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1.
The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments.
Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons.
We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of
moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative
mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions.
We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.
相似文献
Jeanette KennettEmail: |
2.
Tomasini F 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2007,28(6):497-507
This article critically evaluates bettering human life. Because this involves lives that do not exist yet, the article investigates
human eugenics and enhancement through the social prism of ‘the imaginary’ (defined ‘as a set of assumptions and concepts
for thinking and speaking about human enhancement and its future direction’) [1]. “Exploring basic assumptions underlying the idea of human enhancement” investigates underlying assumptions and claims for
human enhancement. Firstly, human eugenics and enhancement entangles a factual as well as a normative claim about what improvement/betterment
maybe constitutive of. Secondly, claims about what a better life is, is often a future orientated claim about whether certain
kinds of life that do not exist yet should ever exist. Moral images of thought are introduced and how they work to make normative judgments about lives that do not
exist. This implicates the moral problem of difference, where an image of a ‘better’ life—classically expressed in eugenics
as a ‘superior’ and/or ‘normal’ life—necessarily entails inferiority and/or deviance from a norm. “Moral imagination in contemporary fiction and the history of old eugenics”,
introduces moral images in history of eugenics and demonstrates how examples fall foul of the problem. “The new (liberal)
eugenics and the moral image of therapy” examines progress in contemporary debates, the move from authoritarian to non-authoritarian
eugenics (human enhancement), and how, to some extent, this has solved the problem of difference, through liberal defence
of personal choice. “The heart of the eugenic issue” suggests that personal choice in liberal non-authoritarian eugenics is
not immune to basic drive behind all eugenic arguments; desire as lack which is expressed as the continual dissatisfaction
of not having our future expectations met.
相似文献
Floris TomasiniEmail: |
3.
Liezl van Zyl 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):91-104
In this paper I argue that the disagreement between modern moral philosophers and (some) virtue ethicists about whether motive
affects rightness is a result of conceptual disagreement, and that when they develop a theory of ‘right action,’ the two parties
respond to two very different questions. Whereas virtue ethicists tend to use ‘right’ as interchangeable with ‘good’ or ‘virtuous’
and as implying moral praise, modern moral philosophers use it as roughly equivalent to ‘in accordance with moral obligation.’
One implication of this is that the possibility of an act being right by accident does not pose a problem for consequentialism
or deontology. A further implication is that it reveals a shortcoming in virtue ethics, namely that it does not—yet needs
to—present an account of moral obligation.
相似文献
Liezl van ZylEmail: |
4.
Elise Springer 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(4):407-423
Social psychologists have evidence that evaluative feedback on others’ choices sometimes has unwelcome negative effects on
hearers’ motivation. Holroyd’s article (Holroyd J. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 10:267–278, 2007) draws attention to one such
result, the undermining effect, that should help to challenge moral philosophers’ complacency about blame and praise. The
cause for concern is actually greater than she indicates, both because there are multiple kinds of negative effect on hearer
motivation, and because these are not, as she hopes, reliably counteracted by implicit features of praise and blame. The communicative
ideal that she articulates does point us in the right direction, but it requires further elaboration. Once it is spelled out,
we find that realizing this ideal, in light of the empirical research, requires rethinking the role of verdict-like judgments
within moral feedback.
相似文献
Elise SpringerEmail: |
5.
Richard Garner 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):499-513
Moral anti-realism comes in two forms – noncognitivism and the error theory. The noncognitivist says that when we make moral
judgments we aren’t even trying to state moral facts. The error theorist says that when we make moral judgments we are making
statements about what is objectively good, bad, right, or wrong but, since there are no moral facts, our moral judgments are
uniformly false. This development of moral anti-realism was first seriously defended by John Mackie. In this paper I explore
a dispute among moral error theorists about how to deal with false moral judgments. The advice of the moral abolitionist is
to stop making moral judgments, but the contrary advice of the moral fictionalist is to retain moral language and moral thinking.
After clarifying the choice that arises for the moral error theorist, I argue that moral abolitionism has much to recommend
it. I discuss Mackie’s defense of moral fictionalism as well as a recent version of the same position offered by Daniel Nolan,
Greg Restall, and Caroline West. Then I second some remarks Ian Hinckfuss made in his defense of moral abolitionism and his
criticism of “the moral society.” One of the worst things about moral fictionalism is that it undermines our epistemology
by promoting a culture of deception. To deal with this problem Richard Joyce offers a “non-assertive” version of moral fictionalism
as perhaps the last option for an error theorist who hopes to avoid moral abolitionism. I discuss some of the problems facing
that form of moral fictionalism, offer some further reasons for adopting moral abolitionism in our personal lives, and conclude
with reasons for thinking that abolishing morality may be an essential step in achieving the goals well-meaning moralists
and moral fictionalists have always cherished.
相似文献
Richard GarnerEmail: |
6.
Patricia Sheridan 《Sophia》2007,46(3):263-275
Hutcheson’s theory of morality shares far more common ground with Clarke’s morality than is generally acknowledged. In fact,
Hutcheson’s own view of his innovations in moral theory suggest that he understood moral sense theory more as an elaboration
and partial correction to Clarkean fitness theory than as an outright rejection of it. My aim in this paper will be to illuminate
what I take to be Hutcheson’s grounds for adopting this attitude toward Clarkean fitness theory. In so doing, I hope to bring
to light an otherwise unexpected continuity between moral sense theory and the moral rationalism to which it is usually opposed,
and, in so doing, draw attention to the anti-sceptical realism that lies at the heart of both accounts.
相似文献
Patricia SheridanEmail: |
7.
A Communicative Conception of Moral Appraisal 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Jules Holroyd 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):267-278
I argue that our acts of moral appraisal should be communicative. Praise and blame should communicate, to the appraised, information
about their status and competences as moral agents; that they are recognised by the appraiser as a competent moral agent,
and thus a legitimate candidate for appraisal. I argue for this thesis by drawing on empirical data about factors that can
affect motivation. On the basis of such data, I formulate a constraint, and argue that two prominent models of moral appraisal
– a consequentialist model and Wallace’s ‘evaluative response’ model – violate this constraint. The model that I propose –
the communicative conception of appraisal – does not violate this constraint. This conception, I argue, can provide a fuller
picture of the role of appraisals in deepening agents’ commitment to moral norms. On this model, praise and blame has not
only an evaluative component, but also communicates to the agent competence affirming information.
相似文献
Jules HolroydEmail: |
8.
Rebecca Roman Hanrahan 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):281-306
David Chalmers supports his contention that there is a possible world populated by our zombie twins by arguing for the assumption
that conceivability entails possibility. But, I argue, the modal epistemology he sets forth, ‘modal rationalism,’ ignores
the problem of incompleteness and relies on an idealized notion of conceivability. As a consequence, this epistemology can’t
justify our quotidian judgments of possibility, let alone those judgments that concern the mind/body connection. Working from
the analogy that the imagination is to the possible as perception is to the actual, I set forth a competing epistemology,
‘modal empiricism.’ This epistemology survives the incompleteness objection and allows some of our everyday modal judgments
to be justified. But this epistemology can’t justify the claim that Zombie World is possible, which leaves Chalmers’s property
dualism without the support it needs.
相似文献
Rebecca Roman HanrahanEmail: |
9.
Stephen Finlay 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):315-340
This paper advances a reductive semantics for ‘ought’ and a naturalistic theory of normativity. It gives a unified analysis
of predictive, instrumental, and categorical uses of ‘ought’: the predictive ‘ought’ is basic, and is interpreted in terms
of probability. Instrumental ‘oughts’ are analyzed as predictive ‘oughts’ occurring under an ‘in order that’ modifer (the
end-relational theory). The theory is then extended to categorical uses of ‘ought’: it is argued that they are special rhetorical
uses of the instrumental ‘ought’. Plausible conversational principles explain how this end-relational ‘ought’ can perform
the expressive functions of the moral ‘ought’. The notion of an ‘ought-simpliciter’ is also discussed.
相似文献
Stephen FinlayEmail: |
10.
According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational (the realists go that bit right) but its metaphysical presuppositions
are wildly implausible (the non-cognitivists got that bit right). This is the basis of Mackie’s now famous error theory: that
moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive
moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that
Mackie’s approach can be vindicated by a fictionalist account of moral discourse. And Mark Kalderon has argued that moral
fictionalism is attractive quite independently of Mackie’s error-theory. Kalderon argues that the Frege–Geach problem shows
that we need moral propositions, but that a fictionalist can and should embrace propositional content together with a non-cognitivist
account of acceptance of a moral proposition. Indeed, it is clear that any fictionalist is going to have to postulate more
than one kind of acceptance attitude. We argue that this double-approach to acceptance generates a new problem – a descendent
of Frege–Geach – which we call the acceptance–transfer problem. Although we develop the problem in the context of Kalderon’s
version of non-cognitivist fictionalism, we show that it is not the non-cognitivist aspect of Kalderon’s account that generates
the problem. A closely related problem surfaces for the more typical variants of fictionalism according to which accepting
a moral proposition is believing some closely related non-moral proposition. Fictionalists of both stripes thus have an attitude
problem.
相似文献
Graham OddieEmail: |
11.
Anders Schinkel 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):267-277
Whom I call ‘epistemic reductionists’ in this article are critics of the notion of ‘moral luck’ that maintain that all supposed
cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only
difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue
that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of character from judgements concerning acts,
and they assume a conception of character that is untenable both from a common sense perspective and with a view to findings
from social psychology. I use especially the example of Scobie, the protagonist of Graham Greene’s novel The Heart of the Matter, to show that moral luck is real—that there are cases of moral luck that cannot be reduced to epistemic luck. The reality
of moral luck, in this example at least, lies in its impact on character and personal and moral identity.
相似文献
Anders SchinkelEmail: |
12.
Emotional expressions of moral value 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Julie Tannenbaum 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):43-57
In “Moral Luck” Bernard Williams describes a lorry driver who, through no fault of his own, runs over a child, and feels “agent-regret.”
I believe that the driver’s feeling is moral since the thought associated with this feeling is a negative moral evaluation
of his action. I demonstrate that his action is not morally inadequate with respect his moral obligations. However, I show
that his negative evaluation is nevertheless justified since he acted in way that does not live up to his moral values. I
then use this distinctive negative moral evaluation to distinguish agent-regret from guilt and mere regret.
相似文献
Julie TannenbaumEmail: |
13.
Frances Howard-Snyder 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):1-15
This paper discusses the Principle of Normative Invariance: ‘An action’s moral status does not depend on whether or not it
is performed.’ I show the importance of this principle for arguments regarding actualism and other variations on the person-affecting
restriction, discuss and rebut arguments in favor of the principle, and then discuss five counterexamples to it. I conclude
that the principle as it stands is false; and that if it is modified to avoid the counterexamples, it is gutted of any interest
or power.
相似文献
Frances Howard-SnyderEmail: |
14.
Edmund Wall 《Philosophia》2008,36(2):237-249
15.
M. S. Bedke 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(2):189-209
Consider orthodox motivational judgment internalism: necessarily, A’s sincere moral judgment that he or she ought to φ motivates
A to φ. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who renders moral judgments without any
corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations between moral judgment and
motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show
that certain community-wide motivational failures are not conceptually possible. Second, I introduce a theory of moral motivation
that supplements the intuitive responses to different amoralist cases. According to moral judgment purposivism (MJP), in rough
approximation, a purpose of moral judgments is to motivate corresponding behaviors such that a mental state without this purpose
is not a moral judgment. MJP is consistent with conceptual desiderata, provides an illuminating analysis of amoralist cases,
and offers a step forward in the internalist-externalist debates.
相似文献
M. S. BedkeEmail: |
16.
Angela M. Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):367-392
Recently, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition
of moral responsibility. According to these philosophers, what really matters in determining a person’s responsibility for
some thing is whether that thing can be seen as indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments.
Such accounts might therefore be understood as updated versions of what Susan Wolf has called “real self views,” insofar as
they attempt to ground an agent’s responsibility for her actions and attitudes in the fact (when it is a fact) that they express
who she is as a moral agent. As such, they seem to be open to some of the same objections Wolf originally raised to such accounts,
and in particular to the objection that they cannot license the sorts of robust moral assessments involved in our current
practices of moral responsibility. My aim in this paper is to try to respond to this challenge, by clarifying the kind of
robust moral assessments I take to be licensed by (at least some) non-volitional accounts of responsibility and by explaining
why these assessments do not in general require the agent to have voluntary control over everything for which she is held
responsible. I also argue that the limited applicability of the distinction between “bad agents” and “blameworthy agents”
on these accounts is in fact a mark in their favor.
相似文献
Angela M. SmithEmail: |
17.
We review several instances where cognitive research has identified distinct psychological mechanisms for moral judgment that
yield conflicting answers to moral dilemmas. In each of these cases, the conflict between psychological mechanisms is paralleled
by prominent philosophical debates between different moral theories. A parsimonious account of this data is that key claims
supporting different moral theories ultimately derive from the psychological mechanisms that give rise to moral judgments.
If this view is correct, it has some important implications for the practice of philosophy. We suggest several ways that moral
philosophy and practical reasoning can proceed in the face of discordant theories grounded in diverse psychological mechanisms.
相似文献
Fiery CushmanEmail: |
18.
Michael Cholbi 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(4):323-334
Philosophers have harbored doubts about the possibility of moral expertise since Plato. I argue that irrespective of whether
moral experts exist, identifying who those experts are is insurmountable because of the credentials problem: Moral experts have no need to seek out others’ moral expertise, but moral non-experts lack sufficient knowledge to determine
whether the advice provided by a putative moral expert in response to complex moral situations is correct and hence whether
an individual is a bone fide expert. Traditional accounts of moral expertise require that moral experts give reliably correct
moral advice supported by adequate justification, an account which, I argue, is too lean in allowing for the possibility of
a moral expert who is motivationally indifferent to her own moral judgments and advice. Yet even if the proposition that a
moral expert is an individual who provides reliably correct moral advice supported by adequate justification and is necessarily motivated by that advice exhausts the necessary and sufficient conditions for moral expertise, this proposition
cannot function as an applicable criterion for non-experts to use in appraising would-be experts’ claims to expertise. The
credentials problem thus remains unanswered.
相似文献
Michael CholbiEmail: |
19.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):1-19
The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents
any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could
have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct
Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by constructing
counterexamples to a rule of inference it invokes.
相似文献
Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
20.
Cain Samuel Todd 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(2):187-211
This paper argues that there is no genuine puzzle of ‘imaginative resistance’. In part 1 of the paper I argue that the imaginability
of fictional propositions is relative to a range of different factors including the ‘thickness’ of certain concepts, and certain pre-theoretical and theoretical commitments.
I suggest that those holding realist moral commitments may be more susceptible to resistance and inability than those holding
non-realist commitments, and that it is such realist commitments that ultimately motivate the problem. However, I argue that
the relativity of imaginability is not a particularly puzzling feature of imagination. In part 2, I claim that it is the so-called
‘alethic’ puzzle, concerning fictional truth, which generates a real puzzle about imaginative resistance. However, I argue
that the alethic puzzle itself depends on certain realist assumptions about the nature of fictional truth which are implausible
and should be rejected in favour of an interpretive view of fictional truth. Once this is done, I contend, it becomes evident
that the supposed problem of imaginative resistance as it has hitherto been discussed in the literature is not puzzling at
all.
相似文献
Cain Samuel ToddEmail: |