A smile biases the recognition of eye expressions: Configural projection from a salient mouth

A smile is visually highly salient and grabs attention automatically. We investigated how extrafoveally seen smiles influence the viewers' perception of non-happy eyes in a face. A smiling mouth appeared in composite faces with incongruent non-happy (fearful, neutral, etc.) eyes, thus producing blended expressions, or it appeared in intact faces with genuine expressions. Attention to the eye region was spatially cued while foveal vision of the mouth was blocked by gaze-contingent masking. Participants judged whether the eyes were happy or not. Results indicated that the smile biased the evaluation of the eye expression: The same non-happy eyes were more likely to be judged as happy and categorized more slowly as not happy in a face with a smiling mouth than in a face with a non-smiling mouth or with no mouth. This bias occurred when the mouth and the eyes appeared simultaneously and aligned, but also to some extent when they were misaligned and when the mouth appeared after the eyes. We conclude that the highly salient smile projects to other facial regions, thus influencing the perception of the eye expression. Projection serves spatial and temporal integration of face parts and changes.     

Exploration of older drivers’ speeding behaviour

Speeding increases crash risk and resulting injury severity. Older drivers are at increased risk of injury due to frailty, at increased risk of crashing due to slower reaction times, and have less agility judging time and distance compared to younger drivers. However, there is little objective evidence about older drivers’ speeding behaviour. Cross-sectional data from older drivers living in the suburban outskirts of Sydney, Australia, were used to determine the proportion of drivers involved in speed events, and examine factors that may influence this behaviour. Driving speed was estimated in approximately one-second intervals using Global Positioning System (GPS) location. Speed events were defined as driving 1 km/h or more, with 3% tolerance, above a single speed limit, averaged over 30-s of travel. Driving data from one-week were recorded for 344 participants aged 75–94 years (median 80). The majority of participants (78%) were involved in a speed event. Speed events per participant ranged from zero to 186 (median 8). Younger participants, those living in rural areas, and those driving on familiar roads closer to home were more likely to be involved in speed events adjusted for distance driven. In addition, rural residents were more likely to be involved in speed events when they had not been a driver involved in a crash during the previous year compared to those involved in a crash. Measures of visual and cognitive function did not predict involvement with speed events per distance (p > 0.2). These findings are important for policy-makers and researchers addressing older drivers’ speeding to reduce the incidence of crashes and resulting fatalities and injuries. As no evidence was found for speeding being associated with functional decline, countermeasures to address speeding for other drivers seem likely to be relevant to older drivers.     

Estimating the probability of negative events

How well we are attuned to the statistics of our environment is a fundamental question in understanding human behaviour. It seems particularly important to be able to provide accurate assessments of the probability with which negative events occur so as to guide rational choice of preventative actions. One question that arises here is whether or not our probability estimates for negative events are systematically biased by their severity. In a minimal experimental context involving an unambiguous, objective representation of probability, we found that participants judged a controllable event as more likely to occur when its utility was extremely negative than when it was more neutral. A decision-theoretic explanation based on loss function asymmetries is advanced which supports the claim that probability estimates are not intrinsically biased by utilities.     

Performance and ease influence perceived speed

According to the action-specific perception account, perception is a function of optical information and the perceiver's ability to perform the intended action. While most of the evidence for the action-specific perception account is on spatial perception, in the current experiments we examined similar effects in the perception of speed. Tennis players reproduced the time the ball traveled from the feeder machine to when they hit it. The players judged the ball to be moving faster on trials when they hit the ball out-of-bounds than on trials where they successfully hit the ball in-bounds. Follow-up experiments in the laboratory showed that participants judged virtual balls to be moving slower when they played with a bigger paddle in a modified version of Pong. These studies suggest that performance and task ease influence perceived speed.     

The role of Afrocentric features in person perception: judging by features and categories

Four studies were conducted to test the hypothesis that group-related physical features may directly activate related stereotypes, leading to more stereotypic inferences over and above those resulting from categorization. As predicted, targets with more Afrocentric features were judged as more likely to have traits stereotypic of African Americans. This effect was found with judgments of African Americans and of European Americans. Furthermore, the effect was not eliminated when a more sensitive measure of categorization processes (category accessibility) was used or when the judgement context made category distinctions salient. Of additional interest was the finding that category accessibility independently affected judgment, such that targets who could be more quickly categorized as group members were judged more stereotypically.     

The role of fear and expectancies in capture of covert attention by spiders

Fear-related stimuli are often prioritized during visual selection but it remains unclear whether capture by salient objects is more likely to occur when individuals fear those objects. In this study, participants with high and low fear of spiders searched for a circle while on some trials a completely irrelevant fear-related (spider) or neutral distractor (butterfly/leaf) was presented simultaneously in the display. Our results show that when you fear spiders and you are not sure whether a spider is going to be present, then any salient distractor (i.e., a butterfly) grabs your attention, suggesting that mere expectation of a spider triggered compulsory monitoring of all irrelevant stimuli. However, neutral stimuli did not grab attention when high spider fearful people knew that a spider could not be present during a block of trials, treating the neutral stimuli just as the low spider fearful people do. Our results show that people that fear spiders inspect potential spider-containing locations in a compulsory fashion even though directing attention to this location is completely irrelevant for the task. Reduction of capture can only be accomplished when people that fear spiders do not expect a spider to be present.     

Action-specific effects in a social context: others' abilities influence perceived speed

According to the action-specific account of perception, perceivers see the environment relative to their ability to perform the intended action. For example, in a modified version of the computer game Pong, balls that were easier to block looked to be moving slower than balls that were more difficult to block (Witt & Sugovic, 2010). It is unknown, however, if perception can be influenced by another person's abilities. In the current experiment, we examined whether another person's ability to block a ball influenced the observer's perception of ball speed. Participants played and observed others play the modified version of Pong where the task was to successfully block the ball with paddles that varied in size, and both the actor and observer estimated the speed of the ball. The results showed that both judged the ball to be moving faster when it was harder to block. However, the same effect of difficulty on speed estimates was not found when observers watched a computer play, suggesting the effect is specific to people and not to the task. These studies suggest that the environment can be perceived relative to another person's abilities.     

The vigilant parent: Parental role salience affects parents' risk perceptions, risk-aversion, and trust in strangers

Since parenting involves protecting children from various risks and dangers, tendencies towards increased risk perception, risk-averse decision-making, and distrust of strangers may come to be associated with the parental role. Consequently, parents may be more likely to exhibit each of these psychological tendencies when their parental role is situationally salient than when it is not salient. We tested this hypothesis in two studies that manipulated the salience of the parental role in samples of parents and nonparents and measured the effects on participants' risk perceptions, risk-aversion, and trust in strangers. As we hypothesized, parents perceived greater risk (Study 1), made more risk averse choices (Study 1), and trusted strangers less (Study 2) when their parental role was salient than when it was not salient. Implications for understanding psychological adaptations to social roles are discussed.     

Item-specific congruency effects in nonverbal auditory Stroop

In the current study, participants judged as 'low' or 'high' either the location or the frequency of a single tone presented in one of two locations at one of two frequencies. The classification associated with the irrelevant feature could be either congruent or incongruent with the required response. The results of Experiment 1 revealed that responses were made more slowly on incongruent than on congruent trials, regardless of whether participants judged sounds according to their location or their pitch. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the probability that the classification associated with the irrelevant acoustic feature was consistent with the classification associated with the task-relevant dimension. In this experiment responses were made more quickly on congruent trials when the response associated with the irrelevant feature was likely to be consistent with the required response, and on incongruent trials when the response associated with the irrelevant feature was likely to be inconsistent with the required response.     

Discrepancy detection and vulnerability to misleading postevent information

When people are exposed to misleading details after a witnessed event, they often claim that they saw the misleading details as part of the event. We refer to this as themisinformation effect. In four experiments, involving 570 subjects, we explored the role that discrepancy detection plays in the misinformation effect. Experiment 1 showed that subjects who naturally read a post-event narrative more slowly were more resistant to the effects of misleading information contained in the narrative. In Experiment 2, subjects who naturally read more slowly were more likely to detect a discrepancy between what they were reading and what was stored in their memory. In Experiment 3, subjects who were instructed to read slowly were more likely to detect a discrepancy than were those who were instructed to read quickly. In Experiment 4, subjects who were instructed to read slowly were more resistant to misleading postevent information. Taken together, these results suggest that longer reading times are associated with a greater scrutiny of postevent information. This leads to an increased likelihood that discrepancies will be detected and that the misinformation will be resisted.     

Correlation versus causation in multisensory perception

Events are often perceived in multiple modalities. The co-occurring proximal visual and auditory stimuli events are mostly also causally linked to the distal event, which makes it difficult to evaluate whether learned correlation or perceived causation guides binding in multisensory perception. Piano tones are an interesting exception: They are associated with the act of the pianist striking keys, an event that is visible to the perceiver, but directly results from hammers hitting strings, an event that typically is not visible to the perceiver. We examined the influence of seeing the hammer or the keystroke on auditory temporal order judgments (TOJs). Participants judged the temporal order of a dog bark and a piano tone, while seeing the piano stroke shifted temporally relative to its audio signal. Visual lead increased “piano-first” responses in auditory TOJ, but more so if the associated keystroke was visible than if the sound-producing hammer was visible, even though both were equally visually salient. This provides evidence for a learning account of audiovisual perception.     

Another look at why people are reluctant to exchange lottery tickets

People are reluctant to exchange lottery tickets, a result that previous investigators have attributed to anticipated regret. The authors suggest that people's subjective likelihood judgments also make them disinclined to switch. Four studies examined likelihood judgments with respect to exchanged and retained lottery tickets and found that (a) exchanged tickets are judged more likely to win a lottery than are retained tickets and (b) exchanged tickets are judged more likely to win the more aversive it would be if the ticket did win. The authors provide evidence that this effect occurs because the act of imagining an exchanged ticket winning the lottery increases the belief that such an event is likely to occur.     

The quality of false memory over time: Is memory for misinformation “remembered” or “known”?

The conscious quality of eyewitness memory for misinformation after different retention intervals was investigated in two experiments. Participants viewed computer-projected slides depicting a crime (encoding phase), read a narrative containing misinformation, and took a recall test about the original event. Remember/know judgments were made for each response. A "remember" judgment indicated that the participant vividly recalled seeing a detail in the encoding phase. A "know" judgment indicated that the participant believed that a detail was presented but did not vividly remember it. Generally, misinformation was more likely to be associated with a know judgment than with a remember judgment after a short retention interval. This outcome suggests that, in many cases, misleading information is judged as having a different subjective quality than memory for actual events. However, over a relatively long retention interval, misinformation that simply added new information about the event was more often judged as remembered.     

Moving the Arm at Different Rates: Slow Movements are Avoided

Qualitative and quantitative changes characterize locomotion and rhythmic interlimb coordination at different speeds. Legs and hands do not move more or less quickly; they also adopt different relative coordination patterns. In the present article, the authors asked whether similar transitions occur for unimanual hand movements when speed is slowed below the preferred speed. Participants moved a handheld dowel back and forth between 2 large circular targets in time with a metronome at periods between 370 ms and 1667 ms. The authors analyzed the kinematics of participants’ movements at each period and found that proportional dwell time and number of peaks in the velocity profile increased as driving periods increased. Path lengths and peak velocities remained relatively constant for driving periods exceeding 800 ms. Participants made only gradual changes to their movement parameters, so that they went from a continuous mode to a more discrete mode of behavior for longer driving periods. Thus, unlike for rhythmic bimanual movements or locomotory patterns, there are quantitative but no clear qualitative changes for unimanual movements. The results suggest that participants tried to move close to their preferred tempo at different rates, and that they avoided moving slowly.     

Revelation effects in remembering,forecasting, and perspective taking

The revelation effect is a robust phenomenon in episodic memory whereby stimuli that immediately follow a simple cognitive task are more likely to garner positive responses on a variety of memory tests, including autobiographical memory judgments. Six experiments investigated the revelation effect for judgments of past and future events as well as judgments made from others’ perspectives. The purpose of this work was to determine whether these subjectively distinct judgments are subject to the same decision-making biases, as might be expected if they are governed by similar processes (e.g., Schacter, Addis, & Buckner 2007). College-aged participants were asked to rate a variety of life events according to whether the events had occurred during their childhoods or would occur during the next 10 years. Events that followed an anagram task were judged as more likely to have happened in the past and more likely to occur in the future. We also showed a revelation effect when participants were asked to adopt the perspective of others when making judgments about past and future events. When the task was reworded to be non-episodic (participants judged how common the events were during childhood and adulthood), no revelation effect was found for either past or future time frames, which suggests common boundary conditions for both types of judgments. The results are consistent with studies showing strong parallels between remembering and other forms of self-projection but not with semantic memory judgments.     

The elusive wishful thinking effect

Abstract

We define a desirability effect as the inflation of the judged probability of desirable events or the diminution of the judged probability of undersirable events. A series of studies of this effect are reported. In the first four experiments, subjects were presented with visual stimuli (a grid matrix in two colours, or a jar containing beads in two colours), and asked to estimate the probability of drawing at random one of the colours), and asked to estimate the probability of drawing at random one of the colours. The estimated probabilities for a defined draw were not higher when the draw entailed a gain than when it entailed a loss. In the fifth and sixth experiments, subjects read short stories each describing two contestants competing for some desirable outcome (e.g. parents fighting for child custody, or firms bidding for a contract). Some judged the probability that A would win, others judged the Desirability that A would win. Story elements that enhanced a contestant's desirability did not cause the favoured contestant to be judged more likely to win. Only when a contestant's desirability was enhanced by promising the subject of payoff contingent on that contestant's victory was there some slight evidence for a desirability effect: contestants were judged more likely to win when the subject expected a monetary prize if they won than when the subject expected a prize if the other contestant won. In the last experiment, subjects estimated the probability of an over-20-point weekly change in the Dow Jones average, and were promised prizes contingent on such a change either occurring, or failing to occur. They were also given a monetary incentive for accuracy. Subjects who desired a small change. We conclude that desirability effects, when they exist, operate by biasing the evidence brought to mind regarding the event in question, but when a given body of evidence is considered, its judged probability is not influenced by desirability considerations.     

How context-independent is the outgroup homogeneity effect? A response to Bartsch and Judd

Bartsch and Judd (1993) argue that outgroup homogeneity effects occur independently of any tendency for members of minority groups to see their ingroup as more homogeneous than the majority outgroup. This argument is based on evidence of an underlying outgroup homogeneity effect in a study which purports to unconfound the roles of judged group size and ingroup–outgroup judgement by presenting subjects first with a small or large ingroup (or outgroup) and then a small comparison outgroup (or ingroup). However, from the perspective of self-categorization theory (SCT), such a procedure actually introduces a confound as SCT predicts that when an ingroup is judged first it should be perceived as relatively heterogeneous due to the intragroup nature of this judgemental context. Close examination of Bartsch and Judd's data bears this point out: the tendency to see the ingroup as less homogeneous than the outgroup when the ingroup was judged first was extinguished when the ingroup was judged second even when the judged groups were of equal size. Consistent with SCT, this re-analysis suggests that manifestations of outgroup homogeneity are not independent of contextual factors which determine the relative appropriateness of category-based perception of ingroup and outgroup.     

When causality shapes the experience of time: Evidence for temporal binding in young children

It is well established that the temporal proximity of two events is a fundamental cue to causality. Recent research with adults has shown that this relation is bidirectional: events that are believed to be causally related are perceived as occurring closer together in time—the so‐called temporal binding effect. Here, we examined the developmental origins of temporal binding. Participants predicted when an event that was either caused by a button press, or preceded by a non‐causal signal, would occur. We demonstrate for the first time that children as young as 4 years are susceptible to temporal binding. Binding occurred both when the button press was executed via intentional action, and when a machine caused it. These results suggest binding is a fundamental, early developing property of perception and grounded in causal knowledge. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQC_MqjxZQQ