Neural synchronization as a hypothetical explanation of the psychoanalytic unconscious

Cognitive scientists have tried to explain the neural mechanisms of unconscious mental states such as coma, epileptic seizures, and anesthesia-induced unconsciousness. However these types of unconscious states are different from the psychoanalytic unconscious. In this review, we aim to present our hypothesis about the neural correlates underlying psychoanalytic unconscious. To fulfill this aim, we firstly review the previous explanations about the neural correlates of conscious and unconscious mental states, such as brain oscillations, synchronicity of neural networks, and cognitive binding. By doing so, we hope to lay a neuroscientific ground for our hypothesis about neural correlates of psychoanalytic unconscious; parallel but unsynchronized neural networks between different layers of consciousness and unconsciousness. Next, we propose a neuroscientific mechanism about how the repressed mental events reach the conscious awareness; the lock of neural synchronization between two mental layers of conscious and unconscious. At the last section, we will discuss the data about schizophrenia as a clinical example of our proposed hypothesis.     

From conscious experience to a conscious self

In his book The Opacity of Mind, Peter Carruthers (2011 Carruthers, P. (2011). The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) presents the Interpretive Sensory Awareness theory (“ISA”), which holds that while we have direct access to our own sensory states, our access to “self-knowledge” is almost always interpretive. In presenting his view, Carruthers also claims that his account is the first of its kind; after a cursory examination of major theories of mind, he concludes that “transparent access” accounts of self-knowledge—the alternative to ISA—have been endorsed throughout history. This paper challenges this latter claim. Contrary to Carruthers’ view, the paper argues that Buddhist theories of mind are not “transparent access” accounts. Instead, they not only have an analysis of sensory processing and conscious experience similar to that of ISA, but also share what Carruthers sees as ISA’s central tenet: individuals lack transparent, conscious access to most of their propositional attitudes. Given this fundamental alignment, the Buddhist perspective can offer us fresh responses to ISA’s critics, as well as approaches to ethics and free will that are aligned with ISA’s conclusions.     

The conscious, the unconscious, and familiarity

This article examines the role of subjective familiarity in the implicit and explicit learning of artificial grammars. Experiment 1 found that objective measures of similarity (including fragment frequency and repetition structure) predicted ratings of familiarity, that familiarity ratings predicted grammaticality judgments, and that the extremity of familiarity ratings predicted confidence. Familiarity was further shown to predict judgments in the absence of confidence, hence contributing to above-chance guessing. Experiment 2 found that confidence developed as participants refined their knowledge of the distribution of familiarity and that differences in familiarity could be exploited prior to confidence developing. Experiment 3 found that familiarity was consciously exploited to make grammaticality judgments including those made without confidence and that familiarity could in some instances influence participants' grammaticality judgments apparently without their awareness. All 3 experiments found that knowledge distinct from familiarity was derived only under deliberate learning conditions. The results provide decisive evidence that familiarity is the essential source of knowledge in artificial grammar learning while also supporting a dual-process model of implicit and explicit learning.     

Knowledge applied to new domains: The unconscious succeeds where the conscious fails

A common view holds that consciousness is needed for knowledge acquired in one domain to be applied in a novel domain. We present evidence for the opposite; where the transfer of knowledge is achieved only in the absence of conscious awareness. Knowledge of artificial grammars was examined where training and testing occurred in different vocabularies or modalities. In all conditions grammaticality judgments attributed to random selection showed above-chance accuracy (60%), while those attributed to conscious decisions did not. Participants also rated each string’s familiarity and performed a perceptual task assessing fluency. Familiarity was predicted by repetition structure and was thus related to grammaticality. Fluency, though increasing familiarity, was unrelated to grammaticality. While familiarity predicted all judgments only those attributed to random selection showed a significant additional contribution of grammaticality, deriving primarily from chunk novelty. In knowledge transfer, as in visual perception (Marcel, 1993), the unconscious may outperform the conscious.     

Working with movement as a metaphor: Understanding the therapeutic impact of physical exercise from a gestalt perspective

Although the therapeutic impact of exercise on depression has been well documented, studies usually evaluate long-term fitness programmes and relate improved psychological well-being to changes in metabolism and physique. That exercise may stimulate affective and cognitive awareness and exploration is rarely acknowledged. This case study explores the contribution that client-chosen physical activity made to the counselling process. From a gestalt perspective, the experience of physical exercise seemed to heighten the client's present awareness, promoted the recognition and integration of conflicting facets of the self and provided a deep metaphor, both expressing and satisfying the client's needs for movement and activity (rather than passivity). The case example is unusual in illustrating how physical sporting exercise may be used as a vehicle for affective and cognitive expression.     

Narrative as a hermeneutical relationship to the unconscious

In this article, what seems to have been two central tenets in contemporary psychoanalytic narrative theory are challenged. The one—propounded by Roy Schafer—is that the goal of psychoanalytic work is to furnish the analysand with an alternative narrative. The other—propounded by Donald Spence—is that any story will do, if only it is coherent, consistent, persuasive and encompasses the known “facts”. Basing his critique of the mentioned standpoints on an intersubjective understanding of psychoanalytic work and a concept of interpreting inspired by the existential hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger, the author discusses the nature of the analytic dialogue and the role of transference together with the ethical basis of truth in the analytic project. Finally, it is indicated that there is a limit to analytic working-through, where the analysand's narrative activity must come to a halt and room be left for a resolve, where the analysand may undergo a fundamental transformation.     

The living body in the psychoanalytic experience

Instead of viewing body and psyche as two "substances," the author proposes that they be seen as two ways of experiencing the complex reality of the human being. Clinically, this translates into an exploration of the possibility of including the somatic in the territory of what can be represented--that is, recognizing in somatic and sensory elements and in bodily functions the potential for meaning and language, appreciating their status as precursors of representation. These somatic signals may be detected in a dialogue involving not only the minds of analyst and analysand, but also their bodies. Clinical examples are given involving different bodily functions.     

Making conscious the unconscious in order to modify unconscious processing: Some mechanisms of therapeutic change1

This paper examines some of the mechanisms through which interpretation aimed primarily at increasing conscious awareness can nonetheless produce unconscious changes, the latter being deemed the basic aim of psychoanalysis. The concept of valency or motivational weight of the interpretation is proposed to assess which forces of the various motivational systems the interpretation mobilizes (hetero/self‐preservation, sensual/sexual, attachment, narcissistic, psychobiological regulation etc.), on which of the above‐mentioned systems interpretation relies, and which would oppose therapeutic intervention and why. Certain conditions are also analyzed that could explain the so‐called ‘change through the analytic relationship’, pointing out that, despite the major differences between this form of change and change through interpretation, both of them would share certain mechanisms. This conclusion leads to the need to qualify the idea that interpretation would be exclusively aimed at declarative memory, with no effects upon procedural memory. The paper examines the potential consequences for therapeutic techniques derived from recent fi ndings in neuroscience on so‐called labile state memory, and proposes the coupling of experiences as one of the analytical instruments used for therapeutic change. A clinical vignette is included to illustrate some of the theoretical and technical aspects considered.     

Evolving agents as a metaphor for the developing child

The emerging field of Evolutionary Computation (EC), inspired by neo-Darwinian principles (e.g. natural selection, mutation, etc. ), offers developmental psychologists a wide array of mathematical tools for simulating ontogenetic processes. In this brief review; I begin by highlighting three of the approaches that EC researchers employ (Artificial Life, evolutionary robotics and comparative stochastic optimization). I then focus on the advantages of using comparative stochastic optimization as a method for studying development. As a concrete example, I illustrate the design and implementation of an EC model that simulates the development of reaching in young infants.     

The poet as prophet: a psychoanalytic perspective

The poet spins a public fantasy, created from his own private daydreams and speaking to the unconscious fantasies of his audience. He presents a socially acceptable form of expression of forbidden wishes and conflicts. A process of mutual exculpation is set up between the poet and his audience. For a special group the work of the poet may also make possible the alleviation of pathogenic anxieties. An examination of the play, The Beard, indicates how an artist may intuit and articulate changes in sexual morality. The poet rebels against the constraints of society, thereby helping his audience to rebel without guilt. He may be the herald of a changing morality, and even more, his art may become an instrument for such change.     

The psychoanalytic paradox: the self as a transitional object

I have focused upon a group of patients whose biological needs for nurture and comfort were adequately met but whose mothers never related to them beyond simple caretaking. They never smiled at their children inasmuch as they derived no pleasure from playing with them or in their emerging sense of aliveness. From both the analyses of mothers and these patients, it appears that the mothers used their children as transitional objects. In turn, the children's emotional development became fixated in the in-between transition space. This fixation led to specific types of character structure and ego defects. Early development levels did not form a smooth continuum with higher later acquired adaptive ego states. There seem to be extensive lacunae in the middle layers of the psychic apparatus which manifested themselves as defective modulating elements. These patients showed extremes of behavior, marked polarities of sane, sensitive rationality to psychoticlike irrational episodes. There were no transitional gray areas between black and white. They exhibited a peculiar kind of fragmentation or splitting in which connecting bridges between higher and lower levels were missing. There are many such patients who seek treatment. However, they present special problems in therapy which can be explained in terms of the psychoanalytic paradox. The psychoanalytic paradox refers to a treatment impasse caused by an imbrication of psychopathology and various attributes of the psychoanalytic method. The mother's attitude toward her infant child has some similarity to the low-keyed objective analytic attitude, what has been sometimes referred to as analytic neutrality. These patients require different modes of relating which indicate that the therapist is, unlike the mother, very much concerned with their patient's developing autonomy and their entering and exploring the external world. These variations of analysis are not modifications or deviations of analysis. They are elements of the analytic process necessary for the treatment of specific types of psychopathology. Just as each patient is unique and the transference manifests itself in a particular fashion which then causes the analyst to make certain interpretations, the variations of technique discussed in this article address themselves to the construction of a holding environment appropriate for this group of patients.     

Art as a metaphor of the mind

This paper focuses on the emergent neo-Jamesian perspective concerning the phenomenology of art and aesthetic experience. Starting from the distinction between nucleus and fringe in the stream of thought described by William James, it can be argued that our appreciation of a work of art is guided by a vague and blurred perception of a much more powerful content, of which we are not fully aware. Accordingly, a work of art is seen as a kind of metaphor of our mental life, objectified to be able to reach out to a much larger audience. However, it is a “realistic” theory rooted in evolutionary psychology, which claims that our mind developed within a framework shaped by environmental pressures. The aesthetics illustrated by several novelists develops a paradigm for this theory. The search for the neuronal correlates of stream of consciousness allows to make a comparison with the recent findings of neuroaesthetics and to reject its claim that it is unnecessary to take phenomenology and psychology into account.

Cortical movement preparation before and after a conscious decision to move

The idea that our conscious decisions determine our actions has been challenged by a report suggesting that the brain starts to prepare for a movement before the person concerned has consciously decided to move (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Libet et al. claimed that their results show that our actions are not consciously initiated. The current article describes two experiments in which we attempted to replicate Libet et al.'s comparison of participants' movement-related brain activity with the reported times of their decisions to move and also the reported times of their decisions of which hand to move. We also looked at the distribution of participants' reports over time to evaluate an alternative explanation of Libet et al.'s (1983) results. Although the Readiness Potential was usually present before all of the decisions to move, consistent with the findings of Keller and Heckhausen (1990) and Libet et al. (1983), we found that many reported decision times were before the onset of the Lateralized Readiness Potential, which measures hand-specific movement preparation. The latter finding is consistent with the conclusion that the LRP always started after the conscious decision to move. We conclude that even though activity related to movement anticipation may be present before a conscious decision to move, the cortical preparation necessary for the movement to happen immediately may not start until after the conscious decision to move.