessment measures. A manipulated assessment design was used, in which patients were randomly assigned either to a group in which therapists had access to their MMPI-2 data or to a group without therapist access to such information. Illness severity, improvement ratings, number of sessions attended, and premature termination were indicators of therapy outcome. Results indicated that therapist access to the MMPI-2 data did not add to the prediction of positive treatment outcome beyond that predicted by other measures in this setting. Findings from this initial study suggest that, compared with other resources, perhaps in clinical settings with an emphasis on diagnosis-based and evidence-based treatment, the MMPI-2 may not provide incrementally valid information. However, these effects warrant replication across different settings and samples. Guidelines for future studies are discussed.     

Looking at anything that is green when hearing “frog”: How object surface colour and stored object colour knowledge influence language-mediated overt attention

Three eye-tracking experiments investigated the influence of stored colour knowledge, perceived surface colour, and conceptual category of visual objects on language-mediated overt attention. Participants heard spoken target words whose concepts are associated with a diagnostic colour (e.g., “spinach”; spinach is typically green) while their eye movements were monitored to (a) objects associated with a diagnostic colour but presented in black and white (e.g., a black-and-white line drawing of a frog), (b) objects associated with a diagnostic colour but presented in an appropriate but atypical colour (e.g., a colour photograph of a yellow frog), and (c) objects not associated with a diagnostic colour but presented in the diagnostic colour of the target concept (e.g., a green blouse; blouses are not typically green). We observed that colour-mediated shifts in overt attention are primarily due to the perceived surface attributes of the visual objects rather than stored knowledge about the typical colour of the object. In addition our data reveal that conceptual category information is the primary determinant of overt attention if both conceptual category and surface colour competitors are copresent in the visual environment.     

Representations in language processing: why comprehension is not “brute-causal”

I defend a claim, central to much work in psycholinguistics, that constructing mental representations of syntactic structures is a necessary step in language comprehension. Call such representations “mental phrase markers” (MPMs). Several theorists in psycholinguistics, AI, and philosophy have cast doubt on the usefulness of positing MPMs (Devitt, 2006; Rohde, 2002; Schank & Birnbaum, 1984). I examine their proposals and argue that they face major empirical and conceptual difficulties. My conclusions tell against the broader skepticism that persists in philosophy—e.g., in the embodied cognition literature (Hutto & Myin, 2012)—about the usefulness of positing mental representations in psychological models. Using my discussion of sentence parsing as a case study, I propose several conditions on an appropriate appeal to mental representations. Finally, I point out that the familiar arguments from productivity, systematicity, and inferential coherence suffice to establish that MPMs themselves have a constituent structure of a sort that resembles that of public-language sentences. This supports the idea that computational operations defined over MPMs are sensitive to their syntactic structure.     

“It is not a something,but not a nothing either!”—McDowell on Wittgenstein

This paper corrects a mistake in John McDowell’s influential reading of Wittgenstein’s attack on the idea of private sensations. McDowell rightly identifies a primary target of Wittgenstein’s attack to be the Myth of the Given. But he also suggests that Wittgenstein, in the ferocity of his battles with this myth, sometimes goes into overkill, which manifests itself in seemingly behavioristic denials about sensations. But this criticism of Wittgenstein is a mistake. The mistake is made over two important but notoriously difficult sections in the so-called Private Language Argument, namely §304 and §293 of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein, maximally charitably read, commits no overkill in these two sections. This correction strengthens McDowell’s overall reading, but it is only a first step toward fully bringing out the deep but obscurely expressed insights in §304 and §293, the full treatment of which must await another occasion.     

Why is it so hard to do my work? The challenge of attention residue when switching between work tasks

In many jobs, employees must manage multiple projects or tasks at the same time. A typical workday often entails switching between several work activities, including projects, tasks, and meetings. This paper explores how such work design affects individual performance by focusing on the challenge of switching attention from one task to another. As revealed by two experiments, people need to stop thinking about one task in order to fully transition their attention and perform well on another. Yet, results indicate it is difficult for people to transition their attention away from an unfinished task and their subsequent task performance suffers. Being able to finish one task before switching to another is, however, not enough to enable effective task transitions. Time pressure while finishing a prior task is needed to disengage from the first task and thus move to the next task and it contributes to higher performance on the next task.     

“Remembering” emotional words is based on response bias,not recollection

Recent studies have demonstrated that emotional stimuli result in a higher proportion of recognized items that are “remembered” (e.g., Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Ochsner, 2000), leading to greater estimates of recollection by the dual-process model (Yonelinas, 1994). This result suggests that recognition judgments to emotional stimuli depend on a recollection process. We challenge this conclusion with receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve data from two experiments. In both experiments, subjects studied neutral and emotional words. During the recognition test, subjects made old-new confidence ratings as well as remember-know judgments. Four models of remember-know judgments were fit to individual subjects’ data: two versions of a one-dimensional signaldetection-based model (Donaldson, 1996; Wixted & Stretch, 2004), the dual-process model (Yonelinas, 1994), and the two-dimensional signal-detection-based model known as STREAK (Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004). Consistent with the literature, we found that emotion increases subjective reports of “remembering.” However, our ROC analyses and modeling work reveal that the effect is due to response bias differences rather than sensitivity change or use of a high-threshold recollection process.