What can self-disorders in schizophrenia tell us about the nature of subjectivity? A psychopathological investigation

The purpose of this article is to show how schizophrenia, understood as a distortion of the most intimate structures of subjectivity, illustrates the nature of subjectivity as such, while at the same time how philosophical considerations may help to understand schizophrenia. More precisely, schizophrenic experiences of self-alienation seem to reflect a congealing or concretization of a form of differentiation or potential alterity implicit in the dynamic nature of subjectivity. In other words, we propose that the structure of subjectivity includes potential divisions and fissures that condition the experiences of radical self-alienation seen in schizophrenia. In order to elucidate how this alterity emerges within the self in schizophrenia and in order to consider its conditions of possibility we examine the disorders of the self as described in phenomenological psychopathology. We especially use the work of the Japanese psychiatrists Mari Nagai, her teacher Bin Kimura, and the French psychiatrist Henry Ey, supplemented with clinical material from our own research. Finally, we shed light on the development of the psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions, which are understood as the expressions of a radical alterization (i.e., becoming other) of the self.     

What can neuroimaging meta-analyses really tell us about the nature of emotion?

In Vytal and Hamann (2010) we reported a neuroimaging meta-analysis that found that basic emotions can be distinguished by their brain activation correlates, in marked contrast to Lindquist et al.'s conclusions in the target article. Here, I discuss implications of these findings for understanding emotion, outline limitations of using meta-analyses and neuroimaging as the sole basis for deciding between emotion views, and suggest that these views are essentially compatible and could be adapted and combined into an integrated emotion framework.     

What can megastudies tell us about the orthographic structure of English words?

Although the majority of research in visual word recognition has targeted single-syllable words, most words are polysyllabic. These words engender special challenges, one of which concerns their analysis into smaller units. According to a recent hypothesis, the organization of letters into groups of successive consonants (C) and vowels (V) constrains the orthographic structure of printed words. So far, evidence has been reported only in French with factorial studies of relatively small sets of items. In the present study, we performed regression analyses on corpora of megastudies (English and British Lexicon Project databases) to examine the influence of the CV pattern in English. We compared hiatus words, which present a mismatch between the number of syllables and the number of groups of adjacent vowel letters (e.g., client), to other words, controlling for standard lexical variables. In speeded pronunciation, hiatus words were processed more slowly than control words, and the effect was stronger in low-frequency words. In the lexical decision task, the interference effect of hiatus in low-frequency words was balanced by a facilitatory effect in high-frequency words. Taken together, the results support the hypothesis that the configuration of consonant and vowel letters influences the processing of polysyllabic words in English.     

What can autism and dyslexia tell us about intelligence?

This paper argues that understanding developmental disorders requires developing theories and models that explicitly represent the role of general intelligence in the cognitive phenotype of the disorder. In the case of autism it is argued that the low-IQ scores of people with autism are not likely to be due to a deficit in the cognitive process that is arguably the major cause of mental retardation - namely, speed of processing - but rather low IQ reflects the pervasive and cascading effects of the deficit in the information-processing module that causes autism. In the case of dyslexia, two radically different models of reading disorder (ability = disability and a modular deficit model) are likely to be influenced by the effect of general intelligence on reading performance in ways that will remain unclear without an explicit model of how general intelligence influences reading.     

What can the same–different task tell us about the development of magnitude representations?

We examined the development of magnitude representations in children (Exp 1: kindergartners, first-, second- and sixth graders, Exp 2: kindergartners, first-, second- and third graders) using a numerical same-different task with symbolic (i.e. digits) and non-symbolic (i.e. arrays of dots) stimuli. We investigated whether judgments in a same-different task with digits are based upon the numerical value or upon the physical similarity of the digits. In addition, we investigated whether the numerical distance effect decreases with increasing age. Finally, we examined whether the performance in this task is related to general mathematics achievement. Our results reveal that a same-different task with digits is not an appropriate task to study magnitude representations, because already late kindergarteners base their responses on the physical similarity instead of the numerical value of the digits. When decisions cannot be made on the basis of physical similarity, a similar numerical distance effect is present over all age groups. This suggests that the magnitude representation is stable from late kindergarten onwards. The size of the numerical distance effect was not related to mathematical achievement. However, children with a poorer mathematics achievement score seemed to have more difficulties to link a symbol with its corresponding magnitude.     

What do patterns in empirical data tell us about the structure of the world?

This article discusses the relation between features of empirical data and structures in the world. I defend the following claims. Any empirical data set exhibits all possible patterns, each with a certain noise term. The magnitude and other properties of this noise term are irrelevant to the evidential status of a pattern: all patterns exhibited in empirical data constitute evidence of structures in the world. Furthermore, distinct patterns constitute evidence of distinct structures in the world. It follows that the world must be regarded as containing all possible structures. The remainder of the article is devoted to elucidating the meaning and implications of the latter claim.     

What can performance tell us about learning? Explicating a troubled concept

The notion of “performance7rdquo; has a central place in the contemporary discourse of learning and competence. The notion is used to translate abstract ideas and ideals of lifelong learning, organizational learning, learning society, etc., into practical measures. Changes in performance provide the identifiable measures that learning has taken place, evidence of enhanced competency/capability. Different versions of the learning and competency/capability agenda may place different emphases upon the extent to which such performance changes may be predetermined or are essentially emergent, but the assumption remains that performance provides the basis for attribution that learning has (or has not) taken place. This article takes issue with the conventional notion of “performance” as unequivocally observable. Drawing upon traditional philosophical distinctions between behaviour and action, and interpretative, constructionist, situational, and relational traditions within the social sciences, the nature of performance is subjected to theoretical analysis. It is argued that performance cannot be taken as transparent evidence of learning. Rather the attribution of performance is itself the outcome of situated acts of interpretation, essentially contestable and negotiated, subject to reinterpretation and renegotiation. The key social processes by which such interpretation is accomplished will be shown to implicate issues of identity (and identity formation) and social practice (and its discursive production). The potential fruitfulness of the identity-practice model will be illustrated by applying it to the issue of graduate “employability”, in order to address problems with the conventional “skills” approach.     

What can subjective forgetting tell us about memory for childhood trauma?

In the present study, we examined the prevalence and predictors of subjective forgetting (i.e., self-reported amnesia) of child sexual abuse (CSA). Adults who, as children, were involved as victims in legal prosecutions were questioned about their CSA experiences, which had been documented in the 1980s, and about lost and recovered memory of those experiences. Males and individuals who experienced more severe abuse were more likely to report forgetting. The majority of individuals attributed their forgetting to active attempts to avoid thinking about the abuse. In contrast, when predictors of subjective forgetting were used to predict objective memory of abuse, more severe abuse and more extended legal involvement were associated with fewer memory errors. The differences between subjective and objective memory underscore the risks of using subjective measures to assess lost memory of abuse.     

What does the nature of the stimuli tell us about the Global Precedence Effect?

The "Global Precedence Effect" (GPE) is a well-established phenomenon characterised by a global advantage (global response times that are faster than local response times) and an interference effect from global distractors during identification of local targets but not vice versa. In the present study, two experiments were carried out to examine how the GPE is affected by the meaningfulness of the stimuli. Using global/local compound stimuli based on either meaningful or meaningless stimuli, we found, on the one hand, that the global level was always processed faster than the local level, irrespective of the meaningfulness of the material. On the other hand, results show that the interference effect occurred only with meaningful stimuli. We propose that automatic identification of meaningful stimuli plays a role in the interference effect. These results suggest that the GPE involves both "sensory mechanisms" (responsible for the global advantage) and "cognitive mechanisms" (responsible for the interference effect).     

What does the occluding contour tell us about solid shape?

A new theorem is discussed that relates the apparent curvature of the occluding contour of a visual shape to the intrinsic curvature of the surface and the radial curvature. This theorem allows the formulation of general laws for the apparent curvature, independent of viewing distance and regardless of the fact that the rim (the boundary between the visible and invisible parts of the object) is a general, thus twisted, space curve. Consequently convexities, concavities, or inflextions of contours in the retinal image allow the observer to draw inferences about local surface geometry with certainty. These results appear to be counterintuitive, witness to the treatment of the problem by recent authors. It is demonstrated how well-known examples, used to show how concavities and convexities of the contour have no obvious relation to solid shape, are actually good illustrations of the fact that convexities are due to local ovoid shapes, concavities to local saddle shapes.     

What do memory data tell us about the role of contingency awareness in evaluative conditioning?

Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to the effect that pairings of a conditioned stimulus (CS) with a valenced unconditioned stimulus (US) lead to changes in the evaluation of the CS. There have been recurring debates about whether EC requires awareness of the contingency between CSs and USs during learning. We argue that the memory performance data obtained in the standard paradigm remain ambiguous about the role of contingency awareness during the encoding of CS–US pairings. First, memory performance data are unable to distinguish between encoding-related versus retrieval-related effects. Second, the relation between memory performance and evaluation is correlational, which limits conclusions about causal relations between memory performance and EC effects. These ambiguities imply that any possible data pattern can be interpreted in at least two different ways. It is concluded that a resolution of the current debate requires alternative approaches in which contingency awareness is experimentally manipulated during the encoding of CS–US pairings.     

What does infant perception tell us about theories of perception?

The article begins with a summary of eight well-substantiated conclusions drawn from research on perception in infants that have implications for theories of perception. The following section examines several traditional and modern theories of perception in the light of these conclusions. Finally, some "big issues" that have divided perceptual and cognitive theories are discussed, with the suggestion that research on infants can help reconcile the divided camps. Research on perception in young infants not only flourishes but also presents a challenge to all theories of perception.     

What can regular and timely student feedback tell us about the teaching and learning processes?

Most studies on the evaluation of teaching focus on the input (teacher traits) or the output (student-generated products) of the teaching and learning processes. This article is based on a case study that examines the three components of teaching and learning: input, output and process. It presents a framework for collecting quantitative and qualitative data on the quality of instruction, assessment and feedback, and learning environment in college composition courses to complement the feedback provided by the end-of-course student evaluations of teaching for the purpose of monitoring, guiding, and improving instruction.     

What do category-specific semantic deficits tell us about the representation of lexical concepts?

A reassessment of category-specific semantic deficits in light of their contribution to a theory of the representation of lexical concepts is proposed. Two theories are examined: one, held by the majority of researchers in the field, claims that concepts are represented by sets of features; another, in contrast, claims that concepts are atomic representations. An analysis of category-specific semantic deficits in terms of inferential relations (of the meaning-postulates type) between atomic concepts is elaborated. It is argued that this theory can better account for the pattern of performance exhibited by patients with semantic deficits.     

What do our intuitions about the experience machine really tell us about hedonism?

Robert Nozick’s experience machine thought experiment is often considered a decisive refutation of hedonism. I argue that the conclusions we draw from Nozick’s thought experiment ought to be informed by considerations concerning the operation of our intuitions about value. First, I argue that, in order to show that practical hedonistic reasons are not causing our negative reaction to the experience machine, we must not merely stipulate their irrelevance (since our intuitions are not always responsive to stipulation) but fill in the concrete details that would make them irrelevant. If we do this, we may see our feelings about the experience machine becoming less negative. Second, I argue that, even if our feelings about the experience machine do not perfectly track hedonistic reasons, there are various reasons to doubt the reliability of our anti-hedonistic intuitions. And finally, I argue that, since in the actual world seeing certain things besides pleasure as ends in themselves may best serve hedonistic ends, hedonism may justify our taking these other things to be intrinsically valuable, thus again making the existence of our seemingly anti-hedonistic intuitions far from straightforward evidence for the falsity of hedonism.     

FOXP2 in focus: what can genes tell us about speech and language?

The human capacity for acquiring speech and language must derive, at least in part, from the genome. In 2001, a study described the first case of a gene, FOXP2, which is thought to be implicated in our ability to acquire spoken language. In the present article, we discuss how this gene was discovered, what it might do, how it relates to other genes, and what it could tell us about the nature of speech and language development. We explain how FOXP2 could, without being specific to the brain or to our own species, still provide an invaluable entry-point into understanding the genetic cascades and neural pathways that contribute to our capacity for speech and language.     

Family processes in the midst of urban poverty: What does the trauma literature tell us?

Consistent with a family systems framework, this paper examines the clinical and research literatures to clarify the connection between chronic trauma exposure and family processes with a focus on the social ecology of low-income, urban neighborhoods. Strong empirical evidence demonstrates the impact of chronic trauma on individual family members and, in turn, on multiple family subsystems. Additionally, there is evidence that living under chronically harsh, traumatic circumstances slowly erodes family processes, specifically structure, relations, and coping. However, existing research reflects the problems inherent in sorting out relationships among multiple, often interrelated factors. Future research requires comprehensive theoretical models, such as systemic, transactional, or ecodevelopmental, along with sophisticated research designs, prospective, longitudinal or intervention, and multilevel analytic methods.