Unconscious priming by color and form: different processes and levels

Using a metacontrast masking paradigm, prior studies have shown (a) that a target's color information and form information, can be processed without awareness and (b) that unconscious color processing occurs at early, wavelength-dependent levels in the cortical information processing hierarchy. Here we used a combination of paracontrast and metacontrast masking techniques to explore unconscious color and form priming effects produced by blue, green, and neutral stimuli. We found that color priming in normal observers is significantly reduced when an additional paracontrast mask precedes the target at optimal masking SOAs. However, no reduction of form-priming effects was obtained at similar optimal paracontrast SOAs. We conclude that unconscious color priming depends on an early, wavelength- or stimulus-dependent response of color neurons located at early cortical levels whereas unconscious form priming occurs at later levels.     

Unconscious processing of color and form in metacontrast masking

Three experiments employed a metacontrast masking procedure to examine the extent and nature of priming effects from visual stimuli not consciously perceived. The results showed effects of unconscious stimuli on subsequent target responses that (1) were more consistent, reliable, and not subject to strategic control, as compared with consciously perceived stimuli (Experiment 1); (2) produced both facilitation and interference of subsequent processing (Experiment 2); and (3) did not influence indirect response-related levels of processing (Experiment 3). These results demonstrate that color and form attributes of unconscious stimuli are sufficiently registered within the visual system to influence behavior, and that some of these unconscious effects occur at early levels of stimulus encoding, prior to higher level perceptual and response-related processes.     

Masked stimuli modulate endogenous shifts of spatial attention

Unconscious stimuli can influence participants’ motor behavior but also more complex mental processes. Recent research has gradually extended the limits of effects of unconscious stimuli. One field of research where such limits have been proposed is spatial cueing, where exogenous automatic shifts of attention have been distinguished from endogenous controlled processes which govern voluntary shifts of attention. Previous evidence suggests unconscious effects on mechanisms of exogenous shifts of attention. Here, we applied a cue-priming paradigm to a spatial cueing task with arbitrary cues by centrally presenting a masked symmetrical prime before every cue stimulus. We found priming effects on response times in target discrimination tasks with the typical dynamic of cue-priming effects (Experiments 1 and 2) indicating that central symmetrical stimuli which have been associated with endogenous orienting can modulate shifts of spatial attention even when they are masked. Prime–Cue Congruency effects of perceptual dissimilar prime and cue stimuli (Experiment 3) suggest that these effects cannot be entirely reduced to perceptual repetition priming of cue processing. In addition, priming effects did not differ between participants with good and poor prime recognition performance consistent with the view that unconscious stimulus features have access to processes of endogenous shifts of attention.     

基于位置和基于语义交互作用的无意识启动

采用线索-靶子范式,同时操纵刺激的位置和语义属性,考察了基于位置和基于语义交互作用的无意识启动。实验1和实验2分别要求被试完成定位任务和辨别任务。结果发现,当刺激位置属性与实验任务需求相关时,无论刺激的语义属性是否一致都产生了基于位置的启动效应;当刺激的语义属性与实验任务相关时,出现了基于位置和基于语义交互的无意识启动,即启动项和目标项的位置不同时,语义辨别任务存在启动效应;而启动项与目标项位置相同时,语义辨别任务存在着抑制趋势。研究结果表明,基于位置和基于语义交互作用的无意识启动效应仅存在于辨别任务中,而不存在于定位任务中。     

Verbal response-effect compatibility

Ideomotor theory states that motor responses are activated by an anticipation of their sensory effects. We assumed that anticipated effects would produce response-effect (R-E) compatibility when there is dimensional overlap of effects and responses. In a four-choice task, visual digit stimuli called for verbal responses (color names). Each response produced a written response-effect on the screen. In different groups, the response-effect was a colored color word (e.g., blue in blue), a white color word, or a colored nonword (Xs in blue). In different blocks, the predictable effects were either incompatible (e.g., response "blue" --> effect: green) or compatible with the response. We found faster responses with compatible than with incompatible R-E mappings. The compatibility effect was strongest with colored words, intermediate with white words, and smallest with colored nonwords. We conclude that effect anticipation influences response selection on both a perceptual level (related to the word's color) and a conceptual level (related to the word's meaning).     

Limited transfer of subliminal response priming to novel stimulus orientations and identities

Recently, priming effects of unconscious stimuli that were never presented as targets have been taken as evidence for the processing of the stimuli's semantic categories. The present study explored the necessary conditions for a transfer of priming to novel primes. Stimuli were digits and letters which were presented in various viewer-related orientations (upright, horizontal, inverted). The transfer of priming to novel stimulus orientations and identities was remarkably limited: in Experiment 1, in which all conscious targets stood upright, no transfer to unconscious primes in a non-target orientation was found. Experiment 2, in which primes were presented without masks, ruled out the possibility that primes were presented too short to allow congruency effects. In Experiments 3 and 4, in which all targets were presented upside down, priming transferred to upright stimuli with target identities but neither to horizontal stimuli nor to stimuli with novel identities. We suggest that whether a transfer of priming to unpracticed stimuli occurs or not depends on observers' expectations of specific stimulus exemplars.     

Dynamic variations in affective priming

The present study investigates the dynamics of emotional processing and awareness using an affective facial priming paradigm in conjunction with a multimodal assessment of awareness. Key facial primes are visually masked, and are presented for brief (unconscious) and extended (conscious) durations. Using a preference measure, we examine whether the effects of the primes differ qualitatively (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). We show that: (a) unconscious affective priming with faces emerges strongly in initial presentations and diminishes rapidly with repetition; (b) conscious affective priming also emerges strongly in initial presentations, however it persists in strength with repetition; and (c) in contrast to other reports on the salience of negative stimuli, happy faces appear more salient than sad faces when presented outside awareness. We discuss the limits and extensions of unconscious affective priming with faces, and consider several methodological and conceptual questions concerning emotional processing out of awareness.     

Faster might not be better: Pictures may not elicit a stronger unconscious priming effect than words when modulated by semantic similarity

It has been suggested that unconscious semantic processing is stimulus-dependent, and that pictures might have privileged access to semantic content. Those findings led to the hypothesis that unconscious semantic priming effect for pictorial stimuli would be stronger as compared to verbal stimuli. This effect was tested on pictures and words by manipulating the semantic similarity between the prime and target stimuli. Participants performed a masked priming categorization task for either words or pictures with three semantic similarity conditions: strongly similar, weakly similar, and non-similar. Significant differences in reaction times were only found between strongly similar and non-similar and between weakly similar and non-similar, for both pictures and words, with faster overall responses for pictures as compared to words. Nevertheless, pictures showed no superior priming effect over words. This could suggest the hypothesis that even though semantic processing is faster for pictures, this does not imply a stronger unconscious priming effect.     

Unconscious, stimulus-dependent priming and conscious, percept-dependent priming with chromatic stimuli

Using metacontrast masking to suppress the conscious registration of a prime stimulus, Breitmeyer, Ro, and Singhal (2004) showed that color priming produced by a masked prime disk occurs at unconscious stimulus-dependent rather than at percept-dependent levels of visual processing. The current set of experiments compares this type of unconscious stimulus-dependent priming to conscious priming produced by a prime that, in two separate ways, is rendered visible and thus activates percept-dependent visual processes. The results indicate that while the masked prime again acts at a stimulus-dependent level of processing, the unmasked, visible primes additionally act at a later percept-dependent level of processing.     

颜色字词的识别真的无需注意力资源的参与?——来自Stroop范式的证据

3个实验采用颜色词、颜色词同音词以及颜色语义联想词作为启动词,使启动词的语义和颜色实现时空分离、启动词处于非空间注意焦点位置、降低启动词可视度的情境下,考察具有自动化加工特征的启动词是否受到注意力资源的制约以及启动词在获得不同数量的注意力资源时其自动化程度是否存在显著的差异。结果发现:(1)注意力资源实质性地决定着自动化加工能否顺利进行,具有自动激活特征的刺激在无法获得注意力资源时,自动化加工过程终止。(2)可用的注意力资源数量调控着自动化加工的效率和语义提取的效果,可用的注意力资源数量越多,对启动刺激的语义加工越完善,对目标刺激的促进效果也越有效。本研究结果支持注意力敏感模型关于自动化加工受认知系统的支持和配置才能完成的假设。     

Conscious control over the content of unconscious cognition

Visual stimuli (primes) presented too briefly to be consciously identified can nevertheless affect responses to subsequent stimuli - an instance of unconscious cognition. There is a lively debate as to whether such priming effects originate from unconscious semantic processing of the primes or from reactivation of learned motor responses that conscious stimuli afford during preceding practice. In four experiments we demonstrate that unconscious stimuli owe their impact neither to automatic semantic categorization nor to memory traces of preceding stimulus-response episodes, but to their match with pre-specified cognitive action-trigger conditions. The intentional creation of such triggers allows actors to control the way unconscious stimuli bias their behaviour.     

内隐多效性选择的ERP证据

采用事件相关电位技术,考察内隐多效性选择及其神经机制。被试的任务是认真观看配对的纯色图片刺激,并进行分类按键反应。实验结果发现,在P2上,积极启动刺激比对照刺激激发了更大的P2波幅; 对比对照刺激,积极启动刺激在左脑、大脑中部和后脑诱发了更大的P2波幅,其中右脑的效应最大。在N2上,积极启动刺激比对照刺激激发了更小的N2波幅; 对比对照刺激,积极启动刺激在左脑、大脑中部和后脑诱发了更小的N2波幅,其中右脑的效应最大。在P3上,积极启动刺激比对照刺激激发了更大的P3波幅; 对比对照刺激,积极启动刺激在左脑、大脑中部和后脑诱发了更大的P3波幅,其中右脑的效应最大。研究结果表明当外显目标与内隐目标同时被呈现时,被试趋向于做多效性选择,这可能表明无意识信息加工具有相当大的权重。且右后部脑区可能是加工多效性刺激的核心和关键区域,P3成分可能反应了内隐多效性选择的精细加工过程,能够作为内隐多效性选择的有效的ERPs指标。     

Time course of free-choice priming effects explained by a simple accumulator model

Unconscious visual stimuli can be processed by human observers and modulate their behavior. This has been shown for masked prime stimuli that influence motor responses to subsequent target stimuli. Beyond this, masked stimuli can also affect participants' behavior when they are free to choose one of two response alternatives. This finding demonstrates that an apparently free-choice between alternative behaviors can be subject to influences that are outside of awareness. We report three experiments which exhibit that the temporal dynamic of free-choice priming effects corresponds to that of forced-choice priming effects. Forced-choice priming effects were relatively robust against variations of prime stimuli but sensitive to physical features of target stimuli. Free-choice priming effects, in contrast, depended largely on the stimulus-response compatibility of the prime. A simple accumulator model which accounts for forced-choice response priming can also explain free-choice priming effects by the assumption that unconscious stimuli can initiate motor responses when participants are engaged in a speeded choice-reaction time task. According to our analyses free-choice priming results from a response selection mechanism which integrates conscious and unconscious information from external, stimulus driven sources and also from internal sources.     

Temporal dynamics of masked word reading

The repercussions of unconscious priming on the neural correlates subsequent cognition have been explored previously. However, the neural dynamics during the unconscious processing remains largely uncharted. To assess both the complexity and temporal dynamics of unconscious cognition the present study contrasts the evoked response from classes of masked stimuli with three different levels of complexity; words, consonant strings, and blanks. The evoked response to masked word stimuli differed from both consonant strings and blanks, which did not differ from each other. This response was qualitatively different to any evoked potential observed when stimuli were consciously visible and peaked at 140ms, earlier than is usually associated with differences between words and strings and 100ms earlier than word-consonant string differences in the visible condition. The evoked response demonstrates a qualitatively distinct signature of unconscious cognition and directly demonstrates the extraction of abstract information under subliminal conditions.     

On the masking and disclosure of unconscious elaborate processing. A reply to Van Opstal, Reynvoet, and Verguts (2005)

We have recently argued that unconscious numerical stimuli might activate responses by a match with prespecified action trigger codes (action trigger account) rather than by semantic prime processing (elaborate processing account). [Van Opstal, F., Reynvoet, B., and Verguts, T. (2005). How to trigger elaborate processing? A comment on Kunde, Kiesel, and Hoffmann (2003). Cognition] replicate one piece of evidence for our inference—an inefficiency of primes not presented in target format (verbal or Arabic). But this was found only with letter masks and not with hash masks. The authors conclude that letter masks block unconscious prime processing, and that elaborate processing can account for unconscious priming effects if all its (sometimes subtle) side conditions are considered. We agree that the type of mask in general is an important factor in priming studies but we note that (i) the authors' mask-blocking hypothesis is not well supported by the data, (ii) clear evidence for semantic prime processing in their study is lacking and, (iii) differences in mask efficiency (rather than mask type) might account for the conflicting results. To corroborate this inference we replicate van Opstal et al.'s results with letter masks but reduced mask efficiency. Altogether their data do not challenge the action-trigger account nor do they strongly support the elaborate processing view.     

Visual search performance on an lcd monitor: effects of color combination of figure and icon background, shape of icon, and line width of icon border

This study investigated the effects of color combinations for the figure/icon background, icon shape, and line width of the icon border on visual search performance on a liquid crystal display screen. In a circular stimulus array, subjects had to search for a target item which had a diameter of 20 cm and included one target and 19 distractors. Analysis showed that the icon shape significantly affected search performance. The correct response time was significantly shorter for circular icons than for triangular icons, for icon borders with a line width of 3 pixels than for 1 or 2 pixels, and for 2 pixels than for 1 pixel. The color combination also significantly affected the visual search performance: white/yellow, white/blue, black-red, and black/ yellow color combinations for the figure/icon background had shorter correct response times compared to yellow/blue, red/green, yellow/green, and blue/red. However, no effects were found for the line width of the icon border or the icon shape on the error rate. Results have implications for graphics-based design of interfaces, such as for mobile phones, Web sites, and PDAs, as well as complex industrial processes.     

Context-dependent brightness priming occurs without visual awareness

Our visual systems account for stimulus context in brightness perception, but whether such adjustments occur for stimuli that we are unaware of has not been established. We therefore assessed whether stimulus context influences brightness processing by measuring unconscious priming with metacontrast masking. When a middle-gray disk was presented on a darker (or brighter) background, such that it could be consciously perceived as brighter (or darker) via simultaneous brightness contrast (SBC), reaction times were significantly faster to a bright (or dark) annulus than to a dark (or bright) annulus. We further show that context-dependent brightness priming does not correlate with visibility using an objective measure of awareness (Experiment 1) and that context-dependent, but not context-independent brightness priming, occurs equally strongly for stimuli below or above the subjective threshold for awareness (Experiment 2). These results suggest that SBC occurs at early levels of visual input and is not influenced by conscious perception.     

Negative priming with masked distractor-only prime trials: awareness moderates negative priming

The literature yields inconsistent evidence for negative priming (NP) following masked distractor-only prime trials. We contrast two different hypotheses on the inconsistent findings: one - which is most compatible with the temporal discrimination theory - that relates the sign of priming effects to the absence vs. presence of prime awareness and one -which is most compatible with the inhibition and episodic retrieval accounts - that relates the sign of priming effects to the prime event being categorized as a to-be-attended vs. to-be-ignored event. In two experiments, it turned out that participants' awareness of the masked stimuli caused the different results (with participants being not aware of the primes showing NP), whereas the factor prime color = probe target color vs. prime color = probe distractor color (i.e., the prime contains the to-be-attended vs. the to-be-ignored signal) did not moderate NP. These findings are discussed with regard to theories of negative priming and the debate on conscious vs. unconscious perception.     

Partial awareness creates the "illusion" of subliminal semantic priming

We argue that the lack of consensus regarding the existence of subliminal semantic processing arises from not taking into account the fact that linguistic stimuli are represented across several processing levels (features, letters, word form) that can independently reach or not reach awareness. Using masked words, we constructed conditions in which participants were aware of some letters or fragments of a word, while remaining unaware of the whole word. Three experiments using the Stroop priming paradigm show that when the stimulus set is reduced and participants are encouraged to guess the identity of the prime, such partially perceived stimuli can nonetheless give rise to "semantic" processing. We provide evidence that this effect is due to illusory reconstruction of the incompletely perceived stimulus, followed by usual semantic processing of the result. We conclude that previously reported unconscious Stroop priming is in fact a conscious effect, but applied to a perceptual illusion.     

Unconscious vision and executive control: How unconscious processing and conscious action control interact

Research on unconscious or unaware vision has demonstrated that unconscious processing can be flexibly adapted to the current goals of human agents. The present review focuses on one area of research, masked visual priming. This method uses visual stimuli presented in a temporal sequence to lower the visibility of one of these stimuli. In this way, a stimulus can be masked and even rendered invisible. Despite its invisibility, a masked stimulus if used as a prime can influence a variety of executive functions, such as response activation, semantic processing, or attention shifting. There are also limitations on the processing of masked primes. While masked priming research demonstrates the top-down dependent usage of unconscious vision during task-set execution it also highlights that the set-up of a new task-set depends on conscious vision as its input. This basic distinction captures a major qualitative difference between conscious and unconscious vision.